The life of mir jumla : the general of Aurangzeb

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THE LIFE OF

M i R J U ML A

- '7^ |P$p

THE GENERAL OF AURANGZEB

Jagadish Narayan Sarkar

M.A. (Pat.). Ph D. (Cal.)
Assistant Professor of History
Patna College, Patna

■' '

With a Foreword
by

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt.
I>. Litt., Hony. m.r.a.s.

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THACKER, SPINK & CO. f 1933 ) LTD.
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1951

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FOREWORD

The author is to be congratulated on a Irsfc-rate contri¬
bution xp Indo-Musjim History. By patient and deep research
extending over seven years, he has produced a book which will
stand as the authoritative life of Mir Jam la and a worthy
supplement, t— in some points a corrective also—to my volu*
minouB flutory af Aurangzib, It would, indeed, be wrong to
consider this book as superfluon^after that work of mine. Tb©
two books have, no doubt, a certain period in common, namely
the years 1647-1633 ; but this Mir Jumfa does not merely
repeat the earlier History of Aumngzib.

The present author has used the microscope where I had
to apply the telescope ; and, in addition, he has dealt with
many things not at all touched in my work on Aurangsdb.
Hence, this hook has an independent value of its own. To
take a few illustrations, there is nothing in my Aurangzifi,
exoept a dozen of.p^ges, relating to the subject- matter of the
first eighty pages of this hook. And I have said nothing
whatever about Mir Jumla's administrative arrangements,
commercial activities, and dealings with the European traders,
to which the present biography has devoted many erudite and
very informative pages. Again, Mir Junda's campaign against
Shuja in Bihar and Bengal is here painted on a wider canvas
with much fuller anyditu.de of detail than I judged to be
proper in my general history of Aurangzib's entire reign.

Mahmud Gawan, Malik Ambar, and Mir Jumla were the
three noblest gifts of Persia to India, (if I may be permitted to
comprehend the entire Shia world in the term Persia). On tb©
Indian stage these supermen found the fullest opportunity for
displaying their extraordinary genius for war aud diplomacy,
civil government and business management. Of these '‘kings
of men”, the first two were happier than Mir Jumla in this
that they were practically masters iri their respective Jdnigdoms,
though nominally holding the office of ministers. Mir Jumla
never enjoyed such supreme power jn the state ; he was always
a servant, subordinate to a higher authority. Moreover, his
achievements were cast into the shade by the superior splendour
and far wider range of the feats of Aurangzib, his contojnporary

( ri )

^ »*gand co-worker in the same regions. The truly memorable
achievements of Mir Jumla, so carefully elaborated in tins
volume, were compressed into seventeen years only, 1646-1662.
But if a man's character is best judged by the force of the

obstacles he has wrestled with and the manner in which he has

faced unforeseen difficulties and misfortunes, then Mir JttmJa
stands out as the greatest among these three foreign immigrants
in India.

Mir Jumla was also more fortunate than these twc in the
extent and value of the surviving historical records about
him. His biographer has been able to draw upon the day to
day accounts of the European merchants who had dealings
with him, the detailed histories of his career in the Golkonda
and Mughal services written by the Persian historiographers
of the Deccan Sultans and the Delhi Emperors and many
contemporary letters ; and above all the long masterly diary
of his Knob and Assam expeditions written by Shihab-ud-din
Muhammad Talish, a writer nowise inferior to Akbar’s famous
chronicler Abul FazL The factory records of the English
and Dutch East India Companies give accurate dates and
details about his movements arid the economic development
of the country, such as we donot find in the case of any other
mediaeval Indian hero.

All this wealth of information has been utilised in the present
biography. The author has mostly worked in my library,,
using Persian manuscripts not to be found elsewhere in India.
In its critical and exhaustive synthesis of all the available
materials, this life of Mir Jumla leaves nothing to be desired.
I do not know any other research work in Mediaeval Indian
History which shows even half the meticulous care of
Dr Jagadish Narayan Sarkar in tracing every place-name,
however obscure, with the help of district Gazetteers and
the quarter-inch Survey of India maps,

Mir Jumla was one of the greatest characters of mediaeval
India, and now at last a biography truly worthy of him has
been produced.

June 6, 1951

JADUNATH SARKAR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

List Or Abbreviations

Chapter I

Early Lire Of Mir Jumla : Persia To Golkonda

xm-xxn

xxiii-xxvi

1-11

1. Mir Jiimla lea ves Persia., 1.

2. Mir Jumla enters Golkonda service, 3.

3. Mir Jumla as the Wafcir of Golkonda, 6.

4. Quib Shah’s journey to Masulipatam, 8.

f>. Influence of Mir Jumla in the Golkonda State, 10.

Chapter II

Mir Jumla In The Karnatak

12—61

Section A* Role of Mir Jumla in the Muhammadan

conquest of the Karnatak 12—33

1. The Karnatak country and previous
Muhammadan penetration into it, 12.

2. Deputation of Mir Jumla to the Karnatak, 14.

3. Jinji, 17,

4. Gandikota, 23.

5. War over the Partition of the Karnatak, 26.

Section B. Mir Jumla s Administration in the Karnatak 34-49

1. Mir Jumi&’s virtual supremacy over the Karnatak
conquests, 34.

2. Mir Jumla’s civil administration, 35.

3. Military organisation, 41,

4. Mir Jumla’s overseas commercial activities, 44.

5. Religious effects of Mir Jumla’s conquest
of the Karnatak, 48.

6. Strong position of Mir Jumla, 49.

Section C, Relation with the European Companies (till 1655) 50-61

1. Mir Jurhla'a diplomatic use of his own position, 50,

2. Financial Relations with tho English, 52.

3. Friction between Mir Jumla and the English, 53.

4. The Company's efforts to improve their position, 54,

MINIS^

[ Till ]

Effects of the conquest of the Karnatak on Mir Jumla's
relations with the Europeans, 55.

Missions of .the- European Companies to Mir Jumla, 56
7. Relations with the Portuguese, 60.

<§L

Chapter III

The Rebellion Of Mir Jumla 62-80

1. Causes of friction between Q.utb Shah and Mir Jumla, 62
11 Mir Jumla’s diplomatic intrigues, 64.

3 Mission of'Muhammad Mumin, 69,

4 Mir Jumla- a intrigues with Ikhlas Khan, Shahji Bhcnsla
and the Ray ai, 72.

5. Planning of Aurangz.ob’s Qolkonda campaign, 74.

6. Release of Mir Jumla’s son and property, 77.

7. Arrival of Mir Jumla in Aurangzeb’s camp, 70.

Chapter IV

Mir Jumla As Mughal Wazir * 81-146

Section A, The Wazir as an agent of Aurangzeb 81-91

1 Mir Junta’s journey to Delhi and appointment. 81.

2. Administration of Revenue and financial matters, 84.

3. Mir Jumla’s patronage, 87.

4. Mir Jumla, the invaluable a’ly of Aurangzeb, 87,

5. Wazir Mir J umla pitted against Crown Prince Dara. 88.

6. The Wazir as arbiter between the Emperor and the
Deccan Viceroy, 89

7. .Discard between Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb, 01.

Section B. Fate of Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions 92-111

1. The Karnatak conferred on Mir Jumla as jagir under
the Mughal Empire, 92.

2. Reaction on the Deccani Powers. 04.

3. Attitude of Mir Jumla with regard to the new
arrangement, 97.

4. Aurangzeb tries to remove Mir Jumla’s suspicions, 98.

5. Aurangzeb’s measures for defending Mir Jumla’s
Karnatak dominions. 99!

6. Mir Juml&’s suspicions unjustified, 102.

77, Scheme of a second f^rOlkonda campaign rejected by
Mir Jumla. 193

Section C.

Section D

Section E.

9 .

t ** 1

The Karnatak during Awangzeb’s Bijapur campa?
1657-58, 10*.

The Ramatak during the War of Succession and
after, 109.

The Bijapur Campaign of 1657-58 112-122

1. Initiative in launching the Bijapur expedition taken by
Mir Juimla, M2.

2. The tusks before Mir Jumla, 113.

3. The Bijapuri officers and army seduced by Mir Jwnla
and Aurang'«eb, M5.

4. Mir Jumla starts for the Deccan, 117.

5 Aurangzeb decides to march against Bijapur, 119.

6 Bole of Mir Jumla in the Bijapur campaign, 120.

Mir Jumla hurled /rnm office 123-140

!. Mir Jwnla removed from the Wizarat, 123.

2 Mir Jumla sent to Parenda. 124.

3. Mir Jumla as the guide of Aurangzeb, 126.

4. Failure of Mir Inrala to secure delivery of Parenda, 128.

5. Mir Jumla to wind up the Parenda affair and conciliate
the Bijapuris. 130.

6. Mir Jumla’ s retreat from Parenda, 132.

7 Mix Jumla recalled to the Court, 134.

8. Mir Jumla arrested by Aiiratigzeb, 134.

9. Mir Jumla** part in the episode 135.

10. Mir Jumla released by Aurangzeb, 138.

Mir Jumla!s relations with the European#

(c. 1655-'58). 141-146

1. Effect of Mir Jumla’s appointment as Wazir, 141.

2. Alleged complaints of oppression on the Fort St George
factors by Mir- Jvimla’s officers, 142.

3. Retaliation of the English factors, 142.

4 Counter-measures of Vir Jumla’s Governors 143.

5. Attitude of the Dutch and the English, 144.

6. Fresh troubles in 1657 after Mir Junda’s dismissal from
the Wizarat, 145.

Chapter V

The Wap Op Succession

'"Section A. The Battle of Khajwa

h Mir AuronRiseb n,t Kora. 147.

2. Mir Jiirttli* ftt.-lilittjwa, 148.

147-207

147-150

MIN/Sr/Jy

Section C.

Section D.

[ * i V!

The War in Bihar 151 -15 9

1. Mir Jumla starts in pursuit of Shuja, 151.

2. Khajwa— Patna, 152.

3. Patna-Mon gbyr, 153.

4. Monghyr - Garhi, 154.

5. Mir JumlaV turning movement near Garhi, 155*

8. The Rajputs desert Mir Jumla, 157.

7. Mir Jumla occupies Rajmahal, *l>8.

The War on the Ganges 160-172

1. Mir Jumla’s difficulties in the new theatre of war, 160.

2. Mir Jumla’s first naval coup at Dogachi, 182.

3. Mir Jumla’s naval enterprises at Suti, 163.

4. Mir Jumla’s signal failure on 3rd May, 1659, 166.

5. Mir Jumlft’s preparations for a fresh offensive, 168

6. Plight of Muhammad Sultan to Shuja, 170.

The War moves west oj the Ganges 173-180

1. Mir Jurnla’s increased difficulties, 173.

2. Shuja recovers Rajmahal, 174.

3. Battle near Belghataani Giria, 177.

4. Baud Khan’s advance from Patna towards Malda, 180.

5. Mir Jumla chases Shuja out to the eastern bank of the
Ganges, 185.

Section E- The War East of the Ganges 190-201

1. Preparations for crossing the Ganges, 190.

2. Mir Jumla at Samdah. 191.

3. The return of Prince Muhammad Sultan, 195.

4. Mir Jumla’s advance on Tanda. 196.

5. Tanda - Dacca, 199.

Section F. Mir Jumla s relations with the Europeans

(1668-’60) 202-207

1. The junk episode still unsolved, 202,

2. Deputation of Mir Jumla as General to Bihar and*
Bengal, 203.

3. Mir Jumla’s reprisals against the English, 205.

Chapter VI

Mir Jumla As Governor Of Bengal 208-222

1. Mir Jumla appointed Governor of Bengal, 208.

2. Mir Jumla’s administration in Bengal, 210.

[■**■] ^

3. Mir Jumla’s commercial and economic activities
Bengal, 216.

4. MirJumla’srelations with the Europeans (c.T680*’63).

218.

5. Effects of Mir Jutnla’s death, 220.

Chapter VII

Invasion Of Kuch Bihak And Assam

223-28$

Section A. The Prelude to the Assam Campaign—

The Conquest of Kuch Bihar 223-230

1. Genesis of Mir Jumla’s eastern campaigns, 223.

2 Mir Jumla’s war preparations, 225.

3. Mir Jumla conquers Kuch Bihar, 227.

4. Mir Jumla’s administration of Kuch Bihar, 228

Section B. Triumphal March into Assam 231-252

{a) Pecovery of Mughal Kamrup 231-235

1. Mir Jumla sets out against the Ahoras, 231,

2 Mir Jumla’s initial difficulties, 232.

3. Mir Jumla’s advance up to Gauhati, 233. .

(b) From Gauhati to Garhgaon 236-244

1. Mir Jumla enters Assam proper, 236.

2. Simiagarh and Samdhara, 236,

3. Mughal naval victory above Kaliabar, 238.

4. Mir Jumla arrives at Lakhau, 241.

5. Capture of Garhgaon, 242

(c) Mir Jumla s Administrative and Military

arrangements in Kamrup and Assam 245-252

1. Establishment of military rule, 245,

2. Mir Jurnla’s spoils of war in Assam, 247.

S. Mir Jumla’s treatment of the People in Assam, 250.

Section C. Mir Jumla 7 s sad plight in Assam, 253-264

1. Beginning of Mir .Jumla’s real troubles, 253.

2. Failure of Mir Jumla’s efforts to restore communications;
with the fleet, 254.

3. Garhgaon isolated, 256.

4. Fight for occupation of Garhgaon, 258.

5. Pestilence and famine in the Mughal camps at
Mathurapur and Garhgaon, 260.

6. The Mughal navy in Assam, 262.

Section E.

Mir

1* Mir Jumia breaks the isolation of Garhgaon, 205,

2. Mir Jumla’s march to Tipnm, 266.

3. Conclusion of Peace, 208.

Mir Jumia 8 retreat from Assam and Death 272-283

1. Aggravation of the General’s illness and his death, 272.

2. Administrative and military problems during Mir
Jumla’s retreat, 274,

3. Significance of Mir Jumla’s Assam campaign and causes

of his success against the Ahoms, 278.

Chapter VIII

Character A into Achie vement 284- 297

1. Mir Jumia as a man, 284.

2. Mir Jumia as a Statesman, 287.,

3. Mir Jumia as a General, 291.

4. Mir Jumia as a diplomat, 235 .

Appendices

l xii ]

'■'* resumption of offensive

<SL

265-271

Appendix A. Date of the Karnatak Partition Agreement 298
Appendix B. Date of the conquest of Gandikota by

Mir Jumia

299

Appendix C.

Mir Jumla’s family

301

Appendix D.

Arrest of Mir Jumla’s son

302

Appendix E.

Chronology of Mir Jumla’s retreat from
Assam (January-March, 1663) . .

304

Appendix F.

Currency and Weights

305

Bibliography

.. • ... •...

306-328

Index

329-335

INTRODUCTION

From the earliest times India has offered a favourable field
for adventurers and fortune-seekers of different lands. Persians
have come to India as saints, scholars, soldiers, conquerors^
administrators, adventurers and founders of principalities
during successive periods of Indian History from the 0th
century B, (X to the 7th Century A. D„ in the pre-Muslim
ages, and more frequently later on, when Persia became
included in the general movements of Islamic peoples
as a principal co-sharer. During the medieval period Persia
Was admittedly a major centre of Asiatic civilisation,
and she naturally sent many of her sons to India to
play conspicuous roles in Indian History. Such were Mahmud
Gawan, Malik Ambar, Miifca Gkiyas Beg, Itimad ud Daula,
Mir ixt Rustam Safavi, Mir Jumla and many others. In the
Deccan, where there was community of faith and friendship
between its Sultanates and Iran, Persians often rose to the
highest positions in the State. In Hindhsthan, however,
Persians, while finding employment in the army and the civil
government, could not hope easily to rise to the topmost rung
of the ladder. The career of Mir Muhammad Said Mir Jnmia,
who rose to be ttx & Diwan i Kul of the Mughal Empire, is an
exception to this rule.

Mir Muhammad Said Mir Jumla was one of the remark¬
able personalities in the 17th century history of India. The
author of the Qutbnuma-i Alam significantly observes, “ What
he did was written on the page of Time.’* An enterprising,
ambitious and self-made man, he passed through
various vicissitudes of fortune, which enabled him to bestride
the sub-continent of India and influence its history from the
Karnatak to Delhi and from Khandesh to Assam and even to
get a share of the maritime commerce of India. Son of a. Persian
adventurer, migrating to Golkonda as a fortune-seeker, he rose,
by dint of his unrivalled abilities, and through successive stages

WNtSTQy

[ av ]

the post of the keeper of records to that of the Governi
of Masulipatam and finally to the exalted office of Wazir of the
Golkonda State. Deputed by its Sultan to conquer the
Karnatak on his behalf, the Mir practically enjoyed *‘regal
independence” in his conquests, and became in effect the first
Nawah of the Karnatak. Then he transferred his allegiance to
Shahjahan, who appointed him the Diwan i Kill of the Mughal
Empire. For some time, Tinder Aurangzeb, he acted as
Governor of Kbandesh and finally as Viceroy of the important
province of Bengal.

Mir Jumla's active career in India, extending for well-nigh
thirty years, synchronised with the rapid dissolution of the
Vijaypagar Empire. Though it had survived the shock of the
so-called battle of Talikota in 1505, it failed to overcome the
process of disintegration and fast crumbled to pieces in the 17th
century. Torn by repeated wars of succession in which its
nobles and nayaks participated and enfeebled by the growing
weakness of the central government, the rise of the several
Nayaks, chiefly those of Madura, Jinji and Tanjore, the lack
of union due to mutual jealousy and had faith, i he conflict
between the Tamil and Kanarese elements in its population, the
kingdom of Chandragiri could not present a united front to the
Muslim invaders ; and the Raya I, in spite of continued resis¬
tance, found his dominions slipping away from his grasp one
after another. The combination of all these forces rendered
the course of political history extremely complicated, and the
kaleiodoscopic changes in the relations of the Rayal and the
Nayaks niter se and in their system of alliances with one or
another of the invading forces which were determined purely
hy temporary or transient considerations of self-interest, were
further confused by the intervention of the European ti'ading
companies in the troubled affairs of the Deccan.

Mir Jumla undoubtedly was responsible for accelerating the
decline of the Vijaynagar Empire. Barred in their northward
advance by the Mughal partition treaties of May—June, 1030,
the two Deccani Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda could find a
tree outlet for their aggressive instincts only in the southern
and eastern directions across the Krishna and the Tungabhadra

Ml NISTff

[ XV ]

expense of the numerous, petty and warring fragments
■o0/ihe moribund Vijaynagar Empire whioli covered the
Karnatak from the Krishna to Tanjore beyond the Kaveri. Cn
this Muhammadan conquest of the Karnatak Mir Jumla played
a very important role on behalf of his master, Sultan Quib s \.
Shah of Golkonda.

Aurangzeb, the ambitious Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan,
was not the man to remain as an idle spectator of this scramble
for the rich heritage of Vijaynagar. He was waiting for an
opportunity and a pretext to swallow up the Karnatak. These
came with Mir Jutula's rebellion against his first, master. By
inducing the Emperor Shahjahan to offer protection to the
rebel vassal against the revenge of the Sultan of Golkonda,
Aurangzeb paved the way for the absorption, at one stroke, of
Mir Jumla’s Karnatak dominions in the Mughal Empire.

Both Shahjahan and Aurangzeb wanted to utilise Mir
Jumla's unrivalled qualities of military leadership and
unsurpassed knowledge of the Deccan affairs for their' own
imperialistic purposes. The loss of Qandahar to the Persians
in 1649 and the failure of three expeditions to recover it from
them during the next three years had left a rankling sore in
the mind of Emperor Shahjahan. He hoped to retrieve his
own prestige and to tarnish the military fame of Persia then
at its height, by deputing this peerless Persian general to the
task of recovering Qandahar. Mir Jumla might succeed where
Sadullah, Aurangzeb and Dara had failed. But Mir Jumla
diverted the Emperor's attention from the North-West to the
Deccan, and induced him to give up the Qandahar expedition
and to sanction the plan of conquering Bijapur. Mir Jumla’s
counsel was considered worth acceptance, as he was conversant
with the ins and outs of the Deeoam Courts. Thus it was Mir
Jumla who was the principal instigator of the Bijapur
Campaign of 1657-8. Further, as the ally, confidential adviser
ahd General of Aurangzeb during the War of Succession, the Mir
was largely responsible for securing the throne for Aurang74eb.
Again, it was solely clue to Mir Jumla's generalship and through
his conquest of Kuch Bihar and Assam that the north-eastern
push of the Mughal empire reached its logical culmination.

fSL

MINIS?*,.

[ xvi: j

vs military oontabuti(K\.i to tho Mughal E
and solid, his influence on contemporary Mughal
court} politics was Biguihcant. At that time one of the principal
factors which influenced Delhi politics wa^ the longstanding
rivalry between the liberal an cl pacifist Dara, favourably
disposed towards the Shia States of the Deccan, and the.
orthodox and militant Aurangzeb, intent on their annexation
to the Empire. Consequently , Mughal policy under Shahjahau
often vacillated between the two extreme points represented by
these two princes. He was swayed sometimes by the one and
sometimes by the other, Thus the Golkonda campaign of ifiofr
owed its inception to Aurangzeb’s diplomacy. But the con
elusion of peace was effected as a result of Dara’s machinations^
Aurangzeb eagerly clung to Wazir Mir Jumlft after the death
of Wazir Sadullah, one of his adherents. Indeed, Mir Ju du la's
appointment as Wazir meant the victory of the aggressive
policy of Aurangzeb and the discrediting, tor sometime at
least, of the peace policy of Dara in the Emperor's council.
The Bijapur campaign of 1657-'58,. sanctioned by the Emperor
under the influence of Mir Jurala, was abruptly concluded at
Dara's intercessions.

The career of Mir Jurrila is significant not only for the
student of political and* diplomatic history but it is also of
absorbing interest to the student of the economic;history of
India. His mining activities made him the owner of twenty
ma/unds of diamonds. < His economic system was based on the
monopoly of the articles of food and clothing, both in the
Karnatak and in Bengal, Mast er of a growing mercantile marine,
he carded on overseas trade with Western Asia and the East
Indies. The importance of his activities in the commercial
history of the period,—marked by the fail of Vijayoagar, the
decline of the Portuguese maritime empire, and the advent of
the Dutch and the Eng ish in the Asiatic Seas,— lay in the fact
that before tho last two could displace the Portuguese as the
carriers of India's oceanic trade, Mir Jurala, the Persian, grasped
a large share in the maritime trade of Vijaynagar and became
a keen competitor first of the Dutch and subsequently of the
English* They dreaded his influence but courted his favour.

misT/f

[ xvii ]

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

(vii)

Jumlas association with the East * Coast lasted tiii
is end.

TJie career of such an important personality in its different
aspects was not studied before by any other scholar on. a full
scale with adequate utilisation of relevant evidence in varied
documents. I have tried, in my own humble way, to prepare
a biography of Mir Jumla r after about seven years' patient
study of the following classes of original sources.

(i) Contemporary historical works in Persian,
published or unpublished.

Contemporary correspondence in Persian.

The Ahom Buranjis.

European records, mainly English and Dutch.
Works of contemporary European writers and
travellers.

Accounts in Tamil, Telugu and Sanskrit.
Archaeological, Epigrapbie and Numismatic
sources.

The book has been divided into eight chapters, subdivided
into several sections and sub-sections. The early life of Mir
Jumla has been dealt in Chapter I on the basis of Nizamuddin
Ahmad’s Hadiqat us Salatin , Tabrezi’s Golkmxda Letters , and
other contemporary Persian works and European factory
records, besides the writings of foreign travellers on which
mainly Sir J. N. Sarkar’s account is based. This chapter is
wholly original, containing new details as regards Mir Jumla s
ancestry, date of birth, his reasons for leaving Persia, the
stages of his gradual rise to power in Golkonda and his
influence in that State.

Chapter II dealing with Mir Jumla’s activities in the
Karnatak, and subdivided into three sections, is also entirely
original. The stages of the gradual conquest of the Western
Karnatak by Bijapur are fairly well-known. But the story of
the conquest of the Eastern Karnatak by the forces of
Golkonda under Mir Jumla awaited reconstruction from
different classes of sources. The account of Colonel Mackenzie
published in JASB. 1844 is now out of date. Sir J. N. Sarkar's
masterly account, given in his History of Aumngzib , k

<SL

mtsTfff

[ ^wii ]

Warily very brief Dr. Si K. Aiyangar’s articles are
mainly based on European records. This task of
reconstruction has been attempted by mo lor the first time,
in Section A, after a synthetic use of contemporary Persian
chronicles and letter books and European factory records and
travellers' accounts. The details regarding the deputation of
the Mir to the Karnatak, the conclusion of a contract between
the two Sultans for its partition, the struggle over the
possession of Jinji and the conquest of Gandikota are new. For
the first time an attempt has been made here to examine the
working of the partition scheme,—the causes of friction
between the two Sultans, the growing strain and finally the war
resulting in the defeat of the Qutbshahis under Mir Jurnla.
The ultimate allocation by Bijapur of Gandikota and
Kokkanur to Mir Jumla was highly intriguing and sowed the
seed of his rebellion against his master. The treatment, of Mix
Jumla's administration of the Karnatak (Section B), describing
the territorial results of its conquest, his civil administration,
his internal and overseas commerce, his military organisation,
is original. So also is Section 0, wherein his relations with the
Europeans from his appointment as Governor of M asulipatam
in 1635-36 till his absorption, in Mughal imperial ser vice in 1655
has been traced.

Chapter III of the present work is an attempt to tell the
story of Mir Jumia’s entry into Mughal imperial service from
a new angle and a fuller study of older sources and also on the
basis of some new Persian sources not utilised by Sir J. N.
Sarkar for the purpose. Fresh light has been here thrown
on the causes of Mir Jurala’s friction with Sultan Qutb Shah,
on Mir Jurala’s role in planning Aurangzeb’s Golkouda campaign
as well as on his diplomatic intrigues, especially with Persia
and Sri Ranga Rayal. It was the Mir who induced the Rayal
to seek Mughal protection in return for apostacy to Islam.
Again, Mir Jumia’s diplomatic relations with the celebrated
Maratha leader Shalrji Bhonsla will be of interest to students
of Maratha history. The arrest of Muhammad Amin was not
primarily due to the latter’s haughty behaviour as is generally

wwsr/fy

t xix ]

fed* but to the leakage of Mir Jtftnl&V intrigues with the
Mughal Court.

The activities of Mir Jumla as Mughal Wazir (Chapter IV)
have been studied under five sections, of which the first two
and the last one are absolutely original. Section A portrays
the Grand Wazir Mir Jumla as an agent of Aurangzeb in
diplomacy and administration alike. Section B, dealing with
the fate of Mir Ju in la's Karnatak Dominions, is of interest not
only to students of Mughal Court politics but also to those, who
wish to have an idea of the death-pangs of the kingdom of
Ghandragiri. Section E traces the changes effected in his
relations with the Europeans by his appointment as Mughal
Wazir.

The subject-ma tter of the two other sections of Chapter IV
(Section C—the Bijapur campaign, 1657- 58, and Section D—
Mir Jumla hurled from office) lias been discussed in Sarkar’s
History of Aurangzih But the details here given regarding the
diplomatic activities of Mir Jumla are wholly original It has
been shown here how the initiative in launching Aurangzeb's
Bijapur campaign was taken by Mir Jumla, how he seduced
the Bijapuri officers and how he counteracted Dara's moves
during the War of Succession, especially the order of recall of
the Mir. It is indeed significant to know that Aurangzeb
completely depended on Mir Jumla in these matters, and that
he appointed the latter Governor of Khandosh for this purpose.

Chapter V delineates the role of Mil Jumla in Aurangzeb's
war against. Shuja on a different plan and in greater detail than
what one gets in Sarkar's Aurangzib . The chapter has been
divided into 6 sections, each bringing to light some original
facts. Section A corrects the date of Mir Jumla's arrival at
Kora, describes his part in minimising the adverse effects of
Jaswant Singh's desertion of the imperial army at Khajwa, and
throws new light on the causes of Aurangzeb’s victory. Section
B contains new details regarding the movements of the imperial
army in its inarch from Patna to Rajmahal, as well as Mix
JumWs activities especially regarding the administration of
Monghyr and Rajmahal. Ln Section C Mir Jumla's naval
enterprises at Siiti, his preparations for a fresh offensive after

I XX ]

<§l

failure of the frontal assault scheme of 3rd May, 1659,
efforts for the establishment of Aurangzeb’s authority in
Orissa, are absolutely original. Again, it has been proved here
that it was Mir Jumla and not Aurangzeb who was the
originator of the plan of encircling Shuja. Fresh light is also
thrown on the flight of Muhammad Sultan and Mir Jurola's
able handling of the situation. In Section D, the disoussion
of Mir Jumla s activities in South West Bengal, especially the
occupation of Hugli, and Daud Khan's advance from Patna
towards Malda are completely new, while as regards the battle
fought on a spot between Belgbata and Giria, the version of
AqiLKban has been reconciled with the Alamgirnama and the
Tarikh i Shah Shujai. Section E gives new details as regards
Mir Jumla’s plana for protecting the western bank of the
Ganges, his activities at Samdah, and the return of Muhammad
Sultan to the imperial army. Mir Jumla’s relations with the
Europeans during the War of Succession form the theme of
Section F.

Chapter VI, describing Mir Jumla’s administration of Bengal,
is original in all respects. The contents of Aurangzeb’s farman
appointing him Governor of the province have been given here
for the first time.

Chapter VII deals with Mir Jumla's last and crowning
military campaign,-the invasion of Kuoh Bihar and Assam,
This subject has been discussed by Mr. Blochroann, Sir E.
Gait, Sir J. N. Sarkar and Br. S. N. Bhattacharya. But here
it has been approached from the point of view of Mil Jumla,
and the treatment has been more detailed and analytical than
what the previous works contain. The old and known sources
have been thoroughly examined and certain recently
published Ahom Buranjis have been utilised. This
chapter has been divided into 5 sections. Section A, dealing
with the conquest of Kuoh Bihar, throws new light on the
genesis of Mir Jumla’s eastern campaigns and his war
preparations. Section B describes Mir Jumla's triumphal march
to Garhgaon : sub-section (c) of Section B, describing Mir
Jumla’s administrative and military arrangements in Kamrup
and Assam is fully original. Section 0 gives full details of Mir

miST/fy

[ xxi ]

umla’s activities to overcome the difficulties in Assam caused
by the rains, famine, and pestilence. Section D deals with
his resumption , of offensive, the beginning of his fatal illness
and the conclusion of peace. Section E describes his retreat
from Assam, and the administrative and military problems
arising during it.

The concluding Chapter VII f. is an attempt at forming a
genera] estimate of Mir Jumlas character and achievement,
as a man, a statesman, a general, and a diplomat, - and
analysing the reasons of his failure to contribute any construc¬
tive force to history.

The materials have been arranged in such a way as to clearly
indicate the landmarks in Mir Jumia's career. For the sake
of this analysis, each ohapter or section has been further
divided into sub-sections. Foot-notes have been consolidated,
sometimes for one whole paragraph or a sub-section. Several
appendices deal with the more controversial points. The topic
of Mir Jumia's relations with the European Companies has
been studied chronologically under different phases of his career
and not in a single chapter, for the sake of better understanding
of his policy towards them in the light of his current problems
and preoccupations Quotations from European records have
been given in their original form, sometimes with modern
equivalents of unfamiliar words within brackets.

In the preparation of this work I have received generous
assistance from some scholars, for which I am profoundly
grateful to them. The pride of place must go to Sir Jadunath
Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., I). Litt., who suggested the subject to me,
permitted me to utilise his rare Persian manuscripts, besides
books, maps and atlases in his valuable library, guided me in
writing this book with great zeal and love, and wrote the Fore¬
word. ‘Mir Jumla’ has, indeed, grown up under his eyes.
Dr. S. C. Sarkar, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon), former Head of the
History Department of Patna College, and Dr. K. K. Datta,
M.A., P.R.S., Ph. I).,' its present Head, have laid me under a
deep debt of gratitude, by going through the work and offering
their valuable comments. Khan Sahib S. H. Askari of the same
department lent me some manuscripts of his own and helped

misr/fy

' GOt W\

f j [ ]

with several useful suggestions. Dewan Bahadur 0. Si.
Srmivasaehari, former Head of the Department of History and
Polities, Annatnalai University, lent me a translation of the
Karnataka Majakkal Savisiara Gharitmm . Dr. N. K. Shall a of
Calcutta University assisted me in various ways. The authorities
of the Imperial library, Calcutta, the Royal Asiatic Society
of Bengal, the Oriental Public library, Patna, and the Library
of the Bihar Research Society kindly permitted me to use
some of their valuable collections.

The book in its present form was ready before November.
1946, when it wan svbmitted as a thesis for the Ph. 30. Degree
of the University of Calcutta. Even after the publication of
of the result in March, 1948, various difficulties stood in the
way of its printing. My thanks are due to Shri Moksbada
Ranjan Bhattaeharyaand Shri S. Acharya of the Midland Press,.
Calcutta, for getting the hook printed now. Shri Bi&hmi
Bandyopadhyay of Calcutta and Shri Suprakash Sanyal, a
postgraduate student of mine, helped me in the task of
correction of proofs.

June 28, 1951.

Patna Coli/eue, JAC4ADISII NARAYAN SAPvKAR

Patna, 5 .

WNlSTft y

AA

AB

Adah

ADM

AN

ARADND

ARSIE

AS

ASB

AST

ASR

Aurangzih

Ball

BDR

Bernier

BI

BKK

BM

B.MS.A
B Ms.B
B. Itb

Bvm

Bowrey

BPP

Bruce

BS

CM

COM

Gont .

CR

Danvers

Dow

DUS

EAEB

EC

E & D
EFI

*■

ABBREVIATIONS

From Akbar to Aurangzeb by Moreland.

Assam Buranji (1648-81), ed. by 8; K. Dutta.
Adab-i-xAlamgiri.

Akhbarat-i-Darbar-Mnalia.

Alatngirnama.

Annual Report of tho Archaeological Department of
His Exalted Highness the Nizam’s Dominions.

Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy.

Anaald-Salih.

Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Atlas of Sout h India by Pharaah <fe Co.

Annual Report of Archaeological Survey of India,

History of Aimiugzih by Sir Jaduriath Sarkar.

Travels in India by Jean Baptiste Tavernier, ed. by Ball.
Batavia Dagh Register

Travels in the Mogul Empire by Francois Bernier, ed. by
Constable.

Bibliotheca Indica.

Buranji from Khunlung and Khwnlai.

British Museum*

Buranji Ms A.

Buranji Ms. B.

Buranji Bk. II (b)

Buranji VIII.

A Geographical Account of Countries round the Bay of
Bengal.

Bengal : Past and Present.

Annals of E. I. C.

Basatin-us-Salatin (Litho Edn.).

Chingleput Manual.

Court Min ate© of the E. I # C.

Continuation of Fathiyya-i-ibriyya. (Bod. Lib. MS. 589).
Calcutta Review.

The Portuguese in India by F. 0. Danvers.

History of Hind ustan by Dow.

Dacca University Studies.

The Early Annals of tho English in Bengal by C. R. Wilson.
Epigraphia Carnation.

History PfMudia as told by its own historians, ed, by Elliot

and Dowsor .

The English Factories in India. The volumes are indicated
as follows :—

Volume 1634-36 - V.

n 14

<8L

MIN/Sty

EIM

FA

FFSG
FI
Gait
GD ,
Glanius

Gribble

HA

Hall

Hedges

HG

HISI

HLB

m

HSh

HT

HTi

IA

IG

IHQ

Ind •Atlas
tOL
Irvine
IsO

JAHRS

JARS

JASB

JBBRAS

JI30RS

JBRS

JHAS

JIH

JMOM

JPU

[ xxir ]

Volume 1837-41—VI.

Volume 1642-45—VII.

Volume 1646-50- VIII.

Volume 1651-54—IX.

Volume 1655-80—X.

Volume 1661-64—XI.

Volume 1665-67—XII.

Volume 1668-69—XIII.

Epigraph!* Indo-Moslomaica.

Fatuhati- A Jazngiri.

The Founding of Fort St. George by Sir William Foster,
Fathiyya-i-ibriyya.

A History of Assam.

Guldashta.

A relation of an Unfortunate Voyage to the Kingdom of
Bengal*.

A History of the Deccan by J. D. B. Gribble.
Hadiqat-ul-Alam.

Early English Intercom so with Burma.

The Diary of William Hedges.

History of Gingee and its rulers by G. 8. Srinivasachari.
Historical Inscriptions of Southern India
History of the Late Rebellion by Bernier.
Hadiqat-us-Salatin.

House of Shivaji.

Hague Transcripts

History of Tirupati, by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar.

Indian Antiquary,

Imperial Gazetteer.

Indian Historical Quarterly.

Indian Atla3.

India Office Library.

Army of the Indian Mughals by W. Irvine.

Islamic Culture.

Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*.

Journal of Assam Research Society.

Journal of tho Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.

Journal of the Bihar Research Society.

Journal of the Hyderabad Archaeological Society.

Journal of Indian History.

A Journey from Madras through the countries of Mysore.
Carnira and Malabar.

Journal of the Patna University*

AS
KB
Love
MA
MAF
Majmua
MH

Mission

ML

MM

-MN.

MNEFP

MR

m:u

NT AM
N 0

mi

OPL

OAILPB

|; xxv- )

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Loaddtt.

Kamrupar Buranji

Vestiges of Old Madras by Love. *

Maasir-i-A1 amgiri.

Majmaul Afkar.

Majmua-i Muktubat
Muraqaat-i Hasan
Mission du Mad are.

Muntakhab-ul-Lubab.

Mukat-abato Muqima.

Muhammadaama.

Mughal N. E Frontier Policy by Dr. 8 Bhattadharya.

Modern Review,

Maasir- ul-Umara.

North Arcofc Manual.

Nuskha-i-Dilkusha.

Nayaks of Madura.

Oriental Public Library, Patna.

A list of the Objects of Antiquarian interest in the Lower
Provinces of Bengal.

Purani Asama Buranji.

| Source Book of Maratha History, ed. by Patwardhan and
j Rawlinson.

Padshah Buranji.

Aurangnama

Proceedings, Indian History Congress.

Proceedings, Indian Historical Records Commission
Purchas, His Pilgrimes.

Qutbnumai-Alam.

Ruqaat-i-AIamgiri.

Ramanayya—Studies in the History of the Third Dynasty of Vijaynagara
by N. Venkata Ramanayya.

Rise of the British Power in the East by M. Elpbinstone,
Bengal Atlas by Rennell.

Riyaz-us-Salat in.

Relations of the Kingdom of Golkonda by Moreland.

Ruqaat - i - Sh ah - A bbas. S ani.

South Arcot Manual
Studies in Aurangzib’s reign.

Shivaji the Great by Balkrishna,

Shahjahamiama by Inayet Khan.

Ahom Buranji found in the family of Sokumar Mahanta.

A History of Bengal by Stewart.

Storm do Mogor, ed.. by Irvine.

Sources of Vijayanagar History by Dr. S.K. Aiyangar.

PAB
Patwar-
dban
PB
Poem
Pr. IHC
Pr. IHBC
Purchas

RA

RBPE

Rennell

Riyaz

RKG

RSAS

SAM

SAR

SG

SHN

SMAB

.Stewart

Storia

BVH

M WJSTty,

'ftbrezi
TG

Thevenot

TM*

TMu

TS

TV

VSCV

Wans

Wilks

ZNA

[ xxvi ]

<§L

Abdul Ali Tabrezi'a Goikonda I etters.

Tiunov elly Gazetteer by Pate.

Travels of Thevenot,

Tarikh-i-MufazzalL
Tarikhd -Muhammadi.

Tarikh-i-Shah-Shiij ai.

Tazkirat-uMJmara,

Vijaynagara Sexcentenary Volume.

Padshahnama by Waris.

Historical Sketches oi the South of India, in an attempt t*
trace the History of Mysoor by M. Wilks,

Z afar n ainad-A lamgiri,

-**. o j~

CHAPTER 1

>

EARLY LIFE OF MIR JUMLA :
PERSIA TO GOLKONDA

/. Mir Jumia Leaves Persia,

Mir Muhammad Sa‘id Ardistani known to history by his
more famous surname Mir Jumia and entitled Mu'azzam Khan,
Khan-i -Khanan, Sipahsalar. Yar-i-wafadar was a Persian by
birth. Born at Ardistan about 1591, he was son of Mirza
Haza.ru, an extremely poor Sayvid oil-merehant of Ispahan,
for long the capital of Iran. 1 In spite of the poverty of ius
parents* Mir Muhammad found an opportunity to acquire some
knowledge of letters. Probably this helped him to secure the
office of a clerk to a diamond merchant, who was in frequent
touch with Golkonda. This early experience about the diamond
trade stood him in good stead in his subsequent career and
proved to be the corner-stone of his future prosperity.

On reaching the age of discretion Mir Muhammad Sa\id,
tormented by his growing economic wants, due to a large
extent to the financial exactions of a grabbing Shaikh ul Islam,
anil lack of governance in Persia, left the land of his birth,
like many other Persian Shiahs, in search of fortune. Mir
Muhammad himself observed in one of his letters to Nawab
Khalifa-i-Sultan, Wazir of Persia, that he had to leave his
native country (i) to make his living easy, (ii) to send some
help to near relations, and the aged and the infirm members of

1 * We get the name of Mir Muhammad’s father in PB ( 1HQ. V.
474 : IsC. 1928, p. 558). The exact date of his birth is not stated
anywhere. While conducting the war with Shuja* (1070/1659) Mir Jumia
says that he was 70 years old. Poem , 172. This is corroborated by
Assamese Sources. On his way to .Bengal, Mir Jumia speaks of “these
seventy years of my life.” IsC, July. 1929. p. 394; IHQ. V. 473.
Assuming these to be lunar years, we get the date of his birth to be
1000/1591.

mtsTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

family, and (iii) to (‘scape from the oppressions of the
Persian Shaikh ul Islam. 2

Mir Muhammad joined the service of a Persian merchant,
who was carrying some horses from Persia for sale to the King
of Golkonda, which, in those days, was a refuge and an El
Dorado for men of West Asia, and specially Persia. The date
of his arrival in Golkonda is uncertain ; but most probably it
was earlier than 1630. 3 We are also in the dark about the
exact position of Mir Muhammad immediately after his arriv al
there. Whether he only continued as the personal attendant
of the Persian merchant, in charge of the horses, already
brought, as Bernier and .Manned both say, or whether he even
went/ through the streets of Golkonda from door to door
selling shoes, as Manned further writes, there is no doubt that
his arrival in Golkonda, where his propitious stars had led him,
proved to be a turning point in his career. 4

<SL

2 .Tabrezi, 70a-72b.

Mir Jumia’s admiration for the justice, trade and religion of
Persia shows that he very naturally retained a soft corner in his mind
for the land of his birth and, during the formative period of his career
i\n minister in Golkonda, he maintained harmonious relations with the
Court of Iran. This is clearly illustraOjjfl by his letters to Khalifa-i-
Sultan, Mir Juwla-Iran correspondence, in JBORS', June, 1042. This
cordiality was profoundly helpful to him and was dictated by high
political wisdom and foresight, as we shall find later on. At the same
time he maintained commercial relations with Persia throughout his
active career, and we read of one Haji Muhammad JShaf’i, his agent in
Iran ( Tabrezi*'33b-34b ).

3 - The date of his arrival is stated to bo 1630 by Cribble, 1. 270

and Sarkar, Aurangzib. 1. 193. If he arrived at Go lk on do in 1630, he
must then have been about 40 years old, i.e., past youth. This seems
unlikely. The approximate period of arrival might be e. 1615-25.
Tavernier’s statement (Ball, 1. 165) that Mir Muhammad helped

’Abdullah Qutb Shah in his accession (1626) indicates that the former
arrived before 1630.

4 * Early life in Persia in Sto-rin, l. 226n, 231-2 and n; Bernier, 16
& n ; Dow, I II. 182 ; Thevenot, 102; Stewart, 319-20 ; Gribble, 269-72 ;
Sarkar, op. cit; MU. III. 530; Love, I. 99n; HS. 475-92 (Persian
penetration into Golkonda ) ; IsC. op. cit. Persian horse trade,
Mandelslo, 13.

MINIS?*,,

MIR JUMLA ENTERS GOLKONDA SERVICE

2. Mir Jumla enters Golkonda wrvice.'

§L

Mir Muhammad became the darling of Fortune. Wise and
talented, and possessing business experience, he set himself
assiduously to the task of amassing wealth, the source of
material power and independence. He soon established himself
at Golkonda as an apprentice to a diamond merchant,
Subsequently he gave up this service and traded on his own
account. He farmed some diamond mines under feigned
names and ran them with indefatigable industry. His diamonds
were usually counted in sacks. Extensive commerce with
various parts of the world was another source of his prosperity.
Engaged in commercial transactions, specially maritime, he
gradually rose to lie “a great merchant of much fame in the
kingdom,*’ owning numerous ships. Anxious to rise in life,
Mir Muhammad endeavoured to “purchase a place” at the
court of Qutb Shah and utilised his fortune, amassed through
mining and commerce, to realise his political ambition. By
wise and well-placed generosity, be gained for himself many
friends in the royal court who looked after his interests there. 6
But it is clear from English factory records that till 1684 he did
not rise to importance in Golkonda, and even in 1685-6 we find
him an ordinary Sillahdar holding the office of Sar-i-daftar-
Shahi* His eventual appointment in higher service in the
Golkonda state was due to the kind patronage of Nawab
Allami Fahmi- Shaikh Muhammad, entitled Mir Jumla, who
then held the exalted office of the .Peshwa in the State. Nawab
’Allarai was an able officer and was doing his utmost to evolve
order out of the chaos then reigning in the internal administra ¬
tion and army of the Kingdom. His career in Golkonda
shows that in that atmosphere of inefficiency, nepotism and
corruption, a really able person was sure to gain the confidence
of the Sultan and be invested w ith unlimited power, but that
at the same time his very eminence was bound to lead the

8 ‘ Homier, 16-17 ; Storia, l. 232 ; Dow, op. cit. ; Love, l. 99-100n;
Thovmot, 98, 102, 105; Giibblo, 270.

** There is no reference to him in connection with the mission
(1633-34) of Thomas Joyce & Wyehe to the Golkonda Court. EFI. V.
xxxiii, 47; HS. 374.

<

MIN IST/fy.

LIl/'K OF MIR J UMLA,

and disaffected elements in the Court to maldj
fattens against, him to the too credulous Sultan in order to
undermine his influence. This is well illustrated in the career of
Mir Muhammad too. 7

Having virtually the sole power to dispose of all
governmental affairs. Nawab ’Miami. Fahmi was instrumental
in appointing many persons to the State service, elevating
many SiUahdars to the Majlis (Council) and placing some others
in charge of mdhrds as their 'amils and hakims, in recognition of
their merit. Mir Muhammad, holding the office of the Smyt-
daflar-Shahi, was one of these favoured Sillahdars and during
1635-6 he was placed in charge of the port of Masulipatam as
its havaldar* Masulipatam was the centre of the .East Coast
cotton manufactures specially in chintz, and, as the principal
|>0 rf of the Golkonda Kingdom, it had extensive commercial
intercourse with Pegu, Bantam, the Far East, Stirat, Gombroon,
and other western settlements, besides the ports on the
Coromandel Coast. Referring to this place, Nteamuddin Ahmad
wrote that from there “ships proceeded to the countries of
Zerbad (flown country) and balabad (up country), and the ports
of Arab and ’Azam. Throughout the year ships used to come
to and go from here in all directions. That was the special
feature of this port”. But for several years past the affairs of
this jewel of a port were not properly administered. Corruption
was rife. and . heavy exactions were made on the merchants by
its Governor for purely personal and selfish reasons without an
eve to the economic interests; of the Kingdom.-*

Mir Muhammad must have played an important partin
bringing the affairs of the port well under control and in
endeavouring to replenish the coffers of the State. Nizamuddin
Alunad writes that the record of service of Mir Muhammad as-

the havaldar of Masulipatam was excellent. His qualities,
indeed, befitted him for a higher position. After about a year

7 >yoine Aspects of tint Qulhshahi Ad.mnistraHon of Qolhvnda . JBORS
March, 1944; ‘Tike M** of Mir Jvmla’ in Pr. IHRG. (Trivandrum),
1042. 105-8.

«. HS 397 . 446 . An entry in BDR dated »lst Oct. 1636 refers to Mu

Muhammad as “Moorschen Gouvemeu. Mirmameth Sahij (p. 26H-

»• p r . 1HO (1 09). 919-23; JBORS. op. cif. Thevenot. IW-iOe;

KFI. V. 277; VI. 261.

MIN ISr/f

MIR JtTMLA ENTERS CIOLKONDA SERVICE

lie was also appointed hamldar of the Mahal of
Mustafa nagar (Condapilly), a big fort of Telingana. He made
commendable efforts to manage its administration properly-
and to develop 4 its resources. His speeches and actions were
to the liking of all officers in the capital. He began to bask in
the sunshine of the Sultan’s favours and to asfcend the ladder of
fortune stage by stage. The havaldari of Masulipatam and
Mustafanagar became a stepping-stone to the office of the
Sar-i-khaiL 10

The term Sar-i-khail literally means head of the horse’, but
in practice the incumbent of the office had to discharge, like
Mir Jumla, civil and revenue functions besides military duties.
The office was a highly important one, inasmuch as the
well-being of the kingdom depended, to a large extent, on the
ability of its holder. Under a weak and incompetent one, the
officers of the mahals and the Brahmans (employed in revenue
department) were likely to go out of control, peculation and
embezzlement would increase and collections of revenue would,
fall. On the death of Mir Jumla. Mansur Khan the Abyssinian
in 1528, Mulla Muhammad Taqi Taqrishi, the officiating diwan,
had been appointed Sar-i-khail, in eff ect Mir Jumla. But the
temporary arrangements made since his death in May, 1631,
never worked well. Sar-i-khail after Sar-i-khml was changed
till the Sultan’s choice fell on Mir Muhammad. In' obedience
to a royal farinan summoning him to Court, Mir Muhammad
arrived at the capital on gist June, 1637, with presents
probably including several well-bred elephants and various
European and Chinese fabrics. The Sultan received him well,
and discerning '‘the signs of wisdom and ability in him,”
appointed him 8ar-i-khail in succession to Sayyid ’Abdullah
Mazandaraui (23rd June, 1637). Mir Muhammad assumed
charge of his new duties, leaving the administration of his old
mahals in the hands of his Wakik. 11

10 ' IfS. 389-98,446-8. Mir Jumla’s relations with the Europeans
s.nee T63o-t» have been discussed in Ch. 2, Sec. C. infra.

u - Tor the history of the post, JBORS, op cit ; HS. 446-8, 449
(chronogram); titoria. 1. 23If. This appointment of Mir Muhammad as
Sar-i-kfotil was temporary (HS. 517). Later on he received the epithet
*0mdat ul Nuqaba (Ibid, p. 602)

MIN/Sr*y

UFE OF MIR JUMLA

3. Mir Jumlci ns the. Wcizir of Colkonda.

the epithets Asaf Jahi (wise as Asaf), Asaf-munzibtf
and Asaf-martabat to Mir Muhammad, Nizamuddin Ahmad
observes : “The affairs of the Sultanate and duties in respeot
of religion tod *royal prosperity were all discharged (by him)
witii great wisdom and care, and he was ascending the stages of
jnearei approach to the Sultan. By virtue of his fortune and
wisdom, he soon came to possess (in fact) supreme authority
in the task of administration. He removed all sources of
oppression and illicit profit on the part of the collectors. He
realised a huge sum from the subordinates and the Brahmans
and deposited it in the treasury. The Sultan rewarded him
with a jewelled pen-ease and granted him one 'pargana with an
annual income of 30,000 hum, so that he might keep at his
heck and call strong, young Arab retainers, 12

Next, Mir Muhammad »Sa‘id earned a great reputation
for having completed (by July, 1638) within the brief space
of a year the construction of the four-storied Palace Hayat
Mahal, as desired by the Sultan’s mother, with the help of
Malik Almas, havaidar of the masons. With his characteristic
thoroughness of detail, Mir Muhammad set himself to the
task, and, summoning many geometricians and expert
artisans of the state, remained engrossed in this work,
“morning and evening and always. A summer-room together
with a Ghmllchana built on the topmost story between four
lofty towers was decorated by the expert designers of Iraq
and Hindusthati with paintings of scenes depicting the court,
hunting and war, and came to be so beautifully designed
as to be' compared by Nizamuddin with the Eram or
“Eden.” 13

Mir Muhammad displayed his remarkable powers of
organisation, by effecting in a befitting manner all arrangements

HS. 449-50

13 ‘ Garden built by Shade ad. ft is a fine example of Indo-Moslem
architecture and painting in Golkonda. HS. 503-508. Thevenot’s
description of the royal palace (p. 95) suggests that it was the same as
that built by Mir Jumla. In MM. a palace built Asaf Jahi Amir
Muhammad Sa‘icl Mir J umla Shahi is piaised (7a-10b). The Chronogram
is fox 1051/1041. This seems to he a different palace.

MIN tSTfy

MIR JI MLA AS THE WAZIR OF GOLKONDA

honour of the royal visit to this palace araifc
^enes of great pomp and splendour. The lawn (in front
of the building) was cleaned “like a mirror”. The Sarnaubats
arrived there for display of their forces. Mir Muhammad,
assisted by special agents of the Queen- mother, had velvet
carpets and gold brocade spread over the entire way, 1,000
yards long, intervening between the first gateway and the
palace, there being altogether eight lofty gateways. Provision
was made for distribution of victuals in charity. The
stationing of elephants, horses and camels, and of domestics
and the Ohdadars and maliks of 12 harems with handsome
trays of gold and jewels and cloths added grandeur to the
whole show. Possessed of immense wealth, Mir Muhammad
Sa‘id presented to the Sultan one gold bedstead together
with its accessories, using up in all about 12 maunds of gold,
besides gold wire, utensils, fine cloths and other choicest
presents. In recognition of all these recent services, the
Queen-mother honoured him with special presents. 14

Certain other favourable circumstances brightened the
prospects of Mir Muhammad. The opposition and intrigues
of his enemies proved to be a blessing in disguise for him.
His wisdom and ability had excited the jealousy of Mulla
Wais, dabir and munshuul-mamaUk. The latter had out¬
stepped the bounds of his own authority and propriety
and had begun to interfere in the affairs of the Sar-i-khaH
and even of’ the Peshwa and also to look down upon all
other maasahdars as* his subordinates. Mir Muhammad, the
acting Sar-i-khail and a favourite of the Sultan, discharging
‘the duties of the diwani” very well, naturally resented
Mulla Wais’s intervention and made “allegations of disloyalty”
against the latter. Unable to brook the consequent curtailment
of liis own influence, Mulla Wais sent in an application
for leave, which highly incensed the Sultan. Finally, in
July, 1638, the Sultan dismissed Mulla Wais and ordered
Mir Muhammad to look after his retainers, and pay them out
of the proceeds of the former’s jagirs. The office of the dabir ,
held bv Mulla Wais, was conferred on Mirza Taqi Ntehapuri
on 20th February, 1639. The vacant wizarat of Wais Khan

HS. 508-13,

LlFJS OF MIR J1JM.LA

filled by Mirza Rustam, who was summonc
TIM retinue of the dismissed Mulla Wais
tii ixctci uu'ii kept in the custody of the force of Malik
Am bar wa s now en trusted to Mir Muhammad. 15

Soon Mir Muhammad added new feathers to his cap. For
having skilfully organised a parade of his Iraqi contingent
in the maidan of Dadmahal, he was granted a fine robe of
honour and for him '‘with the high post of Sar-i-khail was
combined the dignified office of the wizarat. ’ 16

(fiT

4. Qutb Shah's Journey to Masulipatam .

The good opinion of the Sultan about Mir Muhammad w as
further confirmed by the latter’s performance of extremely
Useful services during a tour of the Sultan from the capital
to the sea coast (October 29—December 27, 1639.) Mir
Muhammad spared no pains to collect certain goods of the
Karkhanm and other requisites for the journey, and to settle
the consequential administrative problems. He sent directions
to the officers of the mahals on the highway to Masulipatam
for keeping the articles of food and fodder ready and
endeavouring to stock them to a maximum. The foreign
ambassadors, including those of Iran and Delhi, were
requested to accompany the Sultan, and Mir Muhammad was
despatched with a Jarman to fetch back Imam Quli Beg,
hujib of Iran, who had already left the capital.

Nizamuddin Ahmad Shicazi, an eye witness, pays a high
testimony to the organising skill of Mir Muhammad by
observing that at Hayatabad (Hayatnagar, Nov. 1-9) every
one of the vast concourse of soldiers and people (about
5 009) had his wants satisfied through his endeavours.
Leaving Moonagalah (Nov. 15-16) where its havaldar , Sayyid
Mir Rustam supplied provisions to Mir Muhammad, the Sultan
proceeded to the mountain fort of Anantgiri and reached
its top along with the Mir.

At Mustafanagar (Gondapilly, Nov. 19), then within his own
jurisdiction, Mir Muhammad’s services were highly commendable.

is IbuJ, ;*>16 - 1 9. For fate of Mulla Wais, ibid, 530-1; 535, 594, 596 ff.

i«. jbirL 531: Storm, l, 231; Love, i. 14, u, (before 19th July, 1639;.

QUTB SHAH’S JOURNEY TO MAS!'LI PAT AM

a/ had to climb to the citadel perched on the rock, foj
bet and cleanse the big royal palaces and make lavish
preparations for the royal reception. He got down in the.
evening and ne.it day the Sultan ascended the hill together with
the ladies, and made a circuit round the fort along with the
intimate courtiers. Mir Muhammad had to remain alert day
and night to meet all the needs of the occasion and to arrange
adequately for night defence against carnivorous animals with
the assistance of a contingent of A hassa-i-khail, bondmen,
naihwars and musketeers.

At Bezwada (Nov. 23), the captains of the three European
companies---the English, the Dutch and the Danish,---
accompanied by their respective retinue, came from Masulipatum
and interviewed the Sultan.

Reaching Weyoor the next day, the Sultan ordered Mir
Muhammad to go, along with Chatur Khan, the Ohdadar of
faraskhana and other Karkhanas , towards the port and
Ingondoor (Engodour) and set up the tents. The Mir had also
to frame rules ( ? for the procession ) from the gateway of the
port to the bankshall. Entering the port, the shops and
houses of which were decorated by the traders with fine cloths
and other articles, the Sultan, riding an elephant, proceeded
towards the bankshall, with the Mir by his side, replying with
due courtesy to his querries. After the conclusion of formal
ceremonies in a majlis convened in the bankshall building, the
Sultan inspected the port and started towards Dubighat
(Point Divy).

On 27tb November, the Sultan again went to the port and
expressed his intention to visit the European factories the next
rlay. On December 3, Mir Muhammad entertained the Sultan
and his family by a demonstration of fishing at Point Divy.

The next day, on the occasion of offering peshkash. Mir
Muhammad Sabd acquainted the Sultan with the condition of
the port and its inhabitants. The Sultan showed great favours
to businessmen and traders of diverse countries, residing there,
by remitting (i) the Zakai , payable on every article, “at the
gate of the port,” by all merchants, native or foreign, and,
(ii) the brokerage, realised from traders in jewellery, which
yielded a huge revenue. At the same time he relieved the
merchants importing rubies from Pegu from the exactions of

mtSTffy

LIFE OF MIR JC/MLA

brokers. Many

deserving

- -v - .o persons, Sayyida, "Alims, arid

others, living in the port, whether new comers or old residents,
received grants of pensions, land or cash for subsistence.

On the day of departure (7th December), the Sultan
honoured Mir Muhammad by rewarding him with the Chadar
(wrapper) from his own neck together with the char-kob, an
essential article of dress of honour pertaining to the office of
the Sar-i-khail, and with some other costly presents. Through
his mediatian the Europeon captains, who deserved presents for
their various services, were duly honoured. 17

* i. Influence of Mir Jumla in the Golkonda state.

Thus, Mir Jumla held various dignified offices and “in all of
them, ‘ as Manucci observes, “gave a good account of himself.” 18
He gradually came to wield enormous political influence in the
State. It would appear that Mir Muhammad Safld succeeded
Shaikh Muhammad as Mir Jumla, though the exact date when
8ar4-khail Mir Muhammad became Mir Jumla is not yet
definitely known. 19 Nizamuddin Ahmad says that in every
task Mir Muhammad proved himself to be a well-wisher of the
Sultan and became his favourite. Waris remarks that Mir
Jumla came to have the power of “ratk o fatk'\ that is to say,,
all the affairs of Qutb Shah passed under his control. Nothing
could be done without his knowledge and approval. He
became the intermediary between the Sultan and the European
factors. Tavernier, wishing to sell some pearls and jewels to
Sultan ‘Abdullah Qutb Shah at Golkonda, had first of all to go
from Masulipatani to Mir Jumla at G \ rlikota, because k ‘the
King would buy nothing rare nor of high price which Mir
Jumla.had not first seen” (July 1652 N. S.). 20 As

17 • For the Sultan’s journov, HS. 533-80; EFT. VI. 221. On the
return journey there is no mention of Mir Jumla’s activities. Probably
he remained behind. The Sultan’s far)nans of exemption were ordered
to have beer engraved on stone-slabs and hung in the Jama Masjid of
the port and that of the Zakat in the way of an imprecation.

18 ‘ Storia X. 231-2; Bernier, 17.

ia. The title ‘NawaV is applied to Mir Jumla in an English
factory record dated May 28, 1038. EFT. VI. 70-77.

so. Ibid . , 260, 102-3; Ball, L 250.

MIR JTJMLA IN THE GOLKONDA STATE

_ „as “all in all in the Golkonda State”, 21 and had
widespread commercial activities, foreign nations came to feel
the weight of his influence. Thus, in the .English factory
records of December, 1639, he is spoken of as “the duet
Governor under the King,” who “governed the whole
kingdom.” Andrew Cogan, an envoy of the English E 1.0.
to ° Golkonda, observed that the SariA-khail “indeed
commanded the whole Kingdom". 22 The Swally Marine
factors put the whole thing succintly, when in 1643-44 they
described him as the “all ruling Sar-i-khail or Vizier who
governed “the king and consequently the country.' 23 Efficient
in administration and influential ia government, Mir him la
also possessed remarkable military abilities which were well
displayed in the conquest of the Eastern Kamatak, w here «ht.
was deputed by the Sultan a few years later.

*'■ HS. 517-18; Wans 102a; ZNA, 12; MIT. lit. 530.
22 * EFT. VI. 200, 220-22.

23 ‘ EFI. VII- 88, 207-8.

CHAPTER il

MIR JUMLA IN THE KARNATAK
Section A

Role of Mir Jumla in the Muhammadan
Conquest of the Karnatak

1. The Karnatak Country and previous Muhammadan
penetration into it.

The Karnatak-dosa properly implies the Kanarese country,
the uplands or the Balaghat, including Mysore and part of
Telingana. But, as Vijaynagar receded to the east, the term
Ivarnat also came to be applied to the plain country or
Payanghat in the East.

The Kanarese country has been famous from the earliest
times for its fertility of soil, richness in minerals, elephants and
accumulated treasures. But the Eastern Karnatak
(Payanghat), the plains lying between the Eastern Ghats and
the sea coast of Madras were infinitely richer and more
populous than the Western Karnatak. Its diamond mines,
fertile valleys and hoards of buried treasures of old Hindu
dynasties subsequently excited Aurangzeb's lust for the
occupation of t hat rich and large province. It was, as he
once wrote to Shahjahan, “equall to the Kingdom of Golkonda
itself in wealth and'extent.” Thus both the divisions of the
Deccan, Malnad and Karnatak, constituted a rich and fertile
country. Zahur ibn Zahuri writes that the climate there was
delightful and the air refreshing. Rains were sufficient for a
plentiful harvest in th<* 17th century, when it surpassed even
Egypt and Syria in agriculture, and the ‘'stores of grain
kissed the sky." Even the small qasbas were well-populated,
and ordinary citizens were fairly well-off. indeed, as
Thevenot also remarks, the region was “exceedingly fruitful”
and provisions were very cheap there. Important towns on

misTfy

£■ KARNATAK OO TIN TRY AND MUHAMMADAN PENETRATION

coast like Negapatam. Tranquebar, Mylapur and Saif
>rne testified to a flourishing commerce of the region. 1

Su di a rich country naturally aroused the cupidity of the
neighbouring States of Bijapur and Golkonda, and, later on, of
the Mughal Empire too, particularly when it- could no longer
be effectively defended. The Adil Shah of Bijapur, desirous of
unfurling the banner of Islam in “tland harb Karnataka
conquered first iVIalnad and then (Eastern) Karnatak. Within
a short span of 6 years (1638-*44), his generals, Randaula
Khan (.Rustam-i-Zarnan), Afzal Khan and Khan Muhammad
succeeded in absorbing the Kanara country of Bednur (Ikkeri
and Basavapatau) and parts of Mysore (Sera, Bangalore,
Srirangapatam, Chik-Nayakanhalli, Bellur, Tarnkur, Balupur,
Kuiihnl or (?) Kunigal and Sagar. 2

As compared to the rapid succession of v ictories secured by
Bijapur in the Western Karnatak before 1645, the initial
attempts of Golkonda to conquer the Eastern Karnatak did
not meet with striking success. True, before the end of 1542,
the Sultan of Golkonda succeeded in overrunning the coastal
regions to the north of Pulicat and even occupying a part of
the territory round Armagori. 3 But the tables were soon
turned when Sri Ranga Rayal, who succeeded Veukat&pati,
determined to pursue a vigorous policy of checking the
Muhammadans by focussing all Hindu forces in the south and,
if possible, by securing the assistance of the Dutch. He was
successful in checkmating the hostile machinations of an
influential spurt-party and the Velugoti brothers of Kalahari
(Damaria Venkatadri and Aivappa), who had intrigued with

x * Description based on IQ. ix. 301-2; JAHRS X. 89-90; JJVICM.
ii. 183-190; in. 90, 10‘3. 201; Wilks. I. 5-10 and n; MX. 180-90 (diamond
mines at Nandiyal and 8 other forts); Adab, 46b; The vend. 105;
Anmngzib l. 220, 221; HSh. 9; for mineral resources and forest
products (esp. Red Sanders tree of X. A root. Cuddapah & Knrnool dtsj.
ami fragrant flowering trees and conditions in modern times, See NAM.
ch. 1 and 4; SAM. pt. 2.

-■ Pbr Bijapuri conquests, see MW. L55-I88 (Poet between Bijapur
tint! tin- Rayal); BS. .116-8; JASB. XIII (1844). 439-19; HSh. 13 . 1 ft
Au-mngzib, 1 . 190-2, 228-9; HG. l- r ,4IT; KM. 20 ff, 129-30; ,111-1. [X
I S Iff; HTi. II. eli. 17, 18; E 0. V. Intro, xxxv.

’. KFT. VII. 70, 80; Pr. IHRC. (Dee. 1938), 23 . 27.

§L

LIFE 0.F MIR JEM LA

:>nda. A defensive league was organised bv Tininiftlak
rCvak of Madura together with the Kayaks of Tanjore and
Jinji. But when the allies were betrayed by the Nayak of
Tanjore and Sri Rang a inarched against the nearest rebel, the
Kayak of Jinji, Timm a] a, “swayed only by fury and desire
for vengeance” and “regardless of the claims of a larger
patriotism,” secretly corresponded with the Golkonda viceroy
on the frontier to induce the Sultan to attack Vellore from the
north. The Raya! turned back from Jinji, and assisted by
the rising power of fkkeri, expelled the Qutb Shahi force* from
his capital. A Qutb Shahi contingent under “Casy aly '
(Ghazi 4 Ali) failed to occupy the well-fortified Dutch
settlement of Pulicat in July, 1644, and was driven beyond
Arm agon up to Udayagiri (September) by the Hindu general
Kistappa Nay ak. 4

2. Deputation of Mir Jumla to the KarnataJc.

So far, Golkonda’s attempts to gain a substantial footing
in the Eastern Karnatak ended in smoke, and Kambam, on
the north-east side of the Cuddapah district, remained the
limit of her advance in the south-east. Tt was at this juncture
that, Sultan ‘Abdullah Qutb Shah deputed his able prime
Minister, Mir Muhammad Sadd, to conquer the Karnatak. As
Waris observes: “No Nayak of Qutbulmulk could capture
even a small part of it, but Mir Jumla conquered it with a few
big fortresses.” 5 6 Karnatak was then “fall of wars and
troubles.” The Rayal had attacked Pulicat (since 12th
Aug., 1645), as the Dutch were apparently trying to reconcile
Golkonda. There was also a civil war between the Rayal on
the one hand and the three Nayaks of Tanjore, Madura and
Jinji on the other ; and the Nayaks had inflicted a severe

4. BDK. 1643-4 in KFE. VIC, 63, 80, 81 n; Pr. IHRC. XV.
24-26; Mission, Eli. 42-3; HG. 157-169, 162-3; HSh. 20-21; HT. Series!,
Vol. XIV. 431 & BDR. 1644-45, 325, in FFI. VEE. 81n, 193-4 & n;

Fort. St. George letter of Sept. 8, 1644; Report of Dutch Govt, of
PuHcftt, Gatdenijs 1# July, returning to Pulicat from Masnlipatam,
HISJ. 278 (Ghazi AH).

6. Aurangzib I. 193-4; Waris 102 a, b; JASB. XIII (1844), 439; EFX.
VIE. 193-4 & n; Kambam in dt. Cuddapah, 79° 1'3E. 15° 32'N.

IMPUTATION OF MIR JUMP4 TO THE KARNATAK

( 0^ on the Rayal’s forces in December, 1645. Conseqtter
latter could only despatch an army of 4,000 soldiers to
blockade the fort oi Pulicat. 0 To add to the difficulties of the
Rayal, the Bijapuri general M uzaffaruddin Khan Muhammad
Khan-i-Khanan advancing from the west (autumn of 1646),
gained a rapid succession of victories in the Karnatak
Balaghat, while early in 1646, he had captured Nandiyal in
the Kurnul district and 8 other strong forts of that region. 7

At this oppportune moment Mir Jumla came at the
head of a well-organised, well-equipped and efficient army,
to “oppose” the Rayal and attack bis territories from the
north and east. 8 Before the middle of February, 1646, the
Muhammadan .general captured three of the Rayal’s castles,

of which one was the “strongest hould (hold) in that
kingdom.” He won over Mallaiva, the Hindu Coiumander-in-
Chief, to whom the Rayal had entrusted the task of defending
the country and who had repulsed a Dutch sortie at Pulicat,
The latter treacherously surrendered the famous fortress of
Udgir (Udayagiri), the capital of the eastern portion of the
kingdom of the Rayal, to Mir Jumla “upon composition for
himself and all this people to go away free.” Sidhout,
east of Cuddapah, was also occupied. 9

It became quite clear to the two Sultans that the conquest
of the Karnatak could never be achieved and “the tree of
the infidels” could never be “rooted out” except through
their mutual co-operation. Adil Shah realised that without
Qutb Shah’s help, a successful war with the Rayal was not
possible and the two became co-sharers in the destruction
of the Rayal and other Zamindars. Hence they made
(c. March-April, 1646) a mutual agreement by which the

EFI. VIII, 24-6, xxv: A diary kept at Pulicat found among HT.
(I. O. Series). 1. XV. No. 484. Ibid, 25n; Love, I. 73, 76; Mission, III.
41-42.

7 ’ MN. 244, 245-50.

8 * Aurangzib, I. If 3-4; EFI, op cit; Bernier, 17 & n.

9 * HISI. 279; EFI. op cit; HT. op cit; Love I. 73, 102; Pr. IHRC.
XV. 27. The fort of Udgir (Udayagiri, 79° 21' E, 14° 52'N) was the
biggest of ail the forts of Vijayanagar, and very high and its circumfer-
ence was 6 farsakhs. HA. 226; chronogram in Fatohnanmh in MM. 6b;
HG. 164.

mist#).

J-tVJS OF MIR JFHU

0&ry, spoils of war, goods, jewels and cash of Sri Range,
ayal, were to be amicably partitioned between Bijapur and
Golkonda in the proportion of two to one, 2/3rds falling
to Adil Shah and ]/3rd to Qutb Shah. 10

I he immediate results of the partition-agreement proved
highly satisfactory to the Muhammadan Sultanates, The
victorious progress of the Adil Shahi Wazir, Nawab Mustafa
Khan, in the Kanarese country came to be paralleled by
the successes of the Qutb Shahi Wazir, .Mir Jumla. in the
Eastern Karnatak. In June, 1046) the Bijapuri general
started and was joined by many Nayaka, desetia and others.
Highly alarmed, the JRayal immediately attacked the three
rebellious maniwar.a (Navaks), now intriguing with Mustafa
Khan. Rup Nayak of Jinji submitted, but Vijayaraghava
of Tanjore and Tirumala of Madura, who controlled hundreds
of mines of jewels and the port of Kahlpatam (Kayalpatnam)
persisted in the war against the Rayal. Mustafa, refusing
‘to be dissuaded from his purpose by the deceitful words
of the Rayal’s envoy,” hastened towards the pass near
Vellore, then the seat of the Rayal, deciding first to conquer
the Jagdev country. 11

About the same time Nawab Mir Jumla was busy
overrunning the entire East coast south of Nellore and
occupying the territory round Fort St George. Tirupatl
and Chandragiri in North Arcot district were captured.
When, on 11th December, 1646, Mir Jumla began encircling
Pulicat, the Dutch opened negotiations, professing submission.

Mir Jumla entered the fort and was highly impressed with
the strength of its fortifications. After protracted negotiations,
during which war seemed imminent, he agreed to the terms
of the qatdnama of the Dutch with the Rayal, ratified the
arrangements for peace and appointed Muhammad Qasim
Mazandarani as Thanadar of that place. He took over the
government not only of Pulicat but of San Thome as well,

Tfibrezi 28a-b, 20 a-b, 5»-7a, 2U-b, I9a-b; HSh. 25; Thevenot.
102. For the date sec App. A. Col. Mackenzie is wrong in plucing the
agreement in 1636. JASB. XIII, 431.

“• MN. 276-85; 286-327; BPF LX. Pts. I & II. 38; HSh. 16-19,
300n; .TMCM. III. 459.

MIN IST/fy

JINJI

ting the country all in order,” as he proceeded, ankl
aking quick headway against the Hindu power. Chmgleput,
“which, in strength and impregnability, was equal to the
seventh heaven,” fell before his irresistible march. It was
reported (letter of January 4, 1647) that Mir Jumla was only
within two days march of the king's court (Vellore), nobody
opposing him as a severe famine had depopulated the
country. 12

The subsequent siege of Vellore, following the decisive
defeat of the Hindu general, thus seems to have been
conducted by the combined strength of the Bijapuris and
the Qutb Shahis, The Rayal submitted, promising the
payment of 50 lakhs of hurts and 150 elephants as war
indemnity (c. April, 1647), but Bijapur’s appropriation of the
entire amount proved to be a cause of its discord with Qutb
Shah. The rebellious Nayaks were now sobered into restoring
their allegiance to the Rayal, and promised to assist him
in maintaining the independence of the country. 13

In June, 1647, the English presented the Mir a brass gun
and had their privileges confirmed in return. In October, the
English factors reported that the general of the King of
Golkonda had “almost conquered this kingdom” and begun,
to reign “as king under the title of Annabob” (Nawab). 14

3. Jinji.

After securing the allegiance of the English in Madras, Mir
Jumla led the advancing Qutb Shahi troops from the north
towards Jinji during the winter of 1647-’48« The Nayak of
Tanjorc, “fearful of the near approach of so redoubtable a

u ' For Tirupati, Bali, I, 272; for Chandragiri, EC. VI. Intro, p. 24;
►SVH. 309: for Fort St George, EFI. VIII. 70, xxvii; for Pulicat,
Tabrezi, 150b-15lb (date 12 Zikada, evidently of A. H. 1056); 35b-36a;
for Chinglep.it, ibid. , 69b-70a; Love, I. 79, 80; ASR. XXIII. 40; EC.
op. cit.

MN. op. cit. ; EFI. )p. at. , xxii. Vellore was subsequently
recovered for the Rayal by Sivappa, the Nayak of Ikkeri, SVH. 347.

u * EFI. VIII. 166-7, xxvii-xxix, xxv, 70; 213-4; X. 4; CM. 141.

2

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

.v^Tirew himself at his mercy, and made a treaty with him.
T [ir Jmnla’s plan was probably to attack Jinji from north,
east and south. He conquered Tandivanam in the country
of Tanjore together with Asiur (? Aliyur) in South Aroot
district. 15 Tirumala Nayak, once betrayed by the Nayak 01
Tanjore, and harbouring a mortal revenge against him, hom
appealed to Adil Shah for help. Adil Shah also wanted to

invade Jinji, the Nayak of which appeared to have now sought

Golkonda’s assistance in self-defence. Thus Qutb Shah wrote
to Shah Jahan that the Zamindars of Jinji and Tanjore had

solicited and got his protection. To Adil Shah this united
front appeared foreboding. He came to know of these
machinations of Mir Jumla with the Nayaks of Jinji and
Tanjore directed against himself, and being mightily angry,
swore vengeance on Qntb Shah. To chastise him, Muzaffar
uddin Khan Muhammad Khan-i-Khanan, was called to the
court and ordered to plunder the country of Golkonda and
raze its forts to dust. But his march was delayed, as Hakim
Muhammad Hussain, envoy of Shahjahan, represented before
Adil Shah that Mir Jumla was only acting on the orders oi
Qutb Shah and that he (envoy) would see that the latter
should be made to give adequate compensation. Thereupon
Qutb Shah prayed to Shahjahan for enforcing the 1/3 : 2/3
division of the Ahdnama and despatched presents to Adil Shah,
without any further delay. 16

But evidently this did not satisfy Adil Shah, for on 10th
January, 1648, he commissioned Mustafa Khan from Kulbary i
to conduct, together with Tirumala Nayak, the siege of Jinji.
Mustafa advanced through Jagdev country with 17,000 horse
and 20-30,000 foot which were combined with Tirumala s

16, Tandivanam is about 16 in. east of Jinji in S. Areot dt. SAM.
435. The identification of Asiur is doubtful. It maybe Aliyur m 8.
Arcbt dt. (A8I. Sh. 2) or Arrilur or Attoor on Gingi-Trichi road in S.
Arcot dt. (ASI. Sh. 11). Can it be Aspoor of Mackenzie MS. II. Sec.
IX. 36, 37, 47 ?

16 * A Dutch account, in JIH. (Dec. 1941). 312. Mission , III. 45 b,
MN. 362-79; Tabrezi, 5a-7a: 25a-b; 151b-153a (Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 207) ;
HSh. 21-2.

miSTfy

JINJI

soldiers. Probably these menacing developments obliged
~umla to return to Conjeoveram during the rainy season of
March, 1648. But he succeeded in forestalling an Adil Shahi
contingent, heading for Wandiwash. Supported by his
formidable artillery, Mir Jumla occupied it himself and reached
Jinji even before Mustafa, so as to prevent its capture by the
Bijapuris. 161 Zahuri, the Bijapuri historian, naturally writes
that Mir Jumla “wanted to create some disturbance". The
Raja of Jinji, in pursuance of his promises, came out of the fort
to see Mir Jumla and reiterated his agreement not to prove
disloyal. When only about 10 miles intervened between the
two Muhammadan armies, the Raja with a well-equipped army
encamped two miles ahead of Mir Jumla ; but the latter
too advanced with his troops and joined the Raja.
Mustafa, considerng the combined strength of his and
Madura troops to be inadequate to meet the hostile
coalition of Mir Jumla and the Karnatak rajas, did
not mobilise and appealed to Sultan Adil Shah for
reinforcements. It was expected that the Sultan would send
ikhlas Khan (Khan Muhammad Khan-i-khanan), together with
7 to 8,000 cavalry, Rustam-i-Zaman, Afzal Khan and other
renowned wazirs and amirs. On the other hand, Qutb Shah,
who regarded the despatch of Mustafa Khan to extricate Jinji
and Tanjore from his hands as a violation of the agreement,
and had made many representations to Mir Muhammad Tahir,
appealed to Shahjahan and instructed Mir Jumla to await
favourable imperial orders, of which he was confident. 17

^SL

,tta ’ cf. Mir Jumla’s observation: “I have conquered almost all
zamindars of the Karnatak, especially that of Jinji who possessed a large
army and was more powerful in many respects than the others”,
Tabrezi, 69b.

17, For Conjeeveram and Wandiwash, JIH, op. cit; Tabrezi, 74a.
For the siege of Jinji, MN. 364403; BS. 328; Tabrezi, 5a-7a, 20a-b,
25a-b, 69a-b. Mission , III. 46; HSh. 22-27. According to BS. (320-4),
the Vail Shahi Van under ShaJiji Bhonsia and Asad Khan was scattered
by the Ray al’s general and Krishna Tupakki of Jinji. Reinforcements
drawn from the besieging force at Gandikcta wore rushed to Mustafa.
As the Rayal pressed on his victory by advancing towards Balaghat,
Malik Radmil was ordered to join Mustafa at once, and Mustafa was

LIFE OF MIR JtTMLA

<>/The two armies thus remained face to face without ant

S'?

■“engagement. A clash between them, in which alone lay the
jfbpe of salvation of Jinji, now seemed inevitable. But the
delay in the arrival of reinforcements, coupled with internal
quarrels in the Adil Shahi army and Mir Jumla’s promptness
in securing the allegiance of many Bijapuyi braves led Mustafa
to think of negotiating with the Qutb Shahi general. The
latter, too, learning of impending arrival of the Adil Shahi
reinforcements, thought it prudent to negotiate for peace.

But the rift between the two Sultans, which thus
manifested itself over the race for possession of Jinji,
widened gradually with the passage of time. For the moment, it
was temporarily bridged over by a formal agreement of peace,
a treaty or contract between the two generals, who were led
“to ignore other points of view*” on account of the “community
of faith". It was settled that after the conquest of Jinji,
Mustafa Khan would remain there and Mir Jumla would stay
at Gandikota, and each promised to help the other. The
Khan-i-Khanan returned half way and halted at Raichur,
while Mustafa conquered the forts of Changam and Trinomal,
advanced towards Jinji and besieged it. Mir Jumla returned
to his camp at Swarigonta, a dependency of Vellore, and 30
miles from Jinji, from where he had been governing, on Qutb
Shah’s behalf, a part of the territory on that side that had
come into the latter’s possession. 18

ordered to defet the battle til! the arrival of Malik Raihan. The victory
over the Hindus near Vellore was followed by a quarrel between Malik
Raihan and Mustafa; but subsequently Malik Raihan (conquering
Chittarkul and going to Sera) joined Mustafa in his siege of Jinji.
There was also a quarrel between Mustafa and Shahji and the latter waa
arrested (25th July, 1648). MN. 372.

is. mn. 365*66, 370; Tabrezi, 79a; Mission, III. 46; HSh. 21-22;
BS (Litho). 326-28; OFL. MS. 150a-151a. A Dutch account states
that Mir Jumla returned to Wand mash in October, 1048. JIH. (Dec.
1041), 312.

According to Manucci, a small river falling into the sea near
Merkanaim (64 miles S. S. W. of Madras) in Tandivanem taluk of S.
Arcot district was the dividing line between Bijapnr and Golkonda.
Storia III. 241-2, n; Madras Manual of Administration, iii, 474.
in ibid.

JINJI

death of Mustafa Khan (9th November, 1648;

Subjected the partition to fresh strain. Before the arrival ot his
permanent successor, Khan Muhammad, the siege of Jinji was
entrusted for somr time to Malik Baihan. This was regarded
by Mir Jumla as a favourable opportunity for realising his
ambitions and occupying Jinji himself. He thought that with
Mustafa Khan dead, his army scattered, and Shahji in a state
of mental depression and despair, Malik Raihan alone would not
be able to resist him and would probably raise the siege. But
Malik Raihan sent a strong and effective remonstrance to Mir
Jumla, “Your stay so near (the fort)”, he wrote, “is
prejudicial (to our interests). Its inhabitants are expecting
your help. It would be better if you go away to a distance. The
control of Adilshahi trooops is not in my hands. If anything
untoward happens, I will not be responsible. Mustafa Khan
may be dead, but I am alive ; and 1 will fight to the last.”
At this strong attitude of Malik Raihan, Mir Jumla, ' not
finding any remedy except silence”, and possibly apprehending
danger from the impending arrival of Khan Muhammad went
away to a distance, halted at Rachootee, 42 miles distant from
Vellore, and carried on his conquests further north in the
Cuddapah district, Khan Muhammad arrived from Tadpatri to
Jinji in obedience to royal order and stiffened the rigour of

the siege. 19

But Mir Jumla could not but make another endeavour to
capture Jinji. In the beginning he had already made an
entente with its Nayak and now he tried to incite him against
Bijapur, in spite of the contract with Mustafa (1618). Zakur
bin Zahuri, the official historian of Bijapur, complains that
“the ungrateful Abdullah,—whose forces had been defeated by
the Rayal and who could not have won an inch of the
Karnatak without Bijapuri support,—had formed a secret

MN. 365,360, 373-5; BS. 326-9; Tabrezi, 5a-6a, 6a-7a, 2lo-b;
HSh. 21*2, 25; EFI IX. pp. xxiv-xxv; Cf. HG. 165, 173; Tabrezi,
(80b-81 a) probably gives Mir , Jumla 5 s reply to Malik Raihan. Mir
Jumla sent some oral messages to him through Dadaji Pandit. We read
(ibid.. 75a-76a) of an ahdnama from Mir Jumla to Khan Muhammad,
which seems to be a confirmation of the agreement between
Mustafa and Mir Jumla about the partition of the Karnatak.

minis?*.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

nee with the infidel and sent his general, Mir Jumla, to
assist the Hindus in the defence of Jinji and incite the Hindu
rajas”. But Mir Jumla with his formidable army arrived too
late at a distance of 2 farsnkJis to be able to render the
promised help to the Raja. On hearing that the Khan-i-
Khanan had conqured Jinji in a day, he became so alarmed
that, instead of redeeming his pledge, he fled away towards
Golkonda. 20

The fall of Jinji 20 * was followed by the continued successful
operations (1640-50) of the Bijapuri army against theNayaksof
Tanjore and Madura, who submitted and agreed to pay
tribute, and by the plunder and devastation of their territories
including the seaboard round Tegnapatam. The unhappy
Rayal took refuge with the Nayak of Mysore, then at war
with Bijapur. There is not the slightest exaggeration in the
following observation of the Jesuit missionaries : “The Adil
Shahi forces returned to Bijapur after conqueriug a vast
country, subjugating two powerful kings and gathering
treasure beyond calculation, without having had to fight one
battle and almost without losing a single soldier.” 21

While Bijapur was thus busy with fresh conquests in the
south, Mir Jumla, “as general of Golkonda forces was busy
consolidating his position in the north.” Thus we find that
though strained almost to the breaking point, the principle of
partition continued to work satisfactorily for a time. Qutb
Shah sent a letter of congratulation to Adil Shah along with a
present of 4 lakh hurts and 4 jewels on the occasion of the fall
of Jinji. He suggested therein that the forts of Karnat and

§L

80 * MN. 379-80; HSh, 22; Cf. Mackenzie in JASB. XIII (1844),
439*440.

a°a. The litho. edn. ofBS. (328-9) gives the date 22 Zilhijja, 1058
(28th Dec. 1648). But 2 MSs. (OPL. and Allahabad) give the year in
figures, and words as 1059 (17th December, 1649). According to a
Dutch account Jinji fell in February, 1649 (JIH. Dec. 1941, pp
307-13).

“• Thevenot, 92; Mission, III. 47; HSh. 27; NM. 265-6. HT.
series I. Vol. 17, no. 532: 518; Vol. 18. no. 539 in EFI. IX.
xxiv-xxv.

MINISr^

gandikota

fadj still iinconqiiered by Adil Shah, might be allowed to be
conquered by Qutb Shah for being used as suitable bases against
enemy attacks. Adil Shah, too, agreed, and thus the fort of
Gandikota and the country of \Kokkanur were left to be
occupied by Qutb Shall. 22

<SL

4. Gandikota.

The country round Gandikota and neighbouring towns in the
modern Cuddapah and Anantapur districts of Madras then
belonged to Timma Nayar, a raja subordinate to Vijaynagar, and
to the Reddi, related to the famous line of the Reddi kings and
owing Jillala. Gandikota itself was a very important stronghold,
commanding the valley ot the Pennar. The fort stood on the
summit of the Yerramalai mountains "of the Cuddapah district at
an elevation of 1,670 feet above sea-level. The town wa*
alongside the hill, and access to it was difficult. Both the Sultans
of Bijapur and Golkonda coveted it on account of its strategic
importance. The latter had several times besieger! it, but could
not overpower its ruler. 23 Sometime after the Bijapuri
annexation of Ikkeri (1638-9) the fort ol Gandikota had been
besieged by Khan Muhammad and Malik Raihan and other
Bijapuri Wazirs. But the siege had to be given up under Adil
Shah's orders so as to reinforce the van (of Mustafa Khan), led
by Shahji Bhonsla and Asad Khan, when they were defeated by
the Rayal's troops. Probably it was about this time that Bijapur
captured Jillala and imprisoned the Reddi; but the latter escaped
and reoccupied it, and with the help of Timma Nayar invaded
2 or 3 villages of Nandiyal. Khan Muhammad made a treaty

22* Mission, III. 47; HSh. 27; Dutch records in EFI. IN. xxlv-xxv;
MN. 403-4; Thevenot, p, 102.

Kokkanur (15° 257'N, 76°E) is a village in Lingasugur district in
Moodgul circar, Haidarabad, with very ancient temples, 15 miles n. w.
of Kopbal, and the seat of Hussain Miana (ASI. sh. 30); HSh. 63;
ARADND, 1929-30, p 5. /

22 . Tabrezi, 151b-153a ; Pr. THRO. XVIII. 2)6-8; JBRS. (March,
1944), 181-2 ; Thevenot, 102 ; Ball. 1. 284 and n ; HA, 220-21. 224, 226-8
(for Golkonda’s efforts to conquer Gandikota). ASH. (1930-34), pp
42-43.

life OF MIB JUMLA I s

^Pirmna Nayar, and the Redd! had to pay compensation for k
villages, which he evidently retained. 24 But Bijapin
continued to regard these places as lying within the ambit of its
expansion till the partition agreement, by whicn Gandikota with
its adjacent territory was allocated to Qtrtb Shah.

Mir JPumla started for Gandikota with a large force, the
only means of access was by a very difficult road, cut in the
mountain, whose width ranged from 20 to 25 feet at some places
to only 7 or 8 at others. On its right there was “a fearful
precipice”, with a large river running at its base. On the
mountain there was a small plain sown, with rice and millet and
watered by many small springs. Tavernier describes the place
as follows: “At the level of the plain to the south, where the
town is built on a point, the limits aro formed by precipices,
with two rivers which bound the point at the base; so that, in
order to enter the town there is but one gate on the plain side,
and it is fortified in this direction with three good walls of cut
stone, with the ditches at their bases faced with the same stone”
Hence the defenders had only to guard “a space of .400 or 500
steps wide. ” They possessed only 2 iron guns, one being a 12
pounder, placed on the gate, the other being a 7-8 pounder placed
on a bastion-like projection. The Baja of the place, Timma
Nayar, was considered to he “one of the best and bravest
commanders” among the Hindu Kajas and lie. seemed to have
been assisted by the Reddi. As many were killed by vigorous
sorties, made by the besieged, Mir Jumla ultimately realised the
necessity of carrying the guns up to the heights. This he did
by seducing* the Baja’s Frank gunners, to each of whom he

promiseed “4 months wages more than their ordinary pay.”
With the four guns thus mounted, the fort was bombarded, and
even the gun on the gate was “rendered useless” by a direct hit.
When half the gate of the town was battered down, the
defenders capitulated, evacuating the fort under honourable
conditions. Tavernier ascribes Mir Jumla's success at Gandikota

24# BS. 319-21 (raising of siege) ; Tabrezi, 15lb-153a ; JBKS op.
at ; Pr. IHKC. op. cit ; JIH. XVIII. 28 ; Jillala (78- 23'E. 15° 23'N), 14
miles s.w. of Nandiyal on Nandiyal-Guti road. ASI. sh. 21. E pi graphic
details, dated 1569 Salta oi 1647 A.D. supply valuable corroborative
evidence. AB8IE. 107.

misr#y

GANDIKOTA

deemed'
of Mir

GANDIKOTA -

He aid of some Frenchmen who had quitted the Dutch
on account of bad treatment but he also refers to
the “great*' assistance rendered to Mir Jumla by many
English and Dutch gunners and 2 or 3 Italians. He is said to
have lost not less than 3,000 men by the sallies of the
defenders. 25

The capture of this rock fortress, hitherto
impregnable, has been regarded as the “crowning feat
Jumla in the Karnatak. 26 The account of the Bijapuri official
historian, Zahur, is clearly biased and it minimises the
importance of Mir Jumla's victory. According to him, the
raja of the fort, being proud of his wealth and numerical
strength of his army, underrated the danger of the invasion
and looked down upon Mir Jumla’s army as “a mirage in the
desert’ V; and though he began the encounter, he did not
consider it necessary to emerge out of the fort. Mir Jumla
strained himself to encircle it>. The raja could have been
successful, but he was shaken by awe of Adil Shah, and,
considering that the defeat of Mir Jumla would be of no avail ,
in face of subsequent retaliation and extermination of all
neighbouring rajas by Adil Shah, and having regard to his own
welfare, deemed obedience to Sultan’s orders expedient. . In
these circumstances he left the fort and Mir Jumla captured
it. This account also militates against the following evidence
of Thevenot : “Mir Gemla being unable to force it, made use
of'his cunning and Money and managed those (whom the
Naique sent to him to negotiate a Peace), that he wheedled out
the governor, under pretext of entering into a League with him
for great Designs : but no sooner was he come to the place of
meeting, but the Omra made sure of his person, contrary to the
Promise he had given, and kept him constantly with him till he
put him in possession of Guendicot.” 37

For his victory Mir Jumla was honoured by the present of a
A 7 auroz - i-Khilat by Qutb Shah. He now petitioned to the
Sultan for permission to go to Mecca, as before the expedition

25 * MN. 404 ; Thevenot, op, c it ; Bail, op, cit. 284-85 ; Tabrezi,
op. cit. KFI. IN 22-23n.

Aurangzib. I. 194.

MN. 404-5 ; Thoveriot, 102.

23081

MINIS,-/?,.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

)hah had promised it to him as a reward for his feat, and
also as he was showing signs of debility and exhaustion. In
fact, Mir Jumla required some rest to recuperate his health
after the arduous strain of the past five years. An illness for
about 20 days, accompanied by painful vomitting arid inability
to take food or to sleep, greatly affected his health, made him
very weak arid necessitated a standing treatment. 28

Mir Jumla’s capture of Gandikota was quickly followed by

<SL

that of C-handraguti (Guti). On the 26th August, 1652 (N. S.
when. Tavernier halted at Tirupati, he found “several
companies of military passing, some with handpikes, others
with guns and others with sticks, who were going to join one of
the principal captains of Mir Jumla’s army, on a hill near

Courua, where he had pitched his tent.“We set

Gut.”, adds he, “to salute him and found him in his

tent with many nobles who were chiefs of the country, all
being idolaters”. 29 Evidently, Mir Jumla’s captain was settling
military and political affairs of the locality with the Hindu

5. War ov r r the partition of the Kama Laic.

Hie partition scheme worked to the disadvantage of the
Raja of Chandragiri, and apparently more to the advantage of
Qutb Shah than of Adil Shah,—at least Adil Shah thought it
to be so. By its very nature the agreement turned out to be
impermanent. The Deccan politics ran along too shifty a
course to be harnessed into a definite channel ; the mutual
jealousies of the two partners were too deep-seated to be
compromised in this way. Each side began to express distrust
of its partner. During the siege of Jinji, Abdullah wrote

28 * Tabrezi, 67a-68a, 08a.

2# * Zahar (MN. 406), as usual, at tributes the conquest of Guti to the
influence of Adil Shah’s might, the defenders thinking it was ho who had
despatched Mir Jumla. According to Radha Madhava Vilasa Champu
(Patwardhan, 23*4) Shahji fought, against the Mir at Guti. For Tirupati
Ball, I. 273, and for Courua (? Ontimon Koorva, about 12 miles n.w. of
Tirupati), ibid., 272n.

WHlST/fy

WAR OVER THE PARTITION OF THE KARNATAK

mg to the Emperor 30 that Adil Shah would not, accordi 1
nature, follow the imperial order arid would consider that
“the country of the Zamindars was more than 1/3 and 2/3.”
Hence Qutb Shah instructed his Delhi Agent, Fasihuddin
Muhammad, to appeal to the Emperor for appointment of two
amins, one on behalf of Bijapur and another on behalf of
Golkonda or pray to the Emperor for writing to Mir
Muhammad Tahir (Aurangzeb’s envoy at Golkonda), for
settlement after due enquiries. Qutb Shah also appealed to the
Emperor for sending an amiri before the actual war (i.e. before
siege of Jinji), so that Adil Shah might not create any
difficulty* In another letter to the Emperor Qutb Shah
complained that Bijapur had violated the agreement, as already
known to Islam Khan, 301 and had been “outwardly and
secretly” trying to fan the flame of animosity as much as
possible. Qutb Shah, therefore, proposed to the Emperor a
modification of the terms of the partition-agreement :
(i) Regarding their respective shares in cash, jewels, elephants
and other articles of plunder and whatever was seized by Adil
Shah from the Rayal and the nayaks, Qutb Shah was willing to
allow Bijapur to appropriate everything, but (ii) the Qutb Shalli
conquests in the Karnatak were to be divided in the proportion
of | : i. This modified agreement does not seem to have been
sanctioned by the Emperor or ever followed by the Sultans.
Qutb Shah further complained that, by taking advantage of the
death of Islam Jvhan (Nov. 1617), who knew of the initial
agreement, Adil Shah had sent many wazirs under Shahji to
help the Hindus in the Karnatak, that the Rayal and other
Zamindars invaded Golkonda dominions with their own troops,
though Mir Jumla defeated the enemies and drove the Rijapuris
to the frontiers of Bidar ; that Adil Shah himself came to Bidar,
the mutual frontier, and that lie had broken his promise and
was forcibly taking away Qutb Shahs portion of spoils. Adil
Shah was also accused of overhastiness in getting his own share
(2/3) and withholding payment of Qutb Shah's share. It ia

y0 - Tabrez;, 5a-7a ; 25a-b ; Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 202-3;

a0 ‘* Governoi of the Deccan, 1645-7. Life in MU. I. 162-7 : Tr. ASB,I.

694-6.

MiNisr^

LIFE OF MIR JXJMLA

berated by the English records that after the s
el lore (1647), Bijapur got the entire indemnity. 31

Active hostilities between the two Deccani Sultans were not
long to begin. The previous crack caused by the struggle over
the possession of Jinji had only been papered over by the
contract between Mustafa and Mir Jumla, but the feeling of
jealousy was too fundamental to be effaced, and fresh causes of
ill-feeling now arose. Khan Muhammad, the Bijapuri Wazir,
made allegations against Golkonda of changed relationship.
Adi) Shah reported to the Emperor that Qutb Shah had
conquered Gandikota “against his order and without his
knowledge". He also complained that Mir Jumla, flushed with
his newly-won victories, had turned hostile to Bijapur without
the knowledge of Qutb Shah. Zahur says : “After these two
or three victories (due to misunderstanding) which were worse
than a thousand defeats. Mir Jumla's actions affected the good

name of his master. The news of his evil deeds.spread

rapidly in the dominions of Adil Shah. The latter smiled at
Qutb Shah's leaving the control of affairs to such a dangerous
man, and attributed it to his folly.In fact, to the

§L

Bijapuri historian, Mir Jumla's crime was that he “was creating
disturbances in Malnad and Karnatak/’ forgetting that his
recent conquests, specially that of Gandikota, were due to Adil
Shah's sufferance. Further, Qutb Shah was accused by Bijapur
of non-reciprocity of the kindness shown by Adi) Shah, of
violation of the agreement regarding the ownership of Jillala
and two or three v illages of Nandiyal and also of mal-treatment
of some messengers and spies of Bijapur, while the siege of Guti
was regarded as a definite cause of rupture of friendship with
Golkonda. 32

3i- Tabrezi, 20a-b, I9a-h, *21a-b ; Pr. IHRO. op. mt.

Ibid 27a (changed relationship) ; 19a-b (Mir Jumla hostile) ;

I56b-157a (Guti, Qutb not reciprocating) ; 76a-77b (Messengers & spies) ;
15lb-153a (Jillala & Nandiyal). Syed Chand Muhammad, havaldar of
Nandiyal, demanded surrender of 2 or 3 villages from ^arsu Pundit of
Jillala, then under Mir Jumla. For Mir’s reply and details see Pr. THRC,
(1942). 206 8, & JBRS (March, 1944). 181-2 ; MN. 406-8.

MIN/Sr^

WAR OVER THE PARTITION OF THE KARNATAK

the other hand, Qutb Shall asked his envoy Mulli
S&macI at Delhi to represent to the Emperor that Adil
Shah's accusations were false, that his objections to the capture
of Gandikota web not justified as it was Quth Shah's lawful
share, and that Adil Shah's constant complaints against Mir
Juinla were encroachments on his personal honour. Qutb Shall
also directed his envoy to inform the Emperor that he had
always shown due deference to Adil Shah and even instructed
him to seek advice from the imperial court regarding his own
future conduct. Further, he levelled counter charges against
Adil Shah of abetting the *‘nefarious activities" of Siddi
Jauhar of Kuraool, e.g. the latter’s invasion of Gandikota and
Guti and their adjoining territories. To prevent them Qutb
Shah even sought the mediation of his sister, the Bari Saheba
(Queen of Adil Shah). Qutb Shah instructed his Bijapur
envoy, Haji Nasira, to impress on the Sultan that Jauhar
should be properly advised and, if need be, threatened—he must
be warned at any cost. He evidently regarded these signs of
friction with Adil Shah to be highly prejudicial to their
common interests, as they would embolden the powerful
enemies, far and near, who were anxiously awaiting such events.
He was in a fix and urgently exhorted his envoy at Bijapur,
and also Khan Muhammad to endeavour to settle these
matters amicably. Mir Juinla on his part, also tried to clear up
misunderstandings by writing, letters to Khan Muhammad and
to Siddi Abdul Wahhab, Suhahdar of KurnooJ. 33

Soon came out of the clash of words a clash of amis between
the erstwhile allies. This is referred to significantly in the
Fort. St. George letter of January 14, 1652. “Wars being
commenced between the Moores of Golkonda and Vizapore, who,
ha ving shared this afflicted kingdom, are now bandying against
each other, whilst the poor Geiitue (the Rayal), hoping their
destruction, watches opportunity to break off his miserable
yoke...."

33 ‘ Tabrezi, 20a«b, 19a-b (Qutb Shah to Mulla Abdus Samad; seeking
advice) ; 25b-27a, 30a-31b (activities of Jauhar; mediation of Bari
Saheba ; friction with Bijapur prejudicial), 27a, 36a-37a (countering Khan
Muhammad’s charge) ; 76a-b ; 76b-7?b (Mir Jximla to Ikhlas Khan), 77b
(to Abdul Wahhab). ARSIE. 1935-6, p 93 for Abdul Wahhab,

LIFE OF MIR JIJMLA

8hah sent Khan i Khanan Khan Muhammad againjp
fe^Tumla to wrest the conquered forts from him. On bis way
to Gandikota, Khan Muhammad besieged the fort of
Ohandraguti, 4 farsakhs distant from it. The Adil Shahi
artillery-men took a heavy toll on the defenders by their
terrific cannonade. The Khan i Khanan then decided to
abandon the siege in order to attack Mir Jumla at Gandikota.

Mir Jumla, having at his disposal immense wealth and a
large army, prepared to oppose him. He went round the fort
and divided his troops in batches at different places. His
trustworthy general, Muhammad Khan Lodi, known for his
courage, was put in command of the van with a large fallowing.
He was met by Baji Ghorpare (of Mudhol), commanding the
Bijapuri van. During the encounter, the Bijapuri lancers
attacked Mir Jumla's forces from both sides and killed many by
their pointed arrows. Muhammad Khan Lodi fell down, under
the feet of horses and his severed head was hurled in the midst
of Mir Jumla's troops, while many soldiers were also slain. Baji
Ghorpare expelled Mir Jumla from Gandikota, and its
inhabitants lied away in consternation to mountains and jungles.
The Bijapuri historian exultingly exclaims : “Mir Jumla, who
was a powerful officer of Qubb Shah with a strong personality
unrivalled even by a crowned head, suffered defeat at the hands
of an ordinary Wazir, Baji Ghorpare, and became scattered like
dust thrown out of hand." The Madras factors observed (letter
of January 14, 1652) ; “In the interim many bickerings have
been within two days’ journey of this place, and it is reported
that the Nabob with his army is besieged among the hills of
Golkondah, whither he retired for the more safety, by the
Vizaporis." In such a humiliating situation, Mir Jumla opened
negotiations for peace, with Khan Muhammad, through a wakil
on the following terms : (i) an indemnity of two lakhs and fifty
thousand hum was to be paid by him, several officers being
detained as hostages till its complete realisation, (ii) the fort of
Gandikota and the country of Kokkanur which Adil Shah had
suffered Qutb Shah to conquer would be given to Mir Jumla,
who was to be forgiven and whose life was to be spared.

The victorious Khan considered peace to be in the interest
of Adil Shah, duly welcomed and honoured Mir Jumla’s wakil,

MIN IST/fy

WAR OVER THE PARTITION OF THE KARNATAK

forwarding his petition to the Sultan, recommended fchalj
terms be accepted because the punishment of Mir Jumla

and the destruction of the fort and the Qutb Shahi army would
mean the loss of tjie unlimited reserves of accumulated wealth
of the fort. Adil Shah agreed to the terms of peace, concluded
sometime between January 14, and February 1 .'2, 165.'? : (i) Mir
Jumla was “restored to possession of his late conquests”—
the fort of Gandikota and the country of Kokkanur ; (ii) Khan
Muhammad got from him 5 lakhs and 50 thousand hum and 4
pieces of diamonds, which were sent to Adil Shah’s court. 31

After defeating Mir Jumla the Bijapuri commander, Khan
Muhammad, advanced to effect the. conquest of Penukonda, the
capital of the Karnatak uplands, and for a time encamped in
the Kasha of Had. Though the sons of Siddi Raihan Shojapuri
had rebelled in Sera, and had entered into a hostile league with
the local rajas, especially the Raja of Mysore, Khan Muhammad
refused to be distracted and pressed the siege of Penukonda.
Its Raja begged for terms, ceded the fort (c. March, 1652) and
removed to Kandarpi. Penukonda was named Takht-i-
Mubarak. 35

There was no immediate cessation of the war in the
Karnatak. During Khan Muhammad’s rest at court and
consequent absence from the Karnatak, Sri Ran.ga Rayal
recovered a portion of his lost dominions with the help of the
Raja of Mysore.. He also repulsed an invading Qutb Shahi
force. To check the growing menace from Mysore, Khan
Muhammad started from the Court, conquered the Jagdey
country, captured the fort of Krishnagiri and besieged the fort
of Mysore and ultimately occupied four forts of its raja. 34 Next,
on his way to Jinji, the Bijapuri commander-in-chief solicited

MX 406-15 ; KFI. IX. 90, 111. See HSh.. 162, 27n. The letter
of Fob. 12, 1652 gives the amount of the indemnity as “6,00,000 (some
say 9,00,000) pagodas”. In 1651 Shahji is said to have defeated Mir
Jumla. HG. 175 ; VSCV. 121

3S> MN. 416-31. Tabrezi, 153a.

Kasha of Hud is evidently Kudclum (77°30'E, U° 8'N) about 11 miles
W. of Penukonda. Kandarpi Fort (77°7"E, 14°18'N) is in Beliary district,
east of the river Pennar (ASI. Sh. 19).

36* Mission III. 47 ; MN. 431-53 ; HSh. 28.

MIN/Styj,

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

umla's permission to pass through the districts, tike;
the control of the Golkonda troops. But this was
refused by Mir Jumla, who, alarmed at the rapid succession of
victories of the Bijapuris, was “animating the Kayak of Mysore
against them and also making overtures to the Carnatic Raja."
The Raya!, depending on Mir Jumla’s promises, returned to
Vellore and raised a large army, with the hope of driving the
Bijapuris out of the country. 87

Mir Jumla’s diplomacy compelled Adil Shah to leave Mysore
for the time being, to concentrate his attention on Sri Ranga
and conquer Vellore. The Sultan ordered Khan Muhammad to
attack the Rayal, who was trying to conquer the Vellore
district with secret Qutb Shahi help and to prevent his
junction with Mir Jumla. 38 After a long siege, the Bijapuri
general captured Vellore (1653). The Rayal was forced to
conclude a treaty with him, by which Chandragiri and the
revenues of certain districts, were left to the former.
Chandragiri now formed the sole remnant of the great empire of
Vijaynagar. The Rayal fled to the forests of the robber tribes
situated north of Tanjore (Akal Kayak's wood). Abandoned
by his courtiers, he lived there in great poverty and hardship,
and finally took refuge with the ruler of Mysore, who had once
been his vassal. 30

The two rulers of Chandragiri and Mysore now invaded the
tracts covered by the recent Golkonda conquests. But instead
of helping the Rayal to recover his territories, Tirumala, the
Nayak of Madura, begged Khan Muhammad to expel the

• 7 Dutch records and.HT. Series I. vol. XIX. no. 050 (i) in EFI. IX.
xxxiii : HSh. 28n ; MN. 453.

MN. 453-58 ; HSh r 28, 21.

39 • Zahur says that Sri Ranga, on hearing the nows of the impending
march of Khan Muhammad, did not think it safe to remain in the fort of
Vellore and after strongly defending it left it with a few followers before
the arrival of Khan Muhammad. MN. 458-’50 : Batavia letter of Nov.
7, 1554 (NS). HT. series I. vol. xix. no. 551 in EFI. IX. p. xxxiii :
Proenza (Mission III. 47) records the rumour that Sri Ranga was
expelled from Vellore by a second and stronger Golkonda force. But
Zahur and Dutch records state that the Bijapuris achieved this conquest.
HSh. 21, 28n. See I.G. XXII. 285.

misr/fy

WAR OVER THE .RARTITIO'ST OR THE KARNATAK

iiig Mysore troops and by opening the mountain passes,
enabled the Bijapur army to “carry the war into Mysore”.
From Atur, belonging to Madura, he plundered Mysore. Its raja
sent Balaji Haibat Bao, late general of Bijapur, against Khan
Muhammad. The latter in Ms turn, sent Siddi Masand -with
the ran against Balaji. In the battle that ensued Balaji was
defeated and ultimately beheaded. The Baja sued for pardon,
promising a large annual tribute and was reinstated (1653). The
Baja oi Madura sent a befitting present, including cash, goods
and 50 war elephants, to Khan Muhammad for curbing his
enemy, the Baja of Mysore. Sri Banga thus lost his last
ally.' 10

MN. 460-66 j Mission HI. 48 ; HSh. 25, 28 ; EFT. IX. 290-1.

Section B

Mm Jumla’s Administbatxon In The Kabnatak
1. Mir Jumla’s virtual supremacy over the Karnatak conquests.

By dint of his remarkable bravery, untiring energy, and
profound diplomatic skill, and with the help of his efficient
army, drilled by European artillerymen, Mir Jumla succeeded,
not only in overrunning a vast tract of the East coast, known
as the Madras or Eastern Karnatak, but also in driving a
wedge into the Bijapuri Karnatak. In theory, this rich land,
300 "miles long and of breadth varying from 40 to 200 miles,
yielding a revenue of 43 lakhs of rupees a year, possessing several
diamond mines and many strong and well-defended fortresses,
now fell like a ripe fruit, into the hands of Abdullah Qutb
Shall. Naturally he exulted over his new gains and hastened
to reward his minister-general by bestowing on him a
Naurozi Jchilat after the conquest of Gandikota and* conferring
on him the hereditary mutwalliship of several wakf villages
in the Karnatak. 1

Mir Jumla, too, acted, for sometime at least, as if he were
merely the “Sar-i-Lashkar” or general of the Sultan. As he
wrote to the latter : “Almost all wazirs, zemindars, maniwars
and sardars and middlemen have done their best in this
expedition. They have all received the special presents sent
by you and offered their grateful thanks for the same. Every
one expects to get your favour, according to his merit, and
I expect that these dependents engaged in fighting would
secure your favour. As far as I know, I do not waver in
the discharge of my duties regarding the administration of
territories and provisions, securing the goodwill of the great
and the small, reconciling soldiers and subjects and defeating
the enemies. In all these I am doing my level best. I pray
that your Majesty would always advise me.” In their report
to the English E. I. C. dated 17th January, 1651, Walter
Littleton and Venkat Brahman, who had been sent by the

i. Wans, 102» ; Tabrezi, 87a-68 (khilat); 42e-43a (routwalliahip).

MINIS fyy

Mm jumla’s civil administration

hh Agent on a mission to the Nawab, observed that th^
annually sent to the king a revenue of 20 hundred
thousand pagodas. 2

With his characteristic thoroughness Mir Jumla had set
himself to the task of establishing complete and effective
control over the conquered country, as he advanced. The
Fort St. George factors observed (January 4, 1047) : “The
warres (wars) and fammine doth furiously rage in these parts,
and we think© that there wilbe a period sett unto the former
before the latter ; for the Anna Bobb (al Nawab) Mir Jumlah
hath taken the government of Pullican (Pulicat) and St.

Thome, setting the country all in order as he goeth along_’ \

This is corroborated by an order (Hash ul hukm) of Qutb Shah
to the Dutch captain of Pulicat, confirming the agreement
which Mir Jumla had made with the captain for “capturing
the qasba and the fort and the port of Pulicat and the country
and territories” adjacent to it. 3 Again Mir Jumla also
confirmed the rights of the English at Madras, granted by the
Dam aria Brothers in 1639 and confirmed by Sri JE&anga Kayal
in 1645.

With the growing estrangement of the Sultan from his
victorious general, the latter began to look upon his conquests
in the Karnatak as his own independent kingdom. In his lette r
to Khalifa-i-Sultan, the Wazir of Persia, Mir Jumla noted :
“The entire body of rebels and rajas of these parts (i.e. the
Karnatak) have all been brought within the fold of mv
control.” 4 It would thus appear that the sovereign rights of
the Baja of Chandragiri were acquired at first by Sultan Qutb
Shah and later on usurped by Mir Jumla himself.

2. Mir Jumla’s civil administration.

It is not, however, possible to give a detailed and
comprehensive account of Mir Jumla's administration in the
Karnatak. The duration of his authority was not so long as to
enable him to introduce any innovation in the system of
government. Moreover, he found his hands full, first owing to
iho continued warfare, necessary to conquer the country, and

2 * Tabrezi, G6a-67a (methods of consolidation) ; EFT. IX. 12.

EFJ. VIII. 70 ; Tabrezi, 35b-36a.

4 ‘ Tabrezi, 70a.72b ; MU. III. 530-1 ; Aurangzib, I. 195, 216.

UFB OF MT.K .UTMLA

o his preoccupations during the period of his strained
relations with the Golkonda court, and finally his departure
from the Kamatak after his appointment in Mughal imperial
Service. It is thus reasonable to infer that he maintained the
system which he had inherited from Vijaynagar or from the
Nay a), an rule, though the change of masters caused a change of

spirit in tho administration. •

Mir Jumla must, have continued the village organisation of
idle Vijaynagar empire, asin the contemporary European records
we find references to the designations of some old village-
officials, e.g., the Nativar or headman, of a md-ti, a circle of villages,
the Karnam. or KmakkapilM or accountant, the Taiiyari
(sthalwar) or tukri, or the village policeman, and the pohgar,
the police officer, responsible for safety and peace of a circle
of villages*

Gandikota was the headquarters of Mir Jumla s government.
The scattered references in some English factory records show
that the country conquered by Mir Jumla, especially the region
round Madras, was divided into some administrative units, eaeh
being placed hi charge of a Governor.®

In English records we read of Mallappa, Sayyid Ibrahim,
Timruaji, Bala Rau and Mir Wavy id Ali as connected with
Nawab Mir Jumla's government of Poonamallee or having

relations with the English at Madras during 1855-58. Sir

William Foster and Mr.Love describe Mallappa and Timmaji as
the Nawab’s Adigar or representative at the choultry of Madras,
but it would appear that Mallappa was not only the Nawab s
Adigar at Madras, but also acted as his governor of Poonamallee.
For, after confirming the privileges granted to the English
by Sri Ranga in June, 1847, Mir Jumla sent Mallappa along
with the English Agent to Madras “to look after” its
government, and he remained there for seven years, “governing
after the manner of the former governors”. Sayyid Ibrahim
succeeded Mallappa as Governor of Poonamallee and he sent

s. CM. 228, 244-47 j TO. 103-4 ; NAM. eh. 3, 90 ff.

•- 'fiie Fort St* George records of 1670 indicate a similar system and
officers wore stationed at Conjeoveram, Pulimolla (Poonamallee)*
Palavar&m and Chingleput. CM. 227,

MIR JCMLa’s CIVIT. ADMINISTRATION

as the Nawab’s Adigar at Madras. 7 In I65i» Ruataq^
am of Zulfiqar Astarabadi, was the havaldat of
Poonainalleo. 8

Mir Jumla placed the financial administration of the
Karaatak in charge of a class of Brahmans who became
distinguished as "Qolkorida Neyogeea” (employed). The total
revenue obtained by Mir Jumla from the Karnatak was 43 lakhs
of rupees a year. 9 His principal sources of income were (i) land
revenue, (u) the ‘Carnatic plunder’, (hi) diamond mining,
(iv) commercial activities, including control of internal
production and monopoly, (v) customs, (vi) octroi duties,
(vii) slavery licenses, (viii) presents, and (ix) impositions.

In his land revenue administration, Mir Jumla appears to
have followed the system of farming the revenue. With the
establishment of Muhammadan rule, there was a change iu
the nomenclature and classes of persons connected with land
and abridgment of the privileges of village proprietors and
increase of assessments on land. 10

He made a vast fortune by acquiring the wealth of the
captured forts, “hoarded treasures” at- various places and other
spoils of war, and by plundering the many old temples iu
the Karnatak and seizing all precious stones od their idols.
According to Catrou “he compelled the inhabitants ol the
Karnatio to surrender to him whatever they possessed of gold
and jewels; and lie caused those, who, according to the custom
of the country had buried their treasures, to expire under the
severity of the lash.” Thevenot observes that Mir Jumla had
the wealth of a prince”, possessing 20 maimds weight of
diamonds, all got from the ‘Carnatic plunder’. 11

7 * Chamber’s Narrative : Love I. 189. EFI. XI. 236, n,

EIM. 1937-38, pp. 52*54 ; EFI. XI. 262.

»* Of. J YSB. XIII (1844), 440-1 & n ; Waris, 102a, b speaks of 43
lakhs (see ante p. 35.). Littleton and Venkat Brahman reported (Jan, 17,
1651) that the revenue taken.by Mir Jumla from “the Jonfcue” was 49
hundrod thousand pagodas a year. EEI. IX. 12.

l0, CM. 215-6, 227-8 ; oh. 5 ; Hemingway, 210f ; NAM. 91-92.

u - Adah, 36b ; Waris, 102b. Storm 1. 232. Homier, 1748a.; Catrou,
207 ; Marxucci ( Storm iii. 242) says that in. the Karnatak much treasure
was buried by men of old times ; Mir Jumla gob some coins, the type of
which was not definitely known. See infra the para on cannon founding.
Aurangzib I. 194. Thevenot, Ch. 8. 102.

MIN/S7ft k

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

mond mining was one of the principal sources
tuo. (Setting information that there were diamond mines
in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla sent 12,000 conscript agricultural
labourers to work them for one year prior to his conquest of the
country, and came to possess 5 small bags of diamonds, but as
their quality did not compensate for the trouble involved, ho-
forbade “further mining" and “sent all these poor people
back to tillage." 12 Besides diamonds, Mir Jumla’s Karnatak
dominions also abounded in bezoars, iron, steel, and saltpetre,
and Mir Jumla could manufacture and procure a large quantity
of the last mentioned article every year. 13

The proceeds of Mir Jumla's extensive and well-organised
commercial enterprises, both inland and foreign, formed another
source of his revenue. The basis of his economic system was
monopoly. He charged monopoly prices and tried to control
internal production. He established a monopoly of the trade ia
all 'brown’ or unbleached cloth in his “new conquests" ; and
they were sold at 20% profit. Again, sale of grain seemed to bo
a strict state monopoly. Paddy and other necessaries coming
to Madras through his jurisdiction had to pay customs, while
paddy was sold to the townspeople at 25% more than the market
price. The English at Madras could not sell anything except
the articles purchased from the men of Nawab's farmer at prices
50% higher than those prevailing in the neighbourhood. He
wahted to establish a monopoly on “all imported goods”. His
articles were carried to Pegu and Persia customs free, as if they
were the goods of the English E. I. C. 1 *

12, Tavomier’a report dated 10th September, 1652. Ball, I. 287.
It m not clear from Tavornier how Mir Jumla could send men to work the
diamond fields before occupation of tho country, unless it is assumed that
he acted only as tho lessee for one yoa-r, but tho question of ownership is
not settled.

For location of the mines, see Ball, I. 287n (and a map) ; II. Ch„
17 ; App. 1 & 2, & II. 86. Irving Brook’s Translation of Bernier, p. 24 t
MX. 248-60 ; Modern Review, Sept. 1042.

1# * EFI. IX. 12 : for Bezoars, see Thevenot, eh. 6. p. 99.

14 ‘ Vide the section, on “Mir Jumla’s commercial activities”, fo»
details. For monopoly, Love I. 189, 165-66 ; EFI. X. 41, 93; IX.
22-23, 235, xxv ; for customs free goods, EFI. IX. 262-3 ; Pr. IHC.
1939, 934-36 ; JIH. (Aug. 1941), 157 ; AA. 148-9.

MIR JUMLA’S CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

As successor to the Hindu Raja Sri Ranga, by virtue of
6nquest, Mir Jumia had inherited the suzerain s claim
half the customs and revenues of the port and the city of
Madraspatam respectively. For the collection of his share of
customs and revenues, the N&wab had his officers stationed at
Madras, San Thome, Mylapore and other places. The services
of such officers were indispensable to him, for attempts
to deprive him of his due share were probably not infrequent.
Mallappa, the NawaVs Adi gar (adhikuTi) at Madras, constantly
attended the choultry to see that his master s share of the
customs was duly credited. 16

Mir Jumla also endeavoured to increase the customs on
articles of common consupmtion, sold in the market at Madras,
e.g. provisions, betel, herbs, in violation of the Nayak’s grant
of Madras dated 22nd August, 1639, and Sri Ranges grant
(Oct-Nov., 1645) which he had confirmed. 18

An Octroi or transit duty was also levied on the English
factors to their great annoyance. 17 The Nawab used to get hall
of the fee for licensing slaves. John Leigh, a factor at
Pettapoli, who was ordered to sit at the Madras choultry as
judge on alternate weeks, observed : “They will venture their
neckes for 9d, for the custom is but 18 d., and the Nabob hath
9 of it/* 18 Presents from different companies formed another

The claim to customs is an ordinary right of a suzerain power.
By the Naik’s grant of Madras (22nd Aug. 1639), the English were to
receive half the customs and revenues of the port and perpetual
exemption from customs on Company’s import and export trade. It was
confirmed with some additional privileges by the g^ni of Sri Ranga (Oct.
-Nov. 1645). Records of 15th Aug. 1649 and 10th Nov. 1679 show that
an ad valorem duty of 4 %% was levied at Madraspatam on all imports and
exports irrespective of ownership. The entire receipts were credited to
Fort St. George treasury, except only half of such amount as was
received from tradors, who were not inhabitants of the place. That half
was payable to the native government. Love, I. 68-70 & n ; 17 & n;
FFSG. 8, 33. 34, 42 ; Mir Jumla confirmed these privileges in June,
1647.

«• EFT. IX. 235-6 ; Love I. 123, 130, 18, 68 ; FFSG. 8, 33.

l7# Fort St. George records of 1670 ; CM. '227,
l8 ‘ Love I. 131 & n, 128, 71 & n.

LIFE OF MJtt JUMLA

§L

addititoljLj

of income to Mir Jumla. Possibly
^^emitributions were realised in times of urgent need. 19

Mir Jumla’vS administration of criminal justice was severe
but quick. Referring to his conduct in connection with the
trial of some criminals on 14th September, 1652 (NS), Tavernier
says: “It is the custom in this country not to keep a man in
prison; but immediately the accused is taken he is examined and
sentence is pronounced on him, which is then executed without
any delay. If the person whom they have seized is found to be
innocent he is released at once ; and whatever the nature of the
ease may be, it is promptly concluded". Next day when
informed that four prisoners, “who were then at the door of his
tent" bad arri ved, Mir Jumla remained silent more than half
an hour, “writing continually and making his secretaries write,
but at length he suddenly ordered the criminals to be brought
in ; and after having questioned them and made them confess
with their own mouths the crime of which they were accused,
he remained nearly an hour without saying anything continuing
to write and to make his secretaries write." Then many army
officers entered his tent and to their salute Mir Jumla replied
only by nodding his head. One prisoner, “who had entered a

house and had slain a mother and her three infants.was

condemned forthwith to have his feet and hands cut off, and to
be thrown into a field near the high road to end his days." The
Nawab ordered another, who had committed theft on the high
road, “to have his stomach slit open and to be flung in a
drain." The heads of two others, whose crimes were not
mentioned by Tavernier, were cut off.

The above details from an eye-witness's account give us
some idea of the methodical way in which Mir Jumla transacted
administrative work. Wo come to know of his profound industry
and his capacity for efficient discharge of duties from the
following events also recorded by the same foreign traveller :
“‘On the 15th September at 7 o'clock in the morning, wo went
to the Nawab, and immediately we were announced he asked us
to enter his tent, where he was seated with two of hi®
secretaries by him. According to the custom of the country—

CM. 227.

misTfy

MILITARY ORGANISATION

►tie goes with naked feet in slippers, without stocking^
wherever you enter you walk on a carpet and sit in
this country as in Turkey, and as our tailors do here,—the
Nawab had the intervals between his toes full of letters and he
also had many between the fingers of the left hand. He drew
them sometimes from his feet, sometimes from his hand, and
sent his replies through his two secretaries, writing some also
himself.” He made his secretaries read out their letters, and
then taking them, sealed them himself, “giving some to footmen
and others to horsemen'’. 20

For facility in transmission of news, Mir Jumla set up a
dalcchouki. from Haidarabad to the Kamatak. Its working has
been thus described by Tavernier : “At every two leagues
there are small huts, where two or three men employed for
running live and immediately when the earner of a letter has
arri ved at one of these huts, he throws it to the others at the
entrance and one of them takes it up and at once sots off to
run. It is considered unlucky to give a letter into the hand of
the messenger : it is therefore thrown at his feet, and he must
lift it up.” The system helped quick transmission of news.
Mir Jumla ordered 16 horsemen to escort Tavernier and his
party and provide them with any requisites of journey on the
way leading to the frontier, which was a river 13 leagues from
dandikota. 21

3 . Military Organisation .

At the time of his deputation by Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah
to the Karnatak, the Mir's own personal army, apart from the
tjutb Shahi forces, was fairly considerable ; for Aurangzeb tells
us that Mir Jumla sent “the major part of his army” to the
Karnatak. There his huge wealth enabled him to build up and
maintain a vast soldiery. According to Walter Littleton and
Venkat Brahman (17th January, 1651), Mir Jumla had 300
elephants, 400 or 500 camels and 10,000 oxen. In the compaign
against Bijapur in 1652, he brought into action a large army,

20 - Ball, I. 290-9 L

«• Ball, I. 291-2, 293 ; MM. 92b-94. See Adah 87b, 83b-83a and
6rD (Sultan Md. to Qutb) ; For transport in Haidarabad see Thevenofc
(1686 ed), 104.

misfy

LIFE OP MIR JUMLA

sitting of Mughals, Afghans, Pathans, and Rajputs, reerur
great efforts and of which he was proud. As he felt
himself strong and firm in those regions, he won over many
Qutb Khahi generals and soldiers by ‘dine treatment and
favours" and collected together an army as efficient as the
old Shahi army. 22 Muhammad Mumin, who was sent by
Aurangzeb to report on the affairs of Mir Jumla (1653-’54)
observed that his army probably numbered 9000 cavalry—of
which 5000 were his own servants and 4000 Qutb Shahi
deserters,—and 20,000 infantry, that his resources consisted of
cash, fine jewels, artillery, good elephants, Iraqi and Arab horses
and that all articles of pomp, and dignity had reached
perfection. 33

There were many Europeans,—Franks, Englishmen,
Portuguese and Italians, in Mir Jumla’s army, chiefly in the
artillery, as gunners, gunner's mates, armourers and sometimes
as troopers. During 1650-2, there were six gunners lent by
the English to Mir Jumla—Jeremy Root, Hugh Dixon, Richard
Emerson, John Cowhill, Robert Bringbourne and Richard Hall.
The servioes of Jeremy Root, gunner of Fort St. George, were
highly valued by Mir Jumla. In 1653 two more gunners
deserted the Fort St. George garrison and were employed by
Mir Jumla. The latter readily afforded protection to any run¬
away from Fort St. George garrison, 24 An English gunner and
“his Italian comrade", belonging to the Nawab's army invited
to a dinner Tavernier and his companion (M. Du Jardin) when
they visited Mir Jumla at Gandikota in September, 1652. A
French gunner, gunfo under and surgeon named Claude Maille of
Bourges was then engaged in casting 20 pieces of cannon ( 10 of

a *‘ Adab 36b ; Storia I. 232 ; Waris, 102b ; EFI. IX. 12 ; MN.
411 (1652 campaign) : The Rajputs of X. Areofc district claim to have
come from Rajputana with Muhammadan armies. NAM, 267.

* 3 * Adab 39a.

® 4 - EFI. IX. 17, 43, n ; 94, 100, 154 ; Love I. 99, 106 ; Hodges,
III. 196, It was diiBcult for such men, lent by the E. 1. 0. to Mir
Jumla, to got leave. EFI. X. 91. Bowrey ( p. Ill ) nays that the high
•alary offered by Mir Jumla tempted many to desert Fort St.
George colours and join his army. COM. 1650-54, p 152 ; Catrouu
208 (Portuguese.)

MINI $Tq

MILITARY ORGANISATION

• Go ^

/nds, and 10 of 24 pounds ), which Mir Jumla wanted tfe
inside the fort of Gandikota as it was difficult to carry
them up. Copper flowed in “from all quarters” and many idols,
removed from “.the pagodas” by the army, were collected
together. Maiile succeeded in melting ail metals and idols,
“except the 6 large idols of the famous pagoda of Gandikota”.
But as he could not manufacture a single cannon, he gave up
the work and subsequently left the Nawab's service. 26 Mir
Jumla had several Hindu generals in his army. Damarla
Venkatappa joined him after being dismissed by Sri Ranga.
Tupakki Krishnappa Nayak of Jinji played a very important
part as Mir Jumla's General during the Hindu revolt in
the Kamatak. 26 Another Hindu commander was Chinnatambi
Mudalivar. 27

Mir Jumla had to be naturally cautious about maintaining
an effective control over such a heterogenous body, having in it
deserters from armies of the neighbouring powers. Tavernier
says that no one was permitted to cross a liver 13 leagues from
Gandikota “without having the Nawab's passport.” 28

There were occasional reviews of the army. On Sept.
1, 1652 (NS), Tavernier found “the whole army” encamped
at Gandikota near the base of the mountain on the
plains of the Pennar river, and the cavalry, whose review
Mir Jumla was just finishing, struck Tavernier as “very
smart”. A second review of “the greater part of the army”
was fixed for 14th September,

Soldiers were sometimes paid in cash. Taverniex
notes that “all the Frank gunners” went ( 11th September,
1652 ) to the tent of Mir Jumla, “clamouring for payment
of the promised four months' wages,” and they even
threatened to desert him in case of non-payment. The Nawab

* R * * **• Ball ( 1. 288-90 ) soys that the difficulty in molting the idola
was due to the fact that they were made of iion and not of copper.
See Aurangzib i, 194. For Claude Maiile, gunfounder and surgeon of
Mir Jumla, see Ball, op, cit. 1. 286, 116; 289, 301 n.

a “ BFL IX. 240. n.

**• EFI, X. 176. Is he to bo identified with the Madura accoun¬
tant of the same name ? SVH . 325.

Ball. 1. 239.

MIN ISTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

them to come the next day, when they were pa
three months and assured of the payment of arrear of
one month at the close of September. The Frank gunners
immediately spent their wages in rinusements and
entertainments, “the baladines (dancing girls) carrying off
.more than half of it/' 2 *

4. Mir Jumla’s overseas commercial activities .

Absorbed as Mir Jumla was in his political activities,
he never lost sight of commerce, the perennial source of
his wealth, prosperity and power. From slight beginnings
the volume of his commerce, internal and external, swelled
mightily by the end of 1650. Early next January, Mir
Jumla had 4,000 horses, 300 elephants, 400 or 500 camels
-and 10,000 oxen which used to transport his goods to
several countries like Golkonda and Bijapur and even into
different regions of the Mughal Empire. Everywhere he had
his agents and merchants stationed. Moreover, he had
trading relations with (i) Burma—-Arrakan, Pegu, Tenasserim
(Mergiii Archipelago), ( ii) Acheen, Peruk, Macassar and
the Maldives, (iil) Persia and Arabia, and (iv) Bengal.
His mercantile marine then consisted of 10 ships and ho
gradually increased their number by building more ships,
especially at Narsapur on the East coast. There a junk
of 800 tons had been built in July, 1638, for being sent
to Persia or Mocha and it was referred to in factory
correspondence as the “great” junk of the Sar-i-khail™

Unwilling to employ Vijaynagar sailors under apprehension
of their treachery, Mir Jumla asked both the English
and Hutch companies to lend him pilots and sailors for
navigating his junks, viz. Roger Adams (1642), Richard

2D * Ball I. 285-0, 288-289, 291.

30 * For range of trade, Keport of Walter Littleton and Venkata
Brahman ( Jan. 17. 1651 ) in Love, 1. 100, EFI. IX. 12; for shipbuild¬
ing, EFI. VI. 79-80; 168; VII. 88, 55. One of the agents of the
Mir was named Virappa, EFI. IX. 262.

Peruk was to the South of Queda in Malay Peninsula and
subject to the king of Acheen. Bowrey, 2G0n, 275n.

miSTfiy

• G0^\

MIE JTTMLA'S OVERSEAS OGMMKIiCIAL ACTIVITIES

-n (1647), John Gayton (1646), Thomas Bos took (1650).

Inhere were some Muslim pilots also, for example, Muhammad
Beg in charge of the Mubarak Tukli, sailing to Pegu,
Makhuda Nura, sailing to Acheen, Nakhuda Mulla Kasaa
Ali sailing to Gombroon. 32

In spite of his growing mercantile marine, Mir Jumla
suffered from naval weakness and had to depend for
passports on the European Companies. In 1651, the Sultan
of Golkonda and Mir Jumla ceased to ask the Portuguese for
passports for their vessels, yet during the siege of
Madras (September, 1657—April, 1658), the English were
asked to give “passes” (passports) for Mir Jumla s sea-going
junks. But they refused. 83

Mir Jumla wanted to get a share in the profitable trade
with Burma. It was the home of “perfect Rubies and
Sapphires,” prized in different parts of the world. Its
gumlack was of the finest quality and superior to Indian
lac. Martavan jars, some gold, copper, tin, quicksilver,
ganza (bell-metal) and benzoin were also available there. 84
As minister in Golkonda he sent Hasan Ivhan to Pegu
to open commercial relations with its ruler, famous as‘the
Lord of white Elephants." Subsequently the Mir asked the
latter to permit Muhammad Beg, the captain of a Golkonda
ship, to trade annually with his own ships to Pegu. 35 Mir
Jumla sometimes employed English private traders (e.g. Richard
Cogan in 1647) to conduct commercial operations on his behalf
to Pegu, which were more.profitable than those of the English.
Mir Jura la’s junks laden with his own freight goods sailed
regularly from Masulipatam to Pegu, while his servants and
agents used to constantly journey to and from Pegu,
sometimes on Dutch ships (e. g. 1653). The political disorders

si- efi, vi. 76-77, 5Xn, 56n, 255 ; Dutch sailors in EFI. VII. 69,
81, 234 ; VIII. 48, 139, 273 i Dutch pilot, EFI. IX. 14, 256-7, 268-9.
See. Fr. IHC (1939). 927-29, n.

» a - Tabrezi, 147b ; EFI, VI. 167-8 and n ; 260, 71.

**• Danvers It. 301 (Portuguese) ; EFI. X. 175.

»«• Hall, 87 ff ; Pure}.as V. 1004 ; Moreland, EKO. EFI. II.
368 ; V. 16, 140 ; VI. 94 ; Howrey,:290, 275n.

35 * Mir Jumla’s letter to the Wazir of Pegu. Tabrezi, 147b.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Sl

Pegu due to the invasion of the Chinese adverj
^yMected the trade of Mir Jumia. as well as of the Dutch
about 3651. About 1653 the king of Pegu prohibited the
sale of tin and tusks to strangers and the export of
Ganza and organised guards on the way to Martaban to
implement his order. 36

Arrakan was famous for wild elephants. Mir Jumia prayed
to Dharmaraja, the ruler of Arrakan, for grant of trade
faeilties to his men. At his special entreaty, the Raja released
from prison seven Iraqis suspected to be Shahjahan’s agents.
He also requested the Raja to release several Mughals long
imprisoned in Arrakan and to grant free trade facilities so that
Arrakan might be the meeting place of traders from different
lands. Mir Jumia purchased 4 elephants sent by the Raja to
the East Coast and received one as a reward. 37

In return for the East Coast calicoes, Mir Jumia procured
the spices of the East Indies, slaves and rice from Macassar,
tin from Peruk and cowries from the Maldives, 38

86, Cogan affair, EH. VIII. 98-99, 198; IX. 260, 263, 206-7
( using Dutch ship ), 19. Mir Jumia secured the release of Richard
Oogan, when the latter was imprisoned by the English Agent of Madras.

Buraia was under the Toungoo dynasty ( 1531-1752). After 1628
the monarchy became weak and Upper Burma was twice overrun by
the Ming and Manchu Chinese and five times by the Manipuris. Harvey,
192-99. Encyolo. Brit. ( 14th ed. ) IV. 430.

3? ‘ For Arrakan trade, Bowroy. 73, 245u. 222; Coni. 153a. SAR.
178 ; Manrique, Ch. 23. For Mir Jumla’s 2 letters to the Raja and
proposal to send Kamran Beg, Tabrezi, 148b, 149a. This Mir Jumia-
Arrakan correspondence is undated, but most probably it belonged to
the period of the Mir’s stay in the Kamatak. Probably the 23rd king
of Arrakan Tsan da tku damma ( aco. 1652 ) is referred to here aa
Dharmaraja. Vide Capt. A. P. Phayre’s article. “On the History of
Arakan” in JASB. XIII ( 1844 ), 23-52. Harvey, 145,

Tenasserim was also famous for elephants, Bowrey, 73, 179, 245n
( customs taken ).

s "' For Achoeri trade, EFX. VI., 167-8n; Bowrey, 288-9) for Bantam,
Macassar, EFI. IX. 99, 290-1; Bowrey, 291 ( slaves ). Macassar was a
iree port and ships paid no customs, Ball’s Tavernier. I. pt. II, 191, For
Peruk, Bowrey, 283u, 252n, 267n, 280n; for Maldives, ibid, 104, 79.

MINlSr^

*] Mffi JDMU S OVERSEAS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

rsia figured prominently in his commercial enterprises?
r ery year he used to send a large quantity of goods in his
junks of all sizes from the East Coast of India to Persia.
Other ships were not allowed to load themselves till those of
Mir Jumla, the ‘ 'all ruling Sar i khail or Vizier’* were filled
up. His power and influence as the minister of Golkonda
enabled him to utilise the ships of the English E. I. Company
also in transporting his articles (e. g. sugar in 1(337 and '40)
to Persia without paying any freight and any customs. In
1.651-2 Mir Jumla’a junk reached Gombroon via Gwador on
the Makran coast and about 200 tumans were remitted as the
Company's share of customs due on his goods from
Masulipatam. In 1658 the Gombroon factors apprehended
troubles if the landing and transporting customs-free of two
bales of Mir Jumla's goods became known to the Shahbundar
as the latter claimed the right to open bales, suspected to
belong to “the Moors”. But they were advised by the
Madras factors that if they were “to continue in this country",
they must not deny the privilege and must be prepared to
suffer in case of denial. 39 The practice of sending goods
customs-free continued when Mir Jumla became the Governor
of Bengal.

Mir Jumla regularly sent his junks to Mokha, pilotted
by Englishmen in 1642, 1646 and 1647. 40

Through his commercial activities Mir Jumla the Persian
became one of the principal inheritors of the maritime trade
of the Vijaynagar Empire with Arrakan, Pegu, Tenasserim,
the Malay Peninsula and the Archipelago, and with Persia
and Arabia. In the 16th century the Portuguese had
displaced the Arabs as the carriers of that trade. During
the first half of the 17th century Mir Jumla endeavoured to
step into the void, created by the decline of the Vijaynagar

50 . EFI. VI. 30, n, 269, 71 ( freight free ); VII, 88, 67, 207-8
( customs free ), 55; IX, 262; 220-22; for remission IX. 67, 117-118,
125-26; Shahbundar’s strictness, ibid , 157& n, 200; also Hague Tr.
series, I. Vol. 18, no. 549 in ibid; opinion of Madras factors, ibid , 228,282;
opinion of Surat factors, ibid,, 256-257, 268-9.

40 . EFI. VII. 69, 81, 234; VIII.’98, 138, ( Darya Daulat ); for
Mokha trade, Bowrey 103, 152n, 245n.

misr^y.

LIFE OF MIR JTJMLA

■ire and the Portuguese. The situation was favourable^
the English trade had not been securely established and as
there was acute rivalry between the Dutch and the English,
each trying to outbid the other in securing the favours of the
Mir. Mir Jumla also became a keen competitor of the English
E. I. Company especially in the Burmese and Persian trade.
The English not finding any opportunity of getting freight on*
goods sent from Masulipatam to Persia, endeavoured not to
lose any freight in the Bay of Bengal ports. They also tried'
to prevent the extension of his commercial ascendancy in Pegu
and the Burmese waters. 41

5. 'Religious effects of Mir Jumla s conquest, of the Karnatak.

In one of his letters to Mir Jumla, Qutb Shah w -ote ;•
“The territories of Hindu Karnatalc have come under my !
possession with its villages and forts. The banner of Islam
has been unfurled there. The shrines of idols and places
of pilgrimage have been converted into mosques and places
of worship of the Muslims and the practices of Islamic religion
have been widely diffused. Three qitas of villages under a’
town, are set apart according to the rules of the Shariat, for
the inhabitants of Najf. As these territories were conquered
through the energy and efforts of Mir Jumla. the Mutwalliship
of these villages is now conferred on him and his family
indefinitely. The total income of these places should be sent
to Najf. My successors are hereby ordered that no interference
should be made in this arrangement.”

Speaking of his victories in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla wrote
to Nawab Khalifa-i-Sultan, Wazir of Persia : “By God’s grace
and Padshah’s luck, the banner of Islam has been flown in
the infidel country of the Karnatak and that of Hinduism has
been brought down.The voice of Islam and the

4l# Vijaynagar trade in Ramanayya, SHTDV. ch. X ; 8VH.
57; VSCV. 220-24; Storia, III. 242; Commercial position of tlio
English in India, Pr. IHC. (1939), 918 920 ; competition with the
English, EFU VL 79-80 ; VII. 88, 55, 67 ; VIII. 98 99, 198.

A STRONG POSITION OF Milt JUMLA

|ices of our saints have been manifest here.” 42 i
tjice of the conversion of temples into mosques it
noted that in 1653, Rustam Beg, the kavalda
1 amallee fort, built a mosque by demolishing the

Mir Jumla pillaged the temples, by plundering their
wealth and collecting together the idols, whether of gold,
silver or copper and melted some of them for easting cannon. *

6. Strong Position of Mir Jumla.

Even neutral observers, like the foreign merchants, were
impressed by Mir Jumla’s power and great resources, and
came to show him the deference due to crowned heads.
Walter Littleton and Venkata Brahman, who had been sent
by the English Agent on a mission to the Nawab, observed
(Jan. 1651): “The whole kingdome of Gulcundah is governed
by him, of whome the people stand in feare and subjection
unto as to the kinge himself.” Even Aurangzeb wrote to the
Emperor in 1645 that "Mir Jumla had got hold over a

populous country containing forts, ports and mines ..

Possessing a pleasing countenance, a medium stature, wisdom
and quickness of apprehension, and well-behaved to others, he

had under bis control many worthy officers”. "In short.

. though Mir Jumla’s rank was that of a noble,

he possessed the power, wealth and grandeur of a ruling
prince. f he lebellion of Mir Jumla, the Mughal invasion
<>i Haidarabad and Mir Jumla’s appointment as Mughal
1 homier,—all follow logically as the sequel to his conquest of
the Karnatak,

Na, j** fc,le site of the tomb of All, is a place of pilgrimage for
Shius. Tabrezi, 42a-43a, 70a-72b ; Mir Jumla-lran Correspondence,

JRORR, June, 1942.

EIM. 1937-38. pp. 52-54. English factory records refer to
Rustam Beg’s plunder of a pagoda at Triplieane. Love I. 142 & n :
EFI. IX, 262.

* ^ * 12 (Littleton and Brahman’s report) ; A dub, 39a ;
Thevenot, op. oit; Aurangzib X. 195.

4

Section C

<SL

Section C

Relation With The European Companies’

( Till 1655 )

1. Mir Jumla s diplomatic use. of his own position.

As Governor of Masulipatam since 1635-’6, Mir Jumla
viewed with jealousy the commercial concessions enjoyed by
the English. By the Golden Farman of 1634 the English had
secured complete exemption from all customs in the Golkonda
kingdom on certain conditions, and the farmers of the
Masulipatam customs had been allowed to pay 806 pagodas
(about £ 400) less a year to the royal treasury by way of
compensation for resultant loss. The Farman was to become
invalid if the duties payable by the English exceeded that
amount. Concerned at the loss of customs revenues, owing
to unlicensed practices on the part of the English East
India Company’s traders, Mir Jumla took steps against them,
in co-operation with the Dutch, and acquainted the Sultan
of their violation of the Golden Farman. Matters proceeded
so far that the Far-i-Khail ( Abdullah Khan Mazandarani)
and the dabir ( Mulla Wais ) of the Golkonda court demanded
from the English the excess over 800 pagodas, the stipulated
yearly abatement. 3

As Sar-i-khail of Golkonda since 1637, Mir Jumla
continued his efforts to prevent the loss to customs revenue

i- Further details on this topic are contained in my articles on
(i) Early Relations of Mir Jumla with the English {up to 1650) in Pr.
IHC. (1939)* 918-949 ; (ii) English Missions to Mir Jumla (1650-2) in
IHQ. XVL 773-82 ; (iii) The English in Madras and Mir Jitmla
(1652-55) in Pr. IHC. (1940), 257-63, JIH (Aug. 1941).

2 . Bruce, 316-6, 325, 342-3; EFI. IV. 84-6, xi ; V. 14-21, 325-6,
xxs.lv ; FFSG. 1-4; Pr. IHRO (1942), 106, for identification of ‘Sari
KhaiP and -Mallivoeco’ of the English factory records.

MIN/Sr^

jumla s diplomatic use op his own position

state, arising from the illegal profits of the English
nsisting on the strict application of the Golden Farman.
His outlook seems to have been legal and rational. But
he moulded his policy as suited his own interests even at
the cost of those of the State. Evasion of the Farman
continued in spite of the protests from Golkonda officials.
In these circumstances, some sort of rapprochement, however
unholy and unjustifiable, was considered to be necessary
for mutual advantage. But it was Mir Jumla, who profited
most by it. By the undue exercise of his virtually supreme
authority, he threatened the English, who, however, did
not fail to realise (May 18, 1638 ) that his threats were
mere pretences for exaction of money. 3

During Sep tern ber-December, 1641, the Governor of
Masulipatam imposed an embargo on the lading of an English
ship, in retaliation of the Danish seizure of the Sar-i-khail
Mir Jumla's junk on the principle of seeking satisfaction
from one Christian nation for the capture of Masulipatam
junks by another. Early in January, 1642, when the Danes
released the junk on the satisfaction of their demands, the
English also were granted liberty to lade their goods. The
Dutch, in order to avoid such seizure of their own ships,
and to have their goods always ready for shipment, employed
small ships continually to fetch their goods. The Fort St.
George factors suggested to the Company (Sept. 1642) the
adoption of the same expedient for prosecution of their
trade. 4

Consequently as Mir Jumla became the most influential
man in the State, whose friendship and aid were invaluable
but displeasure feared, the European factors perceived
the political and commercial advantages of keeping him
appeased. In 1642 Mir Jumla closed the warehouses of
the Dutch, forbade their sale of spices and subjected them
to further “affronts” resulting in a great loss to them.
Nevertheless they lent him 9 men and 2 pieces of ordnance
to sail his junk for Persia and arranged to give a present

EFI. VI. 79-80, 75-76 ; V 325-6 ; FFSG. 14, 4.
FFI. VI. 316 ; VII, 42, 48.

mtsrfy

LIFE OF MIK J'UMLA

10,000 rials of eight to the Golkonda court. 6
gards the English, while they offered him presents, lent
him men ( pilots, sailors, gunners ) and traded on his behalf
by taking his goods in their own ships without charging
freight and customs, Mir Jumla, in his turn, helped them
on various occasions, by lending money, confirming their
privileges, allowing them to use his. ships and pilots and
endeavoured to increase the sense of their obligation to
him. 6 Thus he tried to use them as an instrument for
the realisation of his commercial and political ambitions.

2. Financial Relations with the English.

Mil Jumla occasionally borrowed money from the English
factors, possibly with a view to financing his business
enterprises (like farming of diamond mines, commercial
ventures, building ships), furthering his political designs or
creating an army of his own. The attempts of the English
factors to recover the outstanding debts of Mir Jurnia were
not always successful. A sum of 3,000 pagodas (Rs. 10,500)
Was due from him by the beginning of 1638. In August,
1639. Andrew Cogan at Golkonda was asked by the
Masulipatam factors to recover all debts but Cogan expressed
his confidence that if it was a due debt, it would be “paid on
demand'”. However, by November, 1640, Mir Jumla denied his
liability for 1919 pagodas out of 2099, while acknowledging
receipt of three jewels which he agreed to pay for or return. 7

On the other hand Mir Jumla often assisted the English

5 - BDK. 1641-M2, p. 306, in EFI. VII 80-1.

# * EFL v 325-6 ; VI. 43 (Mir Juinla’s property not to bo
detained, 1638), 220-22, 142-3, 76, 77 ; VII. 81.

The English acquiesced in the practice of taking Mir Juxnla’s
goods without freight or customs out of considerations of some
practical advantages accruing therefrom. EFI. VI. 71 ; VII. 55.
Mir Jumla protended that the goods belonged to the Sultan and
should be landed free of customs in return for the immunities and
privileges enjoyed by the English in the Golkonda ports (Swally
Marine letter, Nov. 28, 1644). EFI. VII. 207-8.

EFI. VI. 49, 52, 146-8, 147n, 72, 266, 256 ; II. 221n.

misT/f

Mxcmon between mik jt-mlv and the English

Cans of money when his funds were satisfactory. I
borrowing in other wavs being difficult at Masulipatam
on account of the desertion of moneyed men due to Mir
Jumla’s attempted monopoly of trade there, the English
factors decided to borrow 4 or 5 thousand pagoda* from
the Mir at Golkonda at an interest of l£% for 4 or f> months.
He also lent the English in Madras 10,000 (new) pagodas
(or 16,000 rials of eight), possibly a part of his Karnatak
plunder, for six months with effect from 9th March, 1846.
The amount was not repaid before 29th June, 1647, and
Mir Juiula waived all claims for interest on receiving some
presents, including a brass gun valued at 641 pagodas 8

fanams . 8

3. Friction between Miv Juvula and the HJngUsh.

The relation between Mir Jumia and the English was
not simply the usual one of a debtor and a creditor. As
the former was thq highest officer of the Golkonda State,
the English had to fepi the weight of his influence in their
transactions regarding ^ the recovery of debts from local
people, and they thought of combating it, if necessary, by
force. Holding Mir Jumia responsible for the delay in
realising their dues (10,000 pagodas) at Golkonda and
Viravasaram in 1(340, the English factors at Masulipatam
thought of ensuring recovery by putting indirect pressure
on him like seizure of his junks. 9

Beneath the outward endeavours of the English to placate
Mir Jumia, who might otherwise be led to adopt stringent or
adverse measures against them, ran a current of deep internal
hatred towards him. Friction with the Golkonda officials,
who prevented the English from receiving from the local
merchants and manufacturers the goods for which they had
contracted, was ‘‘frequent and bitter.” Mir Jumia was
accused (Feb. 1638) of treating the English factor at

8 * EFI. VI. 77, 220-1 ; VII. 69, 79 ; VIII. 166-67, 213-4,

xxvii.xxix ; Love, I. 76n, 97-98 ; FFSC3. 1-2, 97.

*• EFI. VI. 146. 162-3, 255. 190-191.

MINIS/*.,,

OF® OF MTK J UMLA

iida in a 4 ‘base way” and of dealing unjustly wi
English factors of Masulipatam in matters relating to
the town of Malloule (Mallovol) near it. 10 All the comp¬
laints of the English factors were not, however, justified.
Mir Jumla was accused (July, 1638) of instigating the
Governor of Masulipatam to adopt measures of reprisal against
Captain Weddell and Mountney of the Courteen's Association.
But it was they who unjustly claimed that exemption from
customs granted to the East India Company should be
extended to them and opened artillery fire on the city of
Masulipatam on being denied access to the shore by the
local officials. 11

4* The Company's efforts to improve their position .

The Company tried to escape from its embarrassing
position at Masulipatam by selecting a safer station on the
coast further south, within the Vijaynagar dominions, and
bv endeavouring to get a new farman from the Sultan
for grant of fresh commercial privileges to the English.
The first attempt led to the immediate foundation of Fort
St. George, and the second to the mission of Andrew
Cogan from Surat to Golkonda.

During the mission of Andrew Cogan, Sar4-khaU Mir
Jumla helped him in various ways and showed him
respect. This struck Andrew Cogan as very unusual in
view of the different descriptions previously given to him
about his character by the Masulipatam factors. Cogan

Sl

10 * Epithets used against Mir Jumla, EFI. V. 325-6 ; VI. 49,
75-6, 78-9, 163, 142-3, 200 and n ; friction in Bruce, I. 360 ; FFSG-
4; Complaints, EFI. VI. 49; xxxi-xxxii. Mallovol had been rented
by the English from May, 1634, but they’were ordered by the Sultan
to surrender the lease (c.1636-7) and as they objected to do so without
compensation, the English factor at Golkonda was dragged out of
his house, by order of the Sultan’s ‘Secretary’, well beaten and
imprisoned (BDR. 1637, p. 94, in ibid, 52-3).

n * EFI. VI. 78-9, xxxii-xxxiii ; FFSG. 4n ; for Weddell, Bruce,
I. 340-2, 350; 357 ff; COM, 1635*9, pp. 337 38, 127-29 ; KBPE.
38-9 ; Morse, I. Oh. 2.

misr/fy

EFFECTS OF THE CONQUEST OF TEE KARNATAK

Lied a piaca of ambergris to Mir Jumla and exult ingly
(to Bantam, Sept 3, 1639) that if any occasion
arose for the Company to use the Sar-iJchail , the present
would certainly “be repaid a thousand fould.” Mir Jumla
also gave a special letter to the Governor ot Masulipat&m
commanding him to receive and use Cogan with respect. 12

5. Effects of the, conquest of the Karnatak on Mir Jumla’s
relations with the Europeans .

The conquest of the Karnatak by Mir Jumla profoundly -
influenced his relations with the Europeans on the East
Coast. The English found their erstwhile commercial rival
and governor gradually transformed into almost their
overlord. Fear of Mir Jumla, the necessity of checking the
pretensions of his ministers and the need of protection
during a period of wars contributed to the rapid stregth-
ening of the Fort St. George fortifications. 13

But Mir Jumla then wisely refrained from manifesting
any hostile designs against the English and showed an
inclination to - be on friendly terms with them. The latter

also, in their turn, were anxious to get the favour and
protection of the Mir and to obtain from the new govern¬
ment confirmation of all the old privileges granted to them by
the Hindu power. Thus, realising that the Karnatak must
inevitably pass from Vijaynagar to Golkonda, Ivy, the English
Agent at Madras ( Aug. 1644- Sept. 1048 ), hastened to make
an entente, cor diale with the stronger power. In 1646, when
Mir Jumla formed a camp in the vicinity of Madras for the
siege of San Thome, Ivy lent him a gunner and several,
soldiers, assisted him in many ways and presented him with a
brass gun. In return, Mir Jumla confirmed, on behalf of the

liJ ‘ Company’s position. Bruce, .1. 360, 368-9; FFSG, 4; for Cogan’a
mission, EFI. VI. 143-4, 145 148, 162-4; 200; Love I. 13-14. n; See Pr.
IHC. 1939 for Cogan ’s attributes bestowed on Mir Jumla (pp. 944-45).

EFI, VIII. 70, xxv, 25, 26; Love, I. 192, 76, 147, 105; Bruce. I.
377, 378, 424-5, 430, 454-5; FFSG. 15, 16, 18-20, 25.

miSTffy

LIFE OF MIR JTJMLA

grant

Item of Golkonda, the existing qaid (regarding the
drag ) and privileges of the English ( June, 1647 ). 14

I he .Dutch at Pulicat also had their privileges confirmed
by the Mir and even secured some financial concessions from
him. The Portuguese also obtained better financial privileges
from him than from the Hindus. 35 About 1648 a ship of Mir
Jumla was driven by storm to Masulipatam, and he wanted to
utilise the .Dutch or English ships for his commercial jour no vs. 16

§L

6\ M issions of the Eu ropean Companies to Mir Jumla

About 1650-1, Mir Jumla being displeased with the Hutch,
wanted to frustrate their commercial aims by trying to become
a monopolist himself in cloth trade, and to enter into a
commercial agreement or contract with the English East India
Company, by which they would get their supplies of piecegoods
from his agents and “share with him in the profits of voyages
made to Persia and other parts/' 17

l4 * Brace I, 41c; EFT. VIII, xxvii-xxix (brass gun), 25, 1(56-7

(confirmation); X. 4; Love I. 75-77, 79.

1B - EFI. IX. 238.

l6 ‘ Tabrezi, 69a.

EFI. IX. 232, 133, xxv; Love, I. 100-101; Cf. Bruce, I. 454-5,
The English factory records state the following to be the reasons for Mir
Oumla’s hostility towards the Dutch :

(i) The Dutch aimed at monopolising the whole trade of India
(EFI. IX. 13).

(ii) They interfered with the Mir’s trade at Queda and Achin.
Formerly he used to buy spices from tho Dutch at his own prices and
prevented other merchants from coming to them. But the Batavia
authorities ordered that the goods should be stored in their god owns till
the Mir himself would nr allow others to purchase them at the high rates
prescribed by the Dutch. Tho Mir was thus deprived of the profitable
spice trade {ibid, XXV. 22-21).

(iii) Mir Jumla’s letter to the Dutch Governor-General had remained
unnoticed for three years {ibid, XXV. 13). The Governor of Pulicat had
insolently boasted that the Dutch could easily acquire this country. As
the Mir prohibited the Dutch from trading within his own jurisdiction
{ibid, 13), they tried to induce the Mir to reopen the trade and sent a
mission to him in the autumn of 1650.

SICXNS OF THE EUROPEAN (COMPANIES TO MIR JUMLA

L

Jumla refused to meet a Dutch mission at Gandlkota
in September, 1650, but courteously received an English
mission under Venkata Brahman. He represented to the
English that by joining him they would profit immensely,
and would even £ ‘enjoy the whole trade” i.e. just as he would
monopolise the production, control the prices, and be the sole
stockist, the English would become the sole distributors of
articles of trade available in the Coast. Ho also tried to incite
the English against the Dutch by explaining to the former that
the latter wanted to exclude the English from any share in the
Corornandal trade by “overbuying and underselling” the English .
Agent Greenhill responded to Mir Jumla’s offer by sending the
same broker, Venkata Brahman, with Walter "Littleton on
another mission in December, 1650. m ai<nr joint/ report (dan.
17, 1651), they testified to Mir .Jumla’s “real affection” towards
the English, hi- desire to form, a longterm agreement, and assist
the Company’s business operations by a free loan of money (50
or 60,000 pagodas);. They also held that the conclusion of the
agreement would be highly beneficiaL to the Company trade
and would lead to the frustration of the aims of the Hutch.
The Mir delivered to the brokers, a letter addressed to the English
East India Company, together with some presents consisting
of ‘“>000 pieces of dong cloth and Sallampoores. 18

Having so far maintained friendly relations with the Dutch*
Mir Jumla now wanted to strike at them by winning over the
English to his side. It was quite natural for him to offer
generous loans to the English, for he now acquired the immense
Karnatak plunder, which he and tried to put to a profitable
investment in this manner. At the same time he sought to pose
as a real benefactor of the Company arid thereby earn its
gratitude and sense of obligation which could be used in an
emergency.

But the Agent and his council, in consultation with the
Masulipatam factors (Feb. 19, 1651) became sceptical of the
wisdom of the agreement. They held that it would be safest
to accept that proposal of Mir Jumla by which he agreed to

l ** EFI . IX. xxv, 22-23, 12 13 ( Mir’s representation), 44, 201: VIII,
xAxii: Love I. 9», 100-101.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA X

all their goods from Europe m return for cloth and other
articles of the Karnatak at rates to be fixed later. They
deferred their final decision till the. arrival of President-
Baker, and hoped that, if the Company decided to entertain
Mir Turn la's offer, they would empower the President,
Agent &c. “to treat and conclude (an agreement) with the
Nawab/’ Meanwhile in January, 1651, Venkata Brahman was
again deputed to the Nawab at Gandikota to learn what goods
might be expected for the next shipping and what price was to
be fixed for those already supplied to them by Mir Jumla.

The Company’s reply came about a year later. They
avoided “any pledge to make all their pure liases from Mir
Jumla’s agents,” but agreed to give “preference’' to them,
though this would not cover any concession regarding freight.
In the summer of 1652, Littleton and Venkata again went to
Mir Jumla, probably with the Company’s reply, and “met with
a seemingly friendly reception.” The Company disapproved of
the concessions already given to Mir Jumla by the factors, But
as his request was as good as command, the Company suggested
to the latter to rectify the mistake in future and to endeavour
to secure the usual rate if possible. 19

During 1651-2 a Dutch mission under Dirck Steur praying
for enlargement of privileges and permission to rent some towns
and to trad© without payment of customs in return for a large
sum of money, was received by Mir Jumla, but he referred the
question to the Sultan, then at Gandikota. Moreover, he refused
to allow the Dutch to fortify Puiicat, though he renewed their
privileges. On the other hand ho allowed the English factors
to strengthen the defences of Port St. George. But he was
careful to see that the English did not become too strong to
defy his authority. Thus the English Agent of Fort St. George,
who insisted on building a banks hall with lime and stone instead
of straw as permitted by Mir Jumla. had ultimately to submit

19. Pros and Cons of the offor.EFI. IX. 22-24, 261 (arts 35-37) 262
(art 56), 44; Mission of Jan. 1651, ibid., 48-&; ’Company’s reply, 232-33;
vide. IHQ (Dec. 1940), 779 82. COM, 16.50-54, p, 159,

The Court of Committees for the United Joint Stock decided to
spend £ 100 on a present to Mir Jumla and requisitioned ‘a very rich
saddle’ from one Mr. Greene (Doe. 23V 16£J). Ibid,, 142.

mUtST/fy

S8IONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES TO MIR JUMLA

She payment of a heavy fine of 200 pagodas. 20 As thi
ufcch began to suffer reverses in Europe during the first Anglo-
Duteh War, their position became unfavourable in Persia,
Bengal and other places ; they were also reported to be turned
out of their trade with Japan. About 1654 Mir Jumla resented
the Dutch refusal to grant passes to Indian ships trading with
Ceylon, Achin and other places where the Dutch were seeking
to establish their own trade monopoly. They even captured
a ship of Mil* Jumla sailing to Macassar under Portuguese
portection. This strained the relations of the Dutch with Mir
Jumla and the king of Macassar almost to the breaking point
(April, 1654). Mir Jumla threatened to attack Pulicat if the
ship was not restored. He was not completely pacified, even
though the Dutch promised to do so and also to grant passes
to ships sailing to Achin and some other places. 21 The English
factors in Persia requested the Company to send a strong fleet
to cause greater embarrassment to the Dutch. 22

Mir Jurala's attitude towards the other Europeans was not
so bitter. Tavernier and his party visited Mir Jumla at Oandi
kota in September, 1652 (NS) in order to sell some jewels to
the Sultan. The Mir enquired of them whether his personal
jewels (lasques) contained in 5 small bags were vendible in

3e * HT, Ser. 1, Voi, 18, no. 539, 542, 543; in EFI. IX, xxviii-xxix. pp
99, 156 ff, 261, 290-1, 204-5, n, 96; Love I. 112, 114-116,141,154,

104-5, n; Bruce, I. 451-99 (occasional references); see my article on The
English in Madras and, Mir Jumla 1652-55 in Pr. IHC. 1940 and JIH.
Aug. 1941.

HT. Series I. voi. 18, 55 0(i), EFI. IX. xxxiii-xxxiv.

22- EFI. IX. 269-70, In December, 1655, the English E. I. Company
petitioned to the Protector and his Council “for licence to transport to
the Coast of Coromandel for the use of the Nabab or Governor there ten
suits of armour, thirty sword-blades, twenty blunderbusses, and fifteen
pair of horsemen’s pistols, and for directions to be given to the Commi¬
ssioners of Customs to allow these to pass”. (COM. 1859-59, pp 70, 72).
This may be regarded as an endeavour of the Company to secure Mu’
.iumla’s goodwill and thereby take advantage of his displeasure with
the Dutch, The East Coast factors must have pressed the authorities
in England for these when ho was still .formally in the Golkonda
state service.

►e and agreed to write to his son at Golkonda on behalf

LOTS OF MIR JUMLA

23

During the critical period of Mir Jumla’s rebellion 24 against
the Sultan of Golkonda (1653-\5), the former 1 did not want to be
embroiled with the English. However, he had necessarily to
endeavour to augment his financial resources and secure comm¬
ercial and economic advantages in relation to the East India
Company. Moreover, he was anxious to engage the attention
of the Company in their internal preoccupations, by abetting
the caste disputes (c. April, 1655), by refusing to decide them,
even when they were referred to him, and by utilising the diss¬
ensions in the Madras Council for his own advantage so as to
prevent them from sending any help to the Raja of Chandragiri,
whose dominions he was consolidating as his own or to the
Sultan of Golkonda. These are but faint beginnings of a rup¬
ture between Mir Jumla and the English, which widened
subsequently.^

7. Relations with the Portuguese.

While in the Karnatak Mir Jumla was on terms 'of u great
friendship” with Dom Filippe Mascarenhas, the Portuguese
Viceroy of Goa (1645 51). There was an active correspondence
and exchange of presents between them. The Mir highly
prized the “armes blanches”—a breast-plate, a morion and a
sword, sent by the Viceroy, and used them for necessary pur¬
poses in battle. In return, lie sent many jewels and diamonds
procured out of the Karnatak mines, and sometimes he sold his
best diamonds to the Portuguese. Thus did Mir Jumla ende¬
avour to remain on good terms with the Portuguese, with a

- 3 * Ball, I. 259, 261, 286-7, 293; EFI. IX. xxxvii xxxix. Tavernier
and his party were kindly received by a Captain of Mir Jumla at
Tirupati (Aug. 1652, NS), when he learnt that they wore not Dutchmen.
Ball, I. 273,

2t< Discussed in Ch. 3.

2b ’ Caste disputes (1652-3), Love. 1. 118-21, 123; for details, Sec
JIH. 1941 (Aug.).

MINJSr^y

RELATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE

61

g&ifco utilising their assistance, if required in some future
-urgencies. 26

But Mir Jumla did not spare the Portuguese settlement of
San Thome during his conquest of the Karnatak. His blockade
of it and its sequel produced considerable damages on the
Portuguese and his officers seized their “grounds and gardens'’
outside the town and appropriated their revenues on behalf
of their master. In January, 1651, they were, however, resto¬
red except the revenues of a Church valued at 2,000 rials a
year. The Fort St. George factors believed that this was a
fine imposed on the Portuguese padres for disallowing, in viola¬
tion of an old custom, the procession of a Hindu God before
their Church outside the City. 27

a0 * The presents of the Viceroy included different kinds of brocade
and porcelain from China and curios from Japan. Storia , I. 232 n;
Bernier, 17 and n; for Dom Filippe, Danvers II. 287, 302; Catrou, 207.

37 * HT. Series 1, Vol. xvii, no. 530 in EFI. IX. 18.

^ ■ Go, ^X

(s

CHAPTER III

THE REBELLION OF MIRJUMLA

1 Causes of friction between Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla.

The conquest of the Karnatak had at once transformed the
status of Mir Jumla from that of a courtier of a powerless
Sultan to one of an almost independent and strong ruler,
secure at a long distance from his master's capital Following
Bernier, who writes that the jealousy of the Sultan was ‘‘natura-
lly awakened' ’ at this, European historians have generally
supposed that Qutb Shah grew suspicious of his Wazir's
strength and position. But it is doubtful if the Sultan him¬
self had at first foreseen the potential dangers to his own power
on account of Mir Jumla's conquest of the Karnatak and his
consequent influence there. For, as we have seen before, the
Sultan, flushed with Mir Jumla's success, had lavished all
possible favours on hi* victorious minister-general. Moreover,
the Sultan had nurtured,—as he wrote sometime afterwards
to the ruler of Persia,—the sapling of the adventurer Mir
Muhammad Said into the mighty tree of the Mir Jumla or
Wazir of Golkonda, and expressed surprise that the latter
should have chosen to betray him. In fact, the Sultan's sub¬
sequent feelings of suspicion and distrust regarding his Wazir
were not born of his spontaneous consciousness of the latter's
ambitions. They were the outcome of the persistent machina¬
tions of a section of his Deccani courtiers, jealous of Mir
Jumla's wealth and very eminence and angry at the consequent
exclusiveness in the Mir’s attitude.

These malevolent enemies of Mir Jumla endeavoured to
undermine the influence of the Wazir in his absence by dili¬
gently inciting the Sultan against him. Some contemporary
European travellers have referred to rumours of “the improper
intimacy” between Mir Jumla and the Queen-Mother and have
hinted that the Sultan could not brook this violation of the
honour of his family and became alienated from his Wazir.
Nizamuddim Ahmad Shirazi, the author of Hadiqat us Salatin .
observes that Mir Jumla, as the Sar-i-Khali, had performed many

QUTB SHAH AND MTU JUMLA

ees on behalf of the Queen-Mother, and that exchanj
presents between them became frequent. But the public
nature of such exchanges precludes the possibility of any illicit
relation between them. Again, Mir Jumla was away from the
Court. Moreover, the general trend of Mir Jumla s character
does not warrant the story. So, in the absence of any corrobo¬
rative evidence in any other class of contemporary sources, it
must be regarded as a figment of the imagination of scandal¬
mongers. As a matter of fact, the estrangement between the
two was due to the evil machinations of the jealous courtiers.
According to Tavernier, the courtiers told the Sultan ‘That the
power of Mir Jumla should cause him to he suspected ; that
all his actions tended towards dethroning him and securing the
kingdom of Golkonda for his son ; and that he must not wait
till the evil had grown beyond remedy ; and that in order to
lid himself of an enemy—the more dangerous because he
concealed himself—the shortest way was to poison him/'

This view of the brewing of Mir Jumla’s rebellion is suppor¬
ted by a letter written by Emperor Shah Jahan to Qutb Shah,
after the Mir's appointment as the Mughal Wazir. Herein
the Emperor administers a veiled rebuke and casts a satiric
fling at Qutb Shah's folly in alienating such an able officer as
Mir Jumla and expresses a corresponding elation at his own
wisdom in harnessing his services to the cause of the Empire.
The Emperor writes: ‘A useful and experienced official is rare
these days, especially a man of the type of Muazzam K han, who
can hold a candle to any able and skilful Wazir of my court.
His merit should, therefore, be adequately recognised*/ Shah-
jahan continues : “It is inadvisable to pay heed to the words
of the enemies and self-seeking persons, who cannot be expected
to perform any duty and do not look to the well-being of their
masters, and only have an eye to their own interests and turn
our friends into enemies ; the protection of one's own life,
family and honour is the bounded duty of all".

Signs of friction between the Sultan and his Wazir probably
manifested themselves after the Mir's conquest of Gnndikota
(1650). The war between the two Sultans over the partition of
the Karnatak (1651-2), ending in the defeat of Mir Jumia and
Adil Shah’s subsequent restoration of Gahdikota to him and not

Lira OF MIR JUMLA

iitb Shah, might vqry well be regarded as the beginning
fion between the Sultan of Golkonda and his Wazir. Mir
Jumla, disappointed in getting the preferment from the Sultan
in return for his services, intended to retain the territories he
conquered. If he could accomplish this desire, he would, as
the English factors observed, “soon be as great a king as his
master.” The enraged Sultan then endeavoured to sap the
foundations of Mir Jumla’s independent or sovereign pretensions
by treating the latter’s conquests as his own and so disposses¬
sing him of his riches. Inscriptional evidence indicates that
down to September, 1653, there was no open rupture between
the Sultan and Mir Jumla as the latter was described therein as
the former's “agent. ’

Growing suspicious of Mir Jumla, Qutb Shah began to regard
the Wazir “as a dangerous rival rather than an obedient servant”
and “eagerly but silently sought an opportunity” to destroy him
or remove him from his presence. The unceasing admonitions
of his courtiers that the evil must be nipped in the bud before
it was too late, added fuel to fire. Though, being surrounded
by persons devoted to the Wazir, the Sultan “felt the prudence
of concealing his intentions,” yet in an unguarded moment he
gave vent to his feelings of vengeance against him. The latter,
then in the Karnatak, was soon informed of the impending
danger by “his own and his wife's relations and friends”, who
filled every important office at Court. 1

(St

2. Mir Jumla’s Diplomatic Intrigues .

Aware of his master's wrath, Mir Jumla, a cautious and far-
seeing man, felt the need of self-protection even before the

*• Causes of friction in Bernier, .18; Adab , 30a; Waris, I02b; MU.
Ill, 531 (haughtiness); SHN (E, D, VII, 108); Ball’s Tavernier, J,
105; Aurangzib I, 195 0; Gobble, 273;

For Qutb Shah’s letter to Persia, Tabrezi, 141b* 144a (Pr. IHC,
1941, 000*609); Intimacy with the Queen-Mother, in fitoria 1. 233,
Catrou, 206, Bernier, App, II; Shahjahan’s letter to Qutb Shah, Gl>,
(JBOKS, Dec, 1940, p, 276); Opinion of English factors (18th Sopt,
.1654^, EFI, IX, 290, xxxiv; Love I, 115; inscriptions! evidence, EIM,
1937-38, pp, 52-54.

MIR JBMLA'S DIPLOMATIC INTRIGUES

crisis and was not , at all willing to pay court to Quf
“whom he no longer regarded as his master but as the
greatest of his enemies”. Probably his first natural impulse on
becoming aware of the Sultan's suspicions was to be prepared to
return to his home country and to forestall Qutb Shah in an
endeavour to secure the goodwill of the Court of Iran. About
1653 he wrote two letters of friendship to Khalifa-i-Sultan, the
Wazir of Persia, referring to the cultural bonds of affinity
exisiting between them and to the services he had rendered to
the Shah. Pinning his hopes on those services, he also sent a
petition to Shah Abbas II of Persia, professing sincere attach¬
ment and offering to enter the Persian royal service, so that ho
might safely go back, together with all his accumulated wealth
in case the situation in the Karnatak became too hot for him.
In reply the Shah expressed his appreciation of his “sincere
services,” and gave formal assurance of help “at the right
moment”. But, in reality the Shah, not deeming it politic to
openly espouse the cause of a rebellious vassal of a brother-king,
advised him at the same time to strengthen the friendly
relations with Qutb Shah. * 2

But this gesture of help from the Shah of Persia came too
late, and was too vague to be of any use to Mir Jumla.
Moreover, he could not have been under auy illusion about the
arrival of timely help from Persia. Hence he had to look for
shelter nearer his sphere of activities. He first considered the
Itayal, his or his master's erstwhile enemy, but the nearest ruler
to be the most suitable man to be approached, and so he tried
to purchase his support by promising him immunity from
invasion. At the same time, as a counterpoise to Qutb’s
hostility, Mir Jumla had already won over some of his generate
anil soldiers in the Karnatak. He also offered to transfer his
allegiance to Adil Shah of Bijapur and to hold the*Karnatak as
his gift. 3

It was by these “arts of finesse and tricks of diplomacy",
that Mir Jumla was defending himself against his master till a
completely new turn was given to his policy by the cautious

§L

*• Adab, 30a; Bali's Tavernier, I. '166; Tabrezi, 70a 73a; RSAS.

154-156; JRORS. XVIII. 190-197; XIX. 87-93.

3 * Adab, 36b, 39a, 195b-196a; Waris, 119; Awangzib, I. 197.

5

misr/fy

LIFE OF MIR J17 ML A.

secret overtures of Aurangzeb. Indeed, if lie himself haE
so long approached various powers far and near, in and outside
the Deccan, he now came to be courted by the Mughals. To
Aurangzeb the co-operation and counsel of the able prime
minister of Golkonda was invaluable for the realisation of his
Secret ambition of conquering that rich state. He had tried to
win over Mir Jumla even as early as the capture of Wandiwash.
Mir Jumla, too, had probably realised the potentialities of this
move and expressed to Aurangzeb's ambassador the hope that
<! the door of correspondence, friendship and love would
always remain open”. 4 Keeping himself .informed of the growing
^estrangement of the Sultan from his minister, Aurangzeb began
a secret correspondence with the latter, through Abdul Latif
.(brother of Muizziilnmlk ), the Mughal hajib at Golkonda. Mir
Jumla, so long .on the defensive, could now think of taking an
offensive against all his recent foes. Smarting under the bumi-
Jiation of defeat at the hands of Adil Shah, and being forced to
receive Gandikota as a gift from him, Mir Jumla had naturally
•desired to retrieve his lost honour through diplomacy. His
refusal to grant a right of passage to Jinji to the Bijapuri
general, Khan Muhammad, his intrigues with Mysore and
overtures to the Rayal might well be regarded as measures
of this diplomacy. But the masterstroke of his policy was
his profferred mediation with the Mughals on behalf of the
BayaJ through correspondence with Aurangzeb. Zahftr writes
that “Sri Ranga had created trouble in the fort of Vellore,
and through correspondence, made Mir Jumla his own Wakil

and for his own self agreed to pay. peshkash to the

Mughals. Mir Jumla had also taken the responsibility in this
affair and he was tempting the Mughals by ail means to help
the Raja.” 6 About 1053, the Raval, evidently persuaded by
Mir Jumla, sent his confidential Brahman agent, named
Srinivas, to Aurangzeb, with a petition addressed to the
Emperor, professing willingness to embrace Islam and to
remit to him, besides an annual tribute in cash and kind,

4 * Tabrezi, 74a. There is a letter of Mir Jumla to Khwaja
Miimtiddin, late Diwan of Dara in reply to Dara’s {Ibid., 73a*74a), but
the date of it is not certain.

** MN r . 453!

MINfSfy,

^ifeturn for protection of his territories from the aggression of

ikh hurts 200 elephants, and some costly jewels,

MIR JUMLA's DIPLOMATIC INTRIGUES

L

the Sultans. 6

By such a course of policy Mir Jumla would not only win
over the Rayal to stand by him in an emergency, but would
gain a diplomatic victory over Adi! Shah and avenge himself
on his own master, Qutb Shah. To Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla’s
mediation revealed a vista of now possibilities. The appeal of
the Rayal offered him an excellent opportunity to serve the
cause of Islam and to put pressure on the two Sultans to
disgorge a share of their abundant spoils of war in the
Karnatak, in the form of a suitable paslikash , which they
had not yet paid to the Mughals in return for the imperial
sanction of its conquest. Thus the acceptance of the Rayal* s
offer would mean immense spiritual and material gains for
the Empire. 7 Moreover it increased liis chances of seducing
Mir Jumla over to his side.

Aurangzeb instructed his hajib to ply Mir Jumla, who “had
always displayed devotion and submission to the imperial
court’', with Offers of imperial munificence, to persuade hiih to
join the imperial service, and to send a report of his resources
and military strength to the Emperor. At the same time it
was necessary for Aurangzeb to induce the EmperoT to agree
to win over Mir Jumla as the Emperor’s hands were tied by
the } ahd (of treaties) of 1636, according to which he could not
seduce the officers of the Sultans, and as Dara, opposed to
Aurangzeb, was trying to persuade the Emperor not to offer
any assistance to Mir Jumla. But Aurangzeb pleaded that,
though Mif Jumla scrupulously insisted on secrecy, he was
sincere in his profession of devotion to the imperial service.
Imam Wafdi Beg, probably an. agent of Mir Jumla, had also
previously spoken to the Emperor of his good faith. Finally,
convinced of Mir Jumla’s “faith in the imperial court”, the
Emperor became desirous of conciliating him and instructed
Aurangzeb to order whatever he considered necessary for the
welfare of Mir Jumla and his family, though as yet the Emperor

*• Adab r 33b, 33b-34a, 54b-5oa, (petition); MM. 81a-82b,
7 * Adah, 34a, b.

MIN/Sr*y

LIFE OF MIR WMLA

lot commit himself to appointing him in the imperi
i5errice, Aurangzeb therefore offered to send to Mir Jumla a
strong imperial squadron so that fears of a hostile combination
of the Sultans might not deter him from joining the Mughals. 8

In the meantime events had moved apace in Golkonda,
precipitating quick action on the part of Aurangzeb. When
Mir Jumla, in deference to Qutb Shah's summons, once went
rather reluctantly to Golkonda, the Sultan conspired with
some malicious courtiers to kill the Wazir. Mir Jumla,
forewarned by his son, extricated himself with great artifice
from the clutches of the Sultan and repaired to the Karnatak,
resolving never to visit him again. The Sultan, ‘‘learning
of hia secret resolve", continued calling him back with
increasing persistence. But all this only enhanced the
Wazir's suspicions and proved unavailing. At last 4 the
curtain was removed from the face of the affair. 5 Qutb
Shah openly undertook to imprison and crush his rebel Wazir,
who retained the Karnatak conquests, and the Shahi army

there.

Believing that Mir Jumla had not been properly
approached, the Emperor enquired of Aurangzeb why he had
gone to the Karnatak. Aurangzeb reviewed the whole
situation and explained that the Mir was compelled to go to
the Karnatak, because Mughal support was not vet
forthcoming. No body could have hindered him from joining
the Mughals, if he had first been assured of it. Mere
professions of conciliation, without effective help, proved
futile. Aurangzeb evidently felt that the time for quick action
had arrived, and sent a letter to Mir Jumla through his officer,
Sayyid Ahmad, asking him to openly join the latter and
assuring him that he would intercede with the Emperor for

*• Adah, 30a, 31b, 35a (Dara’s allegations), 72a-b, 36b; Aurangzib
I. 198-9. Qutb Shah was in a sense justified in his complaint against
the Mughal Emperor before the Shah of Persia (1656), “Placing
confidence on the ahdnama , I did not believe that the Padshah of

Hindustan.would violate it and help this villainous wretch.

Outwardly adhering to the pact le tters of his wakils arrived, calling
upon me to drive him away, so that he might not combine with Adil
Shah.” Tabrezi, 141b-114a. Pr. IHC (1941), 607-8.

G °\.

lyhig him from his enemies. On his own initiative Aurang
►mmissioned Muhammad Mamin, who was then, according to

MISSION OF MUHAMMAD MUMIN

the imperial mandate, going to Sri Ranga Rayal, to visit the

Mir as well. Mir Jumla now sent a petition to the Emperor

for an imperial messenger and it was forwarded by Aurangzeb/*

3. Mission of Muhammad Mumin.

The news of the appeal of the Rayal to the Emperor, his
willingness to accept Islam and the deputation to him of a
sagacious Mughal ambassador, Muhammad Mumin Safdarkhani,
in 1653-4, caused a flutter in the minds of the Sultans. They
feared that they would lose all their recent conquests in the
Karnatak. Adil Shah was alarmed into hurrying with his
conquests and became fully prepared to take Mir Jumla in his
pay. Qutb Shah now tried his best to appease Mir Jumla by
restoring to him his posts and mahals . Rut it was too late now .
The astute Wazir, already approached by the Mughals, avowed
that, after the expiry of two j^ears, he would either attend on
Qutb Shah or resign his posts and go on pilgrimage to the holy
sanctuaries. But Mir Jumla, as his son and deputy at
Haidarabad, Muhammad Amin, assured Aurangzeb sometime
afterwards, did not really feel safe under Qutb Shah and had
made the above agreement only as it was “good and proper for
the occasion.” Therefore Aurangzeb suggested to the Emperor
that an open gesture of protection would make him join the
imperial service now. 9 10

But. it did not prove to be so easy as Aurangzeb had
expected. Mir Jumla adopted towards him the same dilatory
tactics as towards Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb had exhorted
Muhammad Mumin to discuss matters with him, and ply him
with hopes and encouragement by all the arts he commanded
till he felt satisfied about his willingness to join the Mughals.,

9 - Adab,$ Oa-b, 36b, 72a-b, 72b-73a ; Waris, 102a ; GD (Alamgir to
Qutb Shah) , Aurangzib , I. 196.

10 . A dab, 34b, 35a, 44a, b; GD (Alamgir to Abdullah). So eager
was Aurangzeb to win over Mir Jumla, that, even before the arrival of
imperial order, he sent a ntshan and Khilat to Mir Muhammad Amin and
assured him of royal favours (Adah, 44a, 35b, 34b).

LIFK OF MIR JUMLA

Mangzeb; had already endeavoured to, prepare the ground by
sending Sayyid Ahmad to him and writing to Mir Jumla,
flattering him on his ‘good faith'’ and condemning the Sultan's
unjust treatment of him. He expected that ‘after the outward
obstacle” was removed Mir Jumla would “not give up the
skirt of the Empire," because of the expected benefits. In
short, Aurangzeb urged upon him “to open his mind
unreservedly" before the ambassador and not to lose the chance
of getting a high post in the imperial service. But the shrewd
Wazir, apprehending a coalition of the two Sultans against him
in case he joined the Mughals, did not commit himself
irrevocably without receiving definite terms from the Emperor.
He, therefore, after his interview with Muhammad Mumin,
decided to submit a secret petition to the Emperor, which
Muhammad Mumin sent to Aurangzeb. In forwarding it to
the Emperor, Aurangzeb stated that Mir Jumla had not yet
accepted any offer of his and begged the Emperor to state the
terms of appointment, e. g., his rank, time of bringing him
under a suitable escort and the possibility of receiving
additional troops for the purpose. But Shahjahan’s hesitation
in replying to Mir Jumla alarmed him and made him sceptical
of the Emperor’s intentions. Aurangzeb had therefore to
endeavour to lessen Mir Jumla’s suspense. Secret messages
were exchanged between them by active couriers. An agent
of Aurangzeb, carrying his nishan to conciliate the Mir, returned
after 20 days, together with the latter's reply and 2 footmen.
Aurangzeb sent it to the Emperor for orders and replied
to Mir Jumla by assuring him of the greatest imperial
favours.

At long last, in 1654, the Emperor, yielding to Aurangzeb’s
rej)eated importunities, agreed to take Mir Jumla under his
protection, only if lie would come to the imperial court. He
proposed to send a. confidential agent with a Jarman to bring
Mil* Jumla and another, to forbid Qutb Shah to prevent the
Wazir and his son from entering the Mughal service.

Mir Jumla now hung back and prayed for a year's respite
and that for some very cogent personal reasons. He had to
collect his property still lying scattered at different ports. He
had to redeem his pledge to his old master. He must feel
secure from the fear of reprisal from the Sultans who wanted

UWISTffy

MISSION OF MUHAMMAD MUMIN

fad whom he evaded ; and the secret of his understand!
the Mughals must not be disclosed.

On learning of Mir Jumla s objections, Aurangzeb requested
the Emperor not tp send any agent with farmans and suggested
that it would be advisable to await the return of Muhammad
Mumin to hear from him the reasons for Mir Jumla's
procrastination. He also urged the Emperor to keep these
intrigues secret, because if the two * Sultans came to know of
Mir Jumla’s intention, they would “not desist from any pretenc<*
or fraud to prevent him from getting this high honour” (i. e.
kilt him) and it would be difficult to chastise the Sultans, who
were combined in this matter. At the same time he advised
Mir Jumla (13th Jan. 1655) to quickly dispose of his pending
tasks and not to forsake liis resolve to come under imperial
protection. 11

On Muhammad Mumin's return Aurangzeb wrote to the
Emperor on the strength of his report : “The truth abouo Mir
Jumla is that he outwardly professes that he has no shelter
except the imperial court and that he wuuld start for it, after
collecting his property, but from his actions and demeanour it
appears that this intention is not from the core of his heart.
As he has got hold over a populous kingdom containing forts,
ports and mines (besides a strong army, ample resources and
able, officers), he has not reconciled himself with his old master
and has disgusted the Sultan of Bijapur by declining to enter
his service. His profession of submission to the imperial court
is just a matter of policy and 30 long as he can dexterously
avert the hostility of the two Sultans, he will not leave that
country and turn to any other place .. —Having won over the
Zemindars of the Karnatak with courtesy and beneficence, and

making friendship with Ikhlas Kabshi. Mir Jumla is

passing his days with much care and cautioii.” 12

n. A dab, 34b. 35a, b, 44a, 38a, b ; 72a-b : 72b-73a ; GD {Aiamgir
to Abdullah) ; MM. 81a-82b, 84a-85b.

For 2 letters of Aurangzeb written to Mir Jumla about this time, see
Adab, 73a-74a,

12 * Adab , 39a ; Of. Auramjzib I. 200-1. “In fact throe kings were now
bidding for his services, and he wished to make the pf thg

circumstane es. ”

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

fact Mir Jumla "was in a strong diplomatic posifcioi
r&ngzeb fully realised it and tried to explain matters to the
Emperor, But the conciliatory tone of his correspondence with
Mir Jumla even after the return of Muhammad Mumin shows
that Aurangzeb could not afford to alienate the shrewd and
tactful Wazir in spite of his lukewarm attitude. “Remain
more steadfast in your desire to serve (the imperial court)'",
Aurangzeb now wrote to him, “and consider it a means of
eternal fortune." 13

vv,

ok*.

4. Mir Jumla's intrigues with Ikhlas Khan,
Shahji Bhonsla and the Rayal.

To neutralise Mir Jumla's strong diplomatic position, the
two Sultans counter-intrigued with the Mughals. In Shawwal,
1064 (loth August-12th September, 1654) Aurangzeb asked
Mumin to assure Qutb Shah of favours as the Shah had
expressed the intention of renewing the old agreements. The
Sultan of Bijapur also continued his intrigues. The result was
that the Emperor, heavily bribed by the two Sultans, refused
to extend the hand of protection to the Rayal. The growing
success of the Sultans' counter-intrigues menaced Mir Jumla’s
safety. These circumstances compelled Mir Jumla to cast his
diplomatic net wider. To counterpoise the enmity of Adil
Shah, he had already won o^er Ikhlas Khan, the Abyssinian
governor of the Bijapuri Karnatak, and carried on an
interesting correspondence with him. He now endeavoured to
win over the Marat ha leader, Shahji Bhonsla, who had a
grievance against Adil Shah, by interceding on his behalf with
Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb, hoping to use him against Bijapur,
approved of Mir Jumla's assurances of favours to him as
“highly proper” and wanted to know from the Mir what
Shahji s intentions were, so that he might duly consider
them. 14 Again, Mir Jumla had once mediated on behalf of the

w * Adab, 73b-74a,

14 ' For intrigues with Ikhlas, Tabrezi, 75a-76b ; Adab, 39a, 36b ; for
intrigues with Shahji, Adab % 76a-b. Probably Mir Jumla began negotia-

intrigues with ikhias shahji and THE RATAL

^y4l with the Mughals to feed fat his ancient grudge aga
fijapur and Golkonda, and secure his position. But the
Emperor, as noted above, had refused to help the Rayal. Mil
Jumla, probably to create a second line of defence, now wanted
to win over the Rayal again ; and so he informed Aurangzeb
that the Rayal was sincere in his promises, and requested him
to reconsider his case. Aurangzeb replied that though Mir
Jumla's earlier reserve about the Rayal had previously
prejudiced his case, he would put it up anew bet ore the
Emperor. 15

But with all his diplomatic manoeuvres, Mir Jumla could
not prevent the contingency he most dreaded. His closely-
guarded secret of successful intrigues with the Mughal Emperor
leaked out. Aware of his true intentions, the two Sultans
determined to combine and send an army against him. Neither
of them wanted him to enter the imperial service, together
with his vast resources, as he was familiar with the ins and
outs of their territories. “It was now Mir Jumla's turn to be
as eager as he had been lukewarm before in joining the
Mughals.' 5 In great alarm he despatched a secret petition
in cypher to Aurangzeb, declaring himself as one of the
well-wishers of the court, and seeking the support and help of
the nobles of the powerful Empire by fine stratagems.” He
confessed that he alone was unable to set his own affairs in
order and solicited imperial help against the Sultans. In
forwarding the translation of his petition, Aurangzeb pressed
the Emperor for granting him quick favours. 16

ting with Shahji, even when Muhammad Muvnin was in the Karnatak and
Aurangzeb wrote to him, approving of the conduct ; ‘‘To conciliate a
person, who, in fear of his own master, expresses a desire to serve in this
(imperial! court is necessary for you”. (Adab, 73b-74a). For Shahji’s
first rupture with the Bijapur Court in 1644 and subsequent disloyal
intrigues, see HSh. 85-87, 16-21.

Adab , 44b (Sultans bribing the MughaJs), 76a-b.

te * Ibid., 40a, 36a, 49a ; Aurangzib , I. 201. Re : Qutb Shah's reasons
for deferring punishment of Mir Jurnla, see Tabrezi, 141b-144n, (Pr. IHC.
1941 op. cit).

mtsTfy

LIFE OF MIR JtTMLA

• <*>*

5. Planning of Aurangzeb's Golkonda Campaign.

The leakage of Mir Jumlas negotiations with the Mughals
strained the patience of the Britan to the utmost limit. He
arrested (21st November, 1655) Muhammad Amin, the son
and deputy of the absent Wazir, imprisoned him in the fort of
Golkonda with his mother and sister and seized their cash and
goods, 17

Aurangzeb at once reported it to the Emperor and solicited
bis permission to take “immediate action as the nevrs was
likely to make Mir Jam la alarmed and as the shortsighted
Qutbul Mulk blight even hurt his son/' Indeed, to Aurangzeb,
the incident supplied the long-awaited opportunity and a very
plausible plea for annexing the rich state of Golkonda. But
Golkonda alone was not to satisfy his cupidity. He wanted to
absorb the Karnatak as well. In persuading the Emperor not to
let slip the opportunity, Aurangzeb wrote to him : “Golkonda,
together with what Mir Jumla had occupied in the Karnatak,
which was not less rich or vast than Golkonda itself and to¬
gether with the choicest, and rare articles in abundance, jewels,
limitless wealth and hidden treasures and numerous world-
famous mines, would come into the possession of the Emperor
and a total victory would thus fall to the lot of the nobles of
the eternal empire contributing to its material and spiritual
benefits*'. 18

On 3rd December, 1655, Shahjahan, on hearing of Mir Jumla s
appeal and in accordance with Aurangzeb's request, despatched
through Qazi Muhammad Arif ( second bakhshi of the ahadis ),
a handsome Khilat and a letter-patent to Mir Jumla appoining
him a commander of 5,000 Zat and 5,000 Suwar and his son
a commander of 2,000 Zat and 2,000 Suwar in Mughal imperial
service and asking them to come to Court. A letter was also
sent to Qutb Shah forbidding him to prevent Mir Jumla and
his son from coming to the imperial court, to detain any

l7< Adah, 45a; Bali, I. 166 ; Waris, 109a ; Tahrezi, 12a ; GD.
(AJamgir to Qutb Shah) ; aee Appendix D, Arrest of Mir Jumla’s son.

Bail, I. 166 ; MU. ILL 531 ; Waris 102b, 101a ; Adab, 45a, 46a.

PLANNING OF AUHANGZEB’s GOLKONDA CAMPAIGN

ion of their property or to interfere with their dependents.
These letters were brought to Aurangzeb by Muhammad Sharif
Yasawal on 18th December, 16 >5. Aurangzeb was ordered to
send a note to Qutb Shah that as Mir Jumla and his son had
been included among imperial servants, Qutb Shah must- either
release his son or be prepared to meet the invasion of an
imperial army. 10

Indeed, the two conspirators, the ambitious Mughal viceroy
of the Deccan and the revengeful Persian Wazir of Golkonda,
formulated their grand strategy in collaboration with each
other. Aurangzeb assured the Mir that “due chastisement
would be meted out to that double-dealer (Qutb Shah)........

by rooting him out at the right time in consultation” with him.
Mir Jumla was asked in the meanwhile to excite and seduce the
Sar-i-lashTcar and other officers of Qutb Shah, as their alliance
would be a * valuable asset’ and was further instructed to win
over the Raya! at the time of his departure from the Kamatab.

The conspirators’ plan of action was fixed as follows :—

(i) Qutb Shah was to be asked to release Mir Jumla's
son, and in case he did not,

(ii) Muhammad Sultan would go to Haidarabad, and
release the captive by force, if necessary, and await the
arrival of Mir Jumla there.

(iii) Aurangzeb was to go personally, if Adil Shah came to
help Qutb Shah in opposing the release of Muhammad
Amin,

(iv) Mir Jumla was to quickly dispose of his unfinished
work in the Karnatak ; and after making suitable
arrangements for its administration through his
trustworthy agents there, he was to start towards
Golkonda with his army, artillery and other resources
to accomplish the “real motive” i. e. the conquest of
Golkonda.

19 ‘ Waris, 102b, 100a : Adah , 59b, 76b, 138a. 45a ; GD, (Aurangzeb
to Qutb) ; MU. III. 532 : EFI. X, 62-3, 64-5, 46 ; Aurangzib I. 202-3.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Thus

of a double attack on

the strategy of Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb lay in

Golkonda,—the former marching
from the south and the latter from the north. Aurangzeb
wrote to Mir Jumla : “X wish not to miss this opportunity
of snatching away his. kingdom.” Indeed, as Aurangzeb
pointed out to the Emperor, the advance of Mir Jumla from
the Kara at ak with a well-equip ped army and an excellent park
of artillery and numerous elephants presented “a golden
opportunity, the like of which mrght not repeat itself. As
the success of the plan doubtless depended on the simultaneity
of attack on two fronts, Aurangzeb repeatedly' urged on Mir
Jumla to keep in view “the time-factor and circumstances,”
to advance without further delay and to inform him of the
progress of his journey, even of the exact date of his arrival
in Haidar a bad. 20

,<SL

The execution of the plan was the work of Aurangzeb. On
20th December, 1655, he sent a nishan to Qutb Shah, rebuking
him for having arrested Muhammad Amin “against all principles
of fidelity and ordering him to release immediately the
captive and his relatives, restore their confiscated properties
and send him along with Mir Abdul Kasim ( inspector of the
artillery ) and Sayyid Ali, the bearers of the nishan. The
Sultan was warned that Prince Muhammad would invade
Golkonda in case of his non-compliance. Qutb Shah,
emboldened by Adil Shah's co-operation and as if in utter
negligence, left unheeded the imperial farman of the 3rd
December and Aurangzeb’s nishan of the 20th. Moreover, he

had created disturbances in the country between the frontier

of Indur and Haidarabad. So Aurangzeb despatched
Muhammad Sultan on 26th December, 1655, against Golkonda
and ordered Hadidad Khan, deputy governor of Telingana, to
join him with 10,000 men at Nander. He also sent Asadullah,
son of Mir Fazlullah, with 500 cavalry to the zamindar of

20 * Adah, 72a, 76b ; 76b-77a ; 79a-b , 79b-80a ; 46b ; Waris, 109a-b ;
Tabrezi 141b-144a (Pr. IHC. 1941, op. cit). Tavernier (I. 166-7) refers to
the plan of double attack but his statement that the two combined armies
surprised the Sultan is not correct. HLR,. I. 38-9. (Mir’s letter),
criticised in Gricble, 273-81.

MINISr^

ada, with directions to arrive at that frontier with him

RELEASE OF MIR JUMLA’s SON AND PROPERTY

;l

nis army, to escort Mir Jumla to the imperial court if he came
along that way. Aurangzeb hoped to dispose of the affair
quickly if Adil Shah did not create any difficulty. But as Adil
Shah was busily engaged in preparing to assist Qutb Shah,
Aurangzeb requested the Emperor to approve of his plan of
invading Golkonda on the plea of excursion and hunting in
case of Qutb Shah's delaying to send Muhammad Amin even
after receipt of Aurangzeb’s note.

Meanwhile, learning of Muhammad Amin’s arrest ( 24th
December ) Shahjahan had despatched an express letter to
Qutb Shah, to release Muhammad Amin and his family within
2 or 3 days on pain of punishment. On 29th December the
Emperor intimated to Aurangzeb his strong belief that Qutb
Shah would now release him ; but that taking all points into
consideration and also “in order to gratify Aurangzeb”, he
would sanction the invasion of Golkonda, in case Qutb Shah
defied the imperial order. Both these imperial letters reached
Aurangzeb on 7th January, 1656. “He now employed finesse
to ruin Golkonda. Without giving Qutb Shah time to receive
and follow Shah Jahan’s letter of 24th December, which
explicitly ordered the release of the captives, he declared that
the king's refusal to set them free in spite of the Emperor's
letter of 3rd December amounted to that flat disobedience of
imperial orders which had been laid down as a necessary
condition for the invasion of Golkonda.” He postponed
his own march and commissioned his son to advance towards
Haidarabad and to immediately release the prisoners, in case
they were still detained. 21

6\ Release of Mir Jumla’s son and property.

Qutb Shah, who had not released Muhammad Amin even
after getting the news of the arrival of Prince Muhammad

5l * Aurangzeb’s nishan , Adah, 56b-57a, 45b, 76b-77a ; ‘GD (Prince
Aurangzeb to Qutb) ; his military arrangements, Adah, 45a b, 7Gb-77a,
45b-46ft, b, 47a, 49a, 50b-51a, 152a-b ; Waris, 109b ; MU. III. 532 ;
Tabrezi, 141b 144a ; Aimingzib, I. 203-4 ; Qutb Shah’s disturbances,.
Adaby 101b ; Emperor’s order, Waris, op. cit t A.dab y 46a, 79b-80a.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Sl

Sultan at Nander (7th January), was at last “roused frou
sleep of neglect” on receiving the stern imperial farman of 24th
December, and after the arrival of the prince within two stages
of Haidarabad. He now released Muhammad Amin together
with his family, entrusting them to Abdul Latif, Mughal hajib
at Golkonda, and Abdul Kasim and Sayyid Ali, the
ambassadors of Aurangzeb, and sent his submissive explana¬
tion to the Emperor through Niyaz Beg and Aziz Beg.
Muhammad Amin interviewed the Prince, “his helper,” pro¬
bably on 21st January, at a distance of 12 kos from Hai-
darabed. But as his property had not yet been restored by Qutb
Shah, the prince advanced towards the city of Haidarabad.
The frightened and unnerved Sultan saved his life by a hurried
flight to the castle of Muhammadnagar i, e. Golkonda ( 22nd
January). The Prince arrived at the Husain Sagar Tank on
the morning of 23rd January and, as instructed by Aurangzeb.
intended to halt there for Mir Jumla to come. As the Bijapuri
general Affcftl Khan had massed an army within 40 miles of
Haidarabad, Aurangzeb, considering delay to be dangerous,
started from Nander to Golkonda. He intended to wait there
till the arrival of Mir Jumla, so that he might easily annex
Golkonda if the Emperor approved of it and if not, he might
recover the confiscated property of Mir Jumla, now virtually
imperial property and exact the unpaid peshkash and a hand¬
some present from Qutb Shah. Qutb Shah, too, in utter helpless¬
ness, tried to save himself by appealing through his agent,
Mull a Abdus Samad, to the Emperor, Dara and Jahanara.
Aurangzeb feared that the Emperor might save him and allow
him to occupy Mir Jumla’s “spacious kingdom (of the
Karnatak) with its forts and riches”. But any clemency on the
part of the Emperor would take away the plank from beneath
Aurangzeb's feet. The ma ch of Mir Jumla would lose all
significance. Aurangzeb dreaded such a prospect of letting the
“golden opportunity’' of accomplishing his “great design” pass
away. So he begged the Emperor not to answer Qutb Shah's
appeals till the arrival of Mir Jumla's son,.especially as Mir
Jumla was likely to reach Haidarabad before its agents
arrived at the imperial court.

During the Mughal plunder of Haidarabad, Mir; ^uml^'s

mtsfy

MIR JTJMLA m AtTRA^OZBR # S DAMP

§L

among others, was deputed by Prince Muhammad Sul
inspect and guard the furniture and property of Qutb Shah.
The latter\s envoy, Hakim Nizamuddin Ahmad, was detained
in the Mughal'camp, evinently as a surety, for the Sultan's
delay in restoring Mir Jumla’s property. Finally, on ’anuary
29, 1656, Qutb Shall restored 11 elephants and 60 horses and
other confiscated goods of Mir Jumla to Muhammad Sultan. 22

7. Arrival of Mir Jumla in Aurangzeb’s camp.

During all these months of siege of Golkonda Aurangzeb
was eagerly looking forward to Mir Jumla. . Confidential
messenger after messenger was sent to him. asking him to
advance, lest the opportunity would pass away. But Mir
Jumla could not come without first setting his own house in
order—that is, providing for the administration of his
Karnatak dominions and collecting his scattered goods
together. Early in January, 1656, Mir Jumla explained to
Aurangzeb the reasons of his delay and requested him to
communicate them to the Emperor. Aurangzeb at once (10th
January ) informed him of the future programme,—that
Muhammad Suit an would reach Haidarabad on 18th and that
he himself would start on 20th January. He added : “My
whole endeavour is that just as Qutbul-mulk had detained
Mir Muhammad Amin in Golkonda, we will also do the same
to Qutb-ul-mulk. So if you have arranged for the protection of
forts and collection of your goods, well and good ; otherwise,
without caring for any article, and keeping an eye to the time-
factor, start for Haidarabad and inform me when you reach
there." Even after Qutb Shah had released Muhammad Amin,
Aurangzeb urged him to come quickly for “the fulfilment of
his real motive" and sent Muhammad Mumin to fetch him
holding out promises of securing imperial favours. “Do not
be negligent towards the final result of the matter and do r ot

M \ For release of Muhammad Amin, Adah, 49a, 48a, 47b, 80b, 105b ;
Ball, X. 167 ; Waris, 109b-110a ; MU. III. 532 ; Qutb Shah’s plight,
Waris 109b, Adah, 47a-b, 48b, 49a-50a, 187 ; Tabrezi 141b-144a ; GD.
(Data to Qutb Shah) ; for interview of Abdus Samad (13th March, 1656)
with the Emperor ; Restoration df property, Waris 109a, 110a, Adah,
49, 50a, 105b ; EFI. X. 91 ; Tabiezi, 14lb-144a, Pr. IHC. (1941) op. ciU

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

. ^ evQ\\ a single second”, he wrote to Mir Jura la. At hi
^Swn request, again, Aurangzeb sent Mir Abdul Latif to escort
him on 11th February. But Mir Jumla’s journey, considerably
hampered by his artillery, was slow. Days wore on and Mir
Jumla did not come. In the meantime as Aurangzeb was
gaining victories, Qutb Shah was vigorously pushing on
negotiations with the Emperor for peace and sending offers to
Aurangzeb too. Exasperated and almost driven to desperation
at the prospect of his ambition being frustrated at the time of
highest hopes, the impatient Viceroy wrote to his coadjutor
early in March : “I want to extirpate him (the Sultan). 1

trust you are on the way.Qutb Shah is now craving

pardon.But 1 wish to hurl him to the wilderness of

annihilation.My longing knows no limit.Vou

may have patience, 1 cannot afford to wait further.

At last Aurangzeb’s period of eager expectancy ended. Mir
Jumla crossed the Krishna on 8th March. On 18th March, Mir
Jumla came out of his camp, 8 miles distant from the Husain
Sagar tank, to welcome the imperial farman and Khilat sent
through Khwaja Arif on its bank. Then, returning to his
camp, Mir Jumla proceeded to meet Aurangzeb, accompanied
by his army, consisting of 6,000 cavalry, 16,000 infantry, 150
elephants and an excellent park of artillery together with his
goods, cash, materials of furniture, gold-embroidered weapons,
diamonds, rubies and other acquisitions, and escorted by Maloji,
Nasiri Khan and Mir Shamsuddin, whom the Prince had sent
to him. Indeed he came “more as a prince than as a noble.”
At an auspicious hour on 20th March, a day chosen by the
astrologers as lucky for a first visit, he waited on the Prince in
his camp at, Goikonda, presented a handsome peshkash,
including 3,000 Ibrahimis and received some gifts in return.
Aurangzeb took him to his khilwaikham and Mir Jumla received,
as it were, “a new lease of life”. About a fortnight after the
conclusion of peace with Goikonda, Aurangzeb visited Mir
Jumla (14th April). The latter’s presents to him and his sons
(Sultan Muhammad and Muazzam) were worth several lakhs. 23

,§L

ss. Adab, 49b-50a, 80a-b, 80b-81a, 8ia, b, 121b, 101b ; GD (Dara to
Qutb) ; Waris 111. a, b, 112a-b (Presents) ; Tabrezi, op. cit; Ball, I. 167 ;
MU. III. 534 ; ZNA, 14 ; Aurangzib. I. 214, 217.

MINIS

CHAPTER IV

MIR JUMLA AS MUGHAL WAZIR
Section A

The Wazir as an agent of Aurangzeb
1. Mir Jumla’s 'journey to Delhi and appointment.

Leaving Haidarabad on 16th April, Mir Jumla accompanied
Aurangzeb up to Indur (May 2). A fortnight’s close association
was necessarily attended with exchange of ideas and formulation
of plans for the future, especially in view of a struggle for the
imperial throne. Mir Jumla gave a secret pledge of goodwill
and concord to Aurangzeb at Tndur and was permitted to
advance towards the imperial Court, together with his son,
escorted by Qazi Arif (3rd May). Here Muhammad .Beg, the
mace-bearer, brought to Mir Jumla the imperial farman of
10th April, conferring on him the title of Muazzam Khan
(Exalted Peer).

In deference to an imperial order, summoning him to Delhi,
Mir Jumla left Indur for that place on 7th May. During * the
journey he maintained an active correspondence with
Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb congratulated him on his recent
honours, and asked him, in compliance with the Emperor’s
urgent call, to expedite his march to Delhi, and stated that
Khwaja Muhammad Arif would meet him at Nander. He
also wanted to know whether Mir Jumla had taken Muhammad
Amin along with him or left him at Indur and whether he had
won over the Zamindars of the Karnatak. Mir Muhammad
Amin, on coming to Burhanpur, could not start for the
imperial Da.rbar owing to excessive rains. On learning (27th
June) that Mir Jumla had got a personal letter from the
Emperor, Aurangzeb beoarne highly pleased, and wrote to the

Mir .My mind’s desire came out of the curtain

of Fate. I am always eager to see your plans fulfilled and
I am not fully satisfied at your present leaser honour. I wish
to try for the conferment of further favours on you and 1 hype

6

MiN/sr^

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

ill materialise in no time, even if it will be the cans
jealousy of enemies. (Verse) Wait till the dawn of your
prosperity comes. For this is but the last quarter of the
night.” 1

Indeed, Aurangzeb, losing one adherent in Sadullah
Khan's death, was keenly interested in Mir Jumla’s appoint¬
ment in imperial service, as he wanted to utilise him as a
buffer against, and counterpoise to, Dara. Dara, too,
endeavoured hard to prevent this preferment of Mir Jumla.
But all opposition of Dara’s party was overborne by the
Emperor’s resolve to retrieve his honour in the North-West
Frontier with the help of Mir Jumla, and his conviction that
be was undoubtedly the right person to recover Qandahar from
the Persians. 2

Mir Jumla’s journey to the capital was as grandiose as it
was significant. “Wherever he passed/' writes Manucci, then
at Delhi, “the Governors of the places came out to greet him,
doing him great honour and giving him presents, all by order

of the King.(Near Delhi) the greatest commanders were

sent out to greet and escort him. Orders were given that ail
along his route the streets and shops should be decorated in
the same manner as done for the king's passing.” On 7th July,
1656, the Emperor, hearing of his approach, ordered Qasim
Khan Mir Atish and Danishmand Khan Bakhshi to go to the

(CT

L For journey and title, Waris, 112b ; Tabrezi, op . cit ; MU. III.
534-5 ; Adab, 82b, 121b, 122a ; Storia I. 236-7. (agreement between
Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla) ; EFI. X. 64-5, 68-0 (Army and treasure
coming behind with Muhammad Amin). Aqil Khan’s statement (p. 14)
that Mir Jumla reached Aurangabad along with the imperial army
is wrong. For correspondence with Aurangzeb, see A dab , 82a-b,
82b, 83a.

*• Adah , 117a (to Shah Nawaz), 122a (to Mahabat) ; Manucci’s

remark (Storia I, 237) that the Emperor summoned him to court
in order to utilise his services in reconquering Qandahar finds
corroboration in a letter of Qabil Khan written to Mir Jumla on the
eve of the Bijapur campaign: “It is known from a letter of Ruhullah
that if it is decided to come to this side (Bijapur), the march of the
imperial army to Kabul wilt be postponed.” (Adab f 194b-195a). Letter
of Jesson at Agra to Surat, 4th December, 1656. EFI. X. 73.
(Qandahar expedition abandoned in favour of Bijapur War). See
also HER- I- 44.

misr#y

JUMLA’S JOTJRNE Y TO DELHI AND APPOINTMENT

Jqtfcs of the town and escort Mir Jumla. On that “lucj
he had his audience with the Emperor, who received him
well and honoured him by giving him the highest place for
sitting in Royal Presence. 3

Mir Jumla presented^to the Emperor 1,000 mohurs as nazar
and some precious jewels, including some diamonds of his
Karnatak mines. The Emperor gave him a special khilat ,
and a sword studded with gems and increased his rank by
hazar i hazar Suwar so that he now became a commander of
6,000 Zat and 6,000 Suwar. The Emperor appointed him the
Diwan-i-kul or Diwan-i-Alam i.e. the prime Minister or Diwan
of the whole empire, in place of Sadullah Khan, who had died
on 7th April, 1656. When Mir Jumla informed Aurangzeb of
the imperial favours, the latter expressed pleasure and wrote :
“Let God give you the power to please the Emperor, which
would mean satisfying God. 4 Shahjahan himself wrote to
Qutb Shah : “Mir Jumla’s dignity was daily on the increase
through fresh favours/* The Emperor was pleased to bestow
the Karnatak, as a reward on Mir Jumla, free of tribute for
seven years. 5

In short, the year 1655-'56 formed an important landmark
in the career of Mir Jumla. Setting at naught the authority

»• Storia I. 236-7; GD. 6b-9b ; Tabrezi, 141b- 144a (Pr. IHC.
1941. 606-9) ; MU. Ill (date wrong).

Mir Jumla arrived at Agra on or about 20th June, and left it for
Delhi ori 28th. English factory records place his interview with the
Emperor on 8th July. EFI.X. 68-71.

4 * Waris, I. 114a, 118a. On Sadullah.’s death, Kai Raghunath,
who was in daftar-i-Khaim o tan officiated as High Diwan for 3
months and given the title of Kai Ray an. Waris, II. 108a ; Tabrezi;
op. cit ; GD ; ZNA, 14 ; MU. HI. 535; Tavernier I. 170; Storia
I. 237 ; TU. 60 ; QN. 87 ; Adah, U7b, 144b, 190b ; 83a-b, 190a.
The letter of Jesson (7th May, 1666) to Surat (EFI. X.66-67) states
that on the death of Sadullah (8th April) the office of the High Diwan
was reserved for Mir Jumla ; but that if he was considered unfit for the
post, Shaista Khan was to be selected for it. (Agra to Surat,, 15th Aug.
1656). EFI. X. pp. 69-71 and n. See Ball, I. 395-6 (for stone
presented to Shahjahan).

5 * Tabrezi, ibid. Letter of Thomas Symonds, August 2, 1656,
EFI. X. 91.

: W\ hl¥ ® OF MrR jumla

I § i

"Wilis feeble master of Golkonda, he was not

obtain the possession of the Karnatak as his personal jagir
with the help of the Mughal Emperor, but was also safe under
the latter's sheltering wings against any reprisal from his
old and naturally indignant master. Indeed, Mir Jumla’s
period of apprenticeship or preparation for a successful political
career was over. Destiny now raised him to an even more
exalted station in a much more secure but wider political
sphere.

2. Administration of Revenue and Financial matters.

Mir Jurala held the office of the dlwan for nearly fifteen
months,—from his appointment on July 7, 1656, till his
dismissal towards the end of September, 1657. Of this
period he spent barely five months at Delhi, leaving for the
Deccan on 1st December, 1656, and during the remaining ten
months he remained busily engaged in the campaign against
Bijapur. Throughout his tenure of office as Wazir, whether at
the imperial capital or in the field of battle, whether away from
Aurangzeb or near him, Mir Jumla was playing the same role,
the role of Aurangzeb’s instrument and mouthpiece, his friend,
philosopher and guide, safeguarding his interests, both in
diplomacy and in war.

About Mir Jumla’s handling of administrative problems
as diwan we know next to nothing. The incidental references
gleaned from the Adab-i-Alamgiri about a few revenue and
financial matters, relate only to the Deccan. Aurangzeb
requested Mir Jumla to state before the Emperor, that the
income of the district ofBamgir, ceded to the Mughals by
Qutb Shah in 1656, was not more than 80,000 huns so as to
prove the allegations of Qutb Shah, that Muhammad Nasir
had agreed to pay 1,20,000 hum as its revenue to the
government, to be false.

In the administration of the Deccan, Aurangzeb had to face
serious financial difficulties, which were increased by his
wrangles with the Emperor. The jagirs yielded only a fraction
of their nominal value. There was an annual deficit, which hit
the jagirdars hard and rendered the strength of the Deccan army

MINIS T/fy

INISTRATION OF REVENUE AND FINANCIAL MATTERS 8

carious. Aurangzeb’s orie suggestion, that jagirs in part
should be given to him and the higher officers in other
provinces, was accepted by the Emperor. But his second
proposal that the cash portion of his salary should be paid
from Malwa and Surat was not approved. Again, agriculture
had been ruined by mis-government for the last few years and
prolonged warfare, causing depopulation and ravage. Shahjahan
had therefore exhorted Aurangzeb to improve the condition
of the peasantry and extend cultivation.

Now Murshid Quli, the diwan of the Deccan, wrote to the
Central Government that the pargana of Bir yielded only two-
thirds of its annual income in 1655 and that an increment
was expected next year. The Emperor enquired of the Mir
why, if Murshid Quli’s report about Bir was true, Shah Beg
Khan had preferred to it another pargana yielding lesser
revenue and even doubted the honesty of Murshid Quli in this
matter. So Mir Junffa asked Aurangzeb to explain the reasons
of Shah Beg Khan’s refusal to take Bir.

In reply Aurangzeb sent separate sheets containing the
statistics of the income of the place in the past, and the present,
so that Mir Jumla might form a correct idea of the whole
position ; and he stated at the same time that the reason for
Shah Beg’s refusal to take Bir was not its devastated and
uncultivated condition (Kharabi o birani) but something else.
Shah Beg Khan, summoned from Ahmadnagar to join
Aurangzeb in invading Golkonda, had petitioned for one
pargana for suitable accommodation of his family, instead of
several scattered jagirs. Again, Aurangzeb found on his return
from Golkonda, that the increase in his mansab by the
conferment of Bir on him was not approved of by the Emperor;
so he did not think it advisable to take it away from Shah
Beg. In trying to remove the doubts of the Emperor regarding
Murshid Quli, Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla : “Murshid Quli
Khan is a truthful officer. How can he write an untruth i
The good efforts which he is making here do not require special
praise. It is a matter of regret that the previous diwans of
this province did not perform even hundredth part of what he
is doing. He is a very serviceable officer. It will be better if
he is not taken to task without cause but is retained in his

WNtSTQ

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<8L

^-^post.” Aurangzeb suggested th&t, if Murshid’s conduct was

still suspected to be questionable, an officer might be sent by
the Emperor to enquire into his actions.

It is further known that Wazir Mir Jumla fixed the salary
of Iraj Khan and his brother till the month of Khurdad (3rd
Persian month) and | Aurangzeb informed Kashi Khan that
this arrangement would continue in future. 6

According to the Emperor's orders, intended to cope with
the deficit budget of the Deccan, “Mir Jumla Jumlat-ul-mulki”
wrote to the clerks of the Deccan that any one there whose
mansab was to be increased or who was to get a new mansab,
would have half of his salary in jagir and the entire amount
of his pay only on arrival of the imperial Sanad. Since the
promulgation of the order, the diwans of the Deccan acted up
to it. But the manmbdars of the Deccan, hit hard by the
order which necessarily delayed payment, repeatedly petitioned
to the Emperor, as they were too poor to send their Wakils to
him. Aurangzeb, conscious of their hardships, had included
their complaints in the news-letters. The Emperor was pleased
to revise the order, saying that it would not be necessary to
await the imperial Sanad. The simplified procedure was that
the revenue officer of the Deccan would he informed of the
Emperor’s approval of the (general) recommendation of the
Bakhshi, and then the balance of half-salary would be paid
and the Sanads issued locally.

Now, with regard to those mansabdars , who were either
appointed for the first time or whose ranks had been
increased since Aurangzeb's taking charge of the Deccan,
and whose names were sent by Bakhshi Safi Khan to
Aurangzeb’s Wakil at Delhi, Aurangzeb requested Xtiqad
Khan, Bakhshi of Shahjahan, to verify the names from the
records and issue sanads after putting imperial seals on them
without sending them for imperial confirmation. In future,
Aurangzeb proposed to send a separate statement of
consideration every month in this way, so that, after being
approved of by the Emperor, it would be handed to the

•* Aclab. 82a-b (Ramgir) ; 86a (Murshid Quli) ; 153b-154:1*

(Iraj Khan) ; Aurangzib I. 157-183 ^for Deccan administration). Lifa
of Iraj Khan, MU. I. 268-72: Tr. I. 685-7.

MIR JUMLA’S PATRONAG-E

3^ikil (of Aurangzeb). So Aurangzeb asked Itiqad Khan to
‘"try hard in this matter, as it was conducive to the interests
of the soldiery and the empire’* and as “it relieved men from
vexation/’ 7

3. Mir Jumla’s patronage.

As the Prime Minister of the Empire, Mir Jumla came
to possess extensive powers of patronage. Aurangzeb wanted
him to intercede before the Emperor on behalf of certain
officers, whom he specially liked. The Emperor, being
displeased with Safi Khan, the Bakhshi of the Deccan, had
called him to court and punished him. In recommending his
case for reinstatement, Aurangzeb held that the Emperor’s
displeasure was baseless and his punishment of him unmerited
and wrote to the Mir that “the knot might be cut only through
your efforts/’ Aurangzeb also recommended to Mir Jumla
the cases of Murshid Quli Khan, the experienced and able
diwan of the Deccan, and ofMuItafat Khan (son of Azam Khan),
late diwan of Payanghat, and “a sincere officer”, then
holding charge of Ahmadnagar (1656).

Munshi Qabil Khan also recommended to the Wazir the
case of Adam Khan Khesbgi, a tactful jmung man and a
good soldier. After serving Murad for long, he had joined
Bijapur government and discharged his duties efficiently.
Aurangzeb summoned him but offered him only a mansab of
500 zal and 100 Suwar. Not satisfied with this, he wanted
to go to the imperial court. 8

Mir Jumla the invaluable ally of Aurangzeb.

The rise of Mir Jumla to eminence in the imperial court
was an index to furtherance of Aurangzeb’s own ambitions
and plans. Hence Aurangzeb was anxious to know of Mir

7 * Adah, 127b. Itiqad Khan was the son of Itimad ud Paula and.
brother of Asaf Khan and the last Bakhshi of Shahjahan. MTJ.I.
180-82. Tr. I. 714-15.

*• Adab, 83a-b (Safi Khan) ; 193b-194a (Murshid Quli and Multafat) ;
190b (Adam Khan). Details about Murshid Quli and Multafat in
Aurangzib I. 168 if and fn.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

la's affairs and developments in his fortune, which,
Aurangzeb assured him, would increase his love for him. Indeed,
in letter after letter, written since Mir Jumla’s departure from
Aurangzeb’s camp, the Viceroy of the .Deccan gave expression
to feelings of deep love and friendship. Aurangzeb advised the
Mir to confide in him as his best well-wisher in every matter.
That the latter reciprocated these feelings is clear from
Aurangzeb’s reply to Mir Jumla’s letter of September b, 1656(f)

wherein he observed “ . love and true friendship spring

ffom heart and cannot be expressed in black and white.
The sincere intentions which you have expressed and are
expressing these days are inspired by your faith in me. I
can feel it in my heart of hearts, even though you may not
write of it. I know it for certain that ali your resolutions are
prompted by gratitude. Let God grant you more power ( for
gratitude )”. 9 This exuberance of feeling proves only one
tangible fact that the Wazir Mir Jurala was an invaluable ally
of the Viceroy of the Deccan.

5. Wazir Mir Jurnla pitted against Crown-Prince Dara .

Aurangzeb’s object was clearly to utilise the Wazir in
furthering his own interests. Shrewdly realising that
success in his plans depended on curtailing the influence of
Dara in the imperial Court, where Mir Jurnla was just a
new-comer and as yet without friends, Aurangzeb requested
Jabanara to show kindness and consideration for Mir Jurnla
and help him in every matter. When Jahanara agreed to do
so, Aurangzeb advised Mir Jumla that it was imperative for
him to secure her support by approaching her through Isa Beg
and by thanking her for her “invisible” acts of kindness,
and representing to her that he had “no refuge in the imperial
court except her favours” and that he had thrown his honour
under her care. Besides, Aurangzeb advised him to behave
with the nobles there in a seemingly good manner.

The effect of Mir Jumla’s presence at Delhi on the course of
diplomacy was quickly felt by all. We have seen before, that,

•* Adah, 81b-82a, 82b, 83», 84a b.

WNfsr/jy

'arbiter between emperor and aitkangzeb

in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla had started negotiations
with Shahji Bhonsla, who, liaving a grievance against his
master, the Sultan of Bijapur, had expressed a desire to join the
Mughals. Aurangzeb had approved of the assurances given
by Mir Jumla to Shahji. Now, after his appointment as the
Mughal Wazir, Mir Jumla tried to induce the Emperor t b
support Shahji as against Bijapur, much to the mortification of
Para. Aurangzeb approved of Mir Jumla’s actions and ad vised
him to dispose of the matter quickly by continuing false
negotiations with Shahji.

Mir Jumla’s defence of Aurangzeb in private discussions
with the Emperor against Para’s accusation of having
misappropriated the tribute from Bijapur was a pleasant
surprise for Aurangzeb. Learning of it from tho report of his
own WaUh Aurangzeb praised Mir Jumla before his munshi
Qabil Khan. “My expectations from Mir Jumla are more than
this. I know for certain that he would leave no stone unturned
for my good, and he will not fail in endeavouring to act even
better than what I would say.” 10

6. The Wazir as arbiter between the Emjperor and
'the Deccan Viceroy.

Mir Jumla’s role as the agent of Aurangzeb is best illustrated
during the. latter’s wrangles with the Emperor about the
Golkonda booty ( Zikada, 30th Jalus ). The way in which
Aurangzeb writes complaining against Shah Jahan’s lack of
confidence in him, justifying his own conduct, and asking Mir
Jumla to plead his case before the Emperor, suggests as if the
Wazir was an arbiter in the quarrel between the Emperor and
his Viceroy. It was to Mir Jumla that Aurangzeb protested
against the Emperor’s charge that he and his son had taken
costly presents from Qutb Shah without duly reporting the faot*
It was at the Mir’s suggestion that certain presents, too
insignificant to be mentioned and unfit to be offered to the

10 • A dab, 84a, (Jahanara),
against Dara).

(Shahji) ; 100b*191b (support

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

&

peror, had been withheld from the entire peahkash wort'
erore and 15 lakhs of rupees. It was the knowledge of the
Emperor's wrangling which had made the Sultan unwilling to
remit a handsome pwhkah in spite of Aurangzeb's pressure.
Aurangzeb further explained to the Wazir how he could not
•arry out his own plan of sending a befitting peshkash to the
Emperor himself because of the “indecent haste” of the
Emperor in having the entire indemnity remitted to him, how
the two Sultans had become highly elated at the news of
Aurangzeb’s discomfiture, and how he finally sent to the
imperial court everything, including even the presents to
himself (the diamond with a black stain and a ring of ruby not
even worth Rs. 4,000/-, seen by Mir Jumla) and to his son.

* ^ * had anything to conceal,” he wrote to Mir Jumla, “why
would I ha ve shown them (presents) to you.Why should

I grudge to give a few jewels to His Majesty when the jewel of
my life itself is at his service ?”■

TV) evoke Mir Jam la ’s interest in the case, Aurangzeb also
complained to the Wazir that the Emperor’s appropriation of
the entire indemnity, including Anrargzeb’s due share of the
eash, had left him indebted to the extent of 20 lacs of
rupees The Deccan army was clamouring for their 6 months’
arrear pay. Anv depletion in the army owing to mutiny
would render it extremely difficult for Aurangzeb to discharge
“the responsibility for imperial service, not to speak of the
control of the provinces,” including Mir Jumla’s Karnatak
dominions, especially as Adil Shah was busily engaged in
defensive preparations (in anticipation of a Mughal invasion),
and as Mir Jumla himself was well aware of the relative
strength < > the imperial army in the Deccan and that of
the armies of the two Sultans. Observing that “the Golkonda
campaign had caused only humiliation” for him and his
sons, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to present the whole
matter, of which he was aware, to the Emperor as he
thought fit. 11

u * Adab, 84b-85a, 85a 80a, 90b, 190a-b, I9lb 192b (Qabil Khan-
inducing Mir Jumla).

►ISCOTID BETWEEN MTR JUMLA AND AURANGZEB

7. Discord between Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb.

The harmony between the two allies was disturbed by
certain unpleasant episodes. Aurangzeb was much worried
over Mir Jumla’s showing to the Emperor a copy of the
Secret ahdnama , containing Qutb Shah’s written promise
to make Muhammad Sultan his heir. Again, when Mir Jumla
became displeased at Aurangzeb’s not holding public or
private audiences and at his giving vent to vexation,
Aurangzeb hastened to explain to Mir Jumla (through bis
munshi) that he had plenty of reasons to be mortified (with
the Emperor), but that as Mir Jumla “was interested in big
affairs, it was not befitting (of him) to look into these private
affairs.” He did not attend the court because it was then
the day of fasting and the building of the diwan i khas o am
was still incomplete.

Further, Aurangzeb was incensed on learning that Mir
Jumla had spoken of Omdatul Mulk Khan Jahan (Shaista
Khan) to the Emperor in a slighting manner. For one thing,
complaint against a relation of the Emperor was highly
unbecoming. For another, if Shaista Khan was transferred
from Malwa, a province contiguous to that of Aurangzeb, it
would not be beneficial to him. Subsequently, however,
when Mir Jumla arranged the matter amicably to Aurangzeb,
the latter was pleased to remark : “Though Mir Jumla (liukn
us Sultanat , Pillar of the Empire) committed some negligence,
it was only human. Now God has crowned him with success
in his object. It is not proper to take vengeance on him.
He endeavours to strengthen the foundation of our friendship.
Both of us should try to keep friendship and dovelop it.” 12

These incidents were of course sources of a temporary
discord, but the Karnatak proved to be a more serious cause
of friction, as Mir Jumla even suspected Aurangzeb of being
negligent in looking after his jagirs there.

**• Adab, 190b-191b (Secret ahdnama) ; 193a-b (Aurangzeb not

holding court) ; 193b-194a and 192b-l93a (Shaista Khan).

Section B

Fate of Mir Jitmla’s Karnatak dominions

L The Karnatak conferred on Mir J tmia as jagir under the
Mughal Empire .

The rebellion of Mir JuraJa against Qutb Shah was oyer,
the Mughal invasion of Haidarabad was suspended, but the
question of the ownership of the Karnatak., the root cause of
these events, remained undecided* even after the conclusion
of a formal peace between Qutb Shah and the Mughals, The
Sultan justly wanted to retain that rich and spacious country,
as it had been acquired by his servant with his own resources*
But, as we have seen before, Aurangzeb coveted it. As early
as March, 1656, he had informed the then Wazir Sadullah
Khan : “As regards the Karnatak where there are several
mines of diamonds and seaports, still under the yomasto.s
(agents) of Mir Jumla, and which has been declared imperial
territory, action will be taken according to the needs of the
situation.” By securing the cession of Ramgir (between the
Fainganga and the Godavari—modern Manikdrug and Chinoor)
from Golkonda, he had brought the Mughal province of
Telingana closer to the Northern Karnatak and could thus
move his army from the one to the other without the need of
a long march through Golkonda territory. So Aurangzeb
tried to baffle every move of the Sultan to retain the Karnatak.

Even before the arrival of Mir Jumla at Delhi, Qutb
Shah intrigued hard to keep possession of it. He petitioned
to Shahjahan for favour of his restoring to him the Karnatak
and the ancestral fort of Ramgir. He hoped that Aurangzeb
would recommend his case before the Emperor and even tried
to influence the Emperor through his own daughter. But
Aurangzeb asked the Sultan to wait, as consideration of the
matter had been deferred till the appointment of Muazzam
Khan. Qutb Shah's Delhi ambassador, Mulla Abdus Samad,
appealed to the Emperor through Dara. The importunities of
the Sultan, sponsored by Dara, melted the heart of the Emperor,

THE KARNATAK CONFERRED ON MIR JUMLA

became inclined towards admitting his claim oyer th5
Larnatak “as a supplement to his old territories/' Highly
incensed at the Sultan s direct appeal without reference to
himself or his Wakn\ Auraogzeb accused him of impertinence
and reminded him that the matter would not be taken in hand
by the Emperor before the arrival of Mir Jumla at Delhi. 1

Mir Jumla was not the man to permit the Sultan to swallow
up his own morsel. Aurangzeb, too, depended on him in
counteracting Qutb Shah's intrigues before the Emperor. In
letter after letter Aurangzeb instructed the Mir to wean the
Emperor over to his side. Immediately on his arrival at Delhi,
he was advised to take from the Emperor a Jarman granting the
Karnatak to him , and to undo the manoeu vrings of the Sultan,
aided by Bara. During the invasion of Haidarabad, Aurangzeb
had endeavoured to persuade the Emperor to acquire that line
country, by pointing to its limitless resources and riches.
Evidently that had left the Emperor unmoved. But now Mir
Jumla kindled the Emperor’s oupidity by his speeches and
presents, which confirmed Aurangseb’s report. The Emperor,
allured by tho jewels of Mir Jumla procured from tho Karnatak,
decided to hold it within the Empire, and conferred it as a
reward on Mir Jumla ( July, 1656 ) as his personal jagir, held
directly from the Emperor, and free of tribute for seven years.
Too late did Qutb Shah beg the Emperor to grant the country
to him in return for the payment of 15 lakhs of rupees as
peshkash every year. Aurangzeb now refused to forward his
petition to . the Emperor, adding sarcastically that he might
send it direct. In explaining how the Karnatak was lost by
Qutb Shah and gained by Mir Jumla, he wrote to the crest¬
fallen Sultan. “At the time of the arrival of the imperial army
at Haidarabad, I had urged you to present to the Emperor
ail your choicest jewels and precious things for placating him
and fulfilling your objects. But you did not pay heed to it.
Mir Jumla, on the other hand, saw the Emperor and presented
diamonds, rubies and other jewels and rare curios to him and
informed him of every matter...If you had acted according to

Adah , 102a ; 58a-b, 58b, 58b-59a, 190a ; Tabrezi, 2b, 4a ; GD.
(Bond of Qutb Shah) ; Aurangzib , I. 220. Ramgir circar in the Nizam’s
dominions. Town 79° 30'E, 18° 47'N (ASI. Sh. 40).

MIN IST/f

LIFE OF MIJR JUMLA

y advice, matters would not have come to such a pass,
is useless to say anything on them when they have passed out
of control/’ 2 Thus at last Mir Jurnla got from the Mughal
Emperor a confirmation of what he had secured by force.

<§L

2. Emotion on the Deccani Powers.

The departure of Mir Jurnla from the Karantak and the
reduction of his armed forces there gave the signal for all
Deccani powers, smarting under feelings of jealousy, frustrated
ambition and vengeance, to make a bid for getting a munch
out of the rich spoils of the absent owner. The two Sultans,
probably in concert, at once began preliminary movements
of their respective armies. While Qutb Shah despatched a force
to the Northern Karnatak under his general Abdul Jabbar
Khan with the professed object of administering and guarding
the old territories, Adil Shah asked the qiladar of Jinji to
nibble at the southernmost part of Mir Jumla's Karnatak
territories as early as June, 1656. The Raja of Chandragiri,
too, desirous of regaining his lost territories, started his
preparations. 3 An understanding among all these erstwhile
dupes of Mir Jurnla, dictated by self-interest and vengeance,
was only a question of time, but it was hastened by the
bestowal of the Karnatak on Mir Jurnla by the Emperor.

The power most vitally affected by it was Qutb Shah,
with the final disposal of the question of the ownership of
the Karnatak, he realised that the days of pure intrigue
were over and that the time for resorting to effective
action, to be supplemented by intrigues, if necessary, had
come. Emboldened by the machinations of Dara, Qutb
Shah now' defied Aurangzeb’s repeated warnings and persisted
in coveting the Karnatak including Kambam and hoped to
nullify the imperial grant in practice by adopting a policy
of obstruction and subterfuges. Far from recalling his men

*• Aclab , 83a. 190a, 60a, 00b-61a ; Tabrezi, 141b-144a ; Thomas
Symonds to Surat (2 August, 1055), EFI. X. 91.

s * Madras letter (7th July, 1056), EFI. op, cit; Adab , §8b.
(Qutb Shah’s activities; ; 8?a-b (Jinji).

REACTION ON THE DEOCANI POWERS

the frontier, be instructed his genera], Abdul
ider the dakchauki of Mir Jmnla and to pick a
with his agents, causing considerable disorders in the internal
administration of the Karnatak. Again before the arrival
of imperial officers in the Karnatak, Qutb Shah’s men
collected the revenues of some mahals there. 4

Much more serious than these pin-pricks of Qutb Shah was
the concerted insurrection of the disaffeoted Hindu Nayaks or
Zamindars and the Vizadores or talliarra at Pulicat, Poonamallee
and San Thome, the mrdars of the sepoys of the Karnatak
under the leadership of t he Rayal against their Muslim masters.
They “raised the dust of rebellion, closed the roads and
interfered with the postal messengers", as Haji Sulaiman,
qiludar ofGandikota, observed. Whatever might have been
the degree of success in Mir Jumla’s efforts at consolidation of
his power in the Karnatak, his conquest of it did not completely
crush the spirit of the Hindus there, while their sentiments
were outraged by his plunder of the idol-temples and his
oppressions on the people to snatch away their gold. While
the movement was instigated by both the Deecani Sultans,
the main part of inciting the Rayal and the zamindars against
the Nawab’s officials seems to have been taken by Qutb Shah.
It was the presence of his army under Abdul Jabbar in the
locality which encouraged the Rajas and largely contributed
to the ‘tumult and commotion” there. Aurangzeb rebuked
the Shah: “You have sown the seed of a new distur¬
bance and have made the country over to a group of
zamindars who came to you at Haidarabad for encouragement

and you have sent several officers of yours . You

have also won over the unfortunate Rayal, and taken some

mahals, .from the gomastas of the Khan. You

have thus disorganised the country which had been brought
under order. The Chamber’s Narrative also significantly refers
to the report that “the King of Gulcondah had lett the country
ofCamaticum again to the Roylaes.” 5

4 ' .1 dab, 86a-b, 59b-60a, 87b, 63a-04b ; EFI. op. cit.

r ’ Adah, I92b-193a, 87b, 59b-60a, 69a—b, 62b-63a. Fort St-. Ooorge
to Company (10 Nov. 1656), Love I. |65, 166 and n ; Madras to

Surat (21 Oct. 1656) and Madras to Bantam (5 Nov. 1656), EFI. X.
91- 93. 95, 97 ; Pr. 1HRC. XV. 31-32 ;

LIFJ2 OF MIR JIJMLA.

The initial efforts of the Hindus were marked with qu'
Success. By October, 1656, they recovered the whole country
round Madras, except the castle of Poonamallee, thanks to
Vengum Raja, the father-in-law of Sri Ranga, who even
invaded Peddapollium. Mir Sayyid All, Mir Jumla’s governor
of Poonamallee, hastened to Pulicat, where most of the
Nawab’s riches had been stored. Such reverses adversely
affected the morale of the Nawab's party. Collecting the
Talliarrs together, Vengum Raja inarched towards Pulicat
and advised Koneri Chetti, Sri Ranga's general in the regions
round Poonamallee, to “gather people together”, and seize
that country. Koneri captured Bala Rau, the Nawab's
Governor of San Thome, Mylapore and Poonamallee, who
was betrayed by the Talliarrs near San Thome. The Hindus
“pillaged him to his clothes", seized 20 elephants of Mir
Jumla and 16 of other Moslem merchants, and brought all of
them to Madras as prisoners.

On hearing of these disasters, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak,
the Nawab's general, sent Lingum Nayak, with a party of
cavalry and infantry to capture Koneri Chetti, with whom
the Nawab's forces had several skirmishes for two or three
days near Poonamallee. The failure of the Hindus to capture
the castle of Poonamallee was due to the treacherous delay
of their general Koneri Chetti, who failed to strike till Mir
party “had united their forces and formed a body to
overpower him." It is probable that after Koneri Chetti had
been beaten by the Muhammadans, he was reinforced by
Vengum Raja, who had so long besieged Pulicat. But their
combined forces proved unable to encounter Lingum Nayak
and so the Hindu generals of the Rayal fled to Peddanaikpetta
near xMadras and sought protection in the fort of Madras with
their army, being hotly pursued by the lVIuhammadans. 0

Qutb Shah also planned a large-scale assault on Mir
Jumla's jagirs with the help of Bijapur. As Aurangzeb
rebuked him : ‘ ‘You are endeavouring to cause destruction to

Bijapur. Do not persist in such actions. Do not

•• EFI. X. 95-98 ; Love I. 190-1 and n ; 160, 167, n ; 168, n.
Vengum Raja of factory records is to be identified with Poehiraju
Venga. SVH. 311..

MiN/sr^

JUMLA TO THU

puris astray. Open
oh shrouds the mirror

3. Attitmi of Mir Jumla with regard to the new arrangement .

Mir Jura la was determined to maintain his conquests, now
incorporated in the Mughal empire, but given back to him as
jagir, We have already seen how he had delayed in joining
Aurangzeb in his invasion of Goikonda to make suitable
arrangements for the administration of his territories and
collecting his goods scattered there. Even after his appoint¬
ment as Mughal Wazir, he remained deeply concerned about
the Karnatak affairs. But, being away from the theatre of
action, where the late rivals in ambition and diplomacy bad
become comrades in arms for partitioning his own dominion
among themsleves, he was obliged to depend on Aurangzeb for
exercising a general supervision, and safeguarding them from
his covetous neighbours, while trusting the internal manage¬
ment of his terriiories to his own lieutenants. In fine, he felt
that the dominion, now included within the frontiers of the
‘eternal empire/ must be under the protection of its army.
From Qabil Khan's assurance to Mir Jumla alsd it appears
that Aurangzeb on his side was fully conscious of his responsi¬
bility. So the Mir repeatedly exhorted Aurangzeb to look after
his jagirs properly, even by sending him directions about all
important matters. Mir Jumla was especially very keen about
the dakchauJci and asked the hajib of Aurangzeb to arrange it
carefully. Aurangzeb, in his turn, complied with his ally's
requests often against his own opinion, 8 and assured him not to
be worried. But the growing aggressiveness of Qutb Shah
enhanced Mir Juml&’s anxiety ; and he began to harbour
feelings of suspicion that probably Aurangzeb was not taking
adequate care of his jagir .

7 * Adab, 63a, 64a

*• Aurangzeb wanted Muhammad Ishaq, probably an officer of Mir
Jumla, to remain with him in the Deccan and discharge the affairs ol
his master But be sent him to Delhi, according to the Wazir’s request,
recommending that a proved and loyal offiicer like him should be amply
rewarded by Mir Jumla (Adab, 83 b).

7

LOTS OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

4. Aurangzeb tries to re?nov3 Mir Jumhs suspicion#

Therefore, Aurangzeb had to try hard to clear the doubts of
his ally. It is significant to note that the Viceroy, who often
adopted a tone of rude indignation in his dealings with his
suspicious father, the Emperor, was courteous and conciliatory
beyond measure in his letters to his suspicious but masterful
ally. The tone of Aurangzeb’s letters of assurance to Mir
Jumla was the same. He complained of the perfidy,
malevolem e and falsehoods of his enemies, instigated by evil
counsellors, described the actual disorders and set out in detail
the steps adopted by him to set matters a right. To allay Mir
JEumla's anxiety, Aurangzeb sent copies of the reports of the
spies and petitions of officers and of other well-wishers, copies of
his own letters to various persons concerned and copies of his
petitions to the Emperor, praying for orders 9 But each letter
contained a peculiar personal note of supplication, which clearly
shows that Aurangzeb could not afford to be haughty in his
relations with Mir Jumla. In August, 1656, we find Aurangzeb
pathetically taking exception to the attitude of the Wazir as
follows: -‘Keeping your mind in peace through imperial
favours, do not think that 1 am not wishing your good." 1 ®

In some letters Aurangzeb showed how, in spite of being
handicapped in the discharge of his duties by the Emperor's
lack of confidence in him, he did his best, by raising an army
in this province, and urging the “keepers of forts and the
frontier officials to be conscious of their duties aud responsi¬
bilities and be ever vigilant and cautious. ” Repeatedly did
Aurangzeb assure the Wazir that he had never neglected the
management of his jagirs in the Kamatafe or ceased t<*
administer the necessary dose of threat to the enemies. 11

0 Ibid , Hfja-b (Keply to Mir Jumla’,s letter of 24th July, I 606 ) • 87b,
193b, J94a.

10 * lbid ' 87a * b * This suggests that Aurangzeb thought that Mir
Jumla, now risen to eminence, was forgetting his friendship with
Aurangzeb ; and a man like Aurangzeb was not likely to forgot this,
though for the present he had to put up with it.*

u - Ibid, 88 a, 88 b* 89a, 192b-193a. Munski Qabil aho wrote*

personal letters to the Wazir assuring him of Aurangzeb’s sihoority,’
ibid , IttOb 191 b, 193b-194a, l9oa*b. ; '»

WHtSTby

AUBANGZEB DEFENDS MTR JUMLXti KARNATAK Ift

iurangzeb’s measures for defending Mir Jumla s ^

Karnatak dominions.

in reality Aurangzeb took all necessary and possible steps to
guard the Karnatak from the hood of dangers rushing through
the gap created by Mir Jumla's departure. He gave adequate
instructions to Qabad Beg, Mughal ha jib at Oolkonda, to see
to the setting up of the dakchauki from Haidarabad to SidhoUt.
He ordered diwan Murshid Quli Khan and a veteran officer,
Muhammad Tahir, to warn the gowastas of the local tuyvldars
of the consequences of impeding its work. He made it plain
to the aggressive Sultan that he would not allow any change M
the status quo , any obstruction in the existing administrative
arrangements and the enforcement of the dakchauki , pending
the arrival of the Mir at Delhi. To occupy the Karhat&k
without imperial sanction, Aurangzeb pointed out to him,
would not only be hasty but also unwise. It was bound to
generate fumes of trouble, especially because Mir Jurhla
might adversely construe it before the Emperor.
Aurangzeb urged the Sultan to withdraw his men from the
Karnatak frontier, and await imperial orders. But when the
Sultan, incited by Dura, and ignoring Aurangzeb’s warnings,
continued to hinder the dakchauki f arid did not recall Abdul
Jabbar from the Karnatak, even after its bestowal on Mir
Jumla, the latter was greatly worried over the consequent
disorders in transmission of news. At the orders of the Empeior,
with whom the Mir had discussed the matter, Aurangzeb
urged the Sultan to recall his men under Abdul Jabbar
leaving only a few men for the administration of rnahals,
end sent a contingent under Ismail Beg to organise the
dakchauki , and to take a letter from the Sultan in the name
of Abdul Jabbar and fetch the commander back. Mir Jumla
persuaded the Emperor to depute .Muhammad Sharif to
Haidarabad to regulate the dakchauki and also requested
Aurangzeb to send a letter to the Sultan through that
messenger. Accordingly Aurangzeb warned the Sultan, both
by a letter and through Muhammad Sharif (August, 1656),
not to neglect the imperial far man and defy recent orders.

MIN ISTff

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

in, at Mir Jumla s request, Aurangzeb dismissed Qab
lo was held responsible for the delays in the working of
the dakchauki , from his post of ha jib , and appointed in hi$
place Ahmad Beg Najmsani, who was expected to act
according to orders and send authentic reports to the
Emperor about “the events, the intentions and the needs of
the Sultan.” Towards the end of 1650 Aurangzeb declared
the dakchauki of Mir Jumla to be a part of the imperial
system as being the best way to safeguard communications.

When Aurangzeb proposed to settle the affair of Kambam,
Qutb Shah requested his son-in-law that Ismail Beg might
not be despatched there. The Prince forwarded the letter
to Aurangzeb, but warned his father-in-law that “any
disturbance in the affairs of that country would be the cause
of a shaking of your own territories." 12

Aurangzeb strongly reprimanded the Sultan for inciting

the Hindu revolt and exhorted him as follows :_“Write

letters of caution to the zamindars recall your officers,

otherwise.. you will bite the finger of shame with

the teeth of repentance in vain." Learning of the imperial
grant of the Karnatak to Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb at once
despatched appropriate letters to all persons concerned
through Haji Shaft, viz., the Rayal, the zamindars, and their
generals in the Karnatak, the Mughal officers there (Qazi
Muhammad Hashim, Krishna and Khawaja Muhammad Arif
Qabad Beg) and Qutb Shah. A Mughal contingent under
Krishna and some officer of Aurangzeb went to Sidhaut and
together with the army of Qazi Muhammad Hashim,'defeated
Abdul Jabbar. For sometime the Shah, “restrained himself in

despair and m loss,” Once again, the dakchauki began to
run as before.

Towards the end of 1656 Aurangzeb threatened Qutb Shah
with invasion, if he did not desist from inciting the zamindars
and recall his officers, from a few mahals of the empire which
they had seized and send them along with Kamgar Beg,

§L

”* Ibid, 58b, 59a-b, 59b-60a, 193b- 194a, 69a-b, 87b, 88b-89a

190b-19lb, 63a-64a, 8zb-83a, 83a-b, Stia-b, 82b.

MINISr^j,

ATJRANGZEB OFFENDS MIB JUMLA S KARNATAK

'dally appointed for the purpose, He also asked the Sultan
to help Karagar in the realisation of the revenues already
collected by his men before. 13

With regard to Bijapur, \urangzeb, even before getting on
21st June, 1050, a letter of Mir Jumla containing an account of
the Sultan’s activities, had arranged that Maluji, whose brother
Mir Jumla had recommended before the Emperor for imperial
favour, would fight the qiladar of Jinji and had asked Maluji's
son as well to be on his guard. Realising that charges against
Bijapur in the imperial court would be of no avail, Aurangzeb
proposed to Mir Jumla to correspond in cypher He also
warned the Sultan through the Mughal kajib at Biiapur. 14

While Aurangzeb was engaged in taking appropriate
military action and writing letters of threat to the jDeccani
powers, to dam the flood of their activities in Mir Jumla’s
jagirs y he did not neglect to adopt suitable tricks of diplomacy.
He kept up a busy but secret correspondence with Shabji
Bhonsla, by the advice of Mir Jumla, whom he kept informed
of the progress of negotiations. Shahji was to be utilised
in protecting the Mir’s Karnatak jagirs in return for some
preferment in order to counter Dara's secret intrigues with the
Sultans. He also wrote to him about checking the Hindu
revolt, promising rewards, and asked Mir Jumla to write to him
personally if he thought necessary. As Shahji expressed willing¬
ness to help the Mughals, Aurangzeb requested Mir Jumla to
inform him of the orders of the Emperor on Shahji's petition.
Probably an attack on Add Shah's flank by Shahji was
contemplated, for Aurangzeb concludes the letter with the
following. “It is not my concern at all if the injury on this
perfidious person (Adil Shah) becomes irremediable; rather it is
very desirable.” 15

l3 - Ibid, 62b-63a, 190b-l9Ib (7 letters), 88b-89a, I93b-194», 87b,
80b, 59b*60a, G3a-64a.

14 * Ibid, 82a-b, 86a-b.

. Ibid, 88b-89a, S6a-b, 87a-b, 193b I94a.

MiNisr^

UFK OF MIB JUMLA

b\ Mir Junta's suspicions unjustified:

Munshi Qabil Khan’s assertion that Aurangzeb’s measures
in the Karnatak dominions of Mir Jumia were too many to be
narrated in a letter is not fulsome flattery, but well merited
praise of the .Deccan viceroy. In the light of these available
materials, the actual steps taken by Aurangzeb, sometimes on
his own initiative and sometimes at Mir Jumla's dictation, and
the confident and sincere tone of the explanatory assurances
offered by Aurangzeb and his munshi, one cannot but conclude
that Mir rlumla s suspicions of Aurangzeb’s good faith were not
only unbecoming but'baseless too, and that he showed lack of,
appreciation of the difficulties of Aurangzeb. It is easy to
explain the suspicions by the long distance and the inevitable
delay in getting news, which must have aggravated the sense of
danger in the mind of the Wazir. It is also easy to see that
his mental tension remained unrelieved, as the letters, few and
far between on account of disorders of the dakchuki, usually
crossed one another on the way. But it is impossible to
justify thorn. They were, to a large extent, due to the policy
followed by tlie Emperor and the Wazir. Both of them
wanted the Viceroy of the Deccan to take the initiative in the
matter of Karnatak defence, because he was the man on tho
spot But whatever he did, either in the field of diplomacy or
military action, was necessarily in the nature o.f temporary
expedients. They were palliatives, not cures. And this was so,
because they lacked the sanction of force. For one thing, the
army "f occupation of the Karnatak was necessarily reduced in i
strength on tho departure of Mir dumla. For another,
circumstances beyond his control were working against him. As 1
we have seen before, Dara’s secret abetment of the ambitious,
designs of Qutb Shah, emboldened him to “stand firm in the
field of obstinacy and to flout Aurangzeb’s repeated exhorta¬
tions and threats, Both the Deecani Sultans were stirred to
defiance of Aurangzeb’s warnings by Dara’s encouragement,
the knowledge that the Emperor had no confidence in
Aurangzeb and the exaggerated nature of the reports of the
Emperor’s demand of explanations from him: Aurangzeb

MIN/Sr^

SCHEME of SECOND OOLKONDA CAMPAIGN REJECTED

@L

inly admitted before Mir Jumla : “My speeches and
writings are unavailing”. He further stated to the Wazir that
there was no chance of the fulfilment of the hopes of the
successful working of the dakchauhi , partly because of the
obstruction of the jagirdars between Indur and Burhanpur and
partly because of the lack of sincerity of the men of the
iahchmiki J*

; . Scheme of a second Golhonda Campaign rejected by
Mir Jumla .

In this way, throughout the second half of the year 1636;
Aurangzeb tried to disarm Mir Jam la 's mind of suspicions as
regards his management of the Karnatak. The Viceroy of the
Deecan rightly held that the real remedy must come from
Delhi. At first he wanted Mir Jumla to ' manipulate the
affair before the Emperor”, by inducing him to send orders to
the two Sultans warning them off their evil designs. But
gradually the situation passed beyond the stage of showing
‘mere threats”, and the time for applying the direct method
of invasion came. He, therefore, emphasised on the Wazir the
necessity of adopting a policy of reprisal against the hostile
Deccani powers, and of securing the necessary imperial
sanction by proper inducements and countermoves against
Dam. To crush the formidable Hindu revolt Aurangzeb
wanted Mir Jumla to persuade the Emperor to send an imperial
force for driving away the Qutb Sh&hi army under Abdul
Jabbar from the Karnatak, as “a mere threat*’ would not do*
When the situation became precarious, and the Mughal
messenger, Haji Shall, could return from the Karnatak only
With great difficulty Aurangzeb asked Mir Jurnfa to seek the
Emperor's sanction to come to the Deccan at once before it was
too late.

* Finally, Aurangzeb suggested to Mir Jumla the plan of
downright extirpation of Qutb Shall and so requested him to

lfl * KFI. X. Pi (army); Adab, 87b, 86a-b> 85a-86a, 87a, 82b-83* ;

H3a-b.

LIFE OF MIB JIJMLA

<SL

toe at the head of an imperial army. Till then Aurangzeb
proposed to raise an army in the Dee can, and if possible, to
send it under a reliable captain to Qazi Muhammad Hashim so
that they might reach the Karnatak quickly. 17

It is thus clear that Aurangzeb urgently wanted Mir
Jnrnla to lead an invasion of the Deccan. The course of
events,— Qutb Shah's interference in his dominions in defi¬
ance of successive imperial farmans and orders and viceregal
nishans and threats, the Sultan's instigation of the Hindu
revolt, and planning of a large-scale assault with the help of
Bijapur, and the difficulty of guarding his jagirs with the
small army of occupation,-too, must have made it clear to
Mir Jnrnla, that either he should persuade the Emperor to
sanction Aurangzeb’s plan of invasion or lose the fruits of his
12 years toil and endeavour. Having agreed ' n the funda¬
mental policy ol launching an invasion of the Deccan, the two
conspirators differed as to the plan. While Aurangzeb wanted
Mir Jumla to deal with the Karnatak first, Mir Jnrnla wanted
to begin with Bijapur. Evidently there arose some friction
between the two allies on this point. In his suspense the
Wazir became worried over what he considered to be the
viceroy’s hesitation or lack of response. The latter hastened
to explain that he had repeatedly acted up to the Wazir’s
advice. He assured him in the following terms : “How is
it possible to show negligence in such an object whose value
is beyond calculation ? Besides, how can I agree that such
a vast country (the Karnatak) will pass out of hand, causing
elation of enemies and your mortification ? God forbid this
thought may find a place in my mind. Surprised to know
that you have taken this for grar»ted/ , ‘ 8

Thus when it appeared that the problem of the ownership
of the Karnatak would again give rise to another offensive in

>’■ Adab. 86a-b, 87b, 8Cb-87ft ; )92b-193a; 88b-89a, I94b-195a

The fear of Qutb Shah of an attack on Haidarabad and the Karnatak
was thus justified See Tabrozi I41b-144a [Pr. rHC. (1941) 806-91

I44a-I45a.

18 ‘ Adah, 88b~89a ; 61a. See Section C for .Bijapur.

mmsT/ty.

THE KARNATAK DURING BIJAPUR CAMPAIGN 1

e Deccan, the death of the Bijapuri Sultan gave a new
turn to the affairs and diverted the tide of invasion only
against Bijapur. #

<si

8. The Karnatak during Aurangzeb* s invasion of
Bijapur in 1557-58.

Reserving himself for the Bijapur campaign, Mir .Jumla
induced the Emperor to sanction the deputation of Shah
Beg Khan to the Karnatak to suppress the Hindu revolt,
and to overawe the Deceani Sultans by the threat of sending
Mir Jumla against them. At the Mir's advice Aurangzeb
ordered the Khan to start at once with whatever forces
he had then at his disposal, without delaying over collection
of the entire army, to gather men on the way and to effect
a speedy junction with Qazi Muhammad Hashim and the
gomastas of Mir Jumla. Shah Beg set out from Bir on
30th November, 1656, reached Indur on 15th December,
and proceeded to his destination, avoiding plunder of the
Qutb Shahi ryots and injury to the standing crops of Mir
Jumla’s territories. To relieve the Wazir’s anxiety, Aurangzeb
sent him the latest despatch of the Qazi in original, together
with a report of his own instructions to Shah Beg Khan, who
was expected to reach the Karnatak by January 7, 1657.

The deputation of Shah Beg proved effective. Abdul
Jabbar retired to Haidarabad. The activities of the “accur¬
sed Rayal” > whom Aurangzeb wanted to neutralise, and
of the other Zamindars , were now shifted from Mir Jumla's
Karnatak to Bijapuri Karnatak. 19

In the meantime the situation in the Karnatak had be¬
come complicated by some bound ary disputes between Qutb
Shah and Mir Jumla, arising out of the conflicting claims of
their respective officers for realisation of revenues in certain
places. The Sultan complained to the Emperor that Mir

Adah , 91b-92a. 195b-196a, 159a-b, 159b, 195a-b, 159b 160a,

89b-90b, 90b-9la, 89a-b ; Tabrezi, I44a-I45a (Qutb Shah’s explanation ;
Mir JumJd to be sent to the Deccan).

MiNisr^

fcOOT OF MIR JTJMLA

In had not kept his promise of either paying him 4 lakhs
of hum (20 lakhs of rupees) or allowing him to realise the re-
demies from his jagirs at Ellore and Rajmandri and other
places south of the Kistna, and sought the Emperor’s permission
to collect the revenue with his own officials.

Mir Jumla was then at Delhi, trying hard to secure the
Emperor's approval to the plan of invasion of Bijapur. He
now presented a befitting peshhash to the Emperor, worth
15 lakhs of rupees (26th Nov. 1656), containing one big piece
of diamond weighing 9 tangs equivalent to 216 Surkhs (or ratis)
priced at 2.16,000 rupees, besides other valuable jewels and 20
elephants. The Emperor confirmed the Sultan of Golkonda
in the possession of the fort of CJdgir and its dependencies but.
asked him not to encroach on Mir Jumla’s territories, as the
latter had remitted to the Sultan “the revenues of those places
and spent a largo amount for the upkeep of the forts”. The
Emperor added .* ‘‘There are many diamond mines, located

the Karnatak. and of those excavated there, the

Khan has made a present of a big diamond weighing 9 tangs to
me. You have never presented such a diamond as pssh&ash to

me. Hence I confer the ownership of those places on him.

You should, therefore, give up the claim of ownership over the
Karnatak and its mines. Inexperienced people are unable
to protect this country from Adil .Shall and the infidels of the

Karnatak.” In case of transgression of imperial orders,

the Emperor proposed to despatch Muhammad Amin Khan
with a large army to govern the jagirs of his father, to protect
them from the zamindars of the Karnatak and to reward him
with those countries which lie would conquer from them. 20

Not satisfied with the Emperor's decision, Qutb Shah took
advantage of the Bijapur campaign to renew his aggresioqs
on the Karnatak. He represented t 0 Aurangzeb that Mir
Jumla’s men wanted to occupy some mahals of Udgir and

<SL

a,) * OD 6b*9b (Shah Jalian to Qutb Shtth) : JBORB. Dee. 1040.
pp 270*77 ; YVaris, 118a ; Storia, 1 237.

Effort! (81° 12’E. -12’N) in 46 m. S.YV. of Rajahmundry ;

Rajahmundry (81° 48*13 17°N) is on the Godavari : both are in dt
Masulipatnm, including the < odavari delta (AST. Sh. 24, 2ffj. ,;!

misr^

THE KARNATAK DURING BIJAPUR CAMPAIGN

10 '

j0kbs\w, which belonged to Qutb Shall from before and had
been assigned to him by the Emperor. Aurangzeb therefore
asked Shah Beg Khan (i) to reach the Karnatak soon, and
according to the Mir’s wish, (ii) to advise Abdul Mabud, an
experienced and honest Bakhshi and Wuqianavis, to send a.
report after enquiry into the dispute, (iii) to settle the matter,
with the help of Q.azi Muhammed Hashim and (iv) to arrange
the <fakohauki of Mir Jumla. But, when Mir Jumla complained
to Aurangzeb that Qutb Shah’s offiicers had .shifted their
boundary 1 60 miles into Mir Jumla’s jagif in the Karnatak,
Aurangzeb directed Shah Beg Khan not to send Abdul Mabud
at all, but to conduct the enquiry himself. If the Mir’s
complaint was true, Shah Beg was to see that “not even a ko&
of village remained under the Sultan’s occupation/'

By July, 1657, Shah Beg found that the Saltan’s complaint
Was false and that “no territory of Udgir, not even a single
village had come under the occupation of Mir Jumla.” It was
only a ruse on the Sultan's part to capture some territories of
Mir Jumla in violation of imperial orders. Accordingly
Aurangzeb ordered Shah Beg to inform him ot the amount of
the revenues of the places occupied by the Sultan’s army, to
restore to Mir Jumla's officers all villages and to disallow any
Qqtb Shahi men to remain at Udgir except its qiladarr 1

In the meantime Shahji Bhonsla, taking advantage ot the
preoccupation of the Mughals in Bijapur and the Karnatak,
gneakishly endeavoured to snatch away some portions of
the Karnatak with the help of Siddi Jauhar, the Abyssinian,
<$la4wr of Kurnool, But he met “defeat after defeat” at the
hands of the imperial officers and Mir Jumla’s men, due to the
defection of Siddi Jauhar, alarmed by the Mughal victories in
Bijapur.

The Bijapur campaign had its repercussions on Mir Jumla’s
Karnatak dominions in another way. It prevented hirq from
providing adequate succour to his forces near Madras, then
dangerously besieged by the local zamindars. Fortunately,
however, Mir Jumla’s general, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak,made
a surprise attack on the Rayal’s plundering cavalry. The Ra> al

— t .1 ,t.:. i . .. — . , ' 1 ' ' • > 1

Sl

Adah, IflOa-b.■ Sfth-ttOb, 91b 02a, • 160b-I(»«i. 161a, 70a-b, !61a-b.

11.

misTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA 'S

his “adjutant^ Shahji had to retreat to Arni Fort near
Jinji- They tried to reinforce their army with the JBijapnris,
but could not achieve much success owing to the counter-
mo ves of Tupaki.

With the perceptible improvement in the situation in the
Karnatak, Aurangzeb ordered Shah Beg to return, after
disposing of the affairs of Kokkanur and Gorumkonda, where
Qazi Muhammad Hasbim and other imperial officers had been
stationed by Auragzeb. 22

The part played by Mir Jumla in shaping Aurangz*b*»
policy and actions with regard to the Karnatak was not
inconsiderable. True, he showed great nervousness over the
whole affair; blit while his feelings of suspicion of Aurangzeb's
sincerity were—as we Have seen before—unjustified, his ner¬
vousness was probably natural. No doubt Aurangzeb, being
the man on the spot, took the necessary preliminary measures
at the approach of every new danger. But Aurangzeb was in a
sense afraid of the Wazir and was always keen in giving effect
to his suggestions. It was Mir Jumla, who suggested to him
the necessary diplomatic tricks (e.g. intrigues with Shahji) and
directed him about the movements of troops and postings of
officers and prescribed punishments to incompetent officers (e.g.
Qabad Beg). Finally, with regard to all measures requiring
imperial sanction, Aurangzeb was able to do nothing
independently and had perforce to rely on Mir Jumla for
inducing the Emperor to approve of an aggressive policy
against the Deccan by counteracting the machinations of Dara.
always friendly to the Sultans, and opposed to the Viceroy and
the Wazir and who wielded a great influence over the Emperor.
The task required infinite patience, considerable diplomatic
skill and tact, great powers of persuasion, accurate knowledge
of the Deccan affairs, and above all, limitless wealth, enabling
him to outbid all other offers. Mir Jumla possessed all these

81 * Ibid, I01b ; Tabrezi, 144a-145a ; for the Hindu siege of Mir
JurnlaVs men, Madras to Surat (10 Sept. 1657), EFI. X. 136.

Kokkanur is in modern Lingsagar district of Madras. Gorumkonda
(78® 40’E, 13° 50’Nj is at the southern end of Cuddapah district.

KARNATAK DURING WAR OF SUCCESSION

i measure and ho may be regarded without muc\
deration as the brain of the Mughal policy towards the
Karnatak in 1056-57.

9. The Kama lafc during the War of Succession and after .

On the eve of the War of Succession Mir JumJa was
collusively imprisoned at Daulatabad by Aurangzeb and his
property and artillery were confiscated (January, 1658). His
Karnatak dominions, too, were now transferred to the govern¬
ment of Aurangzeb. This change in the theoretical position of
the Karnatak was at once attended with an improvement in
the state of its internal security. So, before marching noith-
wards (February) Aurangzeb warned Qutb Shah that he must
■not molest the people, ruin the peasantry and create any
disturbance there during the absence of the Mughal army, so
that along with the theoretical transfer, the administration of
the province might be effective in practice. Aurangzeb also
exhorted the Sultan to guard the frontiers of the Karnatak
from enemies 2J

But, during Aurangzeb's preoccupation in the north, Qutb
Shah wrested Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's men,
weakened by Aurangzeb's appropriation of his artillery, and
completely disorgauised the Karnatak. It was only after
making himself “the supreme ruler in Hindustan/’ 24 that
Aurangzeb became c< mparatively free to turn to the Karnatak.
He now sharply reprimanded the contumacious Sultan for his
hasty and impudent action and ordered him to restore all the
captured territories of Mir Jumla, who was about to be released
from his mock-prison and appointed viceroy of Khandesh. The
Sultan was further ordered not to hinder the dakchaulci of the
Khan running from Haidarabad to the Karnatak and set up
according to imperial orders. 26

29 ‘ Adaby 65a-66b # 7lb-72a ; Tabrezi, 35a.

54 Aurangzib, II 473 ; first coronation of Aurangzeb took place
on Start July, 1658 (op. cit. 9 615).

36 * Adab t 67a-b ; GD. (Sultan Muhammad to Qutb Shah) : MM.
«2b-94.

MINlSr*

Vet

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

^ Qutb Shall persisted in Lis aggression. He sent

reinforcements to the defenders of tlie castle of Poonaroallee,
who had rebelled in August, 1658, but had been besieged and
subdued by Mir Jumla’s general, Tupaki Krishna. Thus in
October, the Goikonda Commander, Quli Beg, not only inflicted
a serious defeat on Tupaki, who was wounded and taken
prisoner, but even subdued the whole district round Mad as,
including San Thome.- 6

After defeating Dara at Ajmir (March, 1659), and during the
war with Shuja, Aurangzeb had again to take the Sultan to task
for not having given up the idea of occupying Mir Jumla’e
estates in the Karnatak. T4e Emperor threatened to depute
the Mir at the head of an army to the South after the end of
the war in Hinciusthan and to annex Goikonda together with
the Karnatak. /‘The Karnatak has been conferred on him
(Mir Jumla)’’, so ran the imperial fiat, “as a reward by way of
imperial favours . . . and it cannot be taken away by any one

by means of deceits.The time has come of uprooting you

.Vou will wash your hands of your country." When Shuja

left Jiajmahal for Tanda, Aurangzeb sent Mir Ahmad Khwafi,
entitled Mustafa Khan, to the fort of Gandikota for controlling
jjuid administering the Karnatak. 27 Thus Aurangzeb's policy
towards Mir Jumla/s Karnatak pulsated with his netds,
preoccupations and fortunes during the war of succession.

After Mir Jumla’s appointment as Mughal Wazir and
consequential departure from the Karnatak, h is agent “Tapa
Tap" ( ? Tabatabpi ) remained as the custodian of Mir Ju in la’s
interests and property at Masulipatajn and Goikonda. Friction
arose with Qutb Shah’s officers over their seizure of goods on
Mir Jumla’s ships at the port. To the Emperor’s remonstrance
against it, on the eve of the Bijapur invasion, Qutb Shah
replied : “In accordance with (my) repeated exhortations not
one officer of the port has the power ( ? audacity ) to seize, on
the plea of 10% duty, the property and goods of Mir Jumla,

Fort St. George fco Bantam (.28 Aug. 1658), and HT. (Series
ft Vo), xxiii, ,639) in EFI. X. 176.

a7 ’ Adah, 66b-67a ; AN. 440 ; MA. 27-28.

KABNATAK DURING WAR OF SUCCESSION

ll/are on his ships and which belong to the imperial
rnment, and to wrangle about the matter. 5 ’ The Sultan,
however, pleaded that the realisation of customs on the
merchandise found on the ships of Mir Jumla and of others was
a long standing practice and wished that it might be
continued. 28

In G oik on da, too, “Tapa Tapps’' tried, after his master’s
death, to evade escheat of his property by the imperial
government, by removing some “household stuffs ami goods”
from Mir Jumla’s werehouses, before they were sealed by
Aurangzeb’s ambassador at Golkonda. 20 So great was Mir
Jumla’s influence in Golkojnda, that even four years after his
death, his son Muhammad Amin was highly respected there
and his agent or broker, ‘\\lier Mameth Hosseyn Taffa Tappa”
(Mir Muhammad Husain Tabatabai ? ) virtually acted as master
of the port. 30

"(St

tH - Tabrezi, 144 a-145a.

EFI. X. 273-4.

Bernier. 195; Dutch records in EFI.

In 1661 Krishnappa Nayalc, Mir Jumla’s governor oi Poolesere
(Pondicherry), was considered by the Dutch to bo powerless to protect
them against Shahji, who captured Tegnapatam in 166U-61., BDE.
16th May, 1601. p. 126 quoted in SO. 146.

MINIS/-/?,,

Section C.

The Bijapur Campaign of 1657-58

/. Initiative in launching the Bijapur expedition
taken by Mir Jumla.

It was during the Wizarat of Mir Jumla that the plan of
the Bijapur campaign of 1657-58 was hammered out. True,
the details regarding it, like those of the Golkonda campaign
of the preceding year, were settled' by Mir Jumla and
Aurangzeb together. But while the initiative in the case of
Golkonda was taken by Aurangzeb, that in the case of
Bijapur came from Mir jumla. We have already seen in
the last chapter how Aurangzeb wanted Mir Jumla to secure
the Emperor's sanction for an invasion of the Deccan and to'
deal with the Karnatak first in order to chastise Qutb Shah
for his aggressive activities there and to satisfy his suppressed
ambition of conquering Golkonda. But the frequently
repeated urgent summons of the Viceroy to come at the head
of an army to wrest the Karnatak from Qutb Shah were
wasted on the Wazir. Mir Jumla thought that Qutb Shah
and the Rayal were exhausted volcanoes, not serious enough
to deserve immediate attention, that Bijapur was the
enemy par excellence, which should be crushed first, and that
the chastisement of its Sultan was the necessary pre-requisite
for ensuring the defence of the Karnatak and peace in the
Deccan peninsula. Probably that is way Mir Jumla advised
Aurangzeb to inform the Emperor of the real motives of both
the Sultans, so that he might convince the Emperor of the
urgency of sanctioning the Bijapur cam paign and counteract
the peace-moves of Dara. The fact that the Wazir induced
the Emperor to send Shah Bog Khan to dispose of the pressing
matters in the Karnatak instead of himself going there shows
that he reserved himself for the Bijapur campaign on which
he had set his heart. Towards the close of October; 1657,
Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla : “in this matter, from begin¬
ning to end, I have acted on your advice and done nothing

MINIS?*,.

THE TASKS BEFORE MIR JUMLA

fet it, and after this, the beginning of other matter

will be made on your advice,.” Again, while it

became subsequently necessary for Aurangzeb to conciliate
Adil Shah, lie observed in a letter to him: “At Mir Jumla's
wicked advice I had attacked your kingdom as well as

Golkonda ... .. «*'

Aurangzeb could not but depend on the advice of his
confidant and ally, Mir Jumla, because he possessed an
unrivalled knowledge of the Deccan affairs. Having risen to
power in the Deccan, he was fully conversant with the ins
and outs of the Deccani courts and administration and the
exact means of winning over the local officers'

Indeed, the two cotispiiators had, for some time past, been
contemplating the subjugation of .Bijapur as it was implicated in
the subversive activities of Qutb Shah in Mir Jumia’s Karnatak
dominions. Even before the death of Muhammad Adil Shah,
they had been carrying on correspondence about the necessity
of an eventual chastisement of the Bijapur Sultan, for which
they thought of preparing the ground by winning over the
Bijhpuri officers and generals, and securing imperial sanction.
The full story of Mir Jumla’s efforts to persuade the Emperor is
not known. It is, however, certain that it took about 4 months
for him to induce the Emperor to give up his idea of recovering
Qandahar from the Persians, and section the plan of his leading
an expedition to the Deccan after the death of Adil Shaln 1

2. The tasks before Mir Jumla .

Learning of the death of Muhammad Adil Shah (4th
November, 1656) and the elevation of his son, Ali Adil Shall II,
from Muhammad Aman, the Mughal hajib at Bijapur, on
10th November, Aurangzeb at once informed the Emperor of
it, soliciting his permission to launch an expedition against
Bijapur. To Mif Jumla he wrote : “ If the news about (the

death of the Sultan 'of) Bijapur proves to be true, and the
plan of that side, which is necessary for the success of that big

u Mir’s reasons, Adah, S9b-90, 88b-89a, 290a-b, 162-3, 88a~b. of. MU.
III . 535. 'Porsuhsion of the Emperor, Adah, 88a ; Qandahar expedition
postponed, &ibr-ia I. see ante , p. 90 <fe n ; EFI. X. 73, 64 : Ball, t. 395-6.

8

1 l\ls \ LIF1Q OF MHi J ITMLA

T § i

undertaking bo such that the matter may
you will place these matters before the Emperor and do what
is necessary for this work.

Thus the task before Mir Jumla was new twofold. He had
to induce the Emperor to sanction the plan of invasion by
counteracting Dara's moves, and also secure for Aurangzeb
that complete authority and control over men and resources
which the Viceroy had demanded. Indeed, Dara, fearing that
Aurangzeb’s position would be strengthened by the adhesion
of the invading army under Mir Jumla, wanted to take away

the plank from beneath Auraugzeb’s feet by suggesting that
the Emperor should lead the Deccan expedition. When
Aurangzeb’s plan of summoning the army of Malwa, then finder
Shaista Khan, was foiled by Dara’s intrigues, the Viceroy
requested Mir Jumla to dexterously persuade the Emperor
immediately to send the Malwa army or to bring at least a
part of it with himself, the rest coming with the Emperor.
“ It is necessary ”, he wrote to Mir Jumla, “ to bring the army
of Malwa ”. Aurangzeb's exasperation is clearly expressed
in his appeal to the Wazir to oome : “ Such sorts of hind¬

rances can be remedied very easily. But to neglect to make
tadbir (careful manoeuvring) to remove the cause of the big
himdranoes is not wise. See that you are included in the
imperial army ; rather it is difficult to prosecute the matter
without you Without you it would not be possible to continue
this work, and obtain its results.

So Aurangzeb held that the speedy arrival of Mir Jumla in
the Deccan was the first requisite for the success of the
campaign- In letter after letter Aurangzeb exhorted the Wazir
to come quickly without delay so that the opportunity might
not slip away. About the middle of December, 1656, Aucangzeb
again wrote to the Mir; ’‘My eagerness to meet you is
indescribable. Come soon, as it is not desirable to defer the
disposal of this matter and time is passing away. The sooner
it is done the better.

». Waris, U8» i Adak, 86*4* 88a ; Stada, I. 238 (Dara’s suggestion),
Wfti, 88*-h (Aurangaeb’s view*.), 195a-b ; GD. (Aurangzeb to Qutb).

be well-accomplisb

ARMY SEDUCED BY Ml R JfJMDA AND ATJRANGZEB

he second condition of success in the Bijapur invasion wai
Ihe possession of an efficient artillery, in accordance with the
Emperor’s orders, Mir Jumla informed Aurangzeb that a few
cannon should be sent to the frontier of Bijapur from the forts
of the Deccan. As there were big pieces of artillery only in the
Daulatabad fort, Aurangzeb ordered Mir Shamsuddin, darogha
of imperial artillery, to inspect them there. He informed
Aurangzeb that there was only one big cannon which might be
of use, but it was very difficult to bring it and even in that
ease it would not be of much effect. Moreover, the artillery of
other forts in the Mughal Deccan was also considered to be
insufficient to demolish the fortifications of the Golkonda fort
and some other forts. So Aurangzeb requested Mir Jumla that,
if he really '‘wished to prosecute this matter’ ’ and come to the
Deccan, he should bring his own artillery with him with the
Emperor’s permission* The Mir was also asked to communicate
to him the Emperor’s views on the matter. Indeed the Wazir’s
artillery was an indispensable material for success in this
enterprise and as it had not then passed beyond Nander, it
epuid be easily brought back from there. Later pn, after
getting news of Mir Jumla’s arrival, Aurangzeb asked him to
send his artillery towards Dharur.

It was also necessary to have in the army captains of
tried loyalty and efficiency. Realising that “no reliance
could be placed qu friendship of anyone now”, Aurangzeb
asked Mir Jumla to bring some officers along with him. viz.,
Shah Hawaz Khan and Mirza Muhammad Mashhadi, who
had beep summoned to court, and whose connection with
Aurangzeb was not unknown to the Mir, and also Saifuddin
<son of Tarbiyat Khan deceased), darogha of the imperial
qur-kkana?

J. The, Bijapuri officers and army seduced by
Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb .

Meanwhile Aurangzeb was busy seducing th,e Bijapuri
officers. Though Mir Jural a had not yet arrived in the Deccan,

a - A4afi', 80k 89a. l-d'4b-I(Vfia r »0a. Dhatur (76 WE, 18°4S’Kk>

m .the Nizam’s (k>rmmom (ASI. Hb. -38).

LIFE OF Mill JUMLA

:perience in intriguing at the Deccani courts sto
ngzeb in good stead in this matter. First of all, the
Bijapuri Wazir, Khan-i-Khanan MuzafFaruddin Ikhlas Khan,
was easily won over.

But Mulla Ahmad Natia of Bijapur proved a harder nut
to crack. As early as July, 1656, Aurangzeb had asked Mir
Jumla, who had a great friendship with the Mulla, to placate
him. As the Mulla was “after misleading his master”, and
was opposed to any diplomatic overtures with the Mughals,
Mir Jumla wrote some letters to the Mulla to persuade him
to adopt a pro-Mughal attitude. About December Aurangzeb
not only assured Mulla Ahmad but took the help of Ikhlas

Khan and it was at the latter’s advice that the Mulla visited the
Mughal ambassador at Bijapur and expressed a desire to join
Aurangzeb. However, Aurangzeb distrusted him and decided
to wait till the coming of Mir Jumla. “What you think
seasonable after your arrival will be done , he wrote to

the Mir.

Moreover, Siddi Jauhar of Kurnool, who had ravaged some
villages of Mir Jumla’s Karnatak dominions (? Kokkanur and
Gorumltunda), expressed repentance and agreed to join

Aurangzeb.

Towards the beginning of December, 1656, Aurangzeb
informed Mir Jumla of his measures for winning over Shivaji.
The latter’s agent waited on Aurangzeb, proposing that if the
Maratha leader was allowed to hold the Bijapuri Konfean which
was under him and given a good mansab and that country was
given as its tankhwah (pay), he would transfer it to the empire.
Aurangzeb agreed to his requests on certain conditions and
also informed Shahji of the same terms. He also assured Mir
Jumla that he would inform him on getting his reply. “If
they followed our commands,” wrote Aurangzeb, “well and
good, otherwise, they would suffer piinishment at the hands of
the imperial army.”

“ The dissensions among the Bijapuri * officers following the
death of Muhammad Adil Shah enabled the Mughals to easily
win over the Bijapuri soldiers. “My whole endeavour”
Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla (on .or some time after 23rd,

MIR JUMLA STARTS FOR THE DECCAN

ber) “is to see that the Bijapuris come to this side by an;
means, so that the famous generals will themselves come over to
us even with a little encouragement/'’ Ghazi Khan, son of

Randaulah Khan, Abdul Qadir Dhaktu and Shaikh Mustafa
Junaidi, Haji Khan Miana, Yasowant, Mustafa Khan and several
other leading captains of Bijapur promised to join Aurangzeb,
who hoped to seduce several other high nobles with the help of
Mir Jumla after his arrival. 4

The necessity of seduoing the Bijapuris as a convenient
means of scattering the Bijapur army naturally raised the
question of finance. “It is imperative/’ Aurangzeb urged, “to
conciliate the deserters from Bijapur ; without money such big
matters cannot be accomplished, and without exciting their
cupidity they cannot be won over." Aurangzeb therefore sent
an account of the state of the public money in the Deccan to Mir
Jumla. The Emperor had forbidden and expenditure from the
reserves of 20 lakhs in the Daulatabad and Asir forts ; and the
30 lakhs stored in other forts would not suffice to meet even a
year's expenditure of the Mughal Deccan. So the Viceroy
asked the Wazir, as one who knew “this affair better than any
one else," to secure the Emperor's permission to spend the
Golkonda indemnity of 10 lakhs of rupees, then stored at
Daulatabad, in defraying the cost of “some urgent works" i.e.,
to use the amount for offering bribes to the Bijapuris. 6

L Mir Jumla starts for the Deccan.

The tactful Wazir acted adroitly according to Aurangzeb's
.advice and succeeded in baffling all the hostile moves of Bara.
The Wazir gave a suitable present to the Emperor, and
convinced him that the conquest of the Deccan would be an
easy task by personally undertaking the responsibility for it.
Lured by the dazzling prospects of possessing the diamond
mines of the Deccan, the Emperor over-ruled the objections of

For Kb an Muhammad, Adah, 9 la-92b ; for Mull a Ahmad, ibid,
193a-b, 87b-88a, 91h*92a ; Aurangzib, I. 293-4 ; for Siddi Jauhar, Adah,
87b-88a, 89b-90b ; for others, «6£ri,".90b-91a f Aurangzib , I. 23.5-6.

Golkonda indemnity collected by Haji Ahmad Said (about Dec,
A656), Adah, I95a*b ; 191b ; Waria 121b ; Aurangzib, L 339-49. n.

Ml UlSTfffr

LIFE OF MT& HTML A

Jahanara. Instead of leading the expeditil
as suggested by D&ra, the Emperor sanctioned
the invasion Oh November 26, and allowed Aurangzeb
fdli power to proceed in the matter as he thought best.

Mir Jumla gained Aurangzeb's point against Data even as
regards the despatch of the Maltva army. The Emperor
ordered Khali Jcahah Shaista Khan to hasten to Ddulatabaci
and await the arrival of Aurangzeb there. The Wazir Was ohe
of those officers, aniirs and mansabdars who got permission to
reinforce the Viceroy direct from the Emperor.

On thb sahib clay the Wazir *s son, Muhammad Amin, was
ordered to officiate as diwan till the retiitn of his father with
his rank (of 3,000 Zdt and 1,000 ter) increased by 1,000 Zdt ..

Thus Mir Jumla’s victory over Dara in the game of
diplomacy seemed to hare been complete. tint the Grown
Prince’s eleventh hour manoeuvres considerably dimmed the
lustre of his opponent’s success. The Wazir had to leave his
eon, Muhammad Ainin and the rest of his family as hostages
at Court. Again, if we believe Marmbei, three days before
Mir Jitmia s departure, Dara bought off 80 of his European
artillerymen 6 .

Mir Jumla left Delhi for the Deccart on December 1, 1056,
and arrived at Aurangabad on January 18, 1657. His slow
advance was largely due to the fact that the Mansabdars did
not promptly join him. Aurapgzeb advised Mir Jumla not to
wait for the reinforcements from Northern India, as the
majority of the auxiliaries were not expected to reach
Aurailgaeb before ] 9th February, 1657. 7

Aurangzeb was getting perturbed over Mir Jumla's delay.
Feeling that he could not wait for him any longer without
missing his chance, he asked the Wazir to come quickly as the
tithe for his march on Bijapur was near at hand. In his reply

*• Storia I. 238 (objections of Dara and Jahanara) ; 239n ; 226
ZNA. 15 ; Waris 118*, h ; EFI. X. 73, 74 (MIr’g presents to the Emperor]U
SHN ; Adab I95b*196a (case of -Kayaks presents to the Mir), 152b ;
Tabrezi 141b-U4»*

Adab, 117b 118a, U5b, 152b, 89l>-90b, 90b-91a, 91*d>, 92a
A urangzib , I. 238.

AURANGZEB DECIDES TO MARCH AGAINST BIJAPUR

Mir Jumla’s letter of 24th December, written from Kalal
^Lurangzeb stressed the desirability of immediate action so as
to take full advantage of certain factors then working against
Bijapur, viz., (i) mutual jealousies among the common
soldiers and captains of BijapuT especially between Khan
Muhammad, Afzal, Fateh Sarnaubat and the sons of Bahlol,
ii) the advance of the Zamindars of the Karnatak, who had
released their own territories from the control of Bijapur, and
(iii) the rebellion of Shahji Bhonala, who, with a view to
establishing his own authority, had created disturbances and
occupied some mahale of the Karnatak, and had entered into
a league with Sri Banga Rayal. “ I am unable to make any
further delfty”, the Viceroy urged upon the Wazir, “ such an
opportunity will not come again. Come very quickly, so that
we together might accomplish this task. Do not delay.
Remember I am ardently looking up for your arrival here.”
Indeed, in his intense eagerness to meet the Wazir, Aurangzeb
asked the astrologers to fix dates for his arrival and urged on
him to come accordingly. 8

5. Aurangzeb decides to march against Bijapur ,

The inability of Mir Jumla to arrive in time left the
Viceroy of the Deccan in great suspense regarding the
possibility of carrying out the Emperor’s orders. The
astrologers had fixed 8th January as the date of AurangzeVs
march against Bijapur. By the middle of December it became
clear that Mir Jumla would not be able to join
Aurangzeb in time. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb, doubting
whether “such a chance would come again”, wanted to conquer
Bijapur first; and punish Qutb Shah subsequently for snatching
away the Karnatak territories of Mir Jumla, as Golkonda
might be seized whenever he desired. The Viceroy did not
consider it prudent to start alone. He informed Mir Jumla
that he would engage in hunting (at* Ramdwah towards
Bijapur frontier) till his arrival and might postpone the date

8 * Adab, 91a-b, 9Tb-t)2a ; lB6a*b ; (either 18th or £3rd January or
any other convenient date).

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

^xpedition in case of the Wazir’3 inability to arrive in tim
bout the middle of January, 1657, Aurangzeb learnt that
Mir Jumla would arrive on L8th January, and at once informed
him that the direction of expedition would be fixed after
consultation with him. Aurangzeb proposed that, on the very
day of his first interview with Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla should
start -and accompany the prince on hunting and discuss the
matter on the way. If it whs settled to go towards Bijapur,
well and good ; otherwise they would turn towards Golkonda. 9

6* j Role of Mir Jumla in the Bijapur Campaign.

On 18th January, 1657, Mir Jumla. arrived at Aurangabad
and on the very same day proceeded, along with Aurangzeb,
to invade Bijapur.- The advance of the imperial army,
encumbered with heavy artillery and siege materials,-was slow.
They reached Andur on 28thFebruary, and leaving Wali
Mahaldar Khan there to guard the road and arrange for
provisions, encamped near the fort of Bidar. 10

The impregnable fort of Bidar, control over which was The key
to the conquest of the Deccan and the Karnatak/’ was defended
by its veteran qiladar, Siddi Marjan, and he had effectively
strengthened its battlements and fortifications, and regulated
ingress and egress. Along with Aurangzeb Mir Jumla inspected
the fort, and threw up entrenchments outside. In the teeth
of deadly artillery fire from the fort on their defenders, Mir
Jumla succeeded in carrying the cannon in two days to the
edge of the ditch and began to fill if up. The Bijapuris

§L

Adah, 89b-90b (Emperor’s instructions), 196b-197a (date of starting
for Bijapur), 197a(hunting', 117b-118a, 145b, 152b.

10 ‘ AS. 2b., Chandor in the text is 70 miles N.W. of Aurangabad and
entirely out of the way in proceeding towards Bidar. The place is
evidently Andur, o. 10 miles west of Bidar (ASI. Sh. See Adcib,

109 b, for the date of arriving here.

The Sultari of Golkonda, apprehending that the invasion of Mil Jumla
was directed against himself, made a pathetic appeal to the Shah of
Persia foi help, on ground of religious affinity, and offered to pay the
expenses of a Persian contingent. Tabrezi; ,141b-144a,

WHlStyy

Mill JUMLA IN BTJAPUE CAMPAIGN

lively attacked the entrenchments of the invaders, bn
repulsed with heavv casualties. Finally the Mughals
damaged two bastions by their artillery discharges and
destroyed the battlements of the lower part, of the walls. On
29th March; 1657, Muhammad Murad scaled the walls of the
tower opposite Mir Jumla's malchar. Wounded by the
explosion of a powder-magazine, on which had fallen a spark
from a rocket thrown by Mir Jumla s artillerymen, biddi
Mar j an surrendered the fort. 11

After the capture of Bidar Mir Jurala remained with
Aurangzed when Mahabat Khan was deputed*to ravage Bijaptn*
territory and clear the road of hovering Bijapuris. Leaving
Bidar on 27th April, Mir Jumla came with Aurangzeb to
Kalya m, 40 miles west, on 3rd May. The same day they
inspected the bastion and fortifications of the city and
invested it. In spite of the artillery discharges of the enemy,
Mir Jumla and other nobles began raising the entrenchments

Sl

and damdama (raised battery) and were determined to reach
the fort by auv means. The defenders launched a heasfy
attack on Mir Jumla’s entrenchments but had to retire after
sometime with several casualties. Their hail of top and
tufetng took a heavy toil on Mughal soldiers. But Mir Jumla
with great care, effort and supervision, carried the trenches to
tho edge of the ditch and thereby weakened the position of the
defenders (12th May). At the same time the ditch was
steadily filled up during night. By 23rd May, three-fourths of
the ditch were filled up and the fort was on the point of being
captured. As Aurangzeb concentrated on capturing the fort,
the Bijapuris endeavoured to divert the attention of the
besiegers from it. When a force of 30,000 Bijapuris advanced
to 4 miles of the Mughal camp, Aurangzeb marched upon
them on 28th May ? leaving a screen of tents round the fort.
The Mughal Van under Mir Jumla, Najabat Khan, Sujan
Singh Bundela, Oilir Khan and others faced the Adi! Shahi
Van under the valorous sons of Bahlol, fighting obstinately.
As the Mughals firmly stood their ground in the face of a

’• AS. 2b-3a : BS. 365 ; Adab, llOa-b ; ZNA. 15-16.

MIN ISTfy

LIFE OF Mm JtJML \

**b Ml sides, the Adil Sti&his attempted
^^Mvance against them but were barred by the dashing Mughal
cavalry. In the meantime Mir Jumla, along with Shah Nawaz
Khan, Rao Oh attarsal, Sham sudd in Kheshgi, and Malmbat
Khan, had attacked the enemy from right and left, and, by
dexterous charges broke the enemy's rank.

i.ne protection of the siege trenches demanded that the
Mtighals should return to the fort in the evening. For, the
garrison, by hurling down lighted gunpowder and burning
naptha and grass (bundles) reduced the plants {with which the
ditfch was filled) to ashes ; the work of bridging the ditch had
to bo begun, anew * the assault was delayedOrders were
giyen for filling up the ditch with stones and mud. On 22nd
Jtiiv, 1*157, Aurangzeb sent ills eldest son with Mir Jumla,
Najabat Khan, Rao Chat tarsal, Mi rasa Sultan, and Dilir Khan
against a resolute band of Adil Shahi defenders, undaunted by
defeats. Sighting the enemy’s banner after an advance of 4&
miles, the Mughal corps darted like lightning on the centre of
th'e Adil Shahi force and, driving them back, pursued them
for 4 miles. As the victors marched, they burnt- and looted
all the villages on both sides arid at the end of day they
reached the qasba of Kulbarga where they swept the whole
country “ with the broomstick of plunder’’, but spared the tomb
of saint Sayyid Gisu Daraz

At last the ditch was filled up with stone and mud, the
bastions were destroyed by Mir jumla’s artillery fire on 9th July,
and the imperialists scaled a tower. Dilawwar Habshi, the
defender of the fort, capitulated on 31st July and on 1st
August, 1»>57, he delivered the keys of the fort to the victors.

fire hmperor suitably rewarded Aurangzeb and several
officers. Mir Jumla was honoured with a special robe and
was confirmed in the possession of some mahals of the
Kamatak province,/ yielding a revenue of 4 crores of dams. 2

l2, AS. 3a-5a, 5b (rewards to Mir Jumla) ; MM. 86a-87a ; ZNA, 15 ;
BS. 405; Storia T. 259; EFT. X. 135-6. Aurangzib 1. 248.

MINlSr^

Section D.

Mir Hurled ^rom Office

L M if Jumla removed from the Wizdral.

While the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan and his ally,.
Wazir Mir Jumla, were nearing the meridian of their victory
in Bijapur, certain events had been brewing at Delhi which
were destined to arrest their advance. The seesaw of Mughal
court politics had begun to work. The Bijapuris had appealed
to Dara, whose jealousy of Aurangzeb had been rising in
proportion to the latter’s success. The Emperor, who had
sanctioned the campaign at the persuasion of Mir Jumla,
now ordered peace at the intercession of Dara. The imperial
order fell like a bomb-shell on Aurangzeb, whose ambition
was once more throttled at the hour of victory as in the
preceding year, as well as on Mir Jumla, whose work of wiping
out the kingdom of Bijapur was undone. By the treaty of
August, 1657, the Sultan of Bijapur agreed to pay an indem¬
nity and to cede Parenda together with its dependencies
and the forts of the Nizamshahi Konkan and the mahal
ofWangi. It was arranged that Mir Jumla Was to establish
thanaa (military outposts) in Parenda, the Nizamshahi Konkan
and Wangi and then to come back to the imperial court
after the realisation of the indemnity to be collected by Qazi
Nizama. Aurangzeb was ordered to return to Bidar after
deputing Mir Jumla to take charge of the forts of the
Konkan. 1

A worse humiliation was in store for Mir Jumla. Shah-
jahan fell ill (6th September) and nominated Dara as his
successor. Dara could no longer afford to retain the trusted
adherent of his rival as the Wazir. Towards the end of
September, 1657, Mir Jumla was removed from the exalted
office of the Wazir for having acted against certain orders.

u AN. 83 ; AS. 5b ; Adah , li2b, 198b ; MU. HI. 530 ; EFJ* X.
118-119.

miST/fy.

LITE OF MIR JUMLA

son, Muhammad Amin Khan, who had been acting as
deputy as diwan was forbidden to go to the office. While
some officers like Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatarsal were
ordered to come back immediately from the Deccan to the
court, Mir Jumla was commanded to return after securing
the surrender of Parenda. 2

<8L

2. Mir Jumla sent to Parenda.

Dara could hurl Mir Jumla from power 4 but not from
AurangzeVs confidence. In fact, Aurangzeb, tormented by
anxiety and perplexed by contradictory projects, had now
to depend totally on Mir Jumla, just as an old and decrepit
person leans on his staff. Before retreating from Kalyani
to Bidar on 4th October, 1(>57, Aurangzeb sent Mir Jumla
towards the fort of .Parenda on 30th September to take
delivery of it, and instructed him to supervise Qazi Nizama’s
collection of war-indemnity at Bijapur and to recall those
jewels and elephants already paid to him till then for
calculation of their value.

Before leaving for Parenda, Mir Jumla advised Aurangzeb
in long and private deliberations “oil every possible contin¬
gency in anticipation”. Even after his departure Aurangzeb
corresponded with him almost daily and confidential officers
arid servants like Shaikh Mir, Abul Path (Qabil Khan),
Muhammad Sharif and the page of Krishna served as the
intermediaries in the lively exchange of oral and written
messages between the two allies. 3 Aurangzeb instructed
Mir Jumla to arrange for the administration of Parenda after
its occupation and also to defend Bir against Shivaji’s sudden
raids, when that district was left vacant hv Nasiri Khan’s
departure for Delhi. Towards the end of October, 1657,
Aurangzeb solicited Mir Jumla's opinion as regards sending
an array against Shivaji, whose men had driven back to

311-8.

AS. 6a, b, 7b, 10a, b; ZNA, 16 ; AN. 29 ; MA. 3.

3 * Adah, 157a, 169a, 92a-b, 92b, 199a-b 200a-b ; Aurangzib , I. 253,

WNIST/fy,

MJR JUMLA SENT TO PARENPA 1

ar its new Mughal faujdar, Muhammad Yusuf, who,
advancing to a place beyond Kalyani by a forced march,,
had beheaded a rebel leader named Habsh Khan, aided
by Shivaji. 4

Mir Jumla’s task was far from easy and Aurangzeb’s
initial hopes of a smooth and early occupation of Parenda were
soon belied. The latter’s retreat from Kalyani emboldened
the Bijapuris to attack isolated Mughal bands and their
general, Afzal Khan, crossed the Bhima river with a view to
recovering the Kalyani and Bidar districts. The Mughal
collectors at the mauzas of Naldrug, especially at Muzamgaon
were attacked by the men of the fort (8th October). There¬
upon Abdul Hamid Deccani, thanadar of Ankalkot, came to
Alluud. Such activity of the Bijapuris frightened the Mughals.
So Aurangzeb favoured the continuance of the thanas,
and suggested that the Mir should ask Ibrahim Khan and
Ikhlas Khan to control the Bijapuris for some days till
the conclusion of the collection, when the mahals would be
returned. If Mir Jumla did not approve of the course of
maintaining the thanas , Aurangzeb would withdraw the
imperial troops. The Bijapuris even intercepted near Naldrug
Aurangzeb’s letter to Mir Jumla and the deciphered copy of a
secret letter- of the Viceroy’s Delhi agent, and so came to
know of the true state of Shahjahan’s health and of Dara’s
attitude towards his younger brothers. Thus they could bide
their time with impunity, knowing fully well that Aurangzeb,
preoccupied with preparing for a contest for the throne, would
not be able to put adequate pressure on them.

The difficulties caused by the interception of news by the
Bijapuris were aggravated by the absence of a regular system
for transmission of messages. Even some of Mir Jumla's
couriers proved “foolish and short-sighted”, worthless or
unreliable, who either gave false news to Aurangzeb or disclosed
secrets. They were accordingly punished and superintendents
were appointed over Mir Ghazi and another harkara and also
over Mir Abdul Hasan for exercising strict censorship. All

4 * Adab, 150a, 157a, 92a-b, 199a-b«.

LIFE OF MIR JITAELA

factors considerably hampered Mir Ju mi la's task
Securing the enforcement of the peace-terms. Hence he
suggested to Aurangzeb the imperative need of establishing a
dakchauJci Aurangzeb approved of the proposal and executed
it, especially as it became more jiecessary than before to get
nows of the surrounding places. 6

3. Mir Jumla as the guide of A urangzeb .

Having perfect confidence in Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb was
resolved never to deviate from his advice in any matter and
not to begin the struggle for the throne without his counsel.
Indeed, as Aurangzeb’s attention was divided between Delhi
and Parenda, his instructions to Mir Jumla pulsated with the
news of Delhi, sent by Isa Beg, the court agent of the Viceroy.
If Shahjahan’s condition was worse, he urged on his ally to
leave Farertda to join him at once. If Shahjahan was better,
he permitted Mir Jumla to persevere further at Parenda.
When, however, Aurangzeb received no news of Shahajahan
he was left in utter suspense and, fearing that the worst had
happened, appealed to Mir Jumla to advise him on ail matters
and come to him immediately to his rescue.

Receiving no news of Delhi for about 25 days (©. 17th
Sept.-12th Oct.) and apprehending the death of the Emperor,
Aurangzeb decided to endeavour to get the throne without
further delay, and asked Mir Juinia (mid-October) to quickly
dispose of the Parenda affair by winning its qiiadar ■ *’ through
any means” . While giving Mir Jumla the distracting news
of Shahjahati’s loss of control of affairs by a m&han-i-khaj of
15th October, Aurangzeb urged him in no case to drag on for
more than two or three days, m there was non© by his side.
But he still deferred to Mir Jumla s discretion, saying
“ Whatever you decide is right.’*

‘V lb& $ l£7ft~b, 2£$b*20.3ft, Nftkk-ijig i« 27 mites n^. of
AUuttd 76 40’ E. 17°34 J N (ASI. Six. 3&.) Popularly koowu as Aladi,
it ia 22 na. n. w. of Qulbarga. For a view of N&ldrug fort, A SR. XIV.
PI. X : ARA0ND 1917-18 (PI*.

*• Adab, 201a-202a (dependence re ."throne) ; 197a, 197a- 198a, • 19Sb„
199a, 190a-200a ; Aurangzib I. 3l4Mfc

MIR JUMLA AS THE GUIDE OF AURANGZEB

harassed by anxiety at the news of Shahjahan's worsening
condition and just bereft of his wife, Aurangzeb left Bidar on
18th October in conformity with Mir Jumla’s advice given at
the time of parting and asked him to send Muhammad Sultan
to Ahmadnagar. In a highly perturbed state of mind
Aurangzeb again pressed on Mir Juxnla (19th Oct.) to expedite
the capture of Parenda. The Viceroy admitted that he was
almost at his wit’s end, as affairs had passed out of his control.
“ My mind,” he expressed, “is so distracted that I can decide
nothing, I can formulate no plan. I have no friend and
confidant but von. Next to God’s grace, I count on your
well-wishing and guidance along the right path. It is your
duty to inform me always of your opinion regarding every
matter so that I may act accordingly ” 7

On receiving (October) a secret message from the Collector
of Agra, Aurangzeb concluded that “ Shahjahan wavS either
dead or a helpless invalid.” In either case “ the great design ”
should be accomplished before it was too late. Therefore he
exhorted Mir Jumla to come away even before securing
Parenda, as it was “ not advisable to delay in such an
emergency, in expectation of one, which bristled with
difficulties”. In case Shahjahan recovered and demanded an
explanation, Aurangzeb hoped to give a plausible one for not
having secured possession of Parenda.

Learning (22nd October) of Dara's assumption of power
at Delhi, Aurangzeb thought of sending Muhammad
Sultan with an army to Burhanpur to prevent imperial
officers like Nasiri Khan from proceeding north at the imperial
summons, to call up the local zamindars and raise a new army.
But sinee this would be an open and deliberate defiance of
imperial authority, too difficult to be explained away, if
Shahjahan recovered, Aurangzeb sought Mir Jumla’s opinion
about the despatch of Muhammad Sultan to Burhanpur.
“If”, Aurangzeb wrote to the Mir, “you consider it useless
to persist in a matter, wheTe defects have cropped np—like
hammering a cold iron—and waste further time, give up the

7 ' Adab ,19Sa-b ; 200a-b ; 202b 203a,

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

negotiate an ahdnama and return to Aurangabad, so that
after consulting you, I may devote myself to the accomplishment
of ‘the great design’. M,v army is going to Pathri with
Muhammad Sultan. I hope to get your letter by then. If
you agree, Muhammad Sultan will go to Ahmadnagar and
I will go to Aurangabad, otherwise Muhammad Sultan would
go to Burhanpur and I will wait there till you return. .Reply
quickly, giving your opinion.” 8

4. Failure of Mir Jumla to secure delivery of Parenda.

• Aurangzeb's complete dependence on Mir Jumla s counsel
and implicit faith in bis judgment concealed a fundamental
difference in the aims of the two collaborators. Throughout
these months of hopes and anxieties, plannings and vacillations,
Aur&ngzeb’s supreme object was never to allow the Pareoda
affair to prejudice and destroy his chances for , accomplishing
his ‘?great design” of securing the throne of Delhi. On the
other hand, Mir & Jumla, undaunted by any difficulty and
unmoved by any other consideration, tenaciously persisted in
the task of securing the fort. At first Mir Jumla followed the
policy of winning over the qiladar of Parenda. In accordance
with Mir Juinla’s suggestion of 14th October, Aurangzeb. wrote
a nishan to the qiladar , sent it to Mir Jumla on 17th October
and asked the qiladar not to cause any difficulty in handing
over the keys of the fort to the Mir. After leaving Bidar
Aurangzeb again asked Mir Jumla, an ^expertinadmimstration”,
to u win over the qiladar by any means.” At Mir J.umla’s
suggestion, too, Aurangzeb wrote a nishan to Muhammad Aman,
the Mughal hajib at Bijapur, but Aurangzeb asked the Mir to
write to the Bijapuri-prime minister. Ikhlas Khan what was
necessary. 9

But the policy of using the golden key failed. , Mir Jumla
then resorted to force. Condemning Aurangzeb’s suggestion to
send Muhammad Sultan to Burhanpur, the Mir asked thp
Viceroy to send him together with his own army from Pathri to

8 * Ibid , 200b-20la, 200a-b, 20la-202a (Mir\s property to be guarded).
•• Ibid, 92a-b, 197b-19Sa, 198a-b, i»8b-199a, 199a'-bf

jfi’AlI.TTBE OF MtB JUMUA TO SECURE OF PAEENDA 129

aa, in the hope that this show of force might cow the
ipuris. Mir Jumla’s proposal did not appeal to Aurangzeb.
In the first place, it would involve a division and hence
weakening of his armed strength. “Where are soldiers”,
Aurangzeb asked, “that some might go with him (the prince)
and some with me ? of those who are already here, it is not
settled whether they would remain with me or not, after the
arrival of the order (of recall), real or fictitious. On the
supposition that the small army of Muhammad Sultan go to
that side and that even I detain by force those who want to go
to Hindusthan, with what army shall I be able to accomplish
this design ? Again, of what use will it be to send Muhammad
Sultan without a strong army ? Of what avail will it bo if J
send him with the army at his disposal ?” Secondly,
Aurangzeb held that the policy of employing force towards
Bijapur would prove futile in view of the rapidly worsening
political situation consequent on Dara’s assumption of power
Sceptical of the wisdom of Mir Jumla’s advice though
Aurangzeb was, he praised it as “well-conceived”, just to
gratify him. Ignoring its attendant difficulties, he dent
Muhammad Sultan to Parenda with a hastily collected force
on 4th November, and exhorted his son to follow the Mir’s
advice in every respect.

Most probably Mir .Jumla expressed in his letters to
Aurangzeb some apprehension of incurring imperial
displeasure for his failure to secure Parenda in time, for we
find Aurangzeb assuring the Mir that the Emperor must have
been aware of the attitude of the Bijapuris and the vacillation
of the qiladar of Parenda. Ascribing this to the very fact of
tho recall of the officers to Delhi, Aurangzeb wrote, “Peace be
on you, Nawab ! when the Jarmans had been issued, and the
nobles had taken the road to the Court, you were pretty
aware of the result of this affair. This group (the Bijapuris)
had prayed to God for such an event and for this reason
repeated exhortations had been sent (by me) to you not to
labour after the affair aa you did, as it would never come to
pass but would cause loss of time”. However, Aurangzeb
9

now

miSTfty,

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Qt

jektJLLi

pec ted Mir Jumla to do. eyery thing, possible to be free
meet Kim 10

Mir Jumla's policy of using force also failed. Within a
week of the arrival of Muhammad Sultan Mir Jumla admitted
his mistake in a letter to Aurangzeb (9th November). Even
the indemnity could not be collected from the Bijapuris, who
had received encouraging letters from Dara. However,
Aurangzeb sounded Mir Jumia as to the policy to be adopted
towards the Bijapuris and the planning of the struggle for the
throne, “as the secrets of the army of the empire, and the
movements of the local troops, and the account of the revenue,
the plan of attacking the enemy, the time, the condition and
the opportunity” were best known to him. 11

5. Mir Jumla to wind up the Parenda affair and
conciliate the. Bijapuris .

During all these months of suspense and anxiety, of patient
but futile toil, Aurangzeb had kept the Mir fully informed of
the developments at Delhi, the events in Gujrat and Bengal
and also of his own preparations to enable the latter to give him
the proper advice regarding the future line of action. 12 Very
likely Mir Jumla suggested to Aurangzeb the policy to be
followed with respect to Murad 13 and Shuja, though we do
not know what detailed advice he gave.

The recall of imperial nobles from the Deccan, and the
publication of the news of the Emperor's loss of control over
all affairs at Delhi and of Dara’s assumption of power, sufficed
to convince Aurangzeb that the Parenda affair could not be
settled even by force. Aurangzeb naturally became anxious
to complete his preparations for contesting the throne. But
this he could not hope to accomplish without acknowledging

10 - Ibid , 201a-202b, 202b-203a ; 203a-204a.

Ibid , 92b ; AN. S3.

Adah , 92b>93a, 201a, 202a, 204a-205a. 265a-206a, 202b*203a.
is- of the following : “By advice of that Politician Emir Jemla. he

dissemblingly Submits to bis brother Morat Back©.” (Bowrey, 137).

There is a brief reference to this in the Poem , 16.

MIN IST/fy

MIR JUMLA TO CONCILIATE THE BIJATURIS

afiture. Aurangzeb entreated Mir Jumla to solve hi
ama. If his quick return was indispensable so as not to
let slip “the chance of accomplishing the really rieoessary
mafcter ', he must put a bold face even over his retreat. The
■conciliation of the two Deccani Sultans was the indispensable
pre-requisite for “strengthening the foundation of prosperity”
—as Aurangzeb wrote, at the end of October, 1657.
Aurangzeb shrewdly endeavoured to conciliate Adil Shah by
shifting the responsiblity for the invasion to Mir Jumla and
•even representing to him that it was “at Mir Jumla’s wicked
advice that he had attacked Bijapur as well as Golkonda.”
He also expressed his desire that “the fort of Parenda and its
dependent territory, the Konkan and the mahal of Wangi,
which have been annexed to the empire, together with that
portion of the Karnatak whioh had been granted to the late
Adil Shah except the forts and the mahals which, after the
transfer of Mir Jumla, had been incorporated with the
Khalsa i Sarkar ”—should be left to him as before.

Realising however, that the best man to conciliate the
Bijapuris was Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb instructed him to wind
up the Bijapur aflair. “On the whole”, he wrote to Mir
Jumla, “give up all ideas of collecting psshkash and conquering
territories. Only see that, by dint of your good treatment, we
may be relieved of them (Bijapuris)”. And he again
communicated to him, “My real object is that the Bijapuris,
being favoured by your kind acts and assurances, may riot
think of creating trouble and in this way, by your conciliatory
steps, a new army should be enlisted. There is
no time to accomplish the matter by force. In this extreme
situation you should try to make apparently sincere
professions of friendship. Do whatever is possible without
losing time/' 14

The modus opemndi, suggested by Aurangzeb, was a
curious mixture of threat and diplomatic conciliation. Mir
Jumla was to publish the news of the arrival of Prince
Muhammad Sultan and of Aurangzeb and so ovorawe the

Adah, 162b-163a, 202a-b, 200b-201a.

LIFTS or MIR JfjULA

;l

/puris to yield, He was to win over the pro«Mu{

3Byapiiri prime minister, Ikhlas Khan, and explain to the
Bijapuris that Mir Jumla and Ikhlas Khan were mediating
before Aurangzeb for ending the war despite the latter's orders
and that the Mir would renounce the claim to indemnity and
the territories on condition that the Bijapuris would “ honour
this exemption " and not claim Bidar, Kalyani and other
adjacent regions and not wage war against the Mughals, 15

But this move, too, ended in smoke, owing to the murder
of Ikhias Khan on 11th November at the instigation of Mulla
Ahmad Natia, a bitter enemy of the Mughals. So Mir Jumla
pw followed a policy wholly divorced from ethical

onsiderations and entirely guided by exigencies of the
mbpaent. He sought to effect a speedy settement of the
Bija^uri affair by winning over the instigator of the murder of
the Bijapuri Wazir. Seeking Aurangzeb's opinion on the
matter, Mir Jumla forwarded a letter of Mulla Ahmad Natia,.
written to himself, to the Viceroy on 18th November, 1057.
In a cautiously-worded reply, Aurangzeb practically approved
of Mir Jumla's policy. 16

6, Mir Jumla's retreat from Parenda .

Realising Mir Jumla's further stay with the Prince at the
foot of the fort of Parenda to be inadvisable lest the Bijapuris
might cause further trouble, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to
come away, postponing the delimitation of the frontiers to a
subsequent and convenient date. To lure the Mir, Aurangzeb
suggested a campaign against Qutb Shah for the sake of
of recovering Kambam. Mir Jumla could send Muhammad
Sultan to Ahmadnagar, after detaining him there for sometime
longer, if he thought it desirable.

On the other hand, Mir Jumla asked Aurangzeb (18th
November) to come to him to punish the Bijapuris.

Ibid , 202a*b, 201a-202b, 202b-203a ; Aurangzib I. 263.

Mir Jumla probably suggested to Aurangzeb the necessity of winning
over the nobles and peasants of the Deccan,

Adah, 92b-93a; 204a-205a ; Aurangzib, I. 263*4.

mik juMX4 r d tmmAt mom parbnda

ngzeb, While agreeing tfeat tin# ch&stisefbent after “ suer
a nefarious action (murder of Khan Muhammad) on their part **
was over-due, considered it useless to go there personally.
“Uvea during the lifetime of Khan Muhammad”, observed
Aurangzet), “ the Bijapuris did nothing but practise deceit
and falsehood. Malta Ahmad, from the very beginning,
tried his utmost to spoil this matter. It can never fee
accomplished. The army of this province, after a year’s hard
campaigning, has lost heart on hearing of their Emperor's
illness and has been unsettled in various ways. They are in
greater trouble than can be described/' So Aurangzeb asked
Mir Jumla to come back to Bir without “ wasting time over a
spoilt affair/'

After lingering on at Parenda, in expection of the Viceroy's
reply to his own letter, Mir Jumla arranged to go to Bir with
Muhammad Sultan. Aurangzeb, learning of this arrangement
from the Prince's letter of 26th November, asked the Mir to
halt at Bir, if he had already started; and if not, he might
stay on (i. e. at Parenda) for a fortnight with the Prince if he
considered it advantageous to do so.

In reply to Mir Jumla’s letter in cypher, Aurangzeb informed
him of his perplexing anxieties and explained why he had been
pressing for his hurried return : he would lose his chance for
the throne if the Bijapur affair Was protracted and his scattered
forces could not be concentrated. 17

About 6th December, Aurangzeb summoned Muhammad
Sultan from Parenda in order to send him to chastise the
contumacious Zamindirs of Burhanpur and to purge the
country up to the Narbada of rebels. Aurangzeb sent Prince
Muhammad Miiaziam to Pareitdd arid advised Mir Jumla to
stay with him at Bir , and to make anotfoer effort‘‘to bring the
Bijapuris to their senses" with the help of an army to he sent
by Aurangzeb. Here, about the middle of December, Mir
Jumla had three confidential interviews with Aurangzob's
secretary. 18

AM, fetift , 4urm$zib-t. 328* 329-30’.

Adah, 94a-b, See infra sub-section 8.

18 .

In the meantime; Mir Jumla, getting an inkling of Dara’s;
machinations at the Court from Muhammad Amin Khan’s
letter (of 6th November) had sought Aurangzeb’s advice before
replying to his son. On or after 9th November Aurangzeb
asked the minister to counteract Dara's moves, adding : “It is
not necessary to teach wisdom to Lukman. Whatever will
strike him will be according to the canons of wisdom. In reply
to the order of the Eldest Prince (Dara), it seems expedient to-
write a judicious preamble and to counterbalance falsehood with
falsehood, according to your far-seeing knowledge and inherent
wisdom and dictates of your illuminating discretion. Write
whatever seem desirable.”

But Mir Jumla’s attempt to baffle Dara’s moves failed.
Aware of Aurangzeb s alliances with Murad and Shuja, early in
December, 1657, Dara sent letters of recall in Shahjahan’s name
to Mir Jumla and other remaining generals, as their continued
stay in the Deccan was likely to prejudice his own cause and.
strengthen Aurangzeb's military position. Aurangzeb received
the imperial far man on 19th December, and the Mir got it from-
him on the 22nd.

The order threw Aurangzeb to the lowest depths of despair.
“Friend”, so ran the Viceroy’s plaintive message to the
minister, written in his own handwriting, “God assist you !
What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe
how the days pass over me? I have no remedy save
patience.” 19

8. Mir Jumla arrested by Aurangzeb.

The time for action had at last come for Aurangzeb.
Apprehending that the conjunction of Mir Jumla/an experi¬
enced, able, intelligent and shrewd officer, a past-master in
diplomacy, a veteran general, and above all, owner of immense
wealth, with the Crown-Prince would spell disaster for himself,

19 - Adab, 203a-204a (Dara) / Dara ’b r reasons for recall in As. 10b
ZNA. 18-19 ; Aurangzib I. 326.

MIR JUMLA% PART IN THE EPISODE

Viceroy of the Deccan at once made up his mind to 1
Dara’s latest move. Aurangzeb asked the Mir to leave Bir
about 27tli December along with Muhammad Muazzam and not
"to set out for Delhi before seeing him. In a most flattering
letter to the Mir, the Viceroy described him as his best friend
and most devoted well-wisher and profound lauded his

wisdom. “I know", he remarked therein, “you are faithful
to your woid. Your intention in going to Hindustan was and
is no other than to increase my power and grandeur
and to make me succeed n my heart's desire.

You have often said within my hearing, "I wish for life only
that I may see the master of mankind (Aurangzeb) on the
throne; and in realising this aim I value not my life or
property.’ Now is the time to display your devotion. I do

not need others in making the necessary equipment for this

business, while you are alive. I care not for those (officers)
who have been estranged from me by reason of my partiality
to you. Come to me, so that with your advice I may
engage in preparations for the work of gaining the Crown.”

Mir Jurala arrived at Aurangtbad about 1st January, 1658,
but was arrested by Aurangzeb soon after and sent as a
prisoner to Daulatabad. All his property, the acquisitions
of his life-time, were confiscated. His army together with
the excellent artillery, manned by Europeans, now passed
under Aurangzeb’s control. To Aurangzeb, then in great need
of money, these “supplied at that critical moment the much-
needed means for his march towards his goal/’ 20

9., Mir Jumla s part in the Episode.

The order of recall came as a supreme test of Mil Jumla’s
diplomacy. For him it revealed the eternal conflict between
duty and self-interest. In particular, it meant a clash
between loyalty to his master, the Emperor, and loyalty to

20 - As. I0a-b ; ZNA. 18-20; Poem., 15-1*7; AN. 83-4; GD (Sultan
Muhammad to Qutb) ; ,Adab , 206b ; Aurangzib I. 332. Mir Ahmad,
Aurangzeb’s hajib. sent a wakil to confiscate Mir Jurnla’s goods Stored at
Mus ul ip at am. Its havaldar Fathulla Beg was ordered to prepares an
inventory of his goods and send it to Aurangzeb’s Court. Tabrezi, 35a,

UEFB or MIR jxjmjla

> i mq

is ally, tlie Viceroy. The problem was complicated by the-
fact that Mir Jumla was the ally of one, whose rival had
virtually usurped the authority of the Emperor. It was
clear that, at that particular moment, Mir Jumla’s obliga¬
tions to the Emperor, obligations to the Viceroy and family
considerations seemed irrecouciliable. No doubt, as the ally
of Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla could never like the idea of going
to the imperial court. But for an imperial officer, which he
legally was, staying behind without any cogent reason was
impossible. It would be an act of open rebellion. More¬
over, it would expose his family, left as hostages in the
Court, to Dara’s vengeance. The problem before Mir Jumla
was how to keep his loyalty untarnished, his honour with
his ally bright and yet to save his family.

Indeed it would have been a baffling problem to any¬
one made of softer stuff than that of Mir Jumla. His
shrewd diplomacy helped him to rise to the occasion. On
arrival at Aurangabad (about 1st January, 1658) he gave
out that he was going to Agra in obedience to the
imperial mandate. Feigning fear of Aurangzeb’s designs, he
refused to see him saying, “As I have been ordered by
the Emperor to go to him, I have no choice but to obey."
Aurangzeb then deputed his son Muhammad Sultan to the
Mir with instructions to bring him over to himself anyhow.
Aurangzeb sent through the Prince a friendly message to
the Mir, to remove his suspicions. He noted that, as he
considered him his well-wisher, he should spare a while to
attend to some urgent matters before proceeding to Agra
and carry an important oral message for the Emperor.
The Prince duly delivered the message to the Mir and
induced him to visit the Viceroy. Then, as soon as the Mb
entered the private apartment (Khilwatgah) of Aurangzeb, he
was arrested.

According to the official history, Alamgimama , it was
Aurangzeb, who was obliged to detain Mir Jumla for “political
reasons”, as the latter# intention of going to the
court was conducive not to his own interests of getting
the throne but to those of the Deccanis. The Aurcmgnwm ,

|P' \%) M1B JCMU’S TAR1 Rt TUB EPISODE

r i > i

states that Aur&cgze A h asked the Mir to
him in the projected advance against Para and then it was
the Mir who suggested that Aurangzeb should imprison him
and confiscate his property, appropriate his entire army and
then, together with Murad, advance against Para. The astute
minister observed that by means of such trickery, Aurangzeb s
purpose would be easily accomplished and his own family also
would be saved. Mir Jumla overbore Aurangzeb's hesitation
to imprison a Sayyid, by saying that as he was volunteering,
no harm would befall the Viceroy. Thereupon, Aurangzeb
imprisoned the Mir, But a secret understanding of this sort
between the two could not possibly have been made so late in
the day. Indeed, with his inherent power of discernment,
Mir Jumla must have anticipated beforehand that his recall
was inevitable. His son, as we have seen, had informed him
of Para's manoeuvres. The subsequent correspondence between
the Mir and the Viceroy and the mission of the latter’s secretary
to the former at Bir ( Pecember, 1657 ) suggest clearly that
the two conspirators were devising plans to thwart Para’s
moves. The report of the mission of Qab.il Khan to Mir
Jumla is couched in such terms, the issues are left so vague,
as to create the suspicion in the mind of the reader that some¬
thing very secret was settled, and that the cautious secretary
did not even consider it safe to put it down on paper but
reserved the matter for an oral communication to Aurangzeb.
Thus there is no doubt that- the imprisonment of Mir Jumla
by Aurangzeb was done at the Mir's own advice, and that it
was outcome of a preconcerted plan between the two to
secure their respective interests through it, though there may
be difference of opinion as regards the time when it was actually
engineered. 21 Para shrewdly suspected that the two were
in league and collusion, reported it to the Emperor and even
took his sanction to imprison Muhammad Amin Khan Bakhshi
on a false charge of neglect of duty, and arrested him in Para’s
own house. Sbahjahan released him after 3 or 4 days knowing
him to be innocent.

It would thus appear that Mir Jumla’s diplomacy succeeded
marvellously well indeed. He managed the whole affair so

mi$T/f

LIFE OF MIK JUMLA

rly that the episode appeared to the Emperor as being due
r ° the injustice and irregularity of Aurangzeb. Shahjakan
wrote a Jetter to Aurangzeb, condemning this unjustified
arrest and the unbecoming confiscation of the property of “two
innocent Sayyids”—who had been preparing to comply with
the imperial summons to proceed to Delhi, and urged the
Viceroy to release them, 21

<SL

10. Mir Jumla released by Aurangzeb.

But before receiving the imperial remonstrance, Aurangzeb
had sent a false explanation to the Emperor that he had
imprisoned Mir Jumla because he had “smelt something of
defiance from his behaviour’’ and because otherwise he would
have joined the Deccani generals. The explanation
even caught hold of popular imagination. An English factor
observed (26th January, 1658) that the Nawab was imprisoned
“for practising with the king of Golkondah to start a broyle
and come in for a share of the crown© ’\ 23

When, after the defeat of Dara, further confinement of Mir
Jumla was not necessary, but he could be more usefully
employed in the impending war against Shuja through his
release, Aurangzeb s~t him free from his mock-prison. A
formal apology on his part is referred to by Munshi Qabil.
Khan. “ I detained you ”, Aurangzeb is said to have written

“for some reason. The time has come for my

apologising to you. It is highly imperative that a

sincere well-wisher, versed in business like yourself, should

21, ZNA, 19-20 ; AS. 10b ; A dab , 168b (QabiVs interview with the
Mir); Poem 16-17; AN- 84; MU. III. 637-8; Aurangzib I. 333.
According ito Manucci (Storia I. 249-50), during<the interview Aurangzeb
showed exuberance of affection towards the Mir, calling him * father ’
and asked him to espouse his cause against Dara, whereupon Mir Jumla
was highly incensed and publioty repretiherid&d the Vicbroy, so that his
loyalty might be reported by spies to the Emperor and Dara.

32 ‘ AN. 84 (Dara imprisons jMuhammad Amin) ; AS. 10b ; MU. IIU
538.

?• ZNA. 20 ; AN. 84 ; Adab 95a, 67b , EFI. X, 263a.

mtST/fy

MIR JUMLA RELEASED BY AURANGZEB

main in my court/’ In another letter Aurangzeb is said "to
have expressed : ‘‘That I imprisoned you was not due to any
disloyalty on your part. Only you showed remissness in exertion
and insisted on going back: to the Court at an inconvenient
time and it was inadvisable to allow you to do so. However
much I have tried to make you realise that, I have failed. So
I was obliged to detain you, much against my will. Now, by
God’s grace my wish has been fulfilled and a new life has come
in the garden of kingdom and religion. My enemies have been
humiliated. It is inhuman to detain you longer. I do not
want to keep an intelligent man like you unnecessarily without
work.” 24 But this apology is nothing but a clever cloak to
hide from others the well-contrived plot of the Mir and
Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb sent an order to Muhammad
Muazzam, releasing Mir Jumla from his mock-prison of
Daulatabad and restoring to him all his goods lying at
Burhanpur, and granting him one lakh of rupees in cash, to
meet the necessary expenses of administration. Muhammad
Muazzam was further instructed to house Mir Jumla suitably
in the Mahakot fort till the end of the rains.

Informing Mir Jumla of the arrival of his ^.on, Muhammad
4min Khan, on *29th May, 1658, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla
to remain grateful for the favours conferred on him. Holding
out hopes of greater favours on his arrival, Aurangzeb
instructed him to be ready to come to the Court and to take
another sum of Rs. 50,000 from Mahakot and whatever was
possible of his goods. After suitable arrangements regarding
his goods had be\sn made by the Prince, Mir Jumla was asked
to hasten to Aurangzeb. 26

But Mir Jumla, though urgently summoned by Aurangzeb,
was personally anxious to proceed to the Karnatak in order to

24 ‘ A'lab 95b, 9da-b, Khafi Khan (ii, 9; writes : '* Aurangzeb
imprisoned Mir Jumla at Daulatabad as a stroke of policy to prevent his
ill-repute.’* Kambu writes (10b) ; “ Muazzam Khan, the best of officers
and the head of this affair, through some evil manner, which was
inconsistent with wise conduct and knowledge, wanted, without
permission of Aurangzeb. to go to the Emperor.”

Adab, 95a-b, 95b, 235a ;

MINI sr^

LOT QW MIR JUMLA

er his forts and mahaU from Qutb Shah's hold. Lear]
the Mix's intention from his son, Aurangzeb pointed out to
the Mir that this could not be carried out unless he remained
there for some time and ordered Qutb Shah to withdraw his
men therefrom. Towards the end of October, 1658, Mir
Jumla was appointed Subahdar of 13 urban pur in the rank of
6,000 Zat and 6,000 Suwar and given the mahas of the province
of Khandesh as his jagir y in place of Wazir Khan, sent to
Aurangabad. Mir Jumla was advised to settle duly his
personal affairs in the Karnatak and elsewhere, and also those
of Burhanpur, to collect together the ships and articles lying
scattered, to restore the dakchaulci from Burhanpur to the
Karnatak, to conciliate the local zamindars and officers, to
organise and improve the army and exercise strict control
over all matters. 26

AN. 218-19 ; Adab ,, 95b-96a ; 235a ; MU. IIT. 538 9.

misrfy

Section E

Mir Jumla's Relations With Europeans 1
(0. 1656-58)

^' Offset of Mir Jumla s appointment as Wazir.

With the appointment of Mir Jumla in Mughal imperial
service, followed by the bestowal of the Karnatak as a
personal jagir on him, a definite change came over his relations
with the English. So long he had utilised the English East
India Company as an instrument for realising his commercial
and political ambitions and usually maintained with them,
outwardly at least, an attitude of friendship. But now any
further wooing of the Company became unnecessary on his
part. At the same time, however, his departure from the
Deccan, a scene of unstable political equilibrium, his territorial
and economic interests being left under the charge of his
lieutenants, the reduction of his armed forces there, and the
uncertainty of his coming back to or of his exercising effective
control over the Karnatak, generated certain factors which
aggravated the friction between Mir Jumla (and his
representatives) and the English factors in Madras, and
probably emboldened the latter to carry on their private
trade in a greater degree than before.-

x * Further details have been given in my articles on Mir Jumla.
and the English (1655-58), in JBORS. Dee. 1940, pp. 323-40 and March,
1941.

Ibid , XXVI. 325-6. The English factors at Agra endeavoured to
gauge his attitude towards the E. I. C. On 27th June, 1656, Jesson, one
of the local factors, saw him with presents worth Rs. 150. Mir Jumla
promised to do for the Company whatever was possible for him. But,
being informed by Hafiz Nasar, Governor of Surat, the Mir did not
consider the claims of the , English regarding insurance to be justified.
EFI. X. 68-69, 69-71.

MINIS

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

Alleged complaints of oppression on the. Fort St Oeorg<
factors by Mir Jumia's officers.

To a large extent, this friction was due to the eompla hits
of oppression on Fort St. George factors and of hindrances to
their trade alleged to have been caused by the Mir’s governors
since the^ime of Sayyid Ibrahim. Matters became unbearable
in the time of Bala Rau, governor of Poonamallee.

Mir Jurala is represented in the English factory records to
have threatened to deprive the English of the fort and
government of Madras, and to have agreed to the suggestion
of Bala Rau that the latter “might sell the corn that grew In
his Dominions in Madras and that the government thereof
might be under him”. When Agent Greenhill objected to the
junction of Poonamallee and Madras, Bala Rau left Madras,
keeping one of his agents there with instructions “to breed
distractions both in the government of the town and in the
Company's affairs/' He also made repeated allegations against
the English to Mir Jumia to fan his wrath against them,
and also interfered with the normal business activities
of the Company in several ways. Thus Bala Rau sought to
utilise his office at Poonamallee to control production and
distribution in Madras, “surrounding and feeding" the English
“from hand to mouth”, so as to compel them to bow to his
will. 3

3. Retaliation of the English Factors .

The complaints of the English factors to Mir Jumia and to
Mir Sayyid Ali. the newly appointed governor of the
former’s Karnatak dominions, made in the hope of securing
an early and effective redress went in vain, and Bala Rau was
emboldened to “insult the English all the more"; he seized
the entire paddy purchased by the English agents even from
outside Mir Jumla's jurisdiction, and also stopped at Terra-

3 * This account is based ;on (I) the Chamiber's Narrative , Love I,
189 ; EFI. X. 41*2 (2) Letter of Greonhill and Chamber, Nov. 10, 1656,
Love 1. 165*66 ; EFI. X. 93 ; see JBORS. XXVI. 340 ; XXVIL 96*98
for details.

COUNTER MBASTTRS OF MT.R JUMNA'S GOVERNORS

’ymjkwmhe (? Tiruvanavasi) the consignment of belj-me
'anza from Pegu), transported with Mir Jumla’s sanction to
Warangal, causing gtfeat loss to the English. 4 5 The gravity of
the losses and troubles suffered by the Port St. George factors
led their Agent Greenhill to think of retaliation. Tt took
the shape of the seizure of the Nawab's Bed Sea (Mocha)
junk, a large country vessel, and the capture of 4 pieces of
ordnance from it (August, 1656). The opportunity for all this
came with the Hindu revolt in the Karnatak.'’

The seizure of the Mir's junk was undoubtedly a challenge
to his authority and proved to be a source of infinite
troubles to the English, first in the East Coast and
subsequently both there and in Bengal. They had resorted to
that "unwarrantable” procedure, believing that, on their
capture of the vessel and its contents, Mir Jumla would come
to a satisfactory agreement with them. But they were
disillusioned. Mir Jumla was made of too strong a stuff to
come down to such a humiliating compromise. Though he
was then preoccupied with his own affairs and his governors
were very much distracted due to the Hindu revolt, he knew
how to bide his time. As a matter of fact, the subsequent
sieges of Madras by his troops formed in a sense strong
measures of reprisal against this opportunist policy of the
Company’s factors at Madras. 6

4. Counter measures of Mir Jumla* s Governors.

Being unable to persuade the English by peaceful negotia¬
tions to surrender the junk, Mir Sayyid Ali gave orders for the
siege of Madras. Bala Bau at first resorted to an economic
blockade of Madras by wholly stopping the import of provisions
there and enforcing it by placing guards round the place. 7 This
was followed by the siege of the town by Mir Jumla’s forces
under Lingum Nayak (18th Dec. 1656), to capture some leaders

4 - Love I. 189-90 ; EFI. X. 41-2.

5 . Love, op cit, 184-5, 165-7 and d, 190 ; EFI. X. 92-4. 288.

EFI. X. 184 ; Love X. 185.

7 - EFI, X 95-97 ; Love I. 190.

US* OF mm WMLA

ie Hindu revolt (Koneri Clietti and Venguro Raja), shelter«
tng in Madras. It was attended with burning of houses,
phinder and seizure of cloths and goods of the Company and
the flight of the injured Hindu inhabitants from the Company’s
settlement in Madras. The departure o f Mir Jumla’s army
was not followed by immediate restoration of normal business
activities there, and trade dislocation continued to the next

year.*

5. Attitude of the Dutch and the English .

If the English at Fort St. George suffered from Mir Jumla’s
forces, the Dutch at Pulicat, in spite of their strong fortifica¬
tions had to bear the brunt of a siege conducted by the forces
of the Raja of Chandragiri. As a matter of fact, despite the
temporary estrangement of Mir Jumla from the Dutch during
I65(V55, the latter were inclined to espouse his cause in case
of a Pinclu attack on Pulicat. On the other hand, Mir Jumla
was definitely alienated from the English about the middle of
1055. 9 They had “much more reason to rejoice than complain’
at the Hindu revolt in the Karnatak and had full sympathy and
possibly some support for the Hindu Raja, anxious to recover
a portion of his dispossessed territories. But though favour¬
able towards their late benefactor, the P*aja of Chandragiri,
the English did not want to give any offence to their new
master, Mir Jumla, by openly defying his authority, if it could
be avoided, 10

*• EFI. X. 97-99 ; Love. I. 167, 168, 190-1.
a- EFI. X. 37-38 ; Love. I. 160.

to. See JBORS, op tit. Dutch refusal to procure for Kayal Mir
Jumla’s riches stored at Pulicat and pledge to help Mir Jumla in siege
(Dutch records in EFI. X. 99) : English assistance to Hindu general,
Koneri Chetti and eagerness to see Rayai recover his territories (EFI. X.
94, 98, 97, Love, I. 167) : Greenhill requested Koneri to release Mir
jucnla’s Governor Bala Rau and housed the latter (Love I. 190 ; EFI.
X 95) : The English wanted to-retain the factory at Viravasaram (under
the Rayal) as a place o£ refuge, if their position became unbearable at
Masulipatam (under Mir Jumla), EFI, X. 39-40 ; Greenhill to continue
as President of Fort St, George in view of growing differences with Mir
Jumla, EFI. X, 37-38 ; Love I. 160.

<p

misTff

UBLES AFTER MIR’s DISMISSAL JJRQM THE WIZARAT

flora fortnight's negotiations between Mir, Juraia's men
and the English, it was agreed that the English should restore
all the detained goods of Mir Jumla, evidently including the
junk, and enjoy their privileges as before. Still, as a measure
of precaution the Agent and (Jouncil at Fort St. Georg*, re¬
inforced the “slender British garrison' 5 by enrolling Eurasian
and native soldiers, formed a hired civic militia for use in case
of an emergency and made a pathetic appeal to the Company
for strengthening the defences of Madras. 11

6*. Fresh troubles in 165? after Mir Jumla s dismissal

from the Wizarat.

Fresh troubles for the English arose in 1657, especially after
Mir Jumla had been hurled from the Wizarat. He attacked
the town of Madras on the ground that the English had assisted
the Raja of Chandragiri in his “War against the Mogul*’ and
had been hostile. The second siege or blockade of Madras
(Sept. 1057—April, 1658) was conducted by the Mir’s
general, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak and his Governor, Bala
Rau, under orders of Mir Sayyid Ali. 12 On the refusal of the
English to grant passports to Mir Jumla’s sea-going junks, his
forces stiffened the siege. But without artillery, which had
been appropriated Aurangzeb early in January, 1658, they
could not seriously damage the defences of Fort St. George.
Moreover, as food supplies could be easily brought by sea, the
blockade became ineffective. Various considerations forced
Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak and Aiyappa (Japa) Nayak to order
Bala Rau to raise the siege (19th April) and to suspend hostili¬
ties till the arrival of Mir Jumla. According to an important
agreement of April, 1658, between Tupaki Krishnappa and
Agent Greenhill, Mir Jumla gave up his “interest" in the
revenues and customs of Madras on payment of a consolidated
annual rent of 380 pagodas by the English, and the latter
were left in undisturbed control of the Fort and the town.

U. EFI X. 1)0, 98. 101, 174 ; Love, [, 167, 169 (Dutch records).
l3 - The exact relationship between Bala Rau and Mir Sayyid AU is
nob clearly ascertainable from English factory records.

10

MIN/Sr^

LIF.fi OF MIB JOMLA

^ was followed by the occupation of Pulicat by an army unde
Ghinnatambi Mudaliyar sent by Mir Jumla's General, Tupakki
Krishnappa Nayak. Both the Dutch and the English lent Mir
Jumla’s men large sums of money, the former 10,000 pagodas,
and the latter 2,000, besides sending cloth worth 1,000 pagodas. 13
The Portuguese settlement of San Thome was also sacked by
Mir Jumla's forces. 14

Sl

». ijove I. 191-2, 168-9 ; EFI. X. 135. 136-137, 173-4, 176. JBORS.
op cit %

The annual rent, of Madras remained fixed at 380 pagodas till 1672,
when it was raised te 1,200 pagodas. This was finally remitted-by
Muhammad Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic.

Aiyappa Nayak was TJrother of Damarla Venkatappa from whom the
original grant for Fort St, George was secured. EFT. X. I75n.
w, Love. f. 174 and n.

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION
Section A

The Battle of Khajwa
L Mir Jumla meets Aurangzeb at Kora.

At the end of September, 1658, Aurangzeb entrusting the
pursuit of Dara to his generals, had to return from the
Punjab to the capital to oppose the advance of Shuja. The
Emperor summoned Mir Jumla to come to him immediately,
leaving Khandesh under some trustworthy person, to guide and
counsel him in his war with the lord of Bengal and bring it to a
successful close. Towards the end of November, Aurangzeb
sent a strong force under Sultan Muhammad from Agra
towards Allahabad to bar Shuja’s path. Advising the Prince
•not to hasten an engagement but to wait till the arrival of his
own wazir and himself, the Emperor himself started (2.1st
December) and joined the Prince and the imperial army at
Kora-Gautampur, eight miles west of Khajwa on 2nd January,
1659. Shuja had reached the little village of Khajwa (80th
December) and occupied a large artificial lake in the midst of
a great plain. But finding his path blocked by the Prince, he
had remained entrenched there with his efficient and well-
organised artillery, largely manned by Europeans. Mir Jumla,
too, advancing from Khandesh by forced marches, arrived at
Kora with a small army “two days before the battle” i.e. on 3rd
January. 1

AN. 242 ; Adah, 236a, 237a ; MA. 12 ; TS. 101a, b ; 112a; Poem,
122-125 ; ZNA. 74-75 ;AS. 19b ; MIT. III. 538-9 ; Storm, I. 329: EFI,
X. 168.

The date of Mir Jumla’s arrival is stated to be 4th January in Poem
124-5, ZNA. 76, Storia I. 329 ; and 2nd January (the same day as
Aurangzeb) in MA. 12 and Adah 237a. But according to the
Alamgirnamci (242), confirmed by Ma’surn (112a) Mir Jumla came “two
days before battle ” i. e. 3rd January.

WNisr^y

|

I

2. Mir Jumla at Khajwa .

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

On the arrival of Mil* Jumla, preparations on the
imperial side were speeded up. On 3rd January, Aurangzeb,
probably acting on Mir Jumla’s advice, arranged his battle
order, and allocated to each division its respective position.
Next day, after exchanging ait ineffectual fire with the
imperialists, the Shujaite artillery retired in the evening
from its position on an elevated ground to the army base.
Mir Jumla, with the instinct of “a born general”, imine-
diatelj captured the deserted place so as to command
Shuja’s camp. Then, drawing up 40 guns to it after hard
toil, he kept them ready for action against the enemy on
the next morning. Ordered by the Emperor., every general
kept his army in a state of preparedness. During the early part
of the night Mir Jumla went round the camp to superintend
the entrenchments and urged the guards to be vigilant. 2

During Jaswant Singh’s treacherous attack on Aurangzeb’s
camp towards the close of the night of 4t.h January, it
was Mir Jumla, if we believe Manucci,—who “counselled
Aurangzeb to reanimate his men ” and advised him to
write an intriguing letter to Alawardi Khan, Chief Adviser
of Shuja, promising to reward him in return for inducing
his master to dismount from his elephant during the battle.
But Bhimsen states that Mir Jumla managed to pump out
of Jaswant his plans in an interview with him and com¬
municated them to the Emperor. In any case Mir Jumla
minimised the gravity of the danger arising from Jaswant’s
treachery. 8

The battle order of the previous day was retained by
Aurangzeb, except that Islam Khan replaced Jaswant as the
commander of the right wing and that Saif Khan was put
in independent charge of its front section. Nevertheless,
Aurangzeb empowered Mir Jumla to introduce whatever
changes bethought necessary according to the exigencies of war*

a- AN. 248, 252, Storm, I. 328 ; Adab, 239b; Aurangzib , II, 479, 480-1.
*• Storia, I. 328-30 ; ND. 14b-15b.

*• Aurangzib , II. 485.

SHUJA DEFEATED AT KHAJWA

The battle of Khajwa (5th January) was pre~emiiien :
an artillery duel, in which cannon, rockets, muskets and
hand-grenades were freely exchanged on both sides* On the
day of battle Mir Jutnla was seated on an elephant just
behind the Emperor's, ready to advise him in decisive
moments. When Sayyid Alam of Shuja's Right, driving three
infuriated elephants, routed the Imperial Left wing and the
ptaic-striken army fled away, “even veterans of the Deccan
wars" and old imperial servants followed suit. The eneniv
attacked the Emperor at the centre, guarded by 2,000 troopers
oixly. The battle had reached a critical stage. The flight
of the Emperor then would have meant the bewildering
retreat of the entire army. But he stood firm, cool and
undaunted, taking care to chain the legs of his elephant so that
it might not run away. In this way he saved the situation.
Then the Emperor veered round to relieve his hard-
pressed Right, bat only after taking due precaution not to
create an impression of a volte face to his army* This was
followed by a simultaneous advance of the Right, Centre and
Left divisions of the imperial army, which enveloped Shuja’s
Centre. 6

In the highly contested battle of Khajwa, Aurangzeb'a
advantage, due to his numerical superiority over Shuja (by
2 to 1), was further augmented by treachery in the latter’s
ranks. The desertion of the Shujaite officers, Murad Kam
Safavi (Mukarrara Khan) and Abdur Rahman Sultan (son of
Nazar Muhammad Khan, ex-king of Balkh) is described by
Kambu as “a surprising event", which placed the victory

»• For battle of Khajwa, AN. 257-65 ; TS. 102b-105b ; AS. 19b*20b ;
ZNA. 75-84 ; Poem, 128-33 (Bakhtan Beg commander of right wing of
imperial artillery and hia son killed) ; MA. 14 ; Aurangzib II. 486-95 ;
KA, (Tr. by J. H. Bilimoria), letter No. XCi. pp. 87-9 > Balasore letter,
March 2, ,1659, EBT. X. 279 and n ; Manuoci (Storia I, 332) says that
when the driver of the Emperor’s elephant was killed, and he was about
to get down from it, Mir Jumla, “ doing his duty as a good leader (and
from him nothing else could be expected) ”, loudly shouted out * Qaina,
Qaim \ (Stand fast, Stand fast/). At this Aurangeeb stopped on the
•ele phaiM uid endured the severe assault.

L£FE OF MIR JUMLA

^.urangzeb’s hands, because under their guidance Aurangd
^-attacked Sbuja’s army. The Enghsh factory correspondence
(Balasore letter of 15th December) ascribes Shuja’s
defeat to his deficiency in “certain kinds of fireworks made of
bamboos, which were, deadlier than grenades, ” as compared
to the imperialists. 6

But a dispassionate and critical study of the Persian
chronicles together with the account of Manucci suggests
that Mir Jnmla made creditable contributions towards turn¬
ing the scales against Shuja. Being in constant attendance
on the Emperor during the battle, as his right-hand man, he
offered him timely advice regarding the tactical moves and
instilled hope and courage into his mind during critical
moments.

6< As, 20b (Verse) ; ZNA 79 ; EFI. X, 279 and n, 280 ; cf. Kambu’s
reference fco hand grenaders ( hukkadaran ) dashing like wind (19b-20a).

MIN IST/fy

Section B

The War in Bihar

1. Mir Jumla starts in pursuit of Shuja.

After his defeat at Khajwa on 5th January, Shuja ded
away towards Bihar in desperate haste and deep depression,
with “neither the feet on the saddle, nor courage in his heart*’.
But despatching Prince Muhammed in his pursuit that very
afternoon so as not to give him any rallying time, Aurangzeb
stayed on at Khajwa for a week longer.

Mir Jumla, too, remained with the Emperor. On llth
January the Emperor rewarded him for his services, by
elevating him to die rank of the commander of 7,000 (haft
hazari haft hazar suwar), 1 * and by giving him some choicest
presents. Next day the Mir accompanied the Emperor on
his return march from Khajwa to the bank of the Ganges.
Before his departure for the capital on 14th January, the
Emperor deputed the Mir to undertake the pursuit of his
fugitive brother and the conquest of Bihar and Bengal from
his hands and asked him to become the atalik (guide) of his
son. Indeed, though in theory they were sent as joint com¬
manders in accordance with the usual Mughal military custom,
Mir Jumla was made the “real commander and vested with
the supreme power of control, dismissal and appointment'Vf
Mir Jumla undertook to accomplish the task in profound
submission, stating that he would ‘ snatch away the ring and
the crown from the enemy ’ .

Sometime after 14th January, Mir Jumla proceeded to
reinforce Muhammad Sultan and the imperial force swelled

l * The Alamgimama (267) states that, as after his release, Mir Jumla
had not been in any high mansab, he was now appointed commander of

7000. But we have already seen in the last chapter that Mir Jumla had
been appointed Governor of Khandesh in the rank of Commander of
6000 (Adah. 95a-b).

«• AN 266, 267 and 269; A dab, 241a (Mir Jumla rewarded! ; ML” 3
(E and D. Vlt. 249) ; MIT. III. 539. For deputation of Mir Jumla, Poem,
134-138 ; ZNA. 91 : AS. .20b ; MA 14 ; Storia I. 333. cf. Ball I. 272 ;
TS. 112a, b (relation with Muhammad Sultan) ; Bernier, 79-80
( Muhammad Amin kept as hostage).

1IR JUMLA

mentions 27 generals
Zulfiqar Khan (Tabrezi), (2)
fslam Khan (Badakhshi), (2) Kunwar Ram Singh (4) Baud
Khan (Qureishi), (5) Fidai Khan (Bakharzai), (6) Raja
Indradyumna Bhamdbera, (7) Rao Bhao Singh Hada (son
of Rao Chattarsal), (8) Thtisham Khan, (9) Fateh Jang Khan
(Ruhela), (10) Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat, (1!) Ikhlas Khan
Kheshgi, (12) Khawas Khan, (13) Ekkataz Khan (original
name Abdullah), (14) Rashid Khan (Ansari), (15) Lodi Khan,
(15) Sajyid Firoz Khan Barha, (17) Sayyid Sher Khan Barha,
(18) Sayyid Muza Bar Khan Barha (Khan-i-Jahan), (19)
Zabardast Khan (Ruhela), (20) Ali Quli Khan, (21) Qizilbash
Khan, (22) Mandar Ruhela, (23) Kakar Khan, (24) Dilawar
Khan, (25) Neknam Khan, (29) Niazi Khan, (27) Qadirdad
Ansari and others. The Emperor instructed Mir Jumla to
take along with him the brave Rozbihani soldiers,—Rasul,
Muhammad and Chiragh ; every one of them was experienced,
fast runner and unflinching in devotion. Ahmad and
Muhammad Murad were brave and skilled skirmishers. 3

2 . Kfaxjwct — Patna.

Shuja fled away from Khajwa to Bahadurpur, 5 miles
east of Benares, via Allahabad and Ju$i, the commandant of
Allahabad having surrendered it to the imperialists (12th
January).

AN. 269, supplemented by t he Poem, 135-0, TS. 112b ; ZNA. 91 ;
KA 4 la, b. We get some other names not mentioned in the
Aiamgirnamn from other sources r

(i) Bahadur Khan (ZNA, FA. RS.)

(ii) The famous eldest son of Rashid Khan Ansari (Poem).

(Hi) Son of Sayyid Shuja‘at Khan (Poem ; TS ; ZNA).

( v-vii) Shahbaz Khan, Salabat, Salar Firoz, Sayyid Nasir (Poem).

(viii) Raja Sujan Singh Rundela {Poem, ZNA).

(ix) Raja Debi Singh,

(x-xii) Sayyid Shihab Khan, Mughal Khan, Raja Anirudh Singh Gaur
(FA.;.

There were several Islam ,Khans. Besides Islam Khan Badakhshi
there were Islam Khan Chiafci (TS.) and Islam Khan Khesbgi (ZNA ).

Ditir Khan (Poem, and FA ) came to reinforce the Mir at a later stag© of
the war.

LIFE OF N

30,000. The Alamgirnama
iceompanied Mir Jumla : (1)

FATNA-M ONGHYIl

eariwhile Mir Jam]a, without making any delay ^n tl
,y, had joined Muhammad Saltan at x\Hahabad. f1 he
Prince heard of Shuja's high entrenchments at Benares
mounted with 7 guns from Chtinar, but could not cross the
flooded Ganges near Bahadurpur for want of boats. The
Mir advised the Prince to advance by way of Ohutiar. Hence,
marching back upstream, Muhammad Sultan forded the
river near Allahabad, and, proceeding via Kheri and Kim tit,
reached Chunar on the 4th day. At the same time Fidai
Khan, Governor of Awadh, was marching from Gorakhpur
towards Patna along the northern bank of the Ganges,
according to the imperial mandate. Highly alarmed at the
prospect of being engulfed by this ‘pincer movement’ of the
imperialists Shuja precipitately withdrew from Bahadurpur
towards Patna ; but, without entering the town, he halted
at Jafar Khan's garden (10th Feb. 1659). The Prince

inspected the deserted entrenchments at Benares, halted
there for two days and then started for Patna under Mir
Jumla's guidance. 1

3. Patna — Monghyr .

Mir Jumla speedily arrived within 20 miles west of Patna.
Feeling insecure in the f great open plains’of that area, Shuja
moved further eastwards and on 19th February reached
Monghyr, and decided to make a resolute stand there against
his enemy (19th February—6th March) k He strengthened
the fortifications on the approaches to the town, repaired the
old wall there running between the Ganges and the foot of its
southern hills, and supported his high entrenchments by a very
powerful artillery and formidable war implements. Stationing
small pickets of Europeans at strategic corners, Shuja entrusted
the defence of the skirt of the hills ( damin-i-koh) to Raja
Bahroz of Kharagpur.

* Sbujas flight, in AN. 285*6, 491-2 ; TS. 105b, 101a ; ENA. 91, 74,
.80*2 ; Poem. 132, 139 ; Bailor© letter (12th Feb. 1659) in EFI. N. 279 ;
Storia. I. 33 l ; Bcrhier, 80. Mir Jwrlla's pursuit, AN. 491, 493 ; TS.
113a ; Poem, 138-41 ; ENA..91-92, 73-74, Storia, op. cit. 327. Klien is in
the Kbyragarh dt ; Kuntifc is near Bindhyachal, 10 m. West of Mirzapur.
Jnd . A Hast, 88.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

he imperialists reached Patna about 22nd February
ays after Shuja's departure therefrom, and were joined by
Fidai Khan. After eight days’ half, during which Mir Jumla
appointed Baud Khan Governor of Bihar, the imperial army
started for Monghyr and learnt of the enemy's strong defence
there at Jakepoorah. 6 Finding the road to Monghyr well-
blocked (early March), the Prince took counsel of Mir Jumla,
regarding the plan of advance* Mir Jumla at once recognised
the utter futility of any attempt t) storm Shuja’s defences
there and decided to cut Shuja's communications in the rear.
Winning over Baja Bahroz by means of a letter of “hope and
fear" and by the power of gold, Mir Jumla made a detour
through the difficult route to Rajmahal running through the
Kharagpur hills, then known as the c Bar Jangal’ i.e., extensive
or terrifying woods, abounding with ferocious beasts and
inhabited by the hillmen. Thus Mir Jumla gained his end
by strategy rather than by huge waste of men and material.
Along with Zulfiqar Khan, he cut his wav through with the
help of thousands of wood-eutters. Then, emerging out of the
woods after a week and going up, he reached the plains east
of Monghyr, followed by the Prince. 6

4. Monghyr — Garki.

Finding himself betrayed by his trusted zamindar and
outflanked at this unexpected strategy of the imperialists,
Shuja fled from Monghyr, in a state of alarm (6th March) to
a place beyond Teliagarhi, mentioned in the Alamgirnama as

*• “Chakra or Jekra” in the text {Poem, 142). It may be identified
with Jakepoorah, about 100 yds s. e of Suragegurra, Rennell, sh. 15.
Is is kajra near kiul ?

«• ZNA. 92 ; AN. 493-5 ; 286 (Baud Khan) ; TS. U3a b ; Poem, 141-5 ;
Bernier, 80-81 in ; Ball, I. 124 : Storia, I 333-4 ; EFI. X. 279, .280-1.
(distorted version), 283 ; Aurangzib, II. 568 : MTJ. III. 539 : Masum (TS.
113b) states that Muhammad Sultan, finding the road to Monghyr
bloc ked, decided to reach Burdwan through Jharkhand and then roach
Rajmahal. This is a curious anticipation of a subsequent move of the
imperialist army. The same mistake occurs in a Balasore lettor of 12th
April (EFI. X. 281-2) Bernier’s statement (81.) that Mir Jumla sent a
part of the army down the river as a feint cannot be accepted, as he
was then lacking in boats.

misfy

MIR JUMLa's TURNING MOVEMENT NEAR GARHE

mati. 7 Here he halted for 15 days (10th-24th Marclj
aiding the river route by a nawwara , and fortifying Garhi,
i.e., Teliagarhi. He asked Khwaja Kama! Afghan, the
zamindar of Birbhum and Chatnagar to oppose another detour
of Mir Jumla through the hills stretching from the Ganges
to Birbhum.

Mir Jumla heard of Shuja's retreat from Monghyr at
Pialapur, 8 40 miles east of it. Leaving Muhammad Sultan
together with a part of the army there for occupation of
those parts, Mir Jumla himself advanced to Monghyr, took
possession of it (0th March) and arranged for its administration
by appointing Muhammad Hossain Salduz temporary
commandant of the fort till the arrival of an imperial officer. On
return, he learnt the news of Shuja’s entrenchments at Garhi and
picking up Muhammad Sultan's force at Pialapur, marched
at the head of the entire imperial army towards Rajmahal in
order to cut off Shuja’s retreat

On hearing of Shuja's strong defences at Garhi, Muhammad
Sultan enquired of Mir Jumla whether he would launch a direct
assault on Garhi and force the defiles. Mir Jumla is said to
have replied satirically : “It is not unfit for you, as you have
no parallel in bravery and are a descendant of Timur to do so,
but it would involve a huge loss ol men and such a war should
never be conducted. Why should you allow men to be slain
in a task, which can be accomplished by strategy ? Tasks
there are, which can be performed not by war but by wisdom
and policy/' 9

5. Mir Jumla"s turning movement near Garhi.

As before Monghyr, so now too, Mir Jumla “resolved to
add policy to strength''. Once again did he adopt the same

7 * Rangamati is Lalmati, midway between Teliagarhi and Sakrigaii.
and 1/2 mile south of Sahebganj Station (Ind. Atlas Sh. 112).

8 * Pialapur, shown 60 miles east of Monghyr in Rennell, Sh: 15 does
not suit here. Sir J, N. Sarkar thinks that Tarrapour. about 22 miles g/e.
of Monghyr is more suitable. Can Pialapur be a copyists error for
Paharpur (Rennell, Sh. 15.)?.

9 - AN. 495-6 ; 336-7 (month Jumadi I wrong, should be Jumadi £1) ;
Aurangzib , II. 570; Poem , 145-8; ZNA, 92: EFI X. 281-3; both
Bernier (81-2) and Manucci ( Storia , I. 334-5) are misleading,

MIN/Sr^j,

LIFE OF MIR Jt MliA

iig movement against Shuja and with the same decisive
results. Once again gold of the imperialists disturbed Shuja's
plans. To catch up his rear and bar his escape, Mir Juirila
won over the zamindar >f Birbhum with the same case as the
Raja of Kharagpur, and‘ purchased a safe passage" through
the former's lands. The way lay through hills south-east
df the Monghyr district, infested with carnivorous animals,
interspersed with marshes and swamps, devoid of fruit-jdeldihg
trees, and of any other article of food except rice and water.
Satisfied with these two articles, Mir Jumla advanced towards
Jharkhand, with Raja Bahroz as his guide who supplied to
the imperialists, materials and corn, collected by his own men.

The general plan of advance was as follows : Wood-cutlets
and bzldars (hatchetmeu, diggers, del vers and pioneers), assisted
by an elephant corps and numerous swift led horses, felled
the trees and constructed a road, which was demarcated by
two flags on either side under the supervision of Mir Jumla and
Zulflqar. The army advanced during day time over the newly
constructed road and halted at night. The rOute via
Jharkhand was of several stages with narrow mountain passes,
difficult Of journey, undulating arid lacking in any trace of
Vegetation. Though the march was toilsome, that vast anriy
moved in as perfect order as possible, thanks to the discipline
of the Mir,—in right, left, front and tear : Zulfiqar with Van ;
Mam Khan with right wing ; Fidai Khan with left wing ; Mir
Jumla, together with K tin war Ram Singh, Ikhlas Khan
Kheshgi and Rao Bhao Singh Hada, Sayyid MuzafF&r Khan
accompanied the Prince, with 15 horsemen in front ; Daud
Khan formed the left reserve ; and Rashid Khan the right
reserve. Crossing the jungle in 12 days the party reached
the plains of Birbhum, Ukhla (Ukhra) in the zamindar i of
Khwaja Kamal, and passed along Suri, the chief town, on
28th March. 10

<SL

Poem , 148-151 (plan of advance) ; AN, 496-7 ; ZNA. 92-93 ; EFI.
X 282 : Ball, L 272-3 ; MU. III. 539 ; RS, 220, 221 and n ; Auranyzib,
If 570-1 ; T8, 113b. Ukhra is now in Burdwan dt. Rennell. Sh. 9,

THE RAJPUTS DESERT MIH JUMLA

0. The Rajput* desert Mir Jumla.

Mir Jumla. could overcome the impedimenta presented by
nature, but he could not prevent those created by the* credulity
apd cowardice of selfish men. At the end of March the
Rajput generals like Kunwar Ram Singh (son of Mirza Raja),
Rao Bliao Singh (son of Raja Chattarsai Hada), Amar Singh,
Chaturbhuj Chauhan, and others deserted Mir Jumla and
proceeded towards Agra by way of Jharkhand. The reasons
o»f this unexpected development, which reduced the numerical
strength of Mir Jumla's army, are stated differently by
different authors. The Shujaite historian Mastrm ascribes it to
Mir Jumla’s refusal to meet the demands for expenses made
by the Rajputs. The Mir is said to have replied : 4 ‘You are
jagirdars of the Emperor and receive handsome pay. There
is not money enough to spare. Wherefrom shall I give it ?
After sometime when the countries will be occupied and
daroghas will be stationed, you will get what you demand.”
The Rozbihani follower of Mir Jumla attributes the incident
to Aurangzeb’s policy of persecution of the Hindus. The
Rajptits like Ram Singh and Bhao Singh hearing that
Aurangzeb, who had destroyed temples and built mosques,
wanted to execute the Hindus, became apprehensive of their
Uvea and decided in a meeting to desert the imperialists. But
these explanations are not adequate. The facts that all
Rajputs did not desert Mir Jumla, that Raja Tndradyunma
remained loyal, and that two Muhammedan generals, Sher
Beg and Syed Shujaat Khan, joined the deserters, all go to
divest the incident of its exclusive Rajput character and show'
that causes, deeper than mere financial discontent and narrow'
sectarianism, were at work. The true reason is that mentioned
by Aqil Khan, Aurangaeb's equerry, and supported by the
official history, Alamqirnama. A false rumour of Dara’s
victory at Ajmer (Deorai, 1 2th-14th March) and of Aurangzeb's
flight to the Deccan had reached Mir Jumla’s army at
Pialapur, and had demoralised a section of it. The Rajputs, in
particular, secretly brooded over the possible vengeance of
I)ara on their homes in Rajputana. They suspected Mir

.^J&hla’s detour to be a secret scheme to escape with Prince

LIFE OF MIK JUMLA

Sultan Muhammad to the Deccan.

Without wasting any time in a vain endeavour to dissuade
or punish the deserters, Mir Jumla with the remnant of the
army, still 25,000 strong, double the strength of Shuja, steadily
advanced against him, so that the task of cutting oft the
enemy’s retreat might not he delayed by a single moment. 11

7. Mir Jumla occupies Rajrnahal.

Meanwhile, hearing of the treachery of the zamindar of
Birbhum and of the advance of the imperialists through his
lands, Shuja evacuated Rangamati and hurried to Rajrnahal
(about 27th March), where he entrenched for a time. The
imperialists turned to the north-east in order to strike the
Ganges near Murshidabad and bar Shuja’s retreat to Dacca.
Their arrival at Belghata, 30 miles from Shuja’s position,
hastened the desertion of the latter’s wa vering followers.

Learning of the encampment of the imperial army on
the bank of the Ganges under the command of Mir Jumla,
Shuja no longer regarded its right (or western) bank to be
safe for him. Acting on the advice of a Council of War of
amirs, led by Mirza Jan Beg, entitled Khan Zaman, Shuja
planned to remove his headquarters and family to Tanda
(4 miles west of the fort of Gaur) and to prolong the war
with the help of his flotilla and artillery cannonade, so that
*■*the tide might return”. So, on 4th April, 1659, Shuja left
Rajrnahal, crossed the Ganges at Dogachi, 12 13 miles south,
and arrived at Firozpur with his family in order to reach
Tanda. He collected the entire flotilla of Bengal at Baqarpur

n. AN, 497-8 ; ZNA. 93 ; TS, 115b, 116a ; Poem , 151-3 ; Auranyzib ,
jj 571 . 3 . Ace. to the Poem, a fruitless effort was made .by Mir Jumla
and Zulfiquar Khan to find out the deserters, but • ftflr .Jumla is said to
have prevented the Prince from executing the fugitives on the ground
that “it was unbecoming of the prince to fight with servants.”

ue« For Dogachi, see Ind. Atlas Sli. 112. There is another Dogachi,
2 m iies south of Dunapnr, but that is not meant here. Ferozpur, T mile
9 w. of Tanda, is shown as l mile north of the Pugla ,R. Ind Atlas ,
Sh. 119.

MIN I$tq.

MIR JUMLA OCCUPIES RAJMAHAL

threw up entrenchments at several plaees on the eastern
left bank of the Ganges.

The news of Shuja’s evacuation of Rajmahai reached
Mir Jumla at Belghata, and he at once dashed northwards
to capture the deserted capital. Preceded by the Van under
Zulfiqar Khan, Mir Jumla, together with the Prince, entered
it on 13th April and arranged for its government. Zulfiqar
Khan was appointed its governor and asked to hold it,
with 5,000 men and assisted by Sayyid Firoz Khan, Zabardast
Khan, Raja Indradyumna and Raja Debi Singh. About
4,000 Shujaites who could not cross the Ganges, returned
to Rajmahai and were induced by Zulfiqar Khan to join
imperial service. The Alamgirnama tells us that the occupa¬
tion of the town, which still contained Shuja’s goods and
officers, was characterised by a spirit of fair justice and an
attempt to conciliate the Shujaites on whom no oppression
or plunder was allowed to be committed. The fortifications
of the town were sought to be strengthened at the orders
of the Emperor and these were completed after about 3 years
under Etwar Khan. Thus Mir Jumla occupied the whole
country on the right bank of the Ganges from Rajmahai
to Hugli. The English factors now came to regard him
and the Prince as conquerors of the country

§L

la . AN: 498-501 ; ZNA 94-5 ; *TS, 110a. b ; Poem, 153-4 ; Aurangzib ,
II. 573-80 ; EFI. X. 281-3 ; Bernier 81-2 (account different).

Section C

This war on the Ganges

1. Mir Jumla s difficultiis in the new theatre of war.

With Shuja’s evacuation of the western bank of the Ganges
the war entered an altogether new phase. So long it had been
pre-eminently a land operation, decided by Mir Jumla’s turning
movements and overwhelming superiority in numbers. That
is why Shuja could not dare face the imperialists even once.
But now, with the Ganges separating the rival forces, the war
became essentially a naval contest, in which Shuja had certain
decided advantages over his pursuer. In the first place, the
lord of Bengal, the land of waterways, had a powerful nawwara
or flotilla. He now either seized the private boats, or sunk and
burnt them, to prevent their oapture by the enemy. On the
other hand, Mir .Tumla’s army was nothing but a land force, a
“ hying army ’' as the .English factors called it. He had not
brought boats with himself and could not hope to easily
procure any in Bengal because of Shuja’s “ scorched earth ”
policy. His initial efforts were paralysed by his pitiable lack
of a naval arm. In the second place, Mir Jumla was also
very weak in artillery, having dragged only light pieces with
him from Khajwa. But Shuja had a vast store of big pieces of
artillery, admirably manned by the European (Portuguese) ana
half-caste (or mestico) gunners of Hugh, Tamluk and Noakhali.
By offering them high pay and making generous promises for
tho future as regards money and freedom to establish churches,
Shuja succeeded in enlisting in his service thousands of
Portuguese, who had taken refuge in Bengal, after having been
ousted by the Dutch from Ceylon and Jafnapatam. With
his base at Tanda, and by means of entrenchments, flotilla
and artillery, Shuja defended various places on the eastern
bank, like Baqarpur and Firozpur, opposite the imperial
front extending from Rajinahal to »Suti. By properly
co-ordinating the two arms, by mounting his “great guns” on
the boats, Shuja could even use his mobile artillery with deadly

UMLA's DIFFXOTJLTIBS IN THE NEW THEATRE OF WAR

anywhere against Mir Jumla's positions on the western"
Sank of the river. Master of the Ganges, Shuja could defend
himself splendidly despite his hopeless paucity of men,
though he was. unable to launch an offensive against the
imperialists. What he evidently wanted was to 'try his
utmost till the last moment. His strategy in taking refuge
behind the river was thus based on a clear grasp of the relative
strength of the rival forces, and it was undoubtedly the
most advantageous under the circumstances, It consider¬
ably delayed his pursuit, by multiplying Mir Jumla’s difficul¬
ties. The English factors of Balasore, though unaware of
Mir Jumla's likely stratagems, shrewdly and rightly diagnosed
the situation, when they observed (30th ApriJ, 1659)
that if Mir Jumla was to succeed that year, he must win
before the advent of the rains. 1 But this was rendered
impossible by his deficiencies in boats and artillery. Baulked
in some of his initial enterprises, unable to cross the Ganges
and helplessly confined to the western bank, Mir Jumla was
compelled to suspend the chase, when, taking advantage
of the rains, the fugitive Prince e.ven assumed the aggressive
and wrested Rajmahal from Mir Jumla's men. It was only
when a diversion had been slowly effected against Shuja
by a vast turning movement of the imperialists on the heart
of Shuja's defences at Tanda that the centre of gravity
shifted away from a theatre of war, where Mir Jumla's
position was inherently weak, and he could once again take
up the field against Shuja.

The history of the next one year, from 13th April, 1659,
when Mir Jumla occupied Rajmahal to 12th April, 1660,
when Shuja reached Dacca, was the story of how Mir Jumla,
after alternate success and failure, finally frustrated Shuja's
grand strategy. It was indeed a drama which unfolded
itself in three acts, in which events moved like the swinging

1* For Shuja's command of the Ganges, artillery and his plan,
Balasore letters of 30th April, 18th May and 15th December, 1059, in
EFI. X. 282-4 ; TS, 117 (Shuja’s capture or sinking of boats near
Rajmahal) ; Aurangzib , II. 578-81, 593 , CHI. IV. 225 ; Bernier, 82 and
S'toria s I. 335, for Portuguese support ; AS. 20b.

II

LIFE OF MIR .Ttr«ntA

o pendulum of a clock. The first act, in which Shuja
played a defensive game, was staged on, the river Ganges:
it ended on 8th June, 1659 with Prince Muhammad Sultan’s
flight to Shuja. In the second act the pendulum oscillated
to the western bank: Shuja assumed the offensive, recap¬
tured Rajmahal but could not retain it. In the third act,
the final phase of the war, Mir Jumla regained his offensive
and the pendulum turned from the western to the eastern
bank, and Shuja, almost encircled from three sides, had to
leave the eastern bank for ever.

'SL

2. Mir Jumla?8 first naval coup at Dogachi.

Without losing heart at tlie difficulties arrayed against him
in the new theatre of war, Mir Jumla steadfastly endeavoured
to tide them over. His first concern after the occupation of
Rajmahal (13th April) was to secure boats, as it was impossible
to advance a single step without them. A fortnight's persistent
search in remote and obscure spots was rewarded with a
modest collection of a few boats.

Meanwhile, without wasting time at Rajmahal, where no
action was possible without a vast flotilla, Mir Jumla
accompanied by the Prince, had proceeded (14th April) to
Dogachi, 13 miles farther south, and took up his quarters
there. There was a high island in midstream opposite his
camp, forming a half-way house to Baqarpur on the other
bank, where the Shujaite general, Sayyid Quli, had entrenched
with his artillery, with Shuja himself in the rear and a flotilla
cruising along in front. With his characteristic keenness, the
Mir at once grasped the strategic value of the island. But
as he had no boats till then, a Shujaite detachment stole a
march over him, seized it one night and began to entrench
and erect damdama (raised batteries) in order to cannonade
against the imperialists.

Then, with his boats ready at hand, Mir Jumla planned to
wrest the island from the Shujaites and, if possible, to cross
over to the eastern bank. But, before launching the
expedition, the experienced general advised the Prince to
erect on the bank an entrenchment, equipped with cannon,

MIR JUMLA S NAVAL ENTERPRISES AT SUTI

teets and rocfcetmen, as a precautionary measure. In many
seoret journeys, conducted after midnight under Mir Jumla's
skilful management and personal inspection, the boats
transported to the island about 2,000 personal followers of
Mir Jumla and some mperial officers like Zulhqar, Fateh Jung,
Rashid Khan Ansari, Lodi Khan, Sujan Singh Bundela,
Taj Niazi, with their respective followers, 200 beldars and a
few guns. In the morning the Shujaites, discovering the
invaders, rowed away with their guns, and their deserted
entrenchments were hastily occupied by the imperialists.

Next day the Shujaite admiral, Fidai Khan, pitted his
entire flotilla including many Europeans in a severe assault
on the imperialists. Behind the smoke-screen of artillery
lire on both sides, he effected a landing on one side of the
island and was hastily entrenching, when he was charged by
Taj Niazi and his Afghan fighters. For sometime the issue
seemed to hang in the balance. Mir Jumla, watching this
deadly, hand-to-hand duel from the bank, grew so alarmed
as to pray to God for victory. At last the Shujaites were
hurled back and some of their boats were sunk. Finally, the
imperialists secured undisturbed possession of the island by
repulsing yet another attempt of the Shujaites to recapture
it with fast boats and artillery during which “the roar of
the guns was so great that even the fish became restless in
the river/’ 2

<Sl

3. Mir Jumla’& naval enterprises at Suti.

This first stroke of Mir Jumla was in reality a daring and
well-conceived one. He had shown remarkable promptness
in securing boats. Ho succeeded in stealing a march over
Shuja evidently because the enemy, over-confident in the
strength of his entrenched position, had underrated Mir
Jnmla's capacity and had not anticipated any such move.
Warned by the loss, Shuja now became more vigilant. While

2. AN. 501-503 ; TS. 118a (boats collected) : The Poem ( 154 . 107 )
gives the name of the leader of the imperialists who defeated. Fidai as
Salabat Ivhan.

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

<SL

cruising flotilla defended his western front, exchanging
fire with the imperialists between Rajmahal arid Dogachi,
be massed his men and artillery opposite Mir Jumla. Again,
the river was as wide here as at Rajmahal. Hence Mir Jumla
rightly realised that it would be hopeless for him to transport
his men and arms in his few boats or land by surprise on the
opposite bank in the presence of such a strong and watchful
enemy, and that it would be impossible to defeat the enemy
there even after a protracted struggle. This inevitable
stagnation necessitated a change of tactics on Mir Jumla/s
part. Modifying his previous arrangements he bided bis
time. He distributed the imperial army along the whole
western bank between Rajmahal in the north and Suti
(28 miles south-east of it) in the south ; Rajmahal under
Muhammad Murad Beg ; Dogaohi (opposite Shuja’s camp)
under the Prince, together with Zulfiqar Khan, Islam Khan
and most of the army ; Dunapur, about 8 miles further
south, commanded by Ali Quli ; while Mir Jumla himself took
post at Suti, with 6 or 7 thousand men to cross the river.

Mir Jumla's choice of Suti was marvellous, determined
by the deficiency of boats. The river was narrow here
and easily fordable, as some local men had informed him.
Its fording would have compensated his previous reverses
by giving him quicker victory. The Prince, too, accepted
the Mir’s valuable advice. To prevent boats and forlorn
Shujaites from crossing over to Shuja and thus disclosing
his plans to the enemy, Mir Jumla closed all ferries and
passages. So strict was the embargo, and so high was the

penalty, that even stealthy crossings were impossible, not

to speak of open attempts; any culprit detected while
crossing had his nose and ears cut off

The day after encampment at Suti, Mir Jumla attempted
to cross the river. Unfortunately, the divers could not
sound the depth of the river. He regretted his reliance on
the words of local men. In fact, there was <c a sudden

rising of the waters in the Ganges’" about J4 days earlier

than usual. This accident saved Shuja from another imme¬
diate discomfiture.

WNIST/fy

MIB JUMLa’ 8 NAVAL ENTERPRISES AT StTTI

„ jticipating danger, Shoja deputed Nurul Has.an t
„ rt .ose Mir Jumla at Suti and Isfandiar Mamuri against
Dunaptir, while his eldest son, Zainuddin, carried his family
to Tanda for safety. 3

Mir Jumla now planned to transport his men to the
ether side as secretly as possible and then to go personally
and entrench there. In feverish haste he set about gathering
boats. He sent his officers to several places like Hugh,
Cassimbazar and some others for the purpose. He called
upon men to supply boats of any kind available, Kisti or
Ghurab, threatening to desolate their country and property
with the help of the soldiers in case of failure. The threat
had the desired result. Within. 10 to 15 days about a
hundred boats of various sorts (lemas, Khaludhg, rahwaras)
were placed at the disposal of the Mir. Zulfiqar, too, sent
40 boats. With this hastily collected flotilla Mir Jumla
could now guard his front against sudden swoopings by
Shuja’s mobile boats. The latter could now rove up and
down for a distance of 40 to 50 leagues only along the
eastern bank.

Losing command of the western bank, Shuja now set
up a high battery of 8 large guns for cannonading on the
imperial lines across the river. To put a stop to the
consequent damage to his men and cattle on the bank, Mir
Jumla sent one night an expeditionary force on 10 boats
to capture the battery. But it was detected and repulsed,
go Mir Jumla changed the time and, next mid-day, sent
a party, consisting of 20 imperial troopers and many of his
own retainers. His very audacity contributed to his success.
Swiftly sailing across along with the wind, which had thrown
the defenders off their guard, his men swooped on the

s■ New arrangements, AN. 503-504 ; Aurangzib, II. 682-3 ; ZNA.
93 ; Mir at Suti, Poem 162-65 ; ZNA. 95 ; TS. I17b. EFI. X 283.
At Suti Mir Jumla resided in the house of Muhammad Shah, son of
Shah Murtaza deceased. MH. 209-12; Unsuccessful fording Poem, 165
EFI. op cit. AN. 504 ; ZNA.

MiN/sr^

Mery, drove nails into the port-holes of 2 guns
me away with the other six, without suffering any loss. 4

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

IL

4. Mir Jumla’a signal failure on 3rd May, 13o9.

Spurred on by success, Mir Jumla planned another coup
on a much larger scale. But Shuja was more vigilant now.
Terrified at the heroic stroke of his adversary, he had
replaced the negligent commander, Nurul Hasan, by an able
and devoted officer, Sayyid Alam of Barha (Khan-i-Alam)
Leaving the trenches and batteries on. the river bank
lightly manned. Shuja concealed his picked troops and fierce
war-elephants under Sayyid Alam and Muhtasham Khan
behind camouflaged ambuscades.

Mir Jumla’s preliminary or reconnaissance boat-raid on
Sayyid Alam on the night of 2nd May, 1659, miscarried.
At dawn (3rd May) 73 boats of Mir Jumla carrying a mixed
force of Mughals, Sayyids, Afghans and Rajputs, numbering
in all 2,000, led by Qasim Khan and Shahbaz Khan,
started to effect a landing on the opposite bank and entrench
there. When the first two or three boats reached the other
side, Ihtimam Khan and his men, unaware of any lurking
danger, occupied the enemy entrenchments by over-powering
their scanty guards. Suddenly the Shujaites emerged from
the ambush with their war-elephants and completely enve¬
loped the small party of the imperialists who had to put
up a gallant defence in the captured redoubt. Mir Jumla,
witnessing the reverse from the western bank, could do
nothing to turn the tide; the fugitive and frightened crew
refused to return to help their brethren despite his entreaties.
He suffered heavy casualties: about half of the troops,

“the very piok of the.army’’ perished, including

3 or 4 captains; of those wounded or captured, numbering
500, some were sent to Firozpur, Malda and other places
and the rest were put to death. The moral effect of the
disaster was greater than the loss in manpower and

4. Poem, 165-7 : TS. 118a; ZNA. 95 ; EFI, X. 283-4 , AN.
504-5 ; Aurangzib, II. 585-4,

WWSTffy

MIR JUMIA S SIGNAL FAILURE

ggfpialg. Ho was highly mortified ; “the disaster”, indee<
mod the lustre of his hitherto victorious career”. But
he screwed up courage to make fresh efforts. He also learnt
to be 4 ‘extremely cautious” and careful for the rest of the
campaign. 5

The cause of Mir Jumla’s tragic reverse has been accurately
diagnosed by Masum, the Shujaite historian. He observes ;
“Even though this (move) was an act of wisdom and courage,,
it must be admitted that it would have been wiser on his
part first to enquire of the enemy’s strength and conditions

and then start on the boats .Muazzam Khan, without

due discernment and eye to future,... .had launched the expedi¬
tion, hoping to fail on the enemy unawares ” In other words,
Mir Jumla had not taken the usual precaution of reconnoitring
the enemy’s dispositions and taking stock of his strength*
Evidently this negligence arose from his over-confidence,
born of egotism and elation at his previous success. Sir
Jadunath Sarkar pithily observes that Mir Jumla “committed
the fatal mistake of despising the enemy”. Mir Jumla
himself admits his mistake in a soliloquy attributed to him
by his Kozbihani follower : “I am now 70 years old. .......At

last in my old age, by some fruitless thought, I have

suffered a reverse.” The English factory records

ascribe the failure of the imperialists to the fact that they
were “in small boats”, whereas the Shujaites were in jellares
(jalia or jalba) or large boats. 6 Shuja's boats did include, we
learn from the Alamgirnama , many fast boats ( kosas ) ; while
since about 1,000 imperialists were carried in 6 boats, it can
not be said that all the boats of Mir Jumla were small. Still

Graphic description in AN, 506*509 (Preliminary boat attack of
2nd May) ; TS. 118a* 119b ; Poem. 167-174 ; ZNA, 95; MH. 209-12 ;
Miserable plight of the imperialists in Aurangzib, IT. 584-6.

The imperial expeditionary force is numbered 2,000 by Masum (118a,
b) and 3,000 by Aqil Khan. Masum's estimate is borne out by the
English factory records which state that Mir Jumla lost about 1,000 men
i, e.. half of the army (Balasore to Masulipatam, 18th May ; letter of
Edmund Foster at Kassimbazar, 8th May, EFI, X. 284).

*• Td.il8a, b ; Poem, 172-3 (Mir Jumla’s soliloquy) ; EFI. X. 284.
Aurangzib, If, 584 ; ZNA, 9c,

WNtSTfy

LIFE OF Mir jumla

met be admitted that the difference in the relative size
respective flotillas contributed somewhat to Mir Jumla s
failure.

5. Mir Jumla'$ preparations for a fresh offensive

Mir Jumla now began his preparations tor launching a fresh
offensive. To make up the deficiency of boats was a pressing
task for him, demanding his constant attention. He
endeavoured to collect these and other materials for a naval
war from Hugh, Mursbidabad and Burdwan. His agents ran
about in search of carpenters to build boats and to summon
as many boatmeu as possible. All oig boats coming down the
river were stopped and seized ; and none could pass beyond
Muxadabad (Mursbidabad). To counterpoise Portuguese
support to Shuja, Mir Jumla began to make a diplomatic use
of his position as Mughal general in Bihar and Bengal in his
relations with the Dutch and the English factors the^e. Being
only 35 miles from Kassimbazar, he requisitioned the Dutch
gunners and physicians. While the English did not see him,
the Director of the ' Dutch, Mattbous Van den Hrouke,
proceeded from Hugli to meet him. It was rumoured that the
imperial commander-in-chief offered the government of Hugli
to the Dutch in return for a sum of two lakhs of rupees.
Early in July, 1650, the Director promised to give all possible
help to Mir Jumla, who ordered him to have the river guarded
by mounting all great guns ready on their sloops. * * 7

Mir Jumla was also engaged now in extending Aurangzeb s
authority into Orissa. The Mir tried to secure the adhesion
of towns near Balasore to the imperial cause by sending
officers and issuing orders to other towns. He also sent
private letters to the Shujaite Governor of Balasore asking
him to visit Sultan Muhammad. But though the latter was
.still afraid to desert Shuja, the English factors expected that
Mir Jumla would soon occupy Balasore and that its Governor
would “willingly embrace the surer side". 8

7 For collection of boats, TS. I19b, I 20 a ; Poem, 173*4 ; AN, 509,

For stoppage of boats and Mir Jumia’s relation with the D itch and the

English, EFI. X. 284 and n, 286, 288 n. Vide Section F. § 2 Infra.

8. EFI, X, 285, 287.

J(JM*La's preparations for a fresh offensive

ir Jumla realised that a mere frontal attack, howev^
■organised it might be, * 1 * * * * * * * would not succeed in dislodging
Shuja from his entrenched positions across the river. He
must track the lion in his own den. He must create a
diversion which would set Shuja flying to protect his rear. In
other words, Mir Jumla planned to hem in Shuja from the
north, the east and the west. For the execution of this
master-plan Mir Jumla had to depend on Daud Khan, the
Governor of Bihar.

Referring to his discomfiture at Suti in a letter to Daud
Khan, Mir Jumla urged upon him to recruit soldiers and “open
the door of the treasury”, to summon rich nobles like the valiant
Hadi and Abdul Maal, Ali Khan and the Kakars along with
their respective retainers and to collect as many boats (kisti
or ghurab i. e. gunboat) as possible, and to equip each boat
suitably with artillery. To avoid being impeded by floods,
Daud was asked to march at once against Shuja as rapidly as
possible with all the collected force and later on to send the
war-boats to Mir Jumla. Further, Daud was advised to
instruct the Rosbihani force under Chiragh Beg and Rashid,
sent by Mir Jumla (at Suti) and Muhammad Sultan (at
Dogachi) respectively, to cross the Kosi. Thus the combined
army of Daud Khan, Rashid and Chiragh would attack Shuja
on the left bank of the Ganges, and then Mir Jumla would
cross it with Daud's boats, join in the grand assault on Shuja,
and so “strike at the root of the enemy’s power”. 9

»• Poem , 172-8 : AN. 513. Abdul Maal is to be identified with

(Mirza) Abu-l-Maali, faujdar of Tirhut and later of Darbhanga. MIT. Tr.

I, 136-7, Text. III. 557-560.

The A lamgirnama states that the strategy of a two-pronged offensive

against Shuja originated with Aurangzeb, who ordered Daud Khan

to advance from Patna eastwards. Bub it would be impossible for the

Emperor, hundreds of miles away from the theatre of war, to devise

strategy best suited to the military situation, unless the suggestion went
from Mir Jumla, the man on the spot. The Rozbihani author explicitly

states that the initiative of this master-strategy to effect divers«on

against Shuja was taken by Mir Jumla immediately .after the failure of

the frontal assault scheme from the south-west of 3rd May. (Gontd.)

umtSTfy

LIFE OF MIR JTJMLA

6. Flight of Muhammad Sultan to Skuja.

While Mir Jumla. was endeavouring to heal the wounds,,
caused by the severe mauling of 3rd May, he had to
suffer another unexpected loss, which stupefied his army
for a while. His associate commander, Prince Muhammad
Sultan, deserting his post at Dogachi, fled to Shuja on
the night of 8th June. It was a terrible ordeal for Mir
Juniia. It would have ended fatally but for his splendid
courage, presence of mind and control over men.

^lie flight of the Prince 10 was due,—besides his
ambition of getting the throne, his love towards Shuja's
daughter, and the tempting overtures of his uncle,—to
his resentment against Mir Juinla’s tutelage, fanned by
allegations of some mischief-mongers, and his apprehension
of his arrest by the Mir at imperial mandate. The
Emperor s suspicious of his son were deepened by either,
as the Shujaite historian says,—Mir Jumla’s written
accusation against the Prince for his “pretended ignorance
and negligence”, contributing to the failure of the coup
of 3rd May, or, as the Poem tells us,-—by the adverse
comments against the Prince made by two spies, deputed
by the Emperor to report on the loyalty of the army.
At this the Emperor wrote to the Mir: ‘‘All affairs, in
general and particular, both there and here, are guided by
your opinion. If my son do not follow your advice, and—If you
do not consider his stay desirable, quickly send him back.”
The imperial message, purporting to be an order for arresting
the Prince and packing him off as a prisoner, was intercepted

there is a lacuaa in the Poem (ms) for the total strength of the army
required by Mir Jumla : Daud received the letter brought by an express
courier in 3 days. He thus got about a week’s timu to start.

The Kakars were an Afghan tribe (distinct from the Cakkars) settled
in North Bihar after Shor Shah.

l0 * For the Prince’s flight, AN. 509-12, 406 7; TS. 12%-124a ; ZNA.
06-7; Poem, 183-194; AS. 20b; Ball’s Tavormer, I. 273-4 , Bernier,
82-3 ; Storia , I. 336 ; Aurctngzib; IF. 586 - 9 , MU. III. 540-1,

FLIGHT OF MOHAMMAD STJLTAK TO SHOJA

his road patrols. The Prince lost all patience,
confident of a sure asylum across the river, he escaped that
very night. 11

Mir Jumla. then at Suti, was taken aback at this
turn of events, Firmly keeping bis own men pacified, he

rode to the Prince's camp at Dogachi the next

morning. On the way he was relieved to learn the true
cause of the flight from Aurangzeb's spies, who had

escaped from the surveillance of the Prince’s guards during
the confusion following the event.

Mir Jumla found the camp at Dogachi in utter

disorder. Everywhere the Mir found defiance, indecision
and despair. But Mir Jumla, “a born leader of men”,
knew how to deal with such desperate situations. Before
a council of war, attended by all soldiers, great and

small, he delivered an impetuous harangue. At first he
won their confidence. Then lie challenged them in a

spirited manner. Refuting the argument that further

fighting would be futile, he appealed to them : “Fou are

fearing an enemy, who has fled like a jackal ! he has

fled from us, not we from him.” Then he instilled

courage into their hearts by observing “Even if the
enemy is bright like the sun, I am, you know, like a

cloud ; and 1 would envelop him like a cloud.I will

drive him towards the group of firingis (Portuguese)*'.
Pointing out that the desertion of the Prince was

immaterial he thundered : “The Emperor has made me
commander. It is only for consultation that the Emperor
sect him (the Prince) with me”, Next, moderating his

tone and reposing his confidence in his audience, he
unfolded to them his contemplated strategy during and
after the rainy season, and assuaged their groundless fears.

Mir Jumla's address, vibrating with anger, reason

11 . For strained relation between the Mir and the Prince, ANV 511 ;
Storiu I. 330. For Emperor’s suspicions and letter to Mir Jumla, TS.
1 20b-121a, corroborated by the Poem, 183-188 : Ball, I. 300-1. It seems
possible that the Emperor sent the spies to verify Mir , Jumla 7 s accusa¬
tion.

LIFE OF MIK JUMLA

„ . .

hope, produced the desired result. It completely won
over the faltering and rebellious hearts* AH welcomed it
as a counsel of perfection, and agreed to obey him as
their sole head. Mir Jumla, beaming with joy, now
tactfully promised to recommend the generals to the
Emperor for promotion and grant of suitable rewards.
He also ordered the treasurer to give the soldiers three
months’ pay.

Having won over the soldiery, Mir Jumla drove away
a Shujaite raiding party designed to carry away the
provisions and stores and men, left behind by the Prince.
He also confiscated the deserter’s property and treasure
in the name of the Emperor and enlisted hie men in
imperial service. Thus, through Mir Jumla’s heroic efforts
the leaderless army was infused with new hopes and
courage, and weathered the storm. ‘‘It lost”, as Aqil
Khan remarks, “only one man—the Prince”. 12

Leaving Fidai Khan and Islam Khan at Dogaohi and
sending Zulfiqar back to Rajmahal, Mir Jumla returned
to Suti, and on 10th June he despatched Rashid Khan
to Hand Khan, then at Qazi Keria*

When the heavy rains of Bengal hampered all military
activities, Mir Jumla sent the army to cantonments. He
now followed a policy of withdrawal and concentration.
Withdrawing the posts at Doga chi, Dunapur and Suti, he
concentrated the army only at two places. He himself
remained with 15,000 men at Masurabazar (Murshidabad),
elevated ground having abundance of provisions.

an

Zulfiqar Khan, together with Islam Khan, Fidai Khan,
Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, Ikhlas Khan, Raja Indradyumna,
Qizilbash and others, stayed at Rajmahal 13

l8, For Mir’s speech and confiscation of ^property, Poem , 188-94;
EFI. X. 289; ZMA, 96- The repulse of the Shujaites could not have
taken place before the restoration of order, ns Aqil Khan says ; again the
Mir came on the second and not on the third day of desertion. See
Aurangzib , XI. 588.

13 ‘ ZNA. 96-7 ; Poem, 194-5 (deputation of Rashid to Daud) ; AN”.

512-13.

Section D

The War Moves West Of The Ganges
1. Mir Jumla s increased difficulties . .

Prince Muhammad Sultan's desertion of Mir Jumla was a
turning-point in the history of the War. With it the offensive
which had remained with Mir Jumla ever since his capture of
Rajmahal passed to his opponent. So long Shuja had pursued
a purely defensive strategy. Now, for the first time in the
war, which, unhappily for him, was also the last, he assumed
the offensive.

The defection of the Prince undoubtedly multiplied the
difficulties of Mir Jumla. True, the numerical strength of the
imperial army* remained unaffected, but its morale did not.
Mir Jumla’s loss was Shuja's gain. In the Prince, conversant
with the secrets of Mir Jumla's army, Shuja had undoubtedly
a trump card to be thrown at his enemy. The rains and the
floods isolated the two imperial camps by making the road
between them extending for sixty miles almost impassable,
and there was now constant danger of the Shujaites cutting
off the imperial army’s communications and supply of provisions.

Not only did the war enter a new phase but the scene of it
changed too. The exultant Shuja planned to launch a direct
assault on Rajmahal on the western bank of the Ganges. Its
recapture would revive his prestige. Relief would be difficult
either from Daud Khan in the north-west or from Mir Jumla in
the south. His flotilla would not be able to launch a direct
assault on the upland cantonments of Mir Jumla at
Murshidabad. Again, he feared that the European Companies
at Hugli and Kassimbazar, who were lukewarm in their loyalty
to himself, would help Mir Jumla. 1

Shuja’s strategy consisted in not only starving the
imperialists at Rajmahal to submission by an effective blockade
of the town but also in preventing Mir Jumla from receiving

t. Aurangzib, II. 589 ; EFI. X, 289 (Prince, a trump card) AN, 612
TS„ 124b.

misTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

ies from the European companies at Hugli. The provisi<
by Mir Jumla from Murshidabad to Rajmahal on water were
intercepted by Shuja's flotilla. By winning over many
zamindars in Bihar and western Bengal, Shuja endeavoured to
intercept goods and messengers on land. Thus Harchand, the
Raja of the Majwa hills, subsidised by Shuja, waylaid every
merchant (banjara) transporting to Rajmahal even a bullock’s
load of grain. A Kassim bazar letter of 5th July tells us that
Shuja gave a free hand to the zamindars to rob any merchant
or soldier of his money, horses and goods on condition that
they would side with him and supply him with whatever
elephants they could capture. Naturally they had already
begun closing the way between Hugli and Kassimbazar so
effectively that no merchant could dare pass with goods for
fear of being robbed on the way and not even a peon could
pass safely with a letter. 2

2. Shuja recovers Rajmahal,

Mir Jumla could do nothing to relieve Rajmahal.
Handicapped by his hopeless deficiency in boats, he had
perforce to remain the silent but uneasy spectator of the
growing isolation of that water-locked city, effected by the
enemy's powerful flotilla mounted with artillery. Shuja’s
blockade was so successful that no grains sent by Mir
Jumla reached Rajmahal. A graphic description of this
man-made famine at Rajmahal, has been left by the Shujaite
bistorian, Masnm, an eye witness. He writes : ‘‘Grain rose
to the price of gold. Coarse, red, bad-smelled rice and dal
sold at nine seers a rupee”/... “In the agony of hunger,
men took morsels of poison." The butchers sold meat at a
rupee a seer. If the poor wanted to take meat, they had to
take their (own) meat. If the mouth had tasted any meat
it was the flesh of their lips." Having no stock of grain,
Masum had to spend 20 to 30 rupees a day. The empty

2. ZNA. 98; TS. a 26a; EFI. 289, 290 (bet. Hugli and Kassimbazar)
AN. 515-6. The Majwa (87* 97' E, 25" 2'N) hills stretch westwards of
.Kajmahal, Ind. Atlas,Sh. 112.

WNlST/fy

SHUJA RECOVERS RAJMAHAL

stood awaiting their* owners’ return : dogs and cats sat"
In the shops : the places of worship were deserted : the wine
shops were without wine. ‘ The flame of famine shot up, and
smoke seemed to come out of earth and time/’ But even
this description, hyperbolic though it is at plaoes, does not,-
he cautions the reader,—suffice to adequately express the
gravity of the situation, for,‘‘whatever is said is like a grain
lifted from a heap of rice ” Mir Jumla’s Rozbihani follower
also admits that the famine was so severe bofeh in the town and
in the villages that “one piece of bread became the source of
life.” Aqil Khan, too, observes : “Men began to sustain
themselves by the blood of their liver in place of food ” The
ravages of flood and famine and the consequent loss of their
horses and draught cattle reduced Mir JumWs men at
Rajmahal to dire straits : and when the discord among their
generals brought the cup of distress, disorder and depressisn
to brimful, they had no alternative but to evacuate
Rajmahal. 3

The right moment now arrived for Shuja to strike.
Without any opposition from the imperialists, his admiral,
Shaikh Abbas, captured a hilly tract, named Patura, south
of Rajmahal, and made it his base for launching boat-raids
to plunder the town. After some time, Shuja became
emboldened to cross over to the western bank of the river.

Leaving Serajuddin Jabri, Mir Alauddin, diwan , and
Muhammad Zaman, Mir-i-Saman, at Tanda, Shuja arrived at
Patura on 18th August. On 22nd August he suddenly
invaded Rajmahal with his war boats. As the imperial
commandant, Zulfiqar, occupying the spur of an elevation
between the old and the new towns was incapacitated by
illness, Raja Indradyumna alone had to offer a strong
opposition to the invader. Islam Khan and Fidai Khan, who
were entrusted with the duty of watching the town, eou'd not
decide upon a common course of action. Finally, they
decided to leave the town and withdraw to Mir Jumla.

3 * TS. I26ba-131a ; Poem , 201 ; ZNA. 98 (exaggerated)
289 ; Aurangzib , II. 590 ; AN. 515-6.

EFI. X.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

.*<l^oceeding along a causeway, coming from the skirt of the
hill to the new town, the two generals advanced against the
enemy but reeled at Shuja’s heavy artillery fire and gave up
fighting even though the pressure from the enemy was not
very great,—as the official history admits. At night the
imperialists beat a retreat to Murshidabad, deserting all
their important strategic positions, and leaving all their
property to be seized by the enemy. Thus Shuja regained
Rajmahal and restored his authority on the right bank of
the Ganges . 4

Mir Jumla administered a stern rebuke to his generals
who had come to him pell-mell. “Wretches' 5 , he roared, “you

are unfit to conduct war. It behoves you

to put on silken attire, to drink goblets of wine, and to relax in

the garden with a singing damsel ...Man’s greatness

consists in valour. The law of the valorous is majesty It
cannot come from old jackals. You have lied from an enemy,

who has no strength and no soldier.,..."

The General's taunt evoked an angry protest from
Zulfiqar. He remonstrated that it was not befitting for
the General to denounce so many distinguished officers as
unmanly cowards. Zulfiqar himself had won renown in the
war against Jaswant Singh, against Dara and Shuja too, and
explained that he had retreated with the entire army not for
fear of Shuja but only because the dearth of provisions
threatened it with starvation. Noticing Zulfiqar’s righteous
indignation, Mir Jumla consoled him by recognising his bravery
and observing how, being the victim of Shuja’s deception, he
had given up without effort the town which the Mir had
captured after great exertion. He also assured the Khan and
the rest of the army not to grieve over the loss, by expressing
that it had been predestined, and that he was confident of
wresting it from Shuja . 6

4 4N. 516-19 ; TS, 125 ; ZNA, 99 ; Poem .. 201-2 ; Ball’s Tavernier,
I. 275 ; Aurcmgzib. II. 590-1 ; EFI. op. cit . 289. Patura is shown as
Putoorah, 5 miles south of Ra jmahal, Jncl. Atlas, 3h. 112.

5. Poem . 202-6.

Ml NIST^

BATTLE NBAEt BELOHATA AND GIRIA

m

phuja had achieved the first of his objects with surprising |
and ease. But he failed in his plans in isolating Mir
Jumla in the south In fact, Mir Jumla did not remain idle
at his rainy season cantonment of Masumbazar. His vast
numerical strength enabled him to spare a contingent for the
purpose ot sweeping clear the southern routes to Hugli and
even the hinterland beyond it, of the roving bands of the
retainers of the Shujaite Zamit.dars of south-west Bengal.
Early in July he deputed a faujdar (? Muhammad Sharif) with
500 horsemen to clear the way between Kassimbazar and
Hugli to conquer Hugli again and even occupy Midnapur.
Shuja, in his turn, commissioned Mirza Isfandiar (Major Splindar
Of English factory records), his governor of Engilee (Hijili) to
advance towards Hugli with 6,000 infantry and 500 horsemen
and some gelliares ( jalbas ) in order to reinforce the governor of
Hugli. But evidently he could not reach the scene in time.
Though the English factor at Kassimbazar apprehended that
Mir Jumla’s men would have to face unexpected danger, finally
they succeeded in occupying Hugli and when early in September
they occupied Midnapur, Shuja’s force had only arrived at
Narayangarh, about 17 miles south-east from Midnapur. 6

3. Battle near Belghcita and Oiria.

Shuja now decided to take the field himself against Mir
Jumla and his vast army, soon after the rains, because the
defeat of Mir Jumla would render Baud’s advance utterly
futile. Nevertheless he did not altogether ignore Daud Khan,
against whom he deputed his general Fidai Khan, and admiral
Khwaja Mishki (Itibar Khan). At the close of the rainy season
Shuja started from Rajmahal via Dunapur, Dogachi, and Suti,

6* EFI. op. c it. 290 and n ; 291 and n. The Kassimbazar Hugli
letter of 5th July suggests that Mir Jurnla had conquered Hugli before
but that it was recovered by* Shuja, probably after the former’s failure at
Suti and now again, Mir Jumla wanted to reconquer it

Hijili (Port Angeli) is the coastal tract on the western side of the
Hugli estuary, including Tamluk in the north and bounded by Jallasore
and Midnapur in the west. See Ingellee (10m, east of Contai) and
Narangur in Rennell, Hh 7.

12

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

reached Belghata in two months. His army consisted
>00 mail-clad warriors. A flotilla of hums and ghurabs saile
down the river abreast of the army on land.

Mir Jumla quickly arranged the army in battle array : the
Van was led by ZuJfiqar Khan, the Right by Muzaffar,
the Left by Fidai. (Khan Koka), and the artillery was under
Muhammad Murad Beg. Advancing 20 miles from Masumbazar
he entrenched behind a deep nala near Belghata on the bank of
the Bhagirathi. Throwing two bridges over itone very near
the army and the other a mile off,—he fortified their heads.
Ekkataz Khan was placed in charge of the right bridge. To
prevent the retreat of generals from the field on the pretext of
the flight of their elephants, Mir Jumla ordered them to ride on
horses only. Anyone violating the prohibition would be
trampled to death by elephants. 7

With the rival forces separated by the nala, a battle 8 of
artillery began on the 6th December about 1£ pahars of the day.
After a few days of cannonading and skirmishing, Shuja
pretended to retreat towards Rajmahal, in order to deceive the
imperialists. But, when Mir Jumla s army pursued and
encircled the enemy, the Shujaite Van under Muhammad Sultan
suddenly veered round and swooped down on Ekkataz Khan
guarding the head of the right bridge with only 400 men (15th
December). The overpowered guard appealed to Mir Jumla for
reinforcements. Accordingly, the latter asked Zulfiqar to send
a mixed force of his Aghar (Uighur) and Rozbihani contingents,
numbering 7,000, with instructions to pursue the Prince in case
of victory. But Zulfiqar soon reeled at the latter’s terrific fire,
and together with the wounded Ekkataz, fled to their own side
the nala , burning the bridge to prevent pursuit. 9

The moment had come for Mir Jumla to stir. Of the three
generals of Shuja, the Prince, leading his van, who had past

§L

ilea

7 For Shuja’s strategy, and disposition of respective armies, Poem ,
326-35 ; Mir Jumla’a prohibition. Poem , 334 ; AN. 514 (Shuja at Tanda)
519.20 ; ZNA. 99 ; TS 131a-b ; EFI. op cit . 292.

8 For the entire campaign at Belghata and Giria, AN. 520-24 ; TS.
131b-133b : ZNA, 99-101 ; Poem , 336-48.

9. TS. 131b ; AN. 520-21 ; Shuja’s strategic retreat in ZN V. 99-100 ;
Poem , 336.

mtsTfy

RATTLE near BELGHATA and giria YF&\

»noe ot tlie imperialists, was preoccupied at the rig^J j
So Mir Jumla planned his characteristic flanking
movement in order to encircle Shuja and attack him from the
rear. Leaving Zulfiqar Khan in charge of the imperial army,

Mir Jumla crossed the nala by the left bridge. His march,
hampered by jungles and mud, was slow. Near Giria, on the
bank of the JBhagirathi, he wheeled round bhuja s rear,
commanded by Mir Ffandiar Mamuri, entitled tvhanzad Khan,
and dispersed it by volleys from cannon rockets, elephant-
swivels arid camel 1-swivels. So hard pressed was Shuja at
the Mir's terrific onset that the Prince had to come to his
relief. Leaving Ibn Husain, daroghai of artillery, to oppose
Zulfiqar, Shuja sallied out to face Mir Jumla “with a small
force but great hopes.''

After 3 pahars of the day had passed, Shuja faced the
imperialists in battle order. His artillery commander, Mirza
Jan Beg, stood like a solid wall with his regrouped pieces of
cannon, which were fired simultaneously with shells of 10 and
15 seers. Mir Jumla's men, advancing like waves, were mown
down by this furious cannonade. His plans were upset. For
some time, he “could neither advance nor retreat' 4 . The
imperial troops shrank back in great disorder. The Alamgir-
narna ascribes it to the defiance of Mir Jumla’s orders by the
captains, and the consequent separation of the different
divisions, which prevented a general charge against the enemy.

No decisive hand to hand fighting took place 10

Both sides were now exhausted. Shuja did not charge
Mir Jumla, though the latter was reduced to great straits in
spite of his superiority in numbers, and materials. The
Shujaite historian says that if he had done so, he could have
defeated Mir Jumla. But the explanation is not far to seek.
Whatever success Shuja had gained in the last two engagements,
at the right bridge and in the rear-guard action at Giria,—was
due to the splendid execution of his artillery. Mirza Jan's
terrific cannonade had, however, exhausted his ammunition,
and without an artillery cover he could not risk a hand to hand

10. AN. 522-4 ; ZNA, 99 ; Poem , 339-45 ; TS. 132a, 133b ; Aurangzib ,
II. 592.

misTfy

LIEE OF MIR JUMLA | ^

ting with the numerically superior imperialists. On thfe_
■her hand, Mir Jumla, pulling his men back from C4iria with
great difficulty but with care and skill, and probably unaware
of Shuja's shortage of ammunition, could not stage a bold
night-attack on Shuja’s position with officers, whose morale
had been shaken by enemy gun fire. 11

Mir Jumla now bided his time. Having already asked
Daud Khan (then at Monghyr) to expedite his diversionary
march across the Kosi towards Tanda at the end of the rains,
he expected Shuja everyday to suddenly give up the war and
fly back to the eastern bank of the river in order to defend
his own base. Weak in artillery and eagerly looking up for
Dilir Khan 'to bring reinforcements from the Emperor, he did
not deem it politic to w r aste his man-power and dwindling
ammunition in any more fruitless skirmishes. So he quietly
retired from the nala towards Murshidabad. 12

Emboldened by Mir Jumla'8 retreat and unaware of theii
danger lurking in his own rear, Shuja designed to cut him off
from Murshidabad. Crossing the Bhagirathi, he marched
parallel to Mir Jumla down the other bank to the ferry of
Nashipur (Nasirpur), 12 miles north of Murshidabad, and hoped
to cross the river again and cut off the Mir's retreat. Here a
cross-river artillery duel continued for several days. On the
night of 26th December, Shuja was about to cross the river
when he received the grave news that Daud Khan, after
having forced a passage across the Kosi by defeating his own
admiral, was rapidly converging on Tanda. 13

4. Daud Khan 8 advance from Patna towards Malda .

To understand this miraculous turn in the tide of Shuja, it
is necessary to take a brief review of Daud Khan’s activities

11. TS. 133b ; Poem, 344*5 ; ZNA, 101 ; Aurangzib, op. cit. f (Shortage
of ammunition). Thus it Is not impossible (Aurangzib. II. 593n) to
reconcile Aqil’s version with AN. and TS.

12. AN. 524*5 ; Aurangzib , II. 593 ; Poem, 345-48 (Mir Jumla holds a
council of war and summons physicians for Ekkataz, who, however*
dies).

13. AN. 525-6 ; TS. 134a ; Poem , 349-50.

MINI STfy

BAUD KHAN'S ADVANCE FROM PATNA TOWARDS MALDA

§L

(mce his receipt of Mir Jumla’s instructions and the imperial
mandate in the month of May. Daud took immediate action
on the Mir s letter. By offering to appoint his generals in
imperial service and giving three months’ pay in advance, he
soon collected a large force. He summoned two pahalwans of
Mehsi and Darbhanga with their men, money and materials,
the Mankali family and three Kakar leaders. Next he
purchased some boats (kisti or ghurab ), from the local majhis
(boatmen) and equipped each of them with 10 gunners and
artillery. 14

With these preparations and leaving his brother's son,
Shaikh Muhammad Hayat, as his deputy, Daud started from
Patna at the head of 1,500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry on 13th
May. Crossing the Ganges there on a bridge of boats and sailling
down the flooded rivers, the Saraju and the Gandak, after
overcoming great obstruction from the enemy entrenchments
on them, he reached the village Qazi-keria (opposite Bhagalpur)
in about three week’s time and then sent 90 boats to fetch
the Rozbihanis, who had then arrived at Bhagalpur. But he
was forestalled there by the Shujaite admiral, Khwaja Mishki
(Itibar Khan) who had a large flotilla, consisting of kusas
(fast boats) and ghurabs (gun-boats). 15 At the end of the first
day's battle, which was a mere indecisive artillery duel, Daud
placed 10 equipped boats each with 10 armed pickets to guard
the river at night. It was only after Khwaja Mishki’s defeat
on the second day that Rashid, deputed by Mir Jumla (10th
June) with a Rozbihani force under Chiragh, met Daud and
conveyed to him the news of Sultan Muhammad's flight and
Mir Jumla's instructions to him not to leave Qazi-Keria till
the end of the rains. As a matter of fact, the floods on the Kosi,

14. See ante Section C. Poem, 17-18; The Mankali was an Afghan
family which had Qpposed Akbar’s conquest of Bengal ( Akbarnama , III.
169, 186, 191).

15. Poem , 179-80 ; ZNA. 95*6 ; Daud’s associates, AN. 513-4. There
have undoubtedly been great changes in the course of rivers since then.
Pickering’s letter from Patna (16th May) gives the number of Daud’s
army as 5,000 horse, and Chamberlain’s letter (17th May) gives the date
of Daud’s departure as I7th May. EFI- X. 285.

WNiST/fy

^ ' G0 W\

(n

LI3PE OP MIR JUMLA

Kalindi and the Mahananda rivers brought Daud to an
absolute halt here. Acting on Baud's instruction, Rashid
entrenched from bank to bank and successfully held his own
against enemy cannonade. Next day, after a futile effort to
attack Baud's party with mobile kusas, Kliwaja Mishki bad
to retreat to Bhagalpur. Here he captured a faujdar of Mir
Jumla. But the Shujaites were, in turn, routed by the
nephew of Ali Quli (Shamsher), also deputed by Mir Jumla
with 100 men to secure the release of the faujdar, and the
imperialists captured war materials and collected Kharaj , 10
About this time, Shuja, flushed with his victory at the
recover of Rajmahal (22nd August), ordered his general, Fidai
Khan, to go to Monghyr and fight the imperialists in the area
extending from Bhagalpur to Surajgarh, occupy all villages and
roads and control all ferries with his own men. He was also
required, in co-operation with Khwaja Mishki, to attack Baud,,
who had then crossed to the right bank between Bhagalpur
and Colgong. Ali Quli’s nephew, Shamsher, did not risk any
battle with the numerically superior force of Fidai, and so,
leaving Bhagalpur, retreated to Jahangira (near Sultanganj).
After a bold and rapid night march from Bhagalpur, deserted
by the imperialists, Fidai captured Jahangira from it®
commander, Ismail, with all cash and materials, placed
tarafdars and rahdars in every village, controlled the ferries
and awaited Shuja’s further instructions. Ismail, wounded in
the artillery duel there, had to be carried to Monghyr where
he died. 17

But Shuja did not feel safe till Daud was disposed of and
the country brought well under control. Moreover, Monghyr
was then well-guarded,—the fort by Muhammad Hossain and
its environs by his five associates, Rasul, Mirza, Hasan,
Shamsher and the brother of the deceased Ismail. So forbid¬
ding Fidai to advance towards Monghyr or Surajgarh, Shuja
asked him to occupy all ferry crossings from the dehkans , to-
collect revenue from the country acquired, and to conduct a

16. Poem , 180-201 ; AN. 514 (halt at Q&su-Keria).

17. Poem, 201-17 ; TS. 124a-125b ; AN. 514.

AUD KHAN’S ADVANCE FROM PATNA TOWARDS MALDA 1

^tval war with Daud. He also instructed Fidai, in case of
victory, to slay Rashid, Abdul Maal, Hadi, Yusuf and ail
others except Baud, and send their armies to be utilised by
Shuja against Mir Jumla. Accordingly, leaving Jahaingira
under guard, Fidai, advised by Khwaja Mishki, immediately
embarked on his flotilla in order to encircle Daud. 18

The second phase of the naval war with Daud now began.
In spite of much firing on the first day, Shuja’s artillery-men
could not, owing to distance and bad aim, inflict any serious
damage on Daud’s men, who were strongly entrenched. Next
day, Rashid and Chiragh put the enemy’s flotilla to flight by
boldly plunging their horses into the river, in the teeth of
intense enemy cannonade and against Daud’s orders. Even
after one week's naval battle, the Shujaites failed to slacken
the morale of Daud’s party, when the ebbing flood water
compelled them to retire with their 700 boats to Jahangira.
Shuja, greatly disheartened, remarked that the tide of fortune
was turning against him. About September (?) he recalled
Fidai Khan in order to advance from Rajmahal against Mir
Jumla, then at Masumbazar, and placed Khwaja Mishki
with his boats at Jahangira to occupy the ferries and
prevent Daud from coming to Rajmahal. 19 About this

time Daud received a letter from Aurangzeb, ordering
him to cross the Ganges near Monghyr and there await
the arrival of Farhad Khan with money and reinforce¬
ments, 1,000 Uzbegs and Uighurs, 50 Rozbihanis under Abdua
Nabi, arms and ammunition,—to give three months’ advance
wages to the soldiery, place 40 cannon on boats, clear the path
for Mir Jumla by swooping down on Fidai and Khwaja Mishki
and then send Farhad Khan with men and treasure to Mir
Jumla and follow his advice. Daud, in reply, promised to
abide by these instructions and prayed that, in view of the
incessant warfare for flve months, the Emperor might be
pleased to reward the Khans The Emperor agreed with this

18. Poem, 211 $3.

ura ojc MIR JTJMJjA

stion and conferred immediate favours on the RozbihaAi
by Chiragh. Baud's rank \yas increased by 1,000. 20
Starting from Qazi-Keria early in December, with one-half
of the army under himself on boats, Baud asked Rashid to hurry
on horse-back towards Monghyr with the other half along the
left bank of the Ganges and to help him, if attacked. Khwaja
Mishki barred Baud's way at Jahangira with a flotilla, largely
manned by Europeans (possibly Portuguese) and mesticos but
was expelled by the Rozbihanis under Rashid, sallying out of
his camp at Gogri (opposite Monghyr). Repulsing Khwaja
Mishki again with the help of Chiragh Beg, Daud reached the
left bank of the river at Monghyr with great difficulty and
crossed over to the right bank in 3 days and 3 nights under
cover of defences which proved too strong for the Shujaite
admiral. Muhammad, the havaldar of the fort, obstructed the
enemy’s advance by cannonade ; 40 boats of Rozbihanis under
Chiragh, anchored on the left bank, and entrenchments were
thrown upon the right bank by Hasan, Mirza, Shamsher and
other Shaikhs and Pat ban leaders. The Shujaites had to
retreat to Jahangira with a loss of 40 cannon and 10,000
rockets. But even Jahangira they had to desert soon before
the simultaneous advance of Baud's army from Monghyr in
two lines, the cavalry being under himself on land and 700
boats sailing down the river. Daud now despatched Farhad
(who had arrived at Monghyr) together with Abdun Nabi,
Hasan, Mirza, Shamsher and Muhammad Rasul and other
reinforcements sent by the Emperor to Mir Jumla. However,
Khwaja Mishki continued to vex Daud on water there. And
so when Mir Jumla instructed him to cross the Ganges
immediately, march on Tanda, capture the enemy’s goods,
pearls and treasure, wait till his own arrival at Rajmahal, and
endeavour to capture Shuja, if he crossed to the left bank,
Daud replied that there might be delay in complying with all
these. At Bhagalpur, Baud, forewarned by spies deputed
the Rozbihanis under Chiragh to frustrate Shujaite Yusuf
Khan's plan of night attack and captured stores, camel-swivels

20. Ibid. 238-62 (Rashid’s rank also increased)

MiN/sr^

Mill JCTMLA chases shuja to the eastern bank

h ant-swivels, guns, rockets and horses. Mir Jumla praised
Daud for his successful exploits and admired his firmness and
loyalty. 21

On the eve of his advance to Colgong, Daud was intercepted
by Khwaja Mishki with 700 boats. But the latter had to
retire to Pialapur and so failed to check Daud at Golgong.
Proceeding towards Tanda, Daud found at Gar hi (Teliagarhi)
that the route along the river towards Rajmahal had been
blocked there by Sayyid Tajuddin of Barha, Khwaja Mishki
and Jamal Ghori, who had been commissioned by ■ Shtija to
that task. Not risking a battle there with a well-equipped
and strongly, entrenched enemy, Daud engaged some
beldars to dig a canal for the passage of his boats. But though
the enemy appeared too soon, from two sides, it had to retire
before Baud's three divisions under his son Hamid, Qadir and
Ohiragh and to entrench on the Kosi. In the battle on the
Kosi, Jamal was killed. Khwaja Mishki fled and entrenched
on Samdah (opposite Rajmahal) with big pieces of cannon.
Daud, crossing the Kosi with Mughals, Shaikhs and Pathans,
and informed by a horseman from Purnea, deputed his bakhshi ,
Fathulla, with 500 men to seize 30,000 dirhams , 20 kusas with
cannon, elephent-swivels and rockets from the Shujaite faujdar
of Purnea, who was taken in imperial service.* 3 Thus clearing
the river of the Shujaites and capturing enemy materials, Daud
advanced irressistibly. Crossing the daria- i-sia (the Kalindi)
at Akbarpur, east of Sikrigali, he awaited the arrival of
reinforcements before advancing further. 23

5. Mir Jumla chases Shuja out to the eastern
hank of the Ganges.

The vanquished Shujaite admiral, Khwaja Mishki, now
appealed to his master for additional help to be able to defend

vl. Ibid. 252-95 ; AN. 524 (reinforcements). For Emperor’s letter and
Khilat to Mir Jumla. Poem, 269-'/6 ; Mir’s. reply; ibid. 270-9 ; Mir’s letter
to Daud, ibid, 280-2.

22. Ibid. 290-316 ; AN 514, 526,

Poem , 310, 350 ; by 20th December, aoo. .to Sarkar, Aumngzifr y 11
594

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<sl

big char (island) of Saindah against an impending assault
by the imperialists. Surrounded by water on all sides, it
was the last entrenched post, which stood between Sbuja’s
chain of defences and the invaders. Its loss would open the
latter’s way to Tanda with all its stores of cash and materials*
and endanger the safety of Shuja’s family sheltering at MaJda.
In great alarm Shuja held a Council of war. Sending
reinforcements to Khwaja Mishki would mean depleting his
own army and courting sure defeat at the hands of Mir • Jumla.
So, postponing a final encounter with him, Shuja decided to
immediately withdraw to Malda, entrench at Samdah and
oppose Daud. He left Nashipur towards the end of 26th
December, crossed the Bhagirathi, and advanced towards Suti
in order finally to fall back on Tanda. 24

Mir Jumla, who had long been waiting for this diversion,,
marched forward in pursuit. Wiser by his experience at Giria,
he issued a proclamation that any person staying behind
“would know that he wore the shroud of the coffin.” Starting
on the morning of 27th December at 9 A. M., and advancing
three miles, he spotted the fugitive Governor of Bengal nestling
behind a nala,' i0 flanked with bogs on three sides with the
artillery guarding his front. Mir Jumla could hardly make
any headway in such a swampy land. So he halted and kept
up a fruitless artillery duel bill evening, when he returned to
his camp, taking care to leave his army in the field to face the
Shujaites. Mir Jumla got at that opportune moment
reinforcements in nun and other materials of artillery from the
Emperor. On 28th December, Shuja fled from his position.
In the morning the imperial general continued the chase by
skilfully crossing the nala and the swamps together with
artillery and men. The couriers brought the news that Shuja
wanted to cross the ferry opposite Tartipur. After proceeding
two miles towards it, Mir Jumla heard that Shuja had gone

24. For Khwaja Mishki’s appeal and Shuja’s Council of War, Poem,
348-53 ; for Shuja’s retreat to Suti, TS. 134a; Poem ; 354; AN. 526
ZNA, 101. For Samdah and Tanda (Tarrab) see Rennelh Sh. 15,

25* This seems to be the Bansli Nala joining the Bhagirathi at
Belghata. See Bennell, Sh. 11.

mis^

JXJMLA CHASES SHUJA TO THE EASTERN

,t^ards Suti. When this was verified by Ikhlas Khan
due reconnaissance, Mir Jumla, too, advanced towards bufci.
After 5 miles he halted at Fatehpur. The artillery under
Muhammad Murad Beg came up during night. Next morning
Mir Jumla resumed the pursuit, and advancing half a mile
beyond Suti, faced Shuja, then halting at Chilmari. 26

Shuja was obliged to engage the imperialists in artillery
action till evening, when about 100 Shujaites darted at the

Imperial Right wing under Zulfiqar Khan, and were
attacked with swords by Abdul Majid Deccani, Pir
Muhammad Uighur and others. The battle ended after one
hour of the night. Nurul Hasan, finding Shuja’s cause to be
a losing one, joined Mir Jumla. The latter s onl^ concern
was to frustrate Shuja’s plan of crossing the river there.
This accounts for the stalemate which now hung over the
battle field, scouts and patrols having daily skirmishes.
Abandoning his plan of crossing the river there, Shuja went
northwards to Dunapur towards the end of night of 1st
January, 1660. Thence he fled to Dogachi, after having
broken one of the two old bridges on nalas at Dunapur. Mir
Jumla followed him in hot pursuit but was obstructed by bad
roads, nalas and damaged bridges. At Dunapur, for instance,
Mir Jumla had to fill up with mud the nala with the broken

bridge and carefully conduct his artillery and men across.
Here he came upon a boat and some materials of artillery,
10 pieces of cannon and 200 rockets, deserted by Shuja. 27

At Dogachi Mir .Jumla threw up an entrenchment for
defence. Shuja now endeavoured to combine the stratagems
adopted before, at the mid-stream island opposite Dogachi
and also at Giria, which had proved so eminently successful.
Arranging his artillery, he concealed his men with instructions

26. AN. 526-8 ; Poem, 354-61 (Mir Jumla’s proclamation). Tartipur
is shown, as Turtypour, about 3/4 mil© oast of Suti on the eastern bank of
the Ganges (Rennell, Sh. 15)

27. AN. 528-30 ; Aurangzib, II. 595.

Dogachi is shown as Jourgatchy, 3/4 mil© north of Downapur, Rennel)
Sh. 15. This satisfies the description of parallel march of the rival
forces on either side of the nala , and opposite it is the island midstream.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA 'SL

remain inactive but to fire all together only when the enemy
would come near. The discreet imperial general did ripf
allow himself to be duped by this trickery of his opponent,
of which he learnt from the qarciwcds . He refused to assault
the enemy emblacemeots without his heavy artillery, still
lagging behind, and before due watch and reconnaissance.

But against his warning, his hasty lieutenants, Fateh Jung
and Islam Khan, without making enquiries, advanced to the
nala of Doga chi with the vanguard. So when the Shujaites,
burned at bay, started a sudden and simultaneous cannonade
from their guns placed behind the nala , the imperialists could
not advance. 28

Mir Jumla now rushed in with Fidai Khan and Zulfiqar
to reinforce his hard-pressed lieutenants, and even, if
possible, to cross the nala , overpower the enemy by the sheer
weight of numbers and capture him before his escape. But
the imperial officers shrank from forcing a passage in the face
of the intense enemy cannonade. Though equipped with only
light artillery, Mir Jumla was obliged to engage in an unequal
contest with Shuja from the end of the day to mid-night
during which Shuja‘8 determined cannonade took a heavy
toll on the imperialists Yet Mir Jumla had to subject his
army to this terrible ordeal, so as to allow the enemy no
respite, and no opportunity to esoape.

At long last Mir Jumla’s heavy artillary came up and was
at once put into aotion. It began to indict heavy casualties
on the Shujaites. This meant the end of the skirmish. About
midnight? Shuja's artillery stopped. Mir Jumla, too,
retired to his camp but kept the artillery directed against

the

enemy/

28. Poem , 361-4 (Shuja’s strategem) ; AN. f>30 ; ZNA, 101-2.

20. AN. 630-1 ; Poem , 364-65 ; ZNA, 101-2.

Once during the crisis caused by dwindling ammunition, Mir Jumla
prayed to God to save “the honour of his white beard” and fired the
demoralised troops with zeal to .stand their ground, Mir Jimla’s
tenacious fight against such heavy odds drew forth praise from Shuja
(Poem, 365-73;,

WNlST/fy

JtTMLA CHASES SHUJA TO THE EASTERN BANK

day (2nd January) Mir Jumla marched towards
lajmahal along the western side of the nala, as bhuja
advanced parallel on its eastern side. The latter was now
in a nice fix. To cross the Ganges so near the enemy was
not an easy task. If he attempted to cross it first, he would
be deserted by his army, and if the latter were transported
before him, there was the risk of his being captured by the
enemy. Therefore, digging a deep moat round his camp,
Shuja threw up entrenchments and mounted guns on them.
Suspecting Muhammad Sultan now, he sent him to Tanda.
In vain did Mir Jumla try by frequent artillery volleys to
frustrate Shuja’s attempt to throw a bridge of boats over
the Ganges. On 9th January, 1660, Shuja crossed the river
on the bridge and carried away its boats too, 30

30. AN. 531-2 ; TS. 134a ; Aurangzib, op. cit., for Shuja’s dilemma,
VPoem, 373-4 ; 423 ; ZNA. 103 ; See Rennell, Sh. 15 for the nala.

MIN IST/f

Section E

The War East oe

the Ganges

]. Preparations for crossing the Ganges.

With Shuja’s final evacuation of the western bank of the
river Ganges and Mir Jumla’s recovery of Rajmahal, the War
of Succession in Bengal entered its final phase. In obedience
to the imperial mandate that the river Ganges must be crossed
its soon as its western bank had been cleared of the enemy.
Mir Jumla lost no time in making preparations for it. Suitable
arrangements were made for defending its right bank against
the enemy’s sudden reprisals. On 10th January he held a
consultation with his nobles at Dogachi and deputed a column
of 3,000 under Farhad Khan to open the riverside road via
Rangamati and Garhi to Monghyr, so long closed by the enemy.
On the 11th the General started for Rajmahal. On his way he
received the news that Diiir Khan (with 2,500 Afghans),
deputed by the Emperor, had crossed the Ganges (9th January)
at Kadamtola ferry on boats supplied, according to Mir Jumla’s
advice, by Daud Khan, then at Akbarpur. The government
of Rajmahal was placed under Islam Khan who was to be
assisted by several officers and a contingent of 10,000 horse.
Entrenchments were thrown up on the river bank, and
information was kept of the enemy’s movements so as
to prevent him from attacking Rajmahal. Officers and agents
were sent to every pargana and chakla. Rasul beg Rozbihani
was appointed thanadar of Rajmahal. Thanas were also set up
beween Dogachi and Suti; Dogachi was guarded by Islam
Khan himself with a force of 5,000; Ali Quli Khan was placed
in charge of Dunapur. The country between Rajmahal and
Teliagarhi, including Rangamati together with the hinterland
of Bara Jungal, was to be guarded by Raja Kokalat Ujjaiuia
while that between Teliagarhi and Monghyr by Raja Bahroz. 1

1 . AN. 532-534 ; TS. 134a-b ; ZNA. 103 ; Poem, 374-77, 379, 380, 424,
316-20 (for Diiir Khan). Kadamtola (So"!?' N, 87°59' E) is shown as 9
m, due n. n.e. of Rajmahal (Ind. Atlas, Sh. 112),

19

MIR JUMLA AT SAMDAH

?(&tily completing his arrangements, Mir Jumla,
5inpanied by several nobles including Zulfiqar Khan, Baja
Bahroz and Raja Kokalat, encamped at Pirpahar, the northern
extremity of Rajmahal on the 11th January. \ T ext he
encamped at Kadamtola (alias Dodha) north of Pirpahar. Mir
Jumla now deputed an officer, Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan, to
bring 17 lakhs of rupees from Monghyr for tbe expenses of his
campaign. He returned with 14| lakhs to Samdah about the
middle of February, J 660. 2

It only remained for Mir Jumla to give effect to his plan 3
of encircling Shuja, who had his defences at Samdah, Chauki-
Mirdadpur, Tanda and Malda,—a plan which had taken eight
months to mature.

2. •Mir Jumla at Samdah ..

On the 13th January, Baud's son, Shaikh Hamid, brought
his flotilla of 160 boats to Dodha (alias Kadamtola) where the
Ganges was split up in three steams. Mir Jumla crossed the
first narrow stream on 15th January by a bridge of boats.
Then the boats were transported to the second and wider
stream and the men, too, were distributed in such a way as to
reach the big island of Samdah between the second and the
third streams (opposite Rajmahal). Last of all Mir Jumla
himself reached Samdah by crossing the second stream with a
bridge of boats on 17th January.

2* AN. 533<4, 545 ; Poem f 379-80 . 3 The Poem (377) says Mir Jumla
encamped at the foot of Bar Kankal”, It may be identified with
Burgungall of John Marshall (72, 117), about 18 m, n, of Rajmahal,

Pirpahar is about 3$ miles n. e. of Rajmahal (Renneli, Sh. 15),
though the A.N, gives the distance as 18 miles. Dodha, 8 miles north of
Pirpahar, at e. to A N, is not traceable in Rennell’s map. The Ind. Atlas
(Sh. 112) shows one Dodherajtola (25°4"N 87°57 /r E) across the Ganges 9 m.
n, n, e. of Rajmahal, There is a place, Innarah, 8 m. north of Pirpahar,
and 4 m. south of Sikrigali, which is just opposite Akbarpur (Renneli, Sh.
15).

3. Sir J. N. Sarkar ( Aurangzib , II. 597-9) gives a summary of Mir
Jumla's plan of campaign.

IiIFB OF MIR JIJMLA

Sl

gV ^he quick advance of Mir Jumla upset the plans of S'huj^
^ffehad proposed to send Muhammad Sultan with guns and
boats across the Mahananda against Diiir and Baud Khan.
But now he collected his boats together, recalled those sent to
the Prince and deputed qarawcds to purloin the boatmen of
Bengal residing at Saindah.

Mr Jumla, too, tried . to counteract these measures. He
speeded up the construction of a bridge of boats on the third
stream. He deputed a contingent to forestall Shuja’s qarawals,
At the same time he set up a thana at Samdah with a force of
1,000 to prevent the local boatmen from joining Shuja. He
held a oonsulation with his lieutenants, Diiir, Daud and Rashid,
who had come forward from the other side of the river
(Akbarpur) to meet him at Samdah in the afternoon of the day
of his arrival and take his advice.

Mir Jurala's difficulties in this threatre of war consisted not
only in his lack of boats, but also in the dense jungles and the
countless nalas , that delayed the advance of his vast army,
numerically superior to Shuja’s. “The place is so bad,”
observed Mir Jumla, “that there is a stream at every corner.”

Though unable to face the imperialists in the open plain,
on account of his hopeless inferiority in numbers, Shuja
presented a stubborn resistance along the Kalindi and the
Mahananda. He constructed a wall and a double line of
entrenchments along the Kalindi (here a branch of the
Mahananda), barring Mir Jumla’s direct route to Tanda, and
placed Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki in charge of the
entrenchments along the Mahananda. Shuja himself remained,
at the ghat of Chauki-Mirdadptir opposite Samdah, along with
Prince Muhammad Sultan.

Mir Jumla had to shape his strategy with due discretion
and caution. With the enemy strongly entrenched with heavy
artillery along the Kalindi, only 4 miles distant from the
imperial post of Samdah, Mir Jumla did not consider it
advisable to desert Samdah, and advance further eastwards. For
this would have meant the fall of Samdah and exposed the
imperial base at Rajmahal, too, to the danger of assault. So,
though he was anxious to expedite the crossing of the third

!*'*%#*.

MIR JUMLA AT SAMDAH

he kept his headquarters at Samdah for sometime
(till 29th February). 4 5

Moreover, an}' attempt on the part of the imperialists to
force a passage through the Shujaite trenches along the bank
of the Mahananda guarded by Sayyid Taj and Kbwaja Mishki
was bound to be futile. So Mir Jumla planned to cross the
Kalindi above its junction with the Mahananda and then to
cross the latter (the Mahananda) by acting on the expert advice
of Daud and Dilir. But, to deceive the enemy and keep their
attention engaged, he ordered the two. Khans along with
Farhad to throw up entrenchments, .mounted with artillery on
the bank of the Kalindi in front of the enemy.

While the work of entrenching was in progress, Mir Jumla
(atSamdah) opened an artillery attack on Shuja (at Chauki-
Mirdadpur). Even after the completion of the trenches, the
artillery duel continued incessantly for about a week. When
the enemy was thus desperately preoccupied, Mir Jumla set
about discovering a suitable .ford on the eastermost branch of
the Ganges. He inspected the entrenchment on the river bank
at Samdali and cruised along, his swimmers sounding the
depth of the water. But it was unfathomable.

Soon afterwards, Mir Jumla’s spies brought the happy news
of the discovery of a ford in the upper course of the Mahananda
at Gunrakha. 6 On the night of 31 st January, 1660, the General
sent Farhad Khan with qarawals and beldars to cross the river
and entrench there so as to prevent the enemy from blocking
the way. Next day (1st February), leaving the army at
Samdah under Zulfiqar, by way of feint, Mir Jumla himself
crossed the easternmost branch of the Ganges with a bridge of
boats after 1 \ pahan pf day had passed.

Mir Jumla then proceeded towards the ford together with
Dilir, Baud, Mirza Khan and Rashid Khan. Here, under Mir

Sl

4. AN. 534-37, 546 ; Poem, 424-7 ; Auratigzzb; II. 599-600.

5. According to AN, 538, it was distant 8 miles from the imperialists

by one way, and only 4 miles by another ; it was surrounded by jungles
inhabited by many savage rustics.

13

TAXm OF MIR JUMI,A

a\s personal supervision, about 5,000 imperialist!
including bddars> qarawals , Uzbegs and auxiliaries, crossed the
Mahananda (50 yds. wide there) in 3 days (February lst-3rd),
the horses swimming across. At SJir Jumla's command about 30
sunken eriemy boats were salvaged and either used as cannon-
carriers or for a bridge. Thanks to Farhad's entrenchments
and the artillery shots of Pir Muhammad's valiant qarawals , an
enemy picket, watching the ferry, was rendered powerless to
obstruct the crossing and its leader, Amir Q.uli, was killed.
Entrusting the task of guarding the trenches of Dilir and Daud
(opposite those of Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki) to the hands
of Abdullah Khansarai, Sayyid Salar Khan, Mi ana Khan and
Jamal Dilzak, Mir Jumla himself came back to Samdah, where
the major part of the army lay, in order to prevent the enemy's
crossing. 6

The outflanked Shujaite generals, Sayyid Taj and Khwaja
Mishki, evacuated their trenches in alarm (3rd February)
and retired to their master. Shuja could neither take any
immediate action nor risk any face to face battle. His drooping
spirits were revived by the return of Sayyid Alam with
Zainuddin, 1,500 cavalry and infantry and 200 guns from
Dacca. Planning to hold on in his water-girt fortress till the
advent of the rains, he concentrated on ’ his defences opposite
Samdah.

On the 5th February the imperialists under Dilir and Daud
came near the deserted entrenchments. But Dilir’s Rozbihani
scouts under Chiiragk failed to discover the bridge used by the
fleeing Shujaites on account of enemy firing, though they found
several boats on the other side. To supervise and facilitate the
fording of a nala of the Mahananda, 2 miles distant from the
camp of Dilir and Daud, Mir Jumla crossed the third or
easternmost branch of the Ganges and the Mahananda too,
together with elephants, fast boats and troopers, and reached
the bank of the nala , which was bridged (7th February). Next
day he sent, a detachment under Sayyid Salar Khan towards

6. AN. 536-40 ; TS, 134b, I35a : Poem, 384-6 (Dilir Commander across
the river), 425 (qju 0 month’s duel) ; Aurangzib, II, 599-600.

BETUBN OV FBfttGE WDHAMMlft SULTAN

to Surround Shuja on the east and intercept his on*
te of withdrawal in the south, his west arid ncrtli being
already barred by the imperial ont-posts from Rajmahal to
Suti and from Samdah to the Mahananda respectively. Shuja
was now on the verge of ruin. The Slmjaites deserted Malda.
At the command of Mir JumJa, Baud Khan, Amir Khan,
Rashid Khan and all his own auxiliaries began to throw up aii
entrenchment betweeh the Ganges and the Mahananda. 7

S. The return of Prince Muhammad Sutian .

At this! crisis in Shuj&'s career Prince Mtihariimad Sultan
deserted his father-in-law arid returned to the imperial camp.
It was Mir Jnmla tfho, by his diplomatic trickery, reminding
us of Aurangfceb's similar stratagem during the rebellion of
Prince Akbar, caused estrange merit 6f feelings between SHU jit
arid Prince JJfuhatHtriad SUltkn. At the fiihpefbt's instructioris,
Mir Jutftfa wrote a letter to the Prince, pleading that
the latter had used his stay with Shuja as a moans of
furthering the interests of the Emperor arid advising hint
to continue doing SO Until occasion arose to fulfil his
promise to his father. As intended by the Mir, the letter fell
into the hands of Shuja, who began to harbour suspicion
against the Prince. Once Shuja’s confidence was shaken, the
Prince, too, came to be distrustful of his father-in-law, now a
losing partner. Prom Tanda he began to correspond secretly
with Islam Khan. The arrival there of Khan-i-Alam with
reinforcements from Shuja’s sOn Din Muhammad at Dacca
wounded the vanity of the Prince, as he considered himself to
have been completely ignored, while the sounding of the drums
on the occasion fanned the anger of the penitent Prince,
as it implied a violation of the traditional prerogatives of the
Mughal Efriperor. With his heart sore against his uncle and
father-in-law, he stole away as lightly as he had joined him

7. AN 541, Poem, 387-93, 456-7 ; TS. 134b, 135 ; Aurangzih , II. 600.

UOT OF MIR JUMLA

h/his heart sore against his father and his father’s gene
xhe evening of 8th February, the Prince left Tan da and, on
his arrival at Dogachi, was welcomed by its commandant, Islam

Sl

Khan. 8

Fast messengers carried the news to Mir Jumla the same
midnight. The General returned from the eastern bank of the
Mahananda to Samdah on 12th February and duly welcomed
the Prince, ordering the drums to be sounded and dismounting
from his horse in his honour. He kept the necessary requisites
from government stores for him and gave him many valuable
presents. But these outward manifestations ol honour seem
only to be a clever cloak for luring the Prince to put himself
at the hands of his relentless father. Mir Jumla, to whom the
Prince had gone for having his case recommended before the
Emperor, could do no more than ask him to wait till the
arrival of the imperial mandate. The Emperor expressed
pleasure at his sons return and at Mir Jumla's activities, but
ordered his commander-in-chief to send the Prince under proper
guard. Nevertheless, Mir Jumla tried to put heart into the
hapless Prince by asking him not to worry, as the Emperor was
merciful, and on 29th February, despatched the Prince, closely
guarded by Fidai Khan, towards the imperial Court. 9

4. Mir Jumla s advance, on Tanda m

It only remained for Mir Jumla to draw his net closer
round 8huja, —to force a passage across the Mahananda and
then cut off Shuja's retreat to the south. Learning from some
local zamindars of the existence of a ford in its lower course

8. fl Mir .JumJa’s trick. Ball’s Tavernier, I, 275, 362; Storia 1.337 -
Berniflr, 83 ; F A. 47a ; Prince’s feelings, AN. 542 ; ZNA. 103 ; AS. 21 a ;
Poem, 402-9, 414-5, 426-7, 435 (sounding of drums on arrival of Khan i
Alain) ; Shuja’s grief, 406-15 ; TS, 160a.

9, Prince’s return and death in AN, 544, 546; Poem , 415-34; ZNA.
103-4 ; Storia I. 337-8, II. 150 ; Ball I. 276, 363 , AS, 21b ; MA, 30, 33 ;
Bernier, 83n ; ADM. 109b : Aurangzib, II. 600-1.

MIK JUMLA/S ADVANCE ON TANDA

%

nemy

r Baglaghat (Bholahat). 10 the direct ferry-route of enemy
supplies, Mir Jumla ordered the d©tacliment at Malda to go
there during night, and dig trenches. But the imperialists were
forestalled bv Shuja’s son, Buland Akhtar, and his general,
Sayyid Alam, guarding the right bank of the river. 11
Apprehending an attack from ' the Shujaites concentrated there,
Mir Jumla reinforced the Malda troops and appointed Dilir
Khan commander of all operations in the Malda-Baglaghat
sector. Leaving his stores at Malda, the Khan (27th February)
advanced south, routed a Shujaite contingent under Mirza Beg
at Sitalghat, and entrenched at Baglaghat opposite Sayyid Alam
and Buland Akhtar on the other side of the Mahananda.

The news of this discomfiture reached Shuja when he was
guarding the southern bank of the Kalindi opposite Daud
Khan's army. Commissioning his son, Buland Akhtar, and
Khan-i-Alara to hold the passages across the Mahananda in the
east, Shuja concentrated on his defences opposite Samdah as

its fall would mean the annihilation of his army and the loss of
his kingdom. 12

But, like the one-eyed deer of iEsop’s fables, Shuja
committed the fatal mistake of staking his all on the Samdah
front. Mir Jumla frustrated Shuja’s strategy by deceiving him
with a screen of men opposite and himself making a wide
detour to the more vulnerable eastern bank of the Mahananda.
Indeed, for Mir Jumla the only strategy lay in fording it, a task
which demanded his personal presence. So, leaving Daud Khan
as a commander-in-chief of the entire northern front, and Sujan
Singh with 1,000 horsemen and 500 musketeers at Samdah,
Mir Jumla finally left the island on 29th February, crossed the
Mahananda next day and proceeded towards Malda (2nd
March). On 6th March he came to Mahmudabad, a few miles
south of Malda, and next day proceeded to inspect Dilir Khan’s

10. Both the AN. and the Poem write of Baglaghat, 5 kos from Malda.
Masum (TS. 160b) evidently speaks of this ford, 10 or 12 miles below
Malda. It is to be identified with Bollehaut (i. e. Bholahat), 7 miles
south of Malda, Kennell, Sh. 15..

11 . AN* 544-5 ; Poem , 435*6.

12. AN. 545*7 ; Poem , 446-57 (graphic description of skirmish?at
Sitalghat).

um mm juw^a

illery-mounted entrenchments at Baglaghat, across which
sfcond Buland Akhtur.

Mir Ju mb now endeavoured to cut off supplies to the enemy
from Pacca, Of the three land-routes to that place, two (i e,
via Malda and via Baglaghat) were already controlled by the
imperialists. So Mir Jumla deputed a contingent under Lodi
Khan to close the third route through Slier pur and
Hazrahati. 13

The end of the duel between Mir Jumla and Shuja was now
in sight. Mir Jumla adopted the same diversionary tactics,
characteristic of him in the past. To keep the attention and
strength of Shuja engaged in the north, he asked Baud Khan to
endeavour to force a passage across the Kalindi against Shuja's
entrenchments. He himself remained at Mahmudabad for a
month, during which a cross-river artillery duel raged. He
forsook comfort and rest, exerting himself unceasingly, in order
to bring his war with Shuja to a successful conclusion before
the advent of the rainy season. But Mir Jumla found it
impossible to force a passage across just in front of the strongly
entrenched enemy, “assisted by water, artillery and
flotilla". 14

At long last, after many reconnaissances and enquiries, an
obscure and ill-guarded ford, four miles below Baglaghat, was
discovered by Dilir Khan, thanks to the services of a local raja.
Mir Jumla at once acted on the information given by his
lieutenant. Leaving his camp and stables standing at
Mahmudabad, he started therefrom at 3 A. M. on 5th April
with an army 10 to 12 thousand strong, picked up Dilir Khan
from Baglaghat and reached the ford at dawn. A small enemy
picket, guarding the opposite bank with a few guns, was
completely taken by surprise.

13. AN. 547-48. Poem, 459 (Dtuid as commander).

Hazrahati is shown as Hazeryhutty on the ©astern bank of the
Ganges, 5 miles south of Surdah in Sherpur ( Hennell, Sh. 6 and 16). The
description in the AN. that it is on the Mahananda; 8 miles below'
Baglaghat is wrong.

14. ZNA. 103 (Daud to force the Kalindi) ; AN. 548 (Mir Jumla’s
exertion) ; TS. 160a-b (artiliery duel) ; MU. IIL 542-3 (Shuja's
advantages) : Aurangzib, II. 601.

mtsrftr

TANDA—DACCA

ifchout lo3ing a moment, Mir Jumia ordered his men
ord. The leaders, Dilir Khan, Ikhlas, Mukhlis and Miizaffar,
showed the way, driving their elephants into the water. Next
the cavalry plunged in. The water was shallow only over a
narrow strip but very deep on both sides. Owing to haste and
enemy-fire the fording was not properly done, and the
apportioned water-route was lost, and about 1,000 imperialists
were killed. But to Mir Jumia it was not too high a price for
this decisive step in the campaign. The Shujaite guards were
soon overpowered and fled, leaving their guns and materials in
the trenches. Reinforcements under Sayyid A lam and Prince
Buland Akhtar came too late. Despite their opposition, the
imperialists forded the river, and some even crossed it on the
bridge constructed with a few boats procured there. 15

The last engagement of the War of Succession was also a
crowning stroke of Mir Jumia. Prince Buland Akhtar fled
distracted to Tanda while Sayyid Aiam conveyed the grave
news to Shuja at Ohauki-Mirdadpur by noon. Shuja, opposite
Samdah, cannonading against Baud, was now surrounded on
three sides and the only means left to escape capture was to
swiftly flee by way of river. On the advice of Mirza Jan Beg r
ho set out at nightfall from Chauki-Mirdadpur and reached
Tanda at dawn of 6th April. The same afternoon at 4- P. M. he
left for Dacca in a number of war-boats. 16

5. Tanda—Dacca.

Shuja could And time to escape because Mir Jumia was
detained at the ford for picking up the corpses of the soldiers
ill fishing nets and giving all the dead a burial and could not
make an immediate dash on Tanda.

Mir Jumia had to remain very busy on 6th April. Early
in the morning he started from the ford for Tanda. On the

15. Fording the Mahananda, AN. 548-51 ; TS. 161a ; Poem , 454-60
(author present) : FA. 47a-b ; Aurangzib , II. 601-3.

The losses on the side of the imperialists are estimated differently by
the various sources, a. g. more than 1,000 (AN. 550) ; about 2,000 (TS.
161a) ; nearly 3,000 men (ZNA, 104) ; and 3,500 (Poem, 460),

16. TS. 16la-162a ; AN. 552 ; Poem. 470-80 (Shuja’s intention to go
to Medina and Mecca) ; ZNA. 104.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

he diverted to the left with a light division to cut of
Shnja’s retreat at Tartipur on the Ganges. Seizing Shuja's
400 loaded boats, he left a contingent of 600 musketeers under
Nurul Hasan and Mir Azir, diwan of the army as Waqianavis
there. Then, making a forced march, he reached Tanda with
only 400 men at midrnightJ 7

The* arrival of Mir Jumla was at once followed by the
restoration of order (7th April) after a period of utter confusion
and terrible plunder. He confiscated to tjie government all
available property and strenuously exerted to recover the
articles, looted by the hooligans of the army, >Vpmen
left behind by Shuja were protected ; the harem was well-
guarded and its officers and < eunuchs were asked to be fully
attentive to their usual duties. The same afternoon Daud
Khan reached Tanda via Mirdadpur.

. Mir Jumla remained at Tanda 12 days in settling its
affairs and arranging for a system of administration for the
conquered areas Tu snatch away property and stores from
the fugitive prince, Mir Jumla deputed men along the river
bank southwards. They seized two treasure-laden ghurabs
at Tartipur ; Lodi Khan captured 30 boats of Shuja’s flotilla
including officers and men at Sherpur and Hazarahati.
They now surrendered to Mir Jumla on Oth April and were
employed in imperial service. 18

From Tanda Mir Jumla wrote to the Emperor, giving the
details of the war, making a special mention of Dilir Khan's
services ami informing him that Shuja would not remain at
Dacca, but w T ould go to Arrakan. Further, the general sought

advice if ha would send the war-materials to the imperial
court. The Emperor was highly pleased to receive the letter
on *20th April. He rewarded the General and asked him to
1 eave no arrears as regards payments to the soldiers, send the

17. AN, 551-552 ; Poem , 480f; TS. 161b (picking up of dead bodies) ;
Aurangzib , II. 602-nn ; 604-5,

Tartipur is at the junction of .the Ganges and the river Bogrutty,
which flows east and south of Tarrah (Tanda). ReonelJ, Sh. 15.

18. AN. 554-5 ; Aurangzib , II. 605 ; MU. III. 543.

MINIS/*,,

TAN DA—DACCA

trials to Delhi, and then to go to

away.

On 19th April Mir Jumla left Tanda for Tartipur. From
here he sent Mukhlis Khan to Rajmahal as its faujdar in place

of Islam Khan, who having some friction with Mir Jumla, had
started from there towards the imperial court without permi¬
ssion of the Emperor. 20

Leaving Tartipur on 20th April, Mir Jumla came toHijrapur
on the land route to Dacca. He was accompanied by Dilir
Khan, Baud Khan, Rashid Khan, Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan,
Raja Narsingh, Farhad Khan, LJighur Khan, Qarawal Khan,
Abdul Bari Ansari. Next day he hastened to Dacca to
prevent Shuja from staying there. Too weak either to chastise
the zamindars who deserted him or to face the advancing
general of the Emperor, the fugitive prince forsook his eastern
capital, for evc 3 r on 6th May, in expectation of help from the
Raja of Arrakan. Mir Jumla reached the outskirts of Dacca
on 9th May. All war materials," stores and property left behind
by Shuja were sent to the EmperOr. The entire Hindusthan now

came under him.* 1

19. Poem , 4 80-6 (for Mir Jumla’s letter) ; 487-93 ( instructions to Mir
Jumla) ; AN. 476 (date)

The Poem says (487-93) that Auraiigzeb’s farman appointing Mir Jumla
Governor of Bengal was sent to Tanda. But the Alamyirnama (476, 483)
makes it clear that Mir Jumla got the Jarman at Dacca; the Emperor
sent the Jarman on 20th April and Mir Jumla left Tanda on 19th April
and reached Dacca on 9th May.

20. AN. 555 ; ZNA. 104.

21. AN. 555, 483 (date of arrival at Dacca) ; ZNA. 104-5 ; Poem,
495-496 ; Bernier, 108-9 ; AS. 21b ; CHI IV, 226,

Except in the Poem containing incidental references, Mir Jumla’s
route from Tartipur to Dacca is not described in any source. From
Rennell (Sh, 6, 16) it appears that he followed the landroute running
parallel to the Ganges from Nabobgunge. Hijrapur is Hoodrapour, south
of Tartipur and north of Nabobgunge (Sh, 15). Is the Rud i Awal of the
Poem (496f) the first river that he had to cross (at Surdah) ? In that
case it may be identified with the Burreel R (Sh. 6). Probably from
Jaffeergunge he did not follow the southern route as it involved the
crossing of numerous streams, but diverted to Gwalpara and proceeding
through Pialapour and Saapour crossed the Dauleserry R. and then the
Buriganga to reach Dacca from the north. (Sh. 6, 16, 12), The daria-i -
Aundal of the Poem cannot be Buriganga, it may be Dulleserry.

mtsr/f

Section F

Mir Jumla’s relations with the Europeans 1

( c. 1658—(iO )

1. The Junk episode still unsolved .

The agreement of April, 1658, did not finally settle the
question of Mir Jumla's junk which had been seized by the
.English during the agency of Greenhill. The latter sold it to
Edward Winter, who had it refitted for his private use*.
Apprehensive of the evil effects of the protracted incident
on account of the growing importance of Mir Jumla in the
Mughal State, the Surat authorities urged on the Madras
factors ( 27th November, 1658 ) to demand the price of the
jpnk from Winter. Unless satisfaction was given to Mir
Jumla, the Company’s trade at Masulipatam and elsewhere,
stood in danger of being hindered and even stopped But
for various reasons it became very difficult for the coast
factors to provide for satisfaction. The Committee of New
General Stock ( 13th September, 1658 ) disclaimed any respon¬
sibility in the matter and warned the factors of the evil conse¬
quences of interfering in local political disputes in future 2

Further, on the strength of a farman granted by Emperor
Aurangzeb for the recovery of Mir Jumla’s vessel, Mir
Muhammad Husain Tapa Tapa ( Tabatabai ? ) the agent of
Mir Jumla, demanded the restoration of the junk from Winter,
and on his refusal, from the Masulipatam factors, and also
pressed for the release of Qazi ( Muhammad Has him ? ),
a general of Mir Jumla, who had been probably captured by
the English. To all this were added threats of reprisals on the
Company and its factors.

1. The results of an independent study of this subject in a more
exhaustive and detailed manner have been published in an article of mine*,
entitled ‘The Last Phase oj Mir Jumla*s Relations with the Europeans
(10586:$), JIH. XXXV. 22-48.

2. EFI. X. 98, 106, 184, 186-7, 243-5, 266-72, Love, I. 185n.

MINfSr^

DEPUTATION OF MIR JUMLA TO BIHAR AND BENGAL 2>

laced between the two horns of dilemma,—Mir Jumla’s
renewed demand and the stern rebuke of the Committees in
England, Agent Chamber, the successor of Greenhill, was at
his wit's end. At his formal orders. Winter surrendered the
junk to Mir Jnmla’s Masulipatam agent but subsequently
recaptured it. 3

2. Deputation of Mir Jumla to Bihar and Bengal.

An additional element of complexity was introduced into
the junk episode by Aurangzeb’s deputation of Mir Jumla
to Bihar and Bengal to conduct the war against Shuja.
Though the English factors were mortally afraid of Mir
Jumla, their attitude towards the settlement of the incident
was characterised by a sense of opportunism and drift and
pulsated with the changing fortunes and preoccupations of
Mir Jumla and the shifting course of the War of Succession
in Bengal. Moreover, while the Bengal factors regarded
themselves as free from any responsibility for the actions of
the Coromandel Coast factors, Mir Jumla fastened the respon¬
sibility on the E. I. Company as a whole, and held that the
Bengal factors could not claim immunity from the effects
of the junk incident. Thus, one of his earliest acts in Bihar
was to prevent the English from procuring saltpetre. Cham¬
berlain, the English factor at Patna, had two interviews witli
him. At the second interview ( 21st February, 1059 ), Mir
Jumla spurned at the offer of a present worth Rs. 600,
described the English factors as “no better than pirates and
robbers’and refused to grant them dustucks for transport
of goods before receiving compensation for his ship and
goods seized on the Coast. At the same time he affirmed
that he had done Chamberlain a great favour in not
imprisoning the factors and seizing their effects in Patna. 4

The success of Mir Jumla over Shuja made it urgently
necessary for the English to pacify the former as soon as

3. EB’T. X. 263, 264*5, Love, I. 183-5.

4. EFI. X. 280, 264, for Bengal factors, Hedges, III. 189 ; EAKB, I.
33: JBORS. (March, 1939),49.

MIN IST/f

klFE OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

►osaible. Chamberlain's promise that the junk would be
returned or compensation paid, that the arrangement should
confirmed by the Coast factors within months, his

be

appeals to the Agent at Fort St. George through Balasore
factors, and the mediation of friends,—ail led Mir Jumla
to grant the English license to trade in Patna and to consi¬
der the incident as finally settled on receipt of papers certified
by his agents. 5 6

Mir Jumla summoned the Dutch factors from Kassimbazar
to his camp at Suti in order to get their help in the provision
of artillery. As the English did not voluntarily wait on him,
he ordered the closing of their factory at Kassimbazar. But
this was avoided, anil its chief, Ken, had two interviews with
the Nawab in the month of May. Mir Jumla refused to
accept the customary presents, demanded the return of the junk
.and Rs. 40,000, for the payment of which he agreed to wait
for two months, and granted several days' time to Ken to
secure the permission of the Hugh and Balasore factors. In case
of non-compliance, Mir Jumla threatened to stop all trade of
the English and seize their saltpetre as partial compensation. 6
towards the end of May, Matthias Halstead came to Mir
Jumla from Hugli with a letter of intercession for the English
from a local official, whereupon Mir Jumla partially conceded
to the demands of the English. The Balasore and Hugli
factors concurred in fixing the payment of Rs. 25,000 as
compensation to the Nawab. Early in June Halstead and
Ken had an interview with Mir Jumla, when he agreed to
grant his dustuck to the English for their trade, provided they
gave him a written pledge to make good all his damages
within about a month. 7

The Dutch Director, Mattheus Van den Brouke, was then
on his way to meet) Mir Jumla, who had ordered the Dutch
to guard the river with sloops mounted with their guns, and
had not stopped their trade. There was a rumour about

5. EFI. X 280-2, 281n.

6 . Ibid., 286 -7 ; vide, ante f3ec. C. §. 5 .

7. Ibid., 287 - 8 .

MiNisr^

MIR JUMLA’S REPRISALS AGAINST THE ENGLISH

utch getting the government of Hugli in return foj
sum of money. But the English, taking advantage o’
rince Muhammad Sultan’s desertion of the imperial army
under Mir Jumla, did not settle the junk inoident even by
middle of June. In the beginning of September Ken was
at Murshidabad in compliance with Mir jumla 1 s summons,
to wait there till the arrival of Agent Trevisa from Balasore.
But, owing to the uncertainty of the issue in war, the latter
was unwilling to part with any money, and followed a policy of
“wait and see”. He expressed his eagerness to interview the
Nawab, and forwarded to him a letter from President
Andrews of Surat and another from Mir Jutnla’s agent at
Masulipatam 8

3. Mir Jumla s reprisals against the English .

Mir Jumla was not the person to be conciliated by
vague promises. He had waited long. He had shown due
civility and consideration to the factors. His patience had
been exhausted and he would be satisfied with nothing but
“immediate payment.” He ordered the Governor of Balasore
to send up Trevisa to Hugli and to levy a duty of 4% on
all English exports, besides anchorage duties on their ships.
By end of November, the trade of the English was almost
at a standstill ; the articles of that year's investment
were purchased by them with money borrowed at high
rates of interest as the banians feared to lend money to
the factors in the face of Mir Jumla’s threats to seize
the Company’s goods for not getting due satisfaction. Thus
the Hugli factors had to face “extraordinary troubles” and
incur “great expenses” in procuring goods for that year,
while the risk of Mir Jumla’s placing an embargo on the
Company’s shipment was still present. Settlement of the
“unhappy and troublesome” junk episode was necessary
before the English could hope to derive the fullest
advantage of the Bengal trade, then considered “the risingest
trade in India. 9

8 . Ibid 288, 292-3 ; 408*9 ; vide ante. Sec. C. §. 5.

8 . Ibid., 294-7.

LIFE OF mm JUMLA

J Indeed, alarmed at Mir Jumla's stoppage of the aaltpet^j?

of the English at Patna, the Surat authorities had

ordered the Madras factors to make full and immediate

restitution to Mir Jumla for his losses (3rd June, 1659)
and send a peremptory order to the latter (12th October)
to restore the junk and to pay Mir Jumla out of GreetihiH's
estate. Early in November, the Madtas factors had advised
their colleagues in Bengal to ascertain the maximum

demands of the Nawab as a necessary prelude to the

final settlement. But, relying on rumours of military
disasters to Mir Jumla, the Madras factors boldly advised
their brethren in Bengal to holdout a threat to Mir Jufcnla
that they “had power to vindicate themselves’', if his
actions prejudiced the interests of the Company. But those
rumours were false, and to the Bengal factors, “acutely
conscious of the power of the offended Nawab, such advice
tendered from the security of Fort St. George, must have
seemed a bitter mockery”. 10

At last, on 1st December, Trevisa left Hugli together
with Ken for Mir Juinla's camp to negotiate with him for
settlement of the junk affair. He came to an agreement with
the Nawab on the following terms:

(i) the junk was to be returned to him together with
all captured articles, (ii) the question of compensation was
to be referred to his MasuJipatam Agent, “Tapatap"
(Tabatabai f) and Messrs. Wm. a Court and Wm. Jersip
(Jearsey) for final arbitration within four months. Trevisa
feared that the Nawab would nob grant the English freedom
of trade before receiving satisfaction of all his demands.

10. Ibid., 263-66, 273, 389. At the end of February, 1660, the Surat
factors also advised those in Bengal to pursue a policy of force, of playing
the fox and the lion. As Mir Jumla’s influence over Aurangzeb was so
great as to embolden him to continue his abuses on Bengal factors and
inflict losses On tho Company on the score of the junk episode, in spite of
their petition to tho Emperor, the factors were asked by the Surat
■authorities to be prepared to leave the place and seize Mughal shipping.
Ibid.. 392-3 ; JIH. NXIV. 38-40.

miSTffy.

MIR JUMLA’s REJSPRI8ALS AGAINST THE ENGLISH

to the reasonableness of Mir Jumla, he grantei
his dustuck or parivana , confirming (7 Jumada II.

February, 1660) the privileges, previously
English by Shah Jahan and Shah Shuja. 11

20 /^

11 * Ibid., 298, 390-1 ( parwana ). For the wrong account of Mir
Jumla's granting freedom of trade to the English, as a result of the
English physician Gabriel Boughton ! s (Bowdon) activities, see Bowrey,
233-34 ; Stewart, 251-2. Arguments against, in Hedges, III. 183, 107-8 ;
EAEB. I. 23-39 ; EFI, VII xxxv xxxviii.

CHAPTER VI

MIR JUMLA AS GOVERNOR OF BENGAL

l. Mir Jumla appointed Governor of Bengal.

On receiving (24th May) the news of Shuja's flight to
Arrakan and Mir Jnmla’s entry into Dacca, Aurangzeb
ordered the celebration of festivities for ten days. In
recognition of Mir Jumla's good services during the last
sixteen months in the face of numerous odds, Anrangzeb
appointed him permanent Governor of Bengal. 1

The far man' of appointment contained an explicit
statement of the reasons for it. This great victory, of
which any powerful ruler might be proud, proved the valour
and loyalty of Mir Jura la as well as his efficiency and
skill in conducting the war to a successful completion in
a manner consonant with the Emperor's desires. Again, the
province of Bengal,—as Mir Jumla had stated in his letter
to his son,—did not possess any sound administrative
organisation; and the appointment of an able Governor was
therefore an imperative necessity. “On the whole,” Aurangzeb
wrote to his general, “the laxity in administration, slackness,
disobedience and rebellion, which have become rampant

there for several years, are not unknown to you....In

every district the din of rebellion is rife and ringleaders
have raised their heads in tumult.” Mir Jumla had
declined the offer of governorship of Bengal on an earlier
occasion, on the ground that his colleagues would be
alienated from him and attribute selfish motives to his
actions. But the Emperor felt that the administration of
such an important province as Bengal could not be entrusted
to anyone except Mir Jumla, reputed as a man of lolty
integrity, impartial justice and as a cherisher of the
subjects.

1 . MA. 30 (date) ; AN. 483 ; Sir J. N. Sarkar says that the farman of
appointment was issued in June, 1060. Aurangzib, Ifl, 156.

2, FA. 4 8a-50a.

Jumla’s manmb, by addition to the original, was fi

MIK JUMLA APPOINTED OOVJ8BJSfOB OF BENGAL

hazar i haft hazar Suwctr, of which 3,000 Bmvar were svk
aspa du asp a. The rnahals , conferred as tankkwah on previous
governors,—the choicest and most fruitful jagirs,—weru given
separately as salary amounting to one krore of dams. A good
Bftbitat, 10 fast horses, Iraqi and Arabi, the best of all the
special horses of the Emperor, forming part of the presents
offered by the Turkish Emperor of Constantinople to the
Emperor (Shahjahari) in his 31st Jains (year),—together with
40 Turkish horses and elephants of the imperial stables and
female elephants were also given to Mir Jumla. Further, if
he considered any mahal bad, he was authorised to inform the^
Emperor of it. and get whichever pargana he desired. Besides,
a belt, together with a special bejewelled sword, whose handle
was made of agate, was given to Mir Jumla. 3

Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to devote himself to the
efficient administration of the province by pacifying the
people, chastising the unruly, regulating the artillery, and
especially the nawwara (flotilla), securing the safety of traffic
on the roads and highways and issuing well-calculated
regulations concerning various other matters. The Emperor
wrote to him : “The hand of the strong over the weak, of
the oppressor over the oppressed should be removed. And in
all affairs you should not transgress the laws of the shariat arid
limits of world-adorning justice. Your whole attention should
be devoted to the well-being of all creatures of God and the
peace of mind of foreign travellers and the inhabitants, and
the safety of the boundaries. Act in such a way that all
people can pursue their work of cultivation in an atmosphere
of security from the persons whose profession is oppression”.

Mir Jumla was also charged with the effective chastisement
of the rather refractory zamindars of the province, and also
particularly the rulers of Assam and of the Maghs, who ill-
treated and oppressed the Mussalmans. He was asked to
consider their punishment as an urgent duty for safeguarding
the interests of religion and brotherhood in Islam. Aurangzeb

3. See AN. 483 ; Poem, 491-3 ; MA. 32.
14

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

leered many army leaders to stay in Bengal for one year a
-galled others to the Imperial court. But if Mir Jurala con¬

sidered those left in Bengal as unsuitable, he was to request
the Emperor for necessary action. 4

Fresh honours were bestowed on Mir Jumia for his victories
overShuja on the 44th birthday of Aurangzeb (15th July,
1660). The new Viceroy of Bengal received the titles of Khan
i Khanan and Sipahsalar and was created commander of 7,000,
his rank being increased by 2,000 du aspa seh aspa , of bis
personal followers, 2,000 were to be du aspa seh aspa , so
that his mansah ; from original and increase, become 7,000,
of which 5,000 were du aspa seh aspa. A special Khilat , and
a gold-embellished sword were also given to him. 5

2. Mir Jumia's administration in Bengal.

Mir Juinla held the reins of the viceroyalty of Bengal for
nearly three years (9th May, 1660—31st March, 1663). But
he was in the province for barely a year and a half, being
engaged in the campaigns in Kuoh Bihar and Assam from
November, 1661. Mir Jumia transferred the capital of Bengal
from Ftajmahal to Dacca out of several considerations, fore¬
most among which was the need of keeping the Arrakanese
and the Portuguese pirates in check. While at Dacca, he
collected the revenue from the peasants with wisdom and
moderation. But the condition in the jagirs of the mansabdars ,
was far from satisfactory. As these were situated in different
parganas , and there were many co-partners, the ryots there
wore subject to oppression, the method of collection of revenue
was wasteful and the parganas became desolate. Mir Jumia

4. The Poem (487-93) says that. Mir Jumia was commissioned to send
to Delhi those soldiers whom he did not require, so that they might be
deputed to the Deccan.

5. AN. 563. Mir Jumia was given the title of Yar-i-wafadar or faithful
friend (of the Empire) by Aurangzeb on bis accession. FI. 2, 52. JBORS
I. 183. The assertion of the Poem (op. cit.) that the titles of Khan i
Khanan, and sipahsalar were given along with the farman cannot bo
accepted.

MiNisr^

MIR JUMLA S ADMINISTRATION IN BENGAL

ined in his own jagirs many virtuous aimadars an«
Ipend-holders and some others who had received Jarmans
from the Emperor. But with regard to others, , Qazi Rizvi,
the Sadr, cancelled their rnadad i maash and pensions in the
orownlands axi&jagirs. Their lands were resumed by the state.
The aimadars were enjoined to till the lands and pay revenue
to it. The order fell very heavily on the aimadars , who did
not cultivate the lands, and so there was no gain in revenue.
The Zakat (l/40th of the income) continued to be eolleoted
from merchants and travellers and custom (hasil) from
artificers, tradesmen and Khushnashin ( well-to-do men),
Hindus or Muslims alike. 6 In many parganas the depart¬
ments of the erownlands or the jagirdar or the zamindar
used to seize the property and even the wife and daughters
of any person, ryot or new-comer, dying without leaving
any son. 7

Suspecting Mulla Mustafa, the Qazi of Dacca, to be a
bribe-taker, and the Mir Adi to be a parasite, Mir Jumla
expelled them from the town and personally administered
justice in both religious and secular affairs. He unhesitatingly
performed whatever appeared to be just to him. At the time
of his advance towards Assam, he left instructions that the
decision of any matter at the city according to the Quranic
Jaw might be referred to Shaikh Azam, but that the latter
should not put his seal on any paper, and consider or name
himself as a Qazi. 8 At the time of a man proving a loan or

6 . Reasons for transfer of capital. Ball's Tavernier, BK. I. Oh. VIII ;
Bowroy, 143. Collection of revenue, Poem , 496 f ; Cont. II7a-.U9a
(oppression of ryots and resumption of lands) ; l?7b-J 29a (zakat) ; SAR.
165-7, 171-2.

According to the Poem (496-501), three rajas refused to submit to
Mir Jumla or to pay the arrears of tribute,—the Raja of Tippera, the
Mehtar of Ghoraghat, and the Raja of Hajo. Ho proposed to send three
expeditionary forces, under Rashid Khan to Hajo, Farhad Khan to
Tippera, and Sujan. Singh to Ghoraghat.

7. This was called Ankura (hooking), Cont. 131b ; SAR. 176. In 1667
Shaista Khan sent to Delhi 300 cartloads of silver and 50 of gold as
revenues of Bengal, collected by Mir Jumla. Storia , TI. 117 and ri.

8 . Cont. 107a.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

M\\m against another, or of the recovery of stolen propert;
te clerks of the police-stations used to collect for the State
l/40th of the amount as *«-a fee for exertion’ 5 . The plaintiff
and the defendant presenting themselves at the magistracy,
were dotained in prison till thb disposal of their esse, and the
summons-servers used to take daily allownces from them
and pay the amount to the state. 9

Quite naturally Mir Jumla exercised almost unrestrained
authority in Bengal administration as its Governor. 10 He
also exercised some degree of control over Bihar and
Orissa. 11 As regards Bihar the facts are as follows:
During 1660-81, Mirza Lutfullah Beg, Diwan of Patna,
in order to monopolise the sale of saltpetre for the benefit
of imperial revenues, forced the dealers, in spite of their
contracts with the Dutch, to deliver their saltpetre to him.
The Dutch Director at Hugh, Mattheus Van den Brouke
complained to Mir Jumla and to the English, alleging that
these actions were secretly instigated by Chamberlain, the
English factor at Patna, and his broker, Gangaram, who
had promised to purchase saltpetre from the Diwan. The
English Agent, Trevisa. disclaimed these allegations and agreed
with the Dutch Director not to deal with the Diwan, but to
purchase directly from the dealers as before, Mir Jumla
forbade Lutfullah by a parwana to hinder the Dutch. 12

In the autumn of 1659 Mir Jumla, having established his
authority in W. Bengal, had deputed Ihtisham Khan to assume
charge of the governor less province of Orissa, then in a state
of anarchy. Probably it was then that Mir Jumla, in

Qt

9. Coni, 131b ; SAR. 176.

10. As early as May, 1659, the English factors observed . What hee
(Mir Jumla) saies (says^ is a law”. (EFI. X. 286) In April, 1660, they
noted : “his (Mir Jumla’s) power over all this new kings dominions being
so great© that his word the Kinge obeyes” ( Ibid., 305). cf. Bowrey, 144-5

11 . Most probably it was this which led Bowrey (p. 139) to observe
that the government of the three kingdoms, Orissa, Bengal and Patna,
was conferred on Mir Jumla.

12* BDR, 1661, in EFI, XI. 69-71.

MINIS ^

MIR JUMLa's ADMINISTRATION IN BENGAL

ance with an imperial Sanad , had attached the kiyu<
aja Nilkantha Dev of Orissa for failure to pay the demands
of the Khalsa. and resumed to the state, the madad-i-ina ash
village of Jasra in pargana Kasijurah, enjoyed by Shaikh Abu!
Khair of Qutbpur in SarJcar Goalpara. Even after the
appointment of Khan i Dauran as Governor of Orissa, Mil'
Jumla, though Governor of Bengal, continued to have some
connection with and hold over Orissa. Its revenues were sent
to the imperial court via Kajmahal along with those of
Bengal. 13 Moreover, after Mir Jumla s death, the Balasore
factors observed (28th April, 1663) that the Governors “in
these parts”, on account of the “long absence and distance”
of the Nawab (Mir Jumla) had been “so insolent and illimitable
in their exactions that they had very much impaired the trade
here ” They expected a remedy of it if the Khan i Khanan
had lived. They added: “this great subject, Khan i Khanan
being extinct, this country will be immediately under”
Aurangzeb. 14

Mir Jumla also helped Khan i Dauran in subduing Bahadur
Khan, the rebel Zamindar of Hijili. The latter had escaped
from the prison into which Shuja had thrown him and
reasserted his authority in his estate. European factory records
state that Mir Jumla wanted to reconquer it, and demanded
ships for the purpose from the Dutch, the Portuguese and the
English. But this enterprise was stayed for some time after
the appointment of Khan i Dauran as Governor of Orissa.
Subsequently Mir Jumla induced the Emperor to transfer the
district from the jurisdiction of Orissa to that of Bengal,
requisitioned an English sloop and a Dutch galliot, and made
preparations to subdue Bahadur. Thanks to the assistance
of the Dutch, Hijili was conquered. Kamal Khan, brother of

13. Deputation of Ibtisham, SAR. 224; MH, 143 (Nilkantha Dev), 78—
BO (Shaikh Abul Khair;, 49-53 and 141 (Orissa revenues). A dakchauhi
was established from Orissa to Rajmahal (ibid., 110-114), but the exact
time for it is not definitely known.

14. EFI. XI. 288-0. Prao. IHC. (Cuttack; 1949), p 297.

MiNisr^

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

rebel, was killed, and Bahadur, with his 11 companio'
ere taken to Dacca as prisoners (6th May, 1661) 15
The King of Arrakan sent an envoy to Mir Jumla with a
haughty letter, demanding the restoration of some of his
territories, which had been occupied by the imperial troops.
Mir Jumla dismissed him with a courteous reply and a small
present. He also put pressure on the Dutch to send a ship
to Arrakan in pursuit of Shuja. 16 Fully alive to the gravity
of the Magh menace to Bengal, Mir Jumla informed the
Emperor that the non-residence of the previous governors at
Khizrpur was due to the fear of the incursions of “the accursed
Maghs”. It was only at the end of the rains and during winter
when the season for the coming of the pirates was over,-that
the Governor of Dacca used to go to Khizrpur with an army
and encamp there. 17 Mir Jumla made some plans for under¬
taking a campaign to subdue the Maghs, but as these required
time to mature, he postponed the expedition till the conclusion
of that against Kuch Bihar and Assam. 18

Before setting out on the expedition to Kuch Bihar and
Assam, Mir Jumla made several administrative arrangements
in Bengal. Mukhlis Khan continued as Governor of Rajroahal;
Ihtisham Khan was put in charge of the Bengal administration
and remained at Khizrpur to guard Dacca. JKai Bhagwati
Das, diwan of crownlands, and Khwaja Bhagwan Das Shujai
were put in charge of the financial affairs of the imperial

15. EFL XX. 68-70 ; MH. 130 (campaign postponed), 133. 115.116
(capture of Bahadur with family). Khan i Dauran was appointed
Governor of Orissa on 3rd April, 1660, and reached Medinipur on 26th
September, SAR. 227.

16. EFT, XI. 09.

17. Cont. 107b, 108a ; SAR. 187. Khizrpur was near Narainganj
8 m. s, w. of Dacca, JASB. XLIII, 211-12.

18. Chap. VII. post. These plans probably included (i)the construction
of the forts at Idrakpur (mod. Munshiganj) on the Dhaleswari, at Fatulla
on the Buri Ganga and a third on the other side of it, (ii)the strengthening
of the forts at Khizrpur, Sonakanda and Hajiganj, (iii) and the
construction of the road from Dacca to Khizrpur (via Fatulla, * passing
over the Pagla bridge). Dacca Dt. Gaz % 30, 186, 189 ; ASK. XXIV, 93-94
and plates XXXI, (b), (c) ; Rennell, Shs, 1 , 17 ; OAILPB, 82-83.

misr/ry

MLR JUMLA’s ADMINISTRATION IN BENGAL
*nrr»oTYf. /in RAnrrn.D and nf TVTir .Inmlfl, _ __ .

ely. Muhammad Muqim, “an expert, clever and hard
working officer’', serving at Dacca, was deputed to supervise
the nawwara. Mir Gkazi was appointed paymaster and news-
writer. 19

While Mir Jura la was engaged in his Assam campaign, a
severe famine visited Bengal and lasted for nearly two years.
The price of grain rose up owing to the high rate of Zakat or
compulsory alms, and virtual suspension of movements of
merchants on account of internal insecurity, the grasping
habit of the chowkidars and the oppression of raJodars (toll-
collectors ). The distress of the people became so acute that, in
the words of Talish, “Life appeared to be cheaper than bread,
and bread was not to be found'’. As this famine coincided with
the famine and pestilence in the Mughal camp at Mathurapur
in Assam, no relief could be sent from Bengal to the Mughal
naval base at Lakhau. To relieve the consequent food
shortage there, Mir Jumla ordered the despatch of rice prepared
from 12,000 mds. of paddy seized near the Dihing river in
Assam. Mir Jumla's successor, Daud Khan, remitted the
Zakat , which relieved the distress of the starving people to
some extent. 20

Mir Jumla could nofc deal effectively with certain admini¬
strative problems of Bengal, the solution of which had become
overdue ever since the time of Shuja. Matters grew worse
under the acting governors after the death of Mir Jumla. and
it was left to Shaista Khan to introduce the necessary reforms
in the administration. The most important of all the unfinished
tasks of Mir Jumla was the rebuilding of the Bengal flotilla
( naunvara ). During the lax regime of Shuja the parganas
assigned for its maintenance, and yielding 14 lakhs of rupees
a year, had become desolate on account of the extortion and
violence of the rent collectors. In his Jarman of appointment
of Mir Jumla as the Governor of Bengal, Aurangzeb had asked
the latter “to try his utmost” to regulate the flotilla, according
to the laws of Ibrahim Khan. Hence, with a view to

19 FI. 10 ; Cont, 1 22a, 137 (Muhammad Muqim),

20. FI, 132-3 (Causes) ; 149 (despatch of rice) ; Coni. llOb-Illa,

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<8L

Cl of

ganising the navy, Mir Jumla abolished the old system
management ; but before he could start a new one, he
undertook the Assam campaign. Many naval officers and men
died in the course of it and the flotilla was utterly ruined at
the death of Mir Jumla. On the resignation of its admiral, Ibn
Husain, Mahmud Beg was appointed its superintendent and
asked to send a report after ascertaining the quality, the number
and the true state of the Bengal flotilla. Its decline led to an
aggravation of the menace of the piracy of the Maghs and the
Portuguese. Early in 1664 the cruising admiral (Sardar i
Sairab ), Munawwar Khan, unable to face them with “the
relics of the nawivara, a few broken and rotten - boats’*, fled
in confusion. Hence Shaista Khan bad virtual^ to create a
new flotilla 21

3. Mir Jumta’s commercial and economic activities in Bengal.

The basis of Mir Jumla's economic system in Bengal, as
well as in the Karnatak, was monopoly. As Governor of
Bengal, he endeavoured to become the sole stockist of all
articles of necessity and then sell them at fanciful pi ices.
About 1660, Mir Jumla offered to supply the English factors
every year as much saltpetre as they would require. In the
opinion of the Madras factors he did so for his personal profit.
About the same time the English faotors at Patna were
indebted to him for supply of 30,000 bags ( 6,000 mds. ) of
saltpetre. 22

An instance of an extraordinary levy of Mir Jumla in
Bengal is given by a Dutch record of November, 1661.

21. The flotilla accompanying Mir Jumla to Assam numbered at least
938. Many Ahom ships also formed part of Mir Jumla’s Assam plunder
(sec Oh VII). After his death, the number of the boats was not so
large (600) as w f >s claimed by Ibn Hussain, nor so small (25), as was the
contention of Daud Khan. Cont. L12a-b, 113a (decay of flotilla),
122a. 137a ; SAK. 191, 194.

22. “The Nabob (Mier Jumlah) doth indeavour to ingrosse all
commodities in Bengal (whereof wee hinted something to you two years
agon).” Madras to Company, (29th Jan. 1662), EFI. XI. 67, See Cont.
127a ; SAR. 170-1.

MINISr^

I'MIR JtTMLA’3 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN BENGAL

21

necurding to it Mir Jumla demanded Rs. 50,000 from the gram
merchants of Dacca, as something like an excess profits tax
•of modern times, on the pretext that the latter had made a
profit of twice the amount due to the continued presence o
the Governor’s large camp ( on the eve of the Kuch Bihar and
Assam Campaign ). They paid Rs. 10,000, but the unsat,shed
Governor adopted severely coercive measures, as a result
of which they contributed in all Rs. 25,000. A sum o t nee
lakhs was offered by the city bankers, forewarned by such

severity. 2 ® ,

In 1658 the Governor of Hugh demanded from the fcmglish
an annual payment of Rs. 3,000 in lieu of customs on the
ground that the imprisonment ( June, 1658 ) of Shahju lan
and assumption of power by Aurangzeb had made all imperial
grants null and void. Next year the Governor of Balasore
began to demand exorbitant charges for anchorage from them.
The English factors declined to pay either, and a dispute
thereupon arose between them and the government o 1
Jumla. In 1660 -,! the English Agent at Hugh, exasperated
at the Mir’s “oppressions,” audaciously seized one of h,s
country vessels as a security for the recovery of debts. Highly
incensed at this, Mir Jumla demanded reparation and
threatened to destroy the out agencies, to se.ze the factory
at Hugli and expel the English from the country Advised
bv the Madras authorities, Agent Trevisa restoied t e oa
and apologised to the Governor. But the latter continued to

exact the annual payment of Rs. 3,00(V J

Every year Mir Jumla was in the habit of utilising the
services of the English and their ships in sending his articles
( viz. gumlack ) to Persia without paying any freight or
customs. The Madras factors advised their brethren at
Gombroon that “in view of his power in Bengal, the Company s
dues ( on a parcel of gumlack ) should be remitted.” At the
same time they held ( May, 1662 ) that this not only went a

:§l

23. RDR. Nov. 1661, referred to in A A, 292-

24. EEI. X. 391-2 ; Bruce, I. 560, 561 : Stewart, 323 ; KAEB. 1.
34-5.

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

g way to squaring Mir Jumla's claims ( regarding the jun|
ut even made him indebted to the English. 25

By way of investing his capital and getting goods in return,
Mir Jumla lent large sums of money amounting to one lakh of
rupees and a quarter to Trevisa, the English Agent in Bengal.
The latter utilised the money in securing goods for investment
and persisted in such borrowing in spite of strong condemnation
of it by the Surat authorities. The Madras authorities originally
acquiesced in these practices but subsequently changed their
attitude and regarded the transaction as a personal or private
loan of Trevisa, lest the burden might fall on the Company.
A part of the loan was not cleared before the death of Mir
Jumla, and out of Ils. 9,700 still due, Bs. 5,672 had to be paid
( by June, 1664 ) by the Kassimbazar factors during the
viceroyalty of Shaista Khan. By October, 1665, the troubles
ue to the dispute over these financial transactions were
atisfactorily settled. 26

<SL

4, Mir Jumla s relations with the Europeans} 1
( 1660-63 )

As Governor of Bengal, Mir Jumla continued his earlier
policy of diluting firmness with opportunism in his dealings
with the English. He used the junk incident as a lever
for securing the English Company’s help in his
measures against the fugitive Shuja. The conference held at
Masulipatam 2H to settle the claims of Mir Jumla regarding tho
junk satisfied neither the Surat authorities nor Mir Jumla. The

25 EEI. XI. 57, 149 (25 tons of gumlack in 1061), 151. For junk
episode see ante Ch. IV. Sec. E ; Ch. V. Sec. F.

20. EFI.Xf. 61 and n ; Surat President’s objections, ibid., 01,68, 153 ;
attitude of Madras authorities, ibid., 62, 149 ; amount not cleared (2nd
April, J 663), ibid., 269, 292 ; payment, ibid., 287 397 ; the amount of loan
is stated to beRs. 76,000 Ip, 62), Us. 1,00,000 (p. 149) and 1,25,000 (p.
183). For settlement, EFI. XII. 145, 135.

27. Further details have been given in my article, «The last phase of
Mir Jumla's Relations with the Europeans (1658-63),’ JIH. XXIV. 35 ff.

28. Ante, Chap. V. Sec. F.

miST/fy

4 nds made on his behalf exceeded 20,000 pagodas $

MIR JUMLa's RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS

mcluded repudiation of his debts to the Company, amounting
to 32,000 pagoda#, a claim which the Surat authorities were
not prepared to accept. About the middle of 1660 the-
dissatisfied Governor stopped the trade of the English at
Kassimbazar and in the Bay. But at the same time he
commanded Agent Trevisa to meet him at Dacca. Accordingly
in August of the same year, the Agent went from Hugli to
Dacca in a small vessel. About the end of August, the Surat
President advised the Bengal factors to placate the Nawab
with presents and with promises of restoring his junk and of
helping him against Shuja. The mission of Trevisa succeeded
well enough; 15,000 maunds of saltpetre procured from Patna,
which had been so long frozen, were released for shipment in
Bengal. Mir Jumla also pressed both the English and the
Dutch to lend him vessels for the purpose of stopping Shuja s
escape. 29

For his military and other purposes, Mir Jumla used the
services of the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese and
their ships. In August, 1660, he employed in his service 6 or
7 English sailors of a small vessel carrying Trevisa, the English
Agent, to Dacca. 30 He also utilised the services of both the
Dutch and the English for constructing his warships. A galliot
built by the Dutch at Hugli and manned by 6 or 7 English
runaways under Mr. Dortson ( Captain John Durson )
reached Dacca about the end of May, 1661. u Mir Jumla also
employed another Englishman, Thomas Pratt by name, in
building boats and making ammunition for river fighting." 2

20. EFI. XI. 301-3 ; BDR (1661), pp. 240, 6, 43, in Ibid 410.

In August, 1662, Mir Jumla’s claim, according to the latest account,
amounted to £ 7,000 {ibid,, 162, 166-7).

30. BDK. 1661 (pp. 6, 43, 75, 238, 3 87) in EFI XI. 68-70; BDR 1661
(p 240) in EFI. X. 410.

31. Dutch records (7th March and 10th October, 1661) in EFI. XI.
70; for Durson, EFI. X 193. An English galliot-builder of Dacca, Mr. Pita
(William Pitt) was not entertained by Mir Jumla (EFI XI. 71 and n).

32 EFI. XI. 204, n, 393 ; Storia. II. 87, 102 (paid Rs 500 a month) :
For Thomas Pratt. IA, 1906, p. 136 : 1907, pp, 173-4. (Suspected by
Daud Khan) ; EFI, XIII, 166-7.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

fj&ain Muscovites served in the Mughal army in Mir Jumla’s
Kueh Bihar and Assam campaigns. 88

The junk affair was not settled during Mir Jumla's. life
time, even though in 1(501 the English factors promised to
restore the vessel to his Masulipatam agent, Tappa Tap*
( Tabatabai ? ). In 1662, on its way from Quedda to Mallacca
it met with a fierce storm and was laid up at Mallacca, with
no hope of recovery. For the sake of preserving the friendship
with Mir Jumla, the Madras Council decided to exchange it
for another vessel. At the same time they advised the
Masulipatam factors to inform Alle Beague ( Ali Beg ), the
successor of Tappa Tap, of the condition of the junk and to
request him to intercede on their behalf for moderation of the
claims. After the death of Mi r Jumla, they hoped ( December,
1663 ) that his son, Muhammad Amin, had forgotten all about
the matter or that at least it was not to be considered again.
Early in 1665 the Madras factors informed the Company that
the question of any claim on account of the junk had not
cropped up, that ali the papers of the late Nawab had gone to
Emperor Aurangzeb and that the letter of Trevisa, containing
his agreement to give him satisfaction had probably been
miscarried. All this, they felt, would mean the end of
the affair. 34

5. Effects of Mir Jumla*s death.

“Mir Jumla's death”, Bernier writes, “produced, as might
be expected, a great sensation throughout the Indies.” Bowrey,
too, observes that Mir Jumla died “to the great griefe of all
wise and Eminent persons in these kingdoms, not alitle doleful!
to the poore and the great losse these kingdoms sustained is

33. Glanius. 167-8. 145-6.

34. Surat proposal to capture the junk for restoring it, EFI. X, 393 ;
XI, 40-1, 148-9, 151 (Ali Beg), 400-1 (Claim not made). Question of Mir
Jumla’s boxes, EFI. XIII. 174, 299, 302-4, 309, 312-14, 317.

EFFEOTS OF MIR JUMBALS DEATH

^asurable. They lost the best of Nabobs, the Kingdonfce
Icham, and by consequence, many large privileges.” 85 The
news of Mir Jumla’s death reached Aurangzeb at Lahore on
23rd April. For sometime Ihtisham Khan continued to be in
charge of the general administration in Bengal, and Rai
Bhagawati Das of its revenue affairs. Mir Jumla’s properties in
Bengal and in the Deccan, originally escheated to the Mughal
State, were restored to his son. Ordered by the Emperor,
Ihtisham Khan proceeded to the Court together with the family
members of the deceased, including his grandson, Mir Abdullah,
his property and elephants, and the treasure of Bengal. Dili..
Khan was commissioned to act as the Governor of Bert gal till
the arrival of Daud Khan from Bihar and the latter was to
officiate as the Governor pending the arrival of the permanent
incumbent, Shaista Khan. 36

The removal, by death, of Mir Jumla's strong personality
was followed by a general wave of laxity and disorder in the
government of the province of Bengal. The selfish desires of
men, so long kept in check by ‘‘the awe of the deceased Khan
i Khanan,” got an outlet. “Everyone began to beat the drum
of arrogance’’.' Officials and ambitious men began to give a
free play to their selfish designs. The acting governor, Ihtisham
Khan, became tyrannical. Dilir Khan, superior in prestige
and rank to him, was dissatisfied, though he did not outwardly
show his resentment. In the general atmosphere of prodigality
and nepotism, each turned to his patron for some preferment
or other. Displaced Zamindars had their estates restored to
them. Shihabuddin Talish applies the term “Days of Nature” 87
to this period, and observes: “Strange were the revolution and
the disorder that had taken place after the death of Mir
Jumla.” 88

35. Bernier, 173 ; Bowrey, 144*5.

36. News, FI. 172 ; MA. 45 ; Aurangzeb’s reaction, Storia , II. 102 ;
Bernier, op. cit. ; Bowrey, 144-5 ; escheat, EFI. XI. 273-4 ; Bernier, op,
cit. ; Storia. II. 98-102 ; Official changes, FI. op. cit. , Gout. 106a- 107b,
108b, 109a. Mahmud Beg is stated to have been ordered to go to the
imperial court with the dependents of Mir Jutnla (Cont. 107b).

37. cf* Hobbes’ State of Nature.

38. Cont. 106a, 109a*b,

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

'he spirit of negligence manifested itself in military an
The expedition for ohe reconquest of Kueh Bihar was pc
poned after Mir Jumla’s death. The repeated importunities of
Askar Khan, appointed by Mir Juinla to undertake the task, to
Daud Khan, acting viceroy of Bengal, for advice and aid went
unheeded. So Askar Khan endeavoured to bring under control
the chakla of Fatehpur, which before the advance of Mir Jumla,
had belonged to the Zamindar of that place. 39

The death of Mir Jumla, whose parwana had regulated the
Kast India Company's affairs both in Bihar and Bengal, and
protected the English traders against all claims for customs,
naturally raised the question of the legality of their right to
this exemption, as the parwana ceased to operate, and as the
old farman of Shahjahan, on which they based their claim had
not been confirmed by Aurangzeb. Freed from the wholesome
restraint of Mir Jumla, officers in Bengal and Bihar began to
demand customs from the English. Moreover, the late Nawab's
grants to the East India Company at Fort St. George, too,
were now left in a precarious condition owing to the
uncertainty regarding his successor. The factors in Patna,
Baiasore and Madras emphasized on the Surat authorities the
need of immediately having a copy of the Emperor’s farman,
as the Dutch had already taken one. The Bengal factors,
disappointed at the delay of the Surat authorities, were obliged
to be satisfied with securing from Diwan Rai Bhagwati Das an
order that Mir Jumla’s parwana should be regarded as being
still in force. 40 Therefore the Europeans especially the English
( in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) had sufficient reasons to express
regret for his death. 11

39. Ibid. 11 Ob.

40. For Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, EFI. XI. 185, 288-0, 373*5
(Payments for 1663) ; for Fort St. George, Bruce, II. 146-7 for order of
the Diwan of Bengal, EFI. X. 416.

41 . Bowrey, 114-5 ; Stewart, HB. 295.

MiN/sr^

CHAPTER VJX

INVASION OF KUCH BIHAR AND ASSAM
Section A

The Prelude to the Assam Campaign
The Conquest of Kuoh Bihar

/. Genesis of Mir Jumla's eastern campaigns.

The conquest of Bengal from the hands of Shuja was quickly
followed by the launching of a gigantic offensive by Mir Jumla
in the north-eastern frontier of Mughal India. Contemporary
European travellers have portrayed the expedition as a clever
device on the part of Emperor Aurangzeb to keep his
successful minister-general, of whom he was afraid, usefully
employed in the dreadful country of Assam, and also as the
outcome of the inordinate personal ambition of Mir Jumla
himself to carry his arms to Burma and the borders of China
and. thereby secure immortal fame. 1 The Assamese chronicles
accuse the Mughal General of undertaking the expedition

1 . Both the unnamed Dutch sailor (Glanius, 176-82), and Bernier
(169-171) state that after defeating Shuja, the old General solicited the
Emperor’s permission to retire from active life, and keep his family by
his side in Bengal, but that the Emperor, suspecting that Mir Jumla
wanted to establish his independent power, appointed his son Muhammad
Amin Mir Bakhshi, though he sent his wife, daughter and son’s children
to the Mir, so as not to displease such a powerful man But Talish’s
statement (FI. 26) and also that .of Aqil Khan (J5NA. 108), that Mir
Jumla hoped to lead another campaign next year, enable us to reject the
view that he was incapable of leading military campaigns. Moreover, the
story of retirement ill fits with the attribution of soaring ambition to Mir
Jumla. See also Storia. II. 98 : Acc. to Tavernier (Ball. II. 277) Mir
Jumla wanted to perpetuate his influence by retaining his generalship,
of Thevenot’s view (Ch. 8 p. 102) that Mir Jumla had the ambition of
becoming king of Bengal. Bowrey (143-4) also states that after the
conquest, of Assam, Mir Jumla next “proposed to adventure both life
and fortune against S. Tartaria”,

\

LIFE OF MIK JUMLA

; out securing the Emperor's prior sanction. 2 But the ft
Hhat Aurangzeb, in his Jarman , appointing Mir Jumla
Governor of Bengal (June, 1660), had commissioned him to
conquer the It aj as of Assam and Arrakan after the settlement of
the affairs of Bengal. The primary task of Mir Jumla was,
therefore, to capture the fugitive Prince Shuja in Arrakan.
But it was Mir Jumla who secured the Emperors permission to
postpone the Arrakan campaign and to lead an expedition
against Kuch Bihar and Assam. 3

Indeed there were cogent reasons why Mir Jumla took that
decision. As Governor of Bengal, he must chastise the
contumacious rulers of Kuch Bihar and Assam in the interests
of maintaining imperial prestige and securing safety of the
imperial dominions. The political turmoils consequent on the
illness of Shahjahan in 1657, and the absence of Shuja from
Bengal had placed the Mughal dominion of Kamrup, extending
from the Monas to Gauhati and including Hajo, between two
fires (March-April, 1658). From the west came the Koch
minister, Bhavanatn Karji oppressing the ryots and the
Moslem women The Ahoms, coming from the east under their
frontier governor, Bargohain Tangchu Sandhikui, occupied
Pandu and Srighat, and rejecting the belated Koch proposal of
an alliance against the Mughals, drove the Koch general
Bhavanath beyond the Monas, and, advancing unopposed
beyond Baritala, established a military outpost in Hatshila
(near Karibari, only 5 stages from Dacca), refused to allow the
Mughals to resort to the local market, and swept Mughal
Kamrup with the “broom of plunder". 4

2 . PB. (IsC. 1928, p, 332n, 343) ; JIH. V. 374-6.

3. FI 25-26 ; For Farman, see ch. VI. § 1. A Dutch letter of 10th
October, 1661, refers to a report that Mir Jumla had been ordered to
invade Cooch Bihar (EFI. XX. 79) ; PAB. 119.

4. FI. 6-8 ; AX. 676-9 ; BKK, I. 653-65 (market) ; SMAB. 89-91,
xxi; B. VIII. 82-85 ; B. MSA. 195, 197 : PB. (IsC 332 and n) ; KB. Ch.
7 ; AB 14 18 ; PAB. 115-117.

The Koch offer of alliance against the Mughals and partition of
Kararup is mentioned in SMAB. 90 , BKK. 656-7.

MINIS

MIE JfJMtrA’H. WAP PREPAIRATI0N8

►art from these immediate eycjftt*, the previous aefcivi
AhoHH like the oapture of Sayyid Abu Bate* and Abdus
Salara in the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan respectively,
had gone unpunished. The accession of Aurangzeb and the
appointment of Mir Jumla as the Governor of Bengal meant
that quick retribution was inevitable. Mir Jumla was actuated
not only by imperialistic designs, but,—as his trusted Waqi a
navis tells us,—also by a desire for “a holy war with the
infidels of Assam”, and “an ardent passion for releasing
Mussulmans (prisoners of war), rooting out idolaters, lifting up
the banner of Islam and destruction of the customs of unbelief
and error. 1 ' 5

2. Mir Jumla's War Preparations.

Hearing of Aurangzeb's victory and of the war preparations
at Dacca, both the offending Koch and A horn kings longed for
peace The Ahom king Jayadhwaj pleaded that he had seized
Kamrup to guard it from the Koches and offered to restore it
to the Mughals. So Mir Jumla, anxious to invade Arrakan
after the end of the rains, deputed Rashid Khan with an army
in 1(561 to bake delivery of Kamrup from the Ahoms. But ho
was not inclined to forgive disloyalty on the part of a vassal.
Pran Narayan of Kuch Bihar, and sent another army under
Raja Sujan Singh, subsequently re-inforced by Mirza Beg Shujai,
to chastise the Koch ruler. The latter’s envoy, who had oome
to pray for pardon of the Raja, was imprisoned and the letter
of a Mughal noble he had brought with him was not even read
by the inexorable General. 6

But these overtures of peace were only a olever ruse on the
part of the Rajas ol Assam and Kuch Bihar to gain time for
completion of preparations. Rashid Khan had to halt at
Rangainati before advancing further against the well-equipped

5. FI. 7*8 (retribution), 18-19 (holy war).

H, FI, 8-9; B. VIII. 88; AB18-19.

15

UFE OF MR JUMIiA

<£L

js f while Raja Sujan Singh could not advance against
oches beyond Ekduar, commanding the entrance to Kueh
Bihar (May-June, 1661), when the advent of the rainy season
suspended all activity. 7

Resolving to, conduct the war in person, and to take the
held first against Kuch Bihar, and then, if necessary, against
Assam r Mir Jumla made several administrative arrangements‘in
Bengal before setting out on the expedition. 8

On the night of 1st November, 1661, Mir Jumla and JDilir
Khan started from Khizrpur with a powerful army of 12,000
horse, and 30,000 foot, together with a vast flotilla of war-
boats numbering at least 323. The most powerful of them were
the glmrabs or floating batteries in charge of the Dutch, each
towed by 4 Kusas (long row-boats) and carrying 14 guns and a
crew of 50 or 60 men. Besides the Portuguese (and Mesticos,
half breeds), the highest naval officers, there were some English
and Dutch sailors too. 9 10 Mir Jumla bad a very good opinion of

7 FI, 9: BKK- 665.

Ekduar was a fortified gateway made of lime and brick, with
a spacious and high top, full of tall and stout trees and wide and deep
pits. Probably EkduaT is to be identified with Ebmooka (26° 16'N, 89°
23'E) 6 m. s. w. of Cooch Bihar ( Survey of India Map, Cooch Bebar,
78 F).

8. FI. 10 ; Vide ante, Ch 6.

9. FI. 11; AN. 694 (from Khizrpur), 696; Glanius 144-47, 167 ;
JStoria, II. 98 ; Ft. 3. 89 (10 or 12 thousand horse) ; BKK. 668 (30,000
foot); Gait. 127, n, 128. Exaggerated figures of Cavalry in Ahom
Sources ; BKK. 668 (40,000), SMAB. 91 (60,000) ; also in Storia, op. cit
(40,000); Gian ins, 145 (3,00,000 horses. 5,000,000 foot).

The Mughal fleet comprised 323 ships when it reached Lakhau ( 9th
March, 1662) after the naval battle above Kaliabar; 169 kosas, 48 jalbas,

10 glmrabs , 7 parindahs , 4 bajras , 50 pattelas , 2 salbs, 1 palil, 1 bhar,
2 balams , 10 khatgiris , 5 mahallgiris, 24 palwars and other small ships;
total 323, (FI. 43; JASB, 1872. p, 73). Some boats carried provisions
and munitions, while the barges bore the ladies of the harem. (Glanius.
144), Mir Jumla asked 'two Dutch carpenters to construct a stately
vessel from his own model (Ibid., 148*9, 183). The English sailors
probably included Captain John Durson (Mr. Dortson) and his compa*
mons. EFI. XI. 70n; X. 193.

MINIS

MIR JUMBA CONQUERS KUOH BIHAR

luropean fighters, especially the Portuguese and th
ich gunners and also of the Armenian horsemen. There
were again several “Muscovites, all extraordinarily well-
mounted.” The Dutch were conscripted, but the English and
the Portuguese were volunteers. 10

3 . Mir Jumla conquers Kuch Bihar.

Arriving at Baritala, an imperial outpost on the frontier of
Kuch Bihar, Mir Jumla selected neither of the two well-known
routes from Mughal territories to that country; the one via*
Ekduar was closed guarded by the Raja, as that place was the
sole fortified post between the invaders and Kuch Bihar; the
other via Khuntaghat, passing near Rangamati, was very
narrow, intersected by mlas and flanked on both sides with
dense jungles. With his characteristic prudence he selected for
his advance an obscure way. left unguarded by the Raja, and
running along an al or embankment much lower than other
roads,—news of which was brought by his scouts. The
fleet guarded the nala flowing from Grhoraghat to the
Brahmaputra.

On the news of the approach of the imperial genera l
together with Sujan Singh near the al or embankment, the
boundary of Kuch Bihar, the Koch sentinels fled away (13th
December, 1661). Next day Mir Jumla reached the al and had
to cut his way through jungles. Riding a pony, he supervised
the construction of the road and shared the sufferings with the
meanest soldier. At a place three stages from the capital, he
learnt that the Raja had fled to Kathalbari at the foot of the
hills of Bhutan and the minister to Maurang. Crossing the

10. Glanius, 167-8 (Armenians), 145-14.6 (Muscovites), 148.

One author equates the Muscovites with Turks, BP1\ 1925. P. 14n,
But there is ample evidence of Russian contact with India in 17th
Century (Hindusthan Standard , Puja number, 1945, 237-9). It might be
that a Russian contingent acoompanied Mir Jumla,

ijof*) of Mii< mum

anil fording» river, Miar Jmttl* catered »pit
iosed on Ifith Deowabor. 11

4, Mir Jrmla'H admmietratdom- «/ Kitch Bihar.

Mir Jumla annexed Kuril Bihar to the Mughal Empire. His
administration was vigorous but conciliatory. At his bidding
the azan or call to prayer was chanted from the terrace of the
royal palace by Sadr Mir Muhammad Sadiq. To remove the
chances of rebellion in future, the fortified gateway of Ekduar
was demolished, the jungle within a radius of 100 yards of it
was cut down, and an open, plain formed. All captured war
materials, were confiscated to the imperial government; 106
pieces of cannon, 140 Zambnraks, 11 RamcTwngis, 123 muskets
and other articles of the arsenal were sent to Dacca, while some
goods of the Raja were reviewed by Muhammad Abid, the
escheat officer. The name of Kuril Bihar was changed to
Alamgirnagar. Till the arrival of Askar Khan, appointed
permanent jaujdar by the Emperor at the General’s suggestion,
Isfandiyar Beg (now styled Khan), son of Allah Yar Khan,
officiated as faujdar of the country, and was assisted by Qazi
Samui Shujai as diwan and Mir Abdur Razzaq and Khwajah
Kish or Das rnansabdar as am,ins.

If Mir Jumla exhibited firmness in the settlement of the
country, he showed wisdom and moderation in dealing with
the ryots, and protected them from plunder at the hands of

11. FI. 10-12 (Route from Maurung); JASB. 1872, 65 and n; Glanius,
147. Khunfcaghat. n.w. of Jogigupha, in Gauripur estate, Goalpara Dt.
Gaz . 117.

Bari tala is near Chilmari near the right bank of the Brahmaputra,
opposite Hatsilah in Karibari pargana. Probably the nala running
through Ghoraghat is to bo identified with the Dharali, and the river
on way to the capital with the Neoicoomer, Kathalbari is Cantalbary
of Rennell, Sh, 5.

Chronology: Raja Sujan Singh joins Mir Junala (12th December);
Mir Jumla reaches the foot of the al (13th December), and the al ( 14th
December), encamps on the environs of the capital (18th December)*
enters it (10th December).

MIR JUMLAABMlKIST«A^lOK OF KUOH BIHAR

^uding soldiers. Even before reaching the capital, he haS
issued a proclamation forbidding plunder of household furniture
and other property of the ryots, present or absent, and inflicted
Severe penalties on the first offenders. A few soldiers, Who
had stolen a goat or a cow, or some plantains from the houses
of fugitive ryots, were paraded round the town and the camp,
with their noses pierced with arrows and the stolen articles sus¬
pended from their necks. This deterred other miscreants, and
encouraged the people to return to their homes and cultivation. 12
A Mughal mint was established at Alamgirnagar and one coin
of Aurangzeb issued from this mint, was described by the late
Mr. R. D. Banerji as “the only Mughal coin in which the
legend is written in Bengali characters, although the language
is Persian or rather Arabic *\ n It may be regarded as an
instance of Mir Jumla'a policy of following, as much as possible,
the line of least modification of local traditions.

The Raja's son joined the Mughals, embraced Islam and
even offered to arrest his father. His Wazir, Bhavanath, was
surrounded from two sides by Isfandiyar and Farhad Khan,
and ultimately arrested by Reza Quli Beg Abakish, and
imprisoned. But Mir Jumla failed to capture the Raja, who
had withdrawn from Kathalbari at the foot of the Bhutan
hills to their summit. The pursuers returned only with one
elephant, a few horses and draught bullocks and their Bliutia
keeper. The Nawab confiscated the animals to the imperial
government but spared the life of the supplicating Bhutia,
gave him some cash and sent him with a written order to
Dharmaraja, the 120 year old ascetic ruler of Bhutan,
asking him to deliver the fugitive Raja of Kuoh Bihar or at
least expel him. But the Raja of Bhutan nobly refused to
drive away his “ unbidden guest”. Mir Jumla, having no
time to lose, could not chastise the Raja of Bhutan and

12. Fit 12 -(aseanVlC (occupation)* 18 (officers), 16 (ryots); AN. 694;
MA. 40.

IS. JASB (1920), 85*86, PI. xiii, no. 8; ML. II. 153; E & VII. 265.

WNIST/ty

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA .

Assam (4th January, 1662) after
stay in Kuch Bihar. 1 *

During the rainy season of 1662, the Raja of Kuch Bihar
came down from the hills, recovered his country, by taking
advantage of popular resentment at the introduction of the
Mughal land revenue administrative methods. He killed
Muhammad Salih, the opposing mansabdar at Kathalbari, and
prevented the coming of provisions to the followers of Isfandiyar
Khan, who fled to Ghoraghat. Askar Khan reached there, but
was unable to recover the country. 1 *

14. FI, 15-16; AN. 688 (Baja’s son Bisknu Narayan). But see
MNEFP. 306-7n.

15. FI. 80-81.

■ AVf . J'+x ■ ' ■

<SL

a sixteen days’

oceaded fc

MINIS,*,

Section B

Triumphal March Into Assam

(a) RECOVERY OF MUGHAL KAMRUP

1. Mir Jumla sets out against the. Ahoms.

On the approach of Rashid Khan in 1661, the Ahoms
abandoned Hatishala and Dhubri and retreated beyond the
Monas river. Rashid recovered the western end of Mughal
Kamrup up to Rangamati 1 from the Ahoms, but suspecting a
snare, halted there for reinforcements from Mir Jumla before
advancing further. In fact, the Ahom King had caused the
two Phukans ( Dihingia and Lahui Phukans ), responsible
for the retreat, to be arrested and imprisoned, .and had
appointed Manthir Rharali Barua, a Hindu Kayastha of
Bejdoloi family, commander of the Lower Assam army. 2 Jogi-
gupha had been strengthened at the mouth of the Monas and
a new fort constructed at Pancharatan ( by the Ahom Cap¬
tains Ahataguria Lahan Phukan and Kandu Kharaon ), on
the opposite bank of the Brahmaputra. The Ahom chiefs
in Kamrup now sent an envoy to Rashid Khan, insolently
enquiring of the reason of Mughal advance, and the messen¬
ger was sent by the Khan to Mir Jumla at Dacca. Never
theless Mir Jumla expressed his willingness to desist from
invading Assam if the Raja restored the whole of Mughal
Kamrup together with the captured materials, sent his
daughter with a suitable tribute and promised not to attack
imperial territories in future. But when Jaynarain- of Ghiia
Bijoypur deserted the king of Assam to escape from punish¬
ment for his failure to redeem some boastful promises^
and joined Mir Jumla, the latter considered the situation

1. Rangamati, west of the Monas R. Ind . Atlas , Sh. 124.

2. The BKK. (665-66) states that the Baduh Phukan was made
Neo" Phukan. This seems unlikely in view of his subsequent
appointment as such (FI. 91-92). Moreover, the SMAB (93) clearly
states the circumstances of the appointment of Manthir Bharali Barua.

LIFE OF MIR JLJMLA

ourable for invasion, and suggested to the Emperor poi
onement of the Arrakan campaign to next year after the
conquest of Xu eh Bihar and of Assam. He wrote to Aurang—
zeb : Assam haj* occupied Kamrup, and is contemplating

to invade us. My scheme of subduing the country of the
Maghs cannot be completed within a short time. So in the
meantime I propose to invade Gooch Bihar and Assam. I am
awaiting the orders of the Emperor/’ Auraugzeb ratified
his General's plan. As for the Assam King, he advised the
Phiika,ns not to .surrender Kamrup, as it had been acquired
from the Koches and not from Mughals. They did not care
to send any reply to Mir Jumla's proposed terms even after his
conquest of Kiich Bfyar. 3

2. Mir Jumla’s initial difficulties .

Mir Jurnla continued his difficult march from Kuch
Bihar towards Assam ( 4th January, 1662) through the jungly
route via Khuntaghat and joined Rashid Khan's army at
Rangamati. The nawwara proceeded up the Brahmaputra
therefrom, co-operating with the land force, each arm giving
cover to the other. The hardships of his journey were aug¬
mented by his lack of local topographical knowledge. But
bis Strong determination helped him to overcome the difficul¬
ties presented by Nature and man. Despairing of getting
correct information and guidance from the local zaniivdars,
the General very wisely decided to follow the course of the
Brahmaputra and utilise the fleet. Hence he ordered Dilir
Khan, the commander of his Van, and Mir Murtaza, daroga
of the imperial artillery, to follow the river oank and
to cut a way forward through the jungles. The exertions of
that old and resolute Nawah, whom Talish describes as the
“Chief of Men’ , were so strenuous, that his work of supervision
extending from sunrise to sunset, was suspended only during

§L

3. FI. *8-2# ; BKK. 665-«7 ; SMAB. 91-93, xxi, xxii ; B VIII. 87-88 ;
128-27 : Riyaz, 224-5. For Jaynarain, SMAB. 90-91, B VIII.
#$.#7: AB. 17. PAB. 117-118. For Mir Jum'a’s letter to Rmperor,
SMAB. 91 ; IHQ. V. 470, 474 ? IsC. 1928, p. 343,

misr/fy

MIR JUMP’S .ADVAK '(M #0 GATTHATl

Tae road was duly constructed in spite of enorrn
impediments. The thick and strong khagra reeds were crushed
by footmen and elephants, the pools and marshes were filled
up with reeds and grasses, and most of the nalas were made
fordable for the men and the beasts of burden.

The unspeakable hardships which all members ol the
expeditionary force bad to suffer; and which the General
shared with the humblest soldier, have been graphically
delineated by Talish. The jungle-cleaners collapsed while
taking, rest alter hard labour ; men paid the penalty of careless
steps by stumbling to death ; the barbed head of the broken
khagra reed pierced the foot of men; horsemen were hurled
down, to death by the silent but sharp and strong stroke of
the bamboo ; musketeers and foot-archers alike became
fatigued, ill or infirm ; the undulating intricacies of the ground
took a heavy toll, while mud paralysed riders as well as pedes¬
trians. In one whole day not more than one narrow' lane
could bo constructed because of these hardships and in the
crowd and pressure of : advance,' men and animals jostling
together and pushing and knocking each other, many died of
attacks by bewildered and infuriated animals,—“the hockey
stick of the tusk” of an elephant, ‘‘the whiff of the kick' of a
horse, the push of a camel, and the horns arid the legs of a bull,
all served to throw persons under “the revolving wheel of
the mill of death

These difficulties, caused by the dense jungles and numerous
nalas , as well as the tardy advance of the imperial * fleet from
Kangamati made Mir Jumla's progress slow. His daily march
did not exceed 4 to 5 miles. 4

3. Mir Jumlaa advance up to UanhaH.

On 17th January Mir Jumla halted 5 miles west of Jogigu-
pha, a spacious and high fort, situated near the junction of
the Monas and the Brahmaputra. A wall built on the summit
of a hill adjoining the latter river blocked the path of the

4. FI. 18-21 ; MU. III. 547 ; MA. 40 (date wrong); AN. 094-95. For
route from Ttangamatf to Jogigupha, see ftermoH, Sir. #7.

mtSTfty

IJFJK OF MIR JUMLA

y^der from the west, in accordance with their usual custom
j^#strengtheaing their mud forts, the Ahoms sunder Baduli
Phukan) defended the western environs of this fort with
phanjis or sharp bamboo stakes fixed on the ground as well
as inside the numerous pits. The north of the fort was
protected by pits, hills and jungles. The defending garrison
having been depleted by the outbreak of cholera, the Ahorn
Dangarias decided to evacuate the fort, and Mir Jumla
eaptured it without fight (20th January).

Crossing the deep and violent river Monas, Mir Jumla
divided the land force into two sections : he himself with the
main army proceeded along the northern bank of the Brahma¬
putra ; Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan marched along the southern
bank with a coxitingent, while the fleet kept pace with the
land forces.

This three-pronged advance of Mir Jumla was eminently
successful. Learning of the loss of Jogigupha, the Ahom king
hastily sent reinforcements to Srighat (held by Rajshahur, the
father-in-law of the Raja), so as “to make a combined attack
on the enemies.” This fort was more elevated and spacious
than that of Jogigupha and was protected by big phanjis y
pits and palisades of strong timber. But Mir Jumla, occupying
the “chowki of Khatta" with two forts, 5 arrived at Srighat
before the Ahom reinforcements. Then bypassing it, he
encamped at the environs of Gauhati (Shahburj) on 4th
February, and deputed Rashid Khan to encircle Srighat by
a northern whirling movement. The panic-stricken Ahom
army escaped it only by a hurried night flight up the river
to Kajli. Next day (5th February) Mir Jumla had the
palisades of Srighat demolished with the help of some elephants
under the direction of Haji Muhammad Baqr Ispahani. Next
Mir Jumla moved two miles, and recovered Gauhati, the
capital of Mughal Karnrup, which then stood on the north
bank of the Brahmaputra.

The imperial forces south of the river wrested the fort of
Pancharatan from the Ahoms (under Phulbarua), who, losing

§L

MU, IIJ. 7 ; Assam Chokey and Chanankotta of Rennell Sh. 5..

MIR JUMXA’S ADVANCE UP TO OAUHATI

t ‘‘first battle*' with the Mughals, retired to Samdhari
Mughals also captured the fort of Pandu, opposite Srighat
and equal to it in strength, without fight. Many retreating
Ahoms were slain by Yadgar Khan Uzbeg. A fort at Beltala,
east of Pandu, foil during a night attack and its garrison was
slain. The fort of Kajli, at the mouth of the Kailang, 14
miles east of Pandu, and not inferior to it or Srighat in
strength, was deserted by the Ahoms, who retreated to
Kathaibari, leaving a few ZambumkSy muskets and powder to
fall to the invaders. 6

6. FI. 21-24 ; BKIC. 666-070 (naval advance, 667 ; some resistance at
Jogigupha) ; SMAB. 93-94 ; B. VIII. 89 : AB. 19 ; ANT. 096-702 PAB.
121 ; the unnamed Dutch sailor (Glanius, 147-58), Bernier, 172 ; Manucci
{ Storia , II. 98) all speak of Mir Jumla’s easy conquest of Azo or Hajo,.
a small fortress in the Kamrup dfc. of Assam.

MIN ISTffy

(b) FROM GAUHATI TO GARHGAON

1. Mir Jumla enters Assam proper.

Q

The victorious General waited for two days at Gauhati.
But receiving no reply to his terms from the Ahoms even there,
he invaded Assam (7th February). For protection against their
dangerous stratagems and night attacks., he ordered all men to
be on the alert and all guards to keep watch at night, armed
and with their horses saddled. Mir Murtaza remained vigilant
with guns. Communications were safeguarded by setting up
thanas on the way. As Garhgaon, the Ahom capital, was
situated on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra, Mir Jumla
crossed it (15th and 16th February) with the whole army at a
place half way between Gauhati and Samdhara. 1 Ignoring an
evasive reply from the Ahom king at this stage, Mir Jumla
moved towards Simlagarh. He had already (after the fall of
Kajli) received the submission of the Raja of Darrang, on the
north bank of the river and now the Raja of Dimarua on its
south sent his nephew to wait upon him and sided with the
imperialists. 2

2. Simlagarh and Samdhara .

The only strongholds that now lay in Mir Jumla's path to
the Ahom capital were Samdhara at the mouth of the Bharali
river and Simlagarh opposite to it on the southern bank of the
Brahmaputra. The Raja decided to fortify these two places
and strenuously endeavoured to arrest the further progress of
the victorious general at Samdhara, which held the key to his
dominions. He replaced his old commanders by new ones, and
divided his army into two sections. The northern army,

1. The place is evidently Burchola (92°25'E, 26°37'N) of Ind. Atlas
4Sh. 142. NE). and Borcholagaon of Robinson. Vide Darrang Dt. Qaz % 177.

2. FI. £6-28. (ships upset and horses jumping into water during a hail
storm ; Mir Jumla’s Bakhshi, >lir Beg Shujai killed, 16, 27) ; 24
(Darrang); B. VIII. 88-*9 ; PAB. 121. For Ahom night attacks and
strategic retreat, FI. 58 ; JBORS. I. 188.

MIN/Styj,

siMLAamm Ann smammA

ng S&mdhamy was placed under Genera1 Ghora Kohrak
,-wt> by Bftduli Phukan, Barukial Bargohain, Keriduguria,
Bappatm ; the southern army, stationed at Simlagarh under
General Bahgaria Buragohaln, assisted by Sairjngia Baja,
Bhitarual G'ohaia, B&rchetia Namniyal Rajshahur
Barphukan. 8

Occupying a highly strategic position between the Brahma¬
putra and the southern hills, the strong, spacious and high
fort of Simlagarh was protected on two sides by high
walls with battlements, mounted with cannon. A ditch and
the pits with bamboo spikes made access to the fort difficult.
Its defenders, “as numerous as ants and locusts” had kept the
materials of defence in a perfect manner.

On 20th February Mir Jumla encamped on the bank of a
neikb flowing westward from the south of the fort. A zemburak
ball from it passed over his tent. Since storming the fort,
would have taken a heavy toll on life, he decided on a siege.
At his command the nobles kept guard at night under the able
superintendentship of Mahmud Beg, imperial Bakhsbi. Cannon
were mounted on entrenchments thrown up within gunshot
by Dilir Khan and Mir Murtaza; leading the Van, but they
produced no impression on the thick walls of the fort.
Dilir Khan, with a few men of Mir Jumla, carried their
stockades by way of a safe lane, close to the fort walls under
heavy fire “from morn to eve and dusk to dawn”, and repulsed,
with difficulty, a night sally on those barriers.

The prolonged siege of the fort obliged Mir Jumla to revise
his strategy. He now planned to encircle it and attack it
simultaneously from two sides. Farhad Khan reconnoitred its
rear and selected its southern side, where the jungles were
sparse, as the place of assault. Taking the sou of an Assamese
Chief, who offered to lead the Mughals to the place, ‘'where the
height of the wall, the width and depth of the holes, full of
bamboo stakes were the least,” Dilir Khan, together with the

3 . FI. 28 ; SMAB. 93-84 ; PAB. 121, and BKK. 67<b72 (differences:
in personnel) ; B. VIII. 89-90. AB. 19 (king’s father-in-law dismissed
and Tamuli Dalai appointed naval commander).

misr/f.

iliery, and 1,500 Nawab's horsemen, set out on the midn

US'S OF MIR JXJMLA

L

"of 25 th February, to deliver the final assault on the unwary
Ahoms at dawn. Leaving a detachment under Mir Murtaza
and Miana Khan to fire at the, centre of the wall and break open
the gate,—so as to divert the attention of the defenders from
the real place of assault,—Diiir himself advanced, but was
betrayed by the guide and led to a spot, where “water, morass,
pits and assembly of the wretches (Ahoras) were greater than
elsewhere.” Undaunted by the sharp hail of arrows and heavy
artillery fire, during which the false guide was fatally hit, Diiir
Khan, whose elephant received 25 arrow-shots, most gallantly
forced his way, and after a stubborn contest, scaled the wall.
Mahmud Beg Bakhshi went to pursue the Ahoms who fled into
the jungle along a path towards the southern nala, slew some
and captured a few others. Mir Jumla entered the fort the
next day (26th February), and expressed wonder at the strength
of its fortifications. 4

The storming of Simlagarh so unnerved the defenders of
.Samdhara that they evacuated that almost impregnable fort
without even waiting to be attacked. 5

3. Mughal naval victory above Kaliahar.

Resting with his army for three days, Mir JTumla left
Kaliahar 6 on 2nd March. The bank of the river being hilly,
the army followed a more level route, 6 miles away. The
Ahoms, having felt the irresistible power of the combined land
and naval forces of the Mughals, planned to destroy the land

4. FI. 28-36 ; AB. 20 ; PAB. 122 (Ahom losses 4,000).

Patakalang (26° 29'$, 92° 55'E, 2nd. Atlas , Sh. 124) besieged bv the

Mughals for “six days and nights” (BKK. 673 , SMAB. 94) is to be
identified with Simlagarh. B. VIII (89-90) evidently speaks of this siege
as “the second battle”, lasting for five days. Vide Nowgong Dt. Gaz.
32n for remains of Simlagarh.

5. SMAB. 94; Glanius, 180-1: Bernier, 172 ; Y1U. III. 548-9,

(>. Kaliabar (26° 32 N, 92° 59 E) is south of Bishnath, on the opposite
side of the Brahmaputra, Ind. Atlas* Sh. 124.

misr/fy

MUGHAL NAVAL VICTORY ABOVE KALI A BAR

_ by cutting off its supplies- So, taking, advantage of the!
..Station of the Mughal fleet, and of the accidental absence of
its admiral, Ibn Husain, they schemed to crush it. An armada of
700 or 800 ships (under the Bargohain) suddenly Swooped down
on 100 imperial boats, anchoring near Kukurakata, after the
evening prayer on 3rd March. The Ahoms also surprised the
Dutch ships of the fleet, and their crew, then at table, had “a
dish of meat carried away by a cannon bullet.” The Portuguese
vessels were saved from the imminent danger of being
“swallowed up”, only by the force of the current, which carried
the Ahom fleet far down the stream. 'Che imperial crew under
Mnnawwar Khan heroically held their own in that unequal
contest till the arrival of reinforcements at two praters of the
night, which enabled him to send immediate succour to the
distressed Dutchmen. Even at day-break, “the whole fleet,
of which the Dutch and the Portuguese led the Van, were in
good order”, and advanced against the Ahoms, as fast as the
wind permitted. But owing to contrary currents, the Dutch
had to be towed by “Moors,” who got down to the shore.

In the meantime, Mir Jumla, on hearing of the night-long
cannonade, had deputed Muhammad Mumin Beg Ekkataz Khan
to relieve the hard-pressed fleet, especially the English, the
Dutch and the Portuguese ships, wrongly reported by a Moorish
informer to have been lost. “Owing to the absence of
habitations, want of firm ground, abundance of jungles and
heaps of mud,” Muhammad Mumin could not arrive near the
fleet during the night. He did so early next morning, along
with 10 or 12 horsemen and ordered the trumpets to he
blown.

This decided the fate of this stubborn contest. The Mughals
were now encouraged to press on, while the disheartened
Ahoms took to their heels, some on boats, others on land. The
Mughals captured, besides powder and lead, 300 or 400 ships,
each containing “big guns”. As the smallest ship carried 70
men, at least 21,000 men were made prisoners of war. Many
were slain by the pursuing columns, who had instructions not
to give any quarter ; and the 50 Ahoms who escaped were
condemned by the Raja to suffer most severe punishment.

misr#,.

Lira OF MIR JUMLA. i

Ahom admiral, taken prisoner in spite of his disguise, ■?.
released at the mtercesaioji of some of the chief officers of Mir
Jumla. The remaining 300 Ahom vessels anchored about a mile
distant from the camp of Mir Jumla, who next dav sank most
of them with artillery fire. The rest fled to the other bank
and some were captured. Effectiveness of the Assamese navy
was completely destroyed. 7

In the naval battle above Kaliabar, the Ahoms had
overwhelming superiority in numbers. Being upstream, they
also had the current in their favour. At one stage the imperial
crew were frightened arid all seemed to have been lost. But
the heavy Ahom bacharU, manned by 60 or 70 men, were less
mobile than the light Kusas of the imperial fleet. This factor,
as well as the close co-operation between the Mughal and
European admirals, and their courageous and desperate fighting
. enabled the imperial fleet to hold its own during the crisis.
The timely deputation of Muhammad Mumin Beg by Mir Jumla
turned the scales in favour of the Mughals. According to the
unnamed Dutch sailor, the Ahom admiral neglected to carry
out the Baja's order to lay in ambush and attack the imperial
nawwara above the strategic point of Gauhati and thus cut off
t he Mughal transport of pro visions. An old wounded Ahom
told Talish that “the Mughal fleet could never have withstood
one collision with the Ahom fleet" and Talish himself admits

7. Naval battle in Glanius, 154 - 161 ; FI; 37-39; AN. 711-15; SMAB.
94 (Kaliabar); BKK. 673, 675(Alionvpolicy: Bargohain); AB. 20; Storia.
II. 98-99.

Talish says that the imperial boats were taken unawares by tho Ahom
armada. But, according to the unnamed Dutch Sailor, the naval battle
was preceded by a tempest 2 or 3 days before, and a ship of Mir Jumla
capsized and 4 Dutchmen and 24 Muslim sailors died. Mir Jumla,
furious at the loss of his vessel, ordered the Dutch reporters to join any
ship, as a naval encounter was expected (Glanius, 150-153). After 2
days the Admiral, together with the fleet, started in search of the Ahoms,
and heard the roar of guns, inferring that the land army was engaged.
This suggests that the Mughals had planned to attack the Ahoms
both on land and water ( ibid., 153-4). This .is corroborated by BKK.
675. Both the land and naval forces of the Ahoms retired discomfited 1
to Canla ( ibid 676),

AU'R JUMLA ARRIVES AT LAKH A U

pri* Mughal advance would have been “difficult or ratli^
mjlnssible,’’ but for the close co operation between the Mughal
fleet and the army. 8

4. Mir Jumla arrives at Lalchau.

The fall of Simlagarh, the evacuation of Samdhara, and the
crippling of the fleet of the Ahoms destroyed their morale.
Awaiting the advent of the rains to flood the land, they
withdrew to the hills. Never daring to face the Mughals in an
open engagement, they took recourse to guerilla tactics,—
organising surprise raids and night attacks, hindering enemy’
supplies and killing any stray person searching forage or
firewood. As is done according to the modern 'scorched earth’
policy, they destroyed stores of powder and paddy and boats
fco prevent them from falling into the hands of the Mughals.
Thus the northern Ahom army destroyed the store of gunpowder
at Samdhara before evacuating it. Retreating eastwards to
Solagarh they laid the country waste and compelled the people
north of Tilan river, to forsake their villages, and thereby
deprive pursuing Mughal bands of provisions. The Ahoms at
Jamming burnt the dwellings in the fort. 9

Undeterred by these harassing tactics of the Ahoms, Mir
Jumla steadily but inexorably advanced, along the southern
bank of the Brahmaputra, into the heart of Assam. When he
occupied the rock fortress of Solagarh, which the Ahoms had
evacuated so as to “draw the Mughals farther into the country”
he received the peace offer of the Phukans. But he rejected
them as his previous overtures had been left unanswered and
as he thought that the object of the present feeler was to gain
time and to weaken the invaders’ vigilance. 10

8. Glanius, op. c it,; IT 39; JASB. 1872, p. 81.

9. FI. 39; Storia, It 99, BKK. 674-5; AB. 20 (Mughals at Dijo).

10. FI, 39-41; Glanius, 161. Solagarh in Nowgong dt. at the mouth
of the Bharali above Kaliabar.

Ahom contingents were stationed at Barduar, Sairing, and ell
Baruas and inhabitants of deserted villages at Taimung. BKK, 682.

16

MIN IST/f,

Hi

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

'he Raja ordered his commanders ( e.g. Bargohail
itarual Phuk&n, Dihingia Phukan of Duariya family ) on
both banks to concentrate all the scattered forces at Lakhau,
But an Ahom envoy was captured by Mir Jumla’s men, and,
guided by Ahom deserters, the General entered Lakhau at the
old junction of the Dihing and the Brahmaputra, on 8th March.
The Raja now made another peace offer through his Brahman
guru and the Tambuli Phukan, and agreed to pay peshkash.
But Mir Jumla rejected it, replying that he would soon be in
Garhgaon, where alone he would act according to circumstances.”

Betrayed by his father-in-law and deserted by many of his
men, the helpless Jayadhwaj now resolved on flight. Leaving
Bur ha Gohaitt and the Dangarias at Garhgaon, and transporting
his property as far as possible,—because one thousand boats
which he required for the purpose could not be procured,—the
king fled to Charaideo, and then to Taraisat, and, decided,
in consultation with his ministers and followers, that
it was impossible “to get victory over the vast hosts of
Musalmans.” After the rejection of his peace offers, the Raja
retreated further inland to Tipam, arid endeavoured to collect
1,00,000 archers 12 in expectation of a future contingency.

§L

5. Capture of Garhgaon.

Joined by many Ahom deserters, Mir Jumla left Lakhau on
12th March. The fleet stayed behind, as it couid not go up the
shallow Dihing. Necessary articles were, however, transported
in small boats available in the army. Proceeding with his

II. FI. 41-42; AN. 716-17 : BKK. 683; Vol. II. p. i; PAB.

123. SMAB- 96.

In the 17th century the Dihing, now joining the Brahmaputra north
of Sib3agar, did so further west at Lakhau. (JBOFuS. IV. 484); for
chages in the course of the Brahmaputra, Gait, 132. Lakhau or
Lakhugarh is 27 m. due east of Bishnath, on the n. bank of the
Brahmaputra near the western point of the Majuli island.

12. BKK. 679-83; SMAB. 94-95; AB. 20; Gait, 132 : PAB. 123.

Charaideo (94° 55"E. 26° 55'N) is east of Garhgaon. Tipam ( 95° 29'E,
27° 16'N ) is near the old fort of Jeypoor. Ind. Atlas. 129.

CAPTURE OF GARHGAON

24

oes along the direct road to Garhgaon, via Dewalgaon
^ ^^jru-14th March ), Gajpur, ( 15th March ) and Trimohani
(16th March) f and fording nalas , too numerous to he mentioned
in detail, Mir Jumla finally crossed the Dikhu nala, entered
Garhgaon on 17th March, and encamped in the eastern wing of
the Raja’s palace. 13

The Raja of the Magas now sent envoys to the Mughal
General agreeing to help him with men against the Ahoms.
The General declined the offer but assured him of Mughal
protection in case he did not assist the Ahoms. 14

Unable to escape to the Naga hills, the Ahom King had
to seek shelter in the penal settlement of Nararup, notorious
for its pestilential climate. In that eastern extremity of his
kingdom, at 14 days’ arduous journey from his capital, the
‘Bhaganiya Raja’ or the Deserting king, surrounded by a small
retinue of 4,980 followers and nobles, patiently awaited the
advent of the rains. The Bar Gohain took refuge in Tiru, and
the Phukans and a large concourse on the big char island of
Majuli. 15

13. FI. 43-46 (Mir Jumla’s speech before an assembly on 16th night);
SMAB. 95-06; Glanius, 161; Storia, IT 99-100 and n; MA, 40; AN. 719,
728 ; Gait, 133 ; PAB. 123-124 ( Peace offers rejected at Dewalgaon and
Gajpur ).

Dewalgaon ( = Debergaon. 94° 3'E, 26°43 / N), 14 m. due n. .of
Golaghat aud nearly the same distance west of Jorhat (Ind. Atlas . 130
N.W. ); Gajpur (94° 19'E, 26° 46'N), l. m- east of Jorhat (Ind- Atlas),
Trimohani (16 miles west of Garhgaon) was situated at the confluence of
the Dikhu and the Dihing. Garhgaon ( 26° 56’N, 94° 45'E), 8 m. s.e. of
Sibsagar town ( Ind. Atlas , 129 S.E.) and on the right bank of the
Dikhu. For the palace, ASR. XXII. 64-65. XXVIII. 42, XVIII, 7.

14. Glanius, 165; FI. 70, The man-eaters or the Anfcropophages of
tho unnamed Dutch sailor are to be identified with the Nagas, whe used
to kill men and collect skulls ( JASB. 1872 Pt. 1, p. 19 ); BPP. 1925,
21 n.

15. FI. 70; SMAB. 95; B. VIII. 90; AB. 20-1; JIH. V. 369; Storia, II.
100. Dispositions of Ahom forces in BKK. 683-94; Tiru (94° 57'E, 26°
55'N), east of Garhgaon, Ind. Atlas. 129. It was on tho way leading to
the Naga hills.

MINISr^j,

LIFE OF Mm JI7MLA

Muhammad Amin, eon of the historiographer Muh&mm,

main, rightly boasts

( Verse )

Khan-i-Khan an, comm ander-in-ehief,

From whose intention the War came to its end,
When he conquered two kingdoms we saw (it),
Time spoke (its) secrets slowly.

Few events happen in one year

(Like) the conquest of Kuch Bihar and Assam. 16,

16. FI. 46 (Verse); MU. III. 549; MA. 40. Mir Jurala claimed to have
explored the way to China which ho expected to conquer next year,
Tho Emperor rewarded his victorious general by bestowing on him a
special Khilat , a tnahal yielding one krore dams and a tuman-i-tugh , AN.

740-1.

MIN isr^

W <c) MIR JUMLA’S ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY
ARRANGEMENTS IN KAMRUP AND ASSAM

L Establishment of military rule .

To maintain communications with Bengal, to retain hold
ov'er the conquered country, to counteract Ahom raids, and to
conciliate the local ryots, Mir Jumla established military out¬
posts as he advanced. Each of these was placed under an
offioer and a garrison. He appointed Muhammad Beg and
Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan faujdars of Gauhati and Kaliabar
respectively, and Ataullah, Hasan Beg Zanganah, Sayyid
Mirza, Ali Reza Beg, Anwar Beg, Mir Nurullah and Muham¬
mad Muqim thanadars of Jogigupha, Kajli, Samdhara, Dewal-
gaon, Gajpur, Trimobani and Ramdang respectively. Under
the command of admiral Ibn Husain in charge of the fleet of
of 323 ships and assisted by Jamal Khan, Ali Beg and other
officers, Munawwar Khan and other Zamindars of Bengal,
Lakhau became a naval and military base against the Ahoms
concentrated at Majuli island. Steps were taken to guard the
royal palace at Garhgaon against trespass by ordinary people. 1
At Garhgaon Mir Jumla opened a mint and struck coins in the
name of the Emperor. 2

Mir Jumla had to be very strict and careful about getting
correct information A Moorish messenger, who gave incorrect
information during the Kaliabar naval battle, had his tongue
cut off and was struck with a whip, “every lash of which cut
as deep as a razor”. 3

The capture of the Ahom capital did not mean the end of
Ahom. resistance. Despite the establishment of thanas , the line
of Mughal communications could not be fully safeguarded
against surprise attacks of roving bands of Ahoms. Some

1. FI. 21, 24, 36, 42*43, 44, 45, 46; SMAB- 95*96; PAB* 124.
Ramdang is a village between Trimohani and Garhgaon.

2. FI. 73.

3. Glanius, 158.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

aden

after Mir Jumla’s arrival at Garhgaon, six Mughal boats
with gold and silver and provisions were captured on
the way to Garhgaon and their crew mostly slain by the Ahoms.
In fact, the Raja s officers and guerillas continued to harass
the Mughals on all sides,—stationing pickets to cut off transport
of food and supplies, burning everything and blockading
Garhgaon,—till the advent of the rains.' 1

That year the rains started earlier than usual. Mir Jumla
had originally planned to spend the rainy season at Lakhan
in order to avoid the risk of scarcity or want of provisions.
But lack of transport facilities would have made the timely
removal of the captured goods to that place an extremely
difficult task, and time was required to break the wild elephants
for proper marching. So he encamped with the main army
at Mathurapur, 4 5 7 miles S. E. of Garhgaon (31st March).
Situated on an elevated and pleasant site, it was suitable for
encampment during rains and it also abounded with fruit trees
and paddy fields. Due precautions were taken to prevent
sudden raios of the Ahoms, scouts being sent everyday to
watch their movements.

Garhgaon, with its artillery, elephants, stores and property
of the army, was guarded by Mir Murtaza, Raja Amar Singh
and 50 horsemen and a few musketeers. The requisite pieces
of artillery were kept there and the rest were sent to Dacca.
Mir Sayyid Muhammad, Mwan-i-tan, was deputed to
conciliate the local ryots. Muhammad Abid, escheat officer,
had to examine the register of the Raja’s articles and arrange

ior payment of the soldiery and send the balance to Daoea.
Muhammad Khalil was appointed a min and Muhammad Ashraf
overseer of property.

Both Garhgaon and Mathurapur were protected by
establishment of outposts on different sides. Thus Mir Jumla
occupied about 100 villages in all, including Sairing, Silghat,

<8L

4. B. VEIL 91; St&rici, II, 100; Crlanius, 161-2.

5, Mathurapur, near the ancient- capital of Charaicfeo, at the

foot of the Tiro mountains.

MIB JUMLA S SPOILS OF WAR IN ASSAM

.. ...w

[k y Charra, Raokham, Sinatoli, largely with the .assistance
^hom deserters. Salpani, on the skirts of the southern hills,
was placed under Miana Khan, to repulse the activities of the
Bar Gokain; Deo pan i, between Garhgaon and Salpani, was held
by Ghazi Khan; the bank of the Dihing, n.e, of Garhgaon, was
guarded by the sturdy Dariabadis under Jalal Kban, while
Adam Khan at Abhoypur, guarded the Namrup side. These
Mughal outposts held their own against the repeated attacks
of the Ahoms. 6

2 . Mir Jumla s spoils of war in Assam.

Mir Jumla considered it to be his bounden duty to
guard the spoils of war as imperial property and spared
no pains in discharging it. Whenever, as at Simlagarh
and Kaliabar, war materials like cannon, zamburak , muskets,
gunpowder, besides elephants, etc., left behind by the
Assamese were captured, they had to be collected together
and listed by a special officer. While at Dewalgaon Mir
Jumla learnt from letters of some Muhammadan inhabitants
of Garhgaon that the fugitive Raja, unable to carry with
him all his treasure, had left behind his elephants, heavy
luggage and “undefined lofids" of goods there. Immediately
the General despatched from Gajpur a flying column under
Farhad Khan and Mir Sayykl Muhammad, the diwan-i-lan, to
capture them. The energetic and conscientious General himself
salvaged many Zamburaks , muskets and Ramchangisy thrown
into tanks ( e.g. the Paduip pukhri tank) at the capital by the
fugitive Raja and the Phukans. During Mir Jumia's stay at
Mathurapur, the task of recovery of war materials was
assiduously continued by tyfir Murtaza. 7

6 . Programme, FI. 71-75 ( author at Garhgaon ); Giannis, 162-3
(Mathurapur); BKK, 694-5 (occupation of villages); SMAB. 95-96
( Sinatoli). Silghat ( 26° 36'JN, 93° E ), s.*». of Tozpur, Ind. Atlas. Sh.
IS54; Taukak ( 27° N, 95° 8 r E), 26 m. due east of Sibsagar; Abhoypur
( 27° 10'N, 94° 68'E ) 16 m. north of Mathurapur and 1 8 miles n e of
Garhgaon, Ind. Atlas. Sh. 129.

7 . FI. 44-45, 34-36, 47; SMAB. 96; Glanius, 181 (Mir Jumla him*
self acquiring Raja’s treasure ).

MINIS

LOTS OF MIK J17MLA

The spoils of war taken in Assam were stupendous:
elephants, the most valuable part of the spoils, about 3 lakhs
of rupees in cash, and all articles left behind by the Raja.
The number of guns captured from tho start of the expedition
till the General s return was 675, of which one was a large iron
gun, discharging 3 md. balls; 1343 camel-swivels, 1,200
ramchangis, 6,570 matchlocks, 340 mds. of gunpowder, 1,960
chests of powder, each weighing about 2 or mds; 7,828
(iron ) shields; of saltpetre, iron, sulphur and lead “there was
no measure ; about 173 stores of paddy, each containing from
10 to 1,000 maunds, constituting “the food of the King and
the Phukans for several years,” which they had unwisely
neglected to burn, and without which Mir Jumla’s army would
have been deprived of food during the impending state of
siege. 8

The defeat of the Ahom armada above KaJiabar did not
mean the destruction of all the ships of the Raja. Besides
those participating in the naval battle there, many lay in the
Raja's nausals or dockyards. Mir Jumla inspected two of them,
one beyond Lakhau and the other at Tiimohani. In the former
he found about 100 (bachari ) ships under the chhaypars or
thatches, measuring 70, 80, 100 and 120 cubits long, extremely
strong and decorated. Though the Assamese had burnt 120
sea-going decorated (bachari ) ships in tho dockyards of
Garhgaon, unequalled in size by any other ships in Assam,
Mir Jumla secured sea-going warships, numbering more than
1,000, manned by 80 or 70 or 60 sailors. 9

8 . FI. 49*50; AN. 40 (208 battering guns, 100 elephants ), Bali’s
Tavernier, II. 277; Bernier, * 72.

Ramchangi is “some sort of light field-piece”, acc. to Iivine, Army.
1.3 7. Hodivala (675 > regards the word as a variant of Ratnjani (a pleasure
girl ) and thinks that the name was given to the weapon on account of
its dances (i.e recoil ) when fired off.

9, FI 43-4 5, 50; SM&B. 96: B, VIII. 90-1. Description of boats in
Assam. “They build warboats, like the Koeahs of Bengal and call them
bachari*. There is no other difference between the two than this that
the prow and stern of the Kosah have two (projecting horns), while the

249

MUt JUMLA’S SPOILS OF WAR IN ASSAM

Jurnla ordered that the Assamese experts in the art of
"""iSmfaoture 0 f matchlocks and gunpowder should be sent

to Dacca. 10 He tried in vain to secure even one of the adept
elephant drivers of Assam, reputed for their skill in capturing
elephants. 11

As in the Karnatak, so in Assam, Mir Jumla amassed huge
treasure by sacking temples. After the conquest of Kajli, he
brought under his control the famous idol temples of Kamakhya
Devi, Luna Chamari and Ismail Jogi. The temple of Dewalgaon
was pillaged. 12

During his stay in Upper Assam, Mir Jumla learnt from
some Ahoms of the treasure deposited in maidams or graves
of the Ahom princes and nobles. The exact spots being pointed
out to him, he bad them opened up and secured property
worth Rs. 90,000, including a gold betel casket of a queen
buried 80 yeans ago, and removed even the bones of the buried
ones. The Ahom king bewailed : “Misery me, I have not
been able to protect even the bones of my ancestors .
Referring to the immense quantity of treasures, the unknown
Dutch sailor observed: “As for riches, we wanted them not,
having found good store in Graves”. When Manucei passed
through Dacca, he “saw huge boats which Mir Jumla was
sending loaded with the booty” taken at Garhgaon and other
places. 13

head and base of the bachari consist of only one levelled plank ; and as,
aiming ( solely ) at strength, they build these boats with the pith of
timber (Qalb-dar) they are slower than Kosahs”. (FI. 63-64; JBORS. I,
161-2).

10. FI. 34, 64; JBORS, I. 192.

1 1. FI. 56; JBORS. I. ISO; JASB, i872. p. 78.

12. FI. 24; MU, III. 5*8; Ball, II. 278-9, 283; Glanius. 169-70
•(golden cow of Deolgaon temple); SMAB. 95.

13. Details of exhumation; Graves of 14 Gobains and three of rajas
in Baisakh—Asar, 1584, Saka, SMAB. 96, xxiii; but only 10 vaults,
according to FI. 65-6 (JBORS. 1,193; JASB, 1872, p. 82); JIH. V. 369-70;
Storia, II. 100; Glanius, 175-6 (escheated) ; for plunder in Hajo, Ball, II.
280% Glanius, 147-8,

misr/fy

LIFE! OF MIR JUMLA

3. Mir Jumla's treatment of the people in Assam.

All political offenders in Assam were of necessity sternly
punished. At Simlagarh Mir Jutnla issued strict orders to the
soldiers to pat all recalcitrant Assamese to death and to
imprison even the supplicating ones and bring them to him
for necessary action. According to the unnamed Dutch sailor,
he offered the Dutch Rs. 50 for “every Head” they “brought
him” and Rs. 100 for each prisoner captured alive. The Ahoms
captured by Mughal scouts, were cruelly scourged and then
beheaded. The object of inflicting such horrible torture on
the Ahoms was to force them to join the Mughals. 14

On the other hand those who helped the Mughals or
remained neutral were treated very kindly. 15 Again, towards
the general populace, not guilty of any political olfences, Mir
Jura la adopted a policy of moderation and showed solicitude
for their welfare. By this means he endeavoured to win the
affections of the Ahorn peasantry, so that they might not join
the guerillas in their surprise raids on the Mughal outposts
and might bring supplies to the imperial army. A strict
disciplinarian, he sternly forbade plunder of property and rape
of women on the part of the soldiery to the utter
disappointment of Mughal Don Juans and marauders. This
order continued in force till the return of the Mughal army
from Assam, and ‘‘not a single amir, trooper, soldier or
campfollower”, could dare cast his lustful eyes on any one’s
property or women in Assam. And “if, by chance, anyone,
high or low,” perpetrated such an act or even was suspected
of it, he was paraded through the city and severely punished.

Once Farhad Khan “wounded and oppressed’’ some
villagers who had participated in his beleaguring on their
return after a temporary disappearance. He had instructed

14, FI. 34-35; Glanius, 143 (remuneration), 147 (Raja of Hajo
imprisoned ), 159-60 ( Ahom admiral captured hut released at tho

intercession of fnme high nobles ); for treatment of war prisoners,
Glanius, 163-4, E and D. VII ( for Khafi Khan’s account).

|5 Glanius, 165.

mi$Tff

JUMLA S TREATMENT OF THE PEOPLE IN ASSAM

macl Muqim Beg “to turn upon those villages, undertake
ifslaughter of the men, the plunder of the property and the
reproaching of the women and the children’'. But Mir Jumla
denounced all this and gave orders for releasing the oppressed,
and many besiegers, who waited on the Nawab before the rainy
season, were assured of safety. Ryots, who had been compelled
by the Ahoms to desert their villages, began to return in
increasing numbers to the Mughal outposts like Lakhau, and
Dewalgaon and, being guaranteed protection, reoccupied their
dwellings. Mir Jumla released the Mussalman inhabitants of
Kamrup, found in the besieged fort of Simlagarh.

On reaching Garhgaon he issued a general order of
rehabilitation to the effect that the inhabitants of Kamrup
should return to their own homes and engage in building and
agricultural activities and exempted them from payment of
revenue and cesses for one year. By another general order
he released all Mughal subjects, Hindu or Muhammadan, kept
as prisoners or slaves by the Raja of Assam or distributed
among the Ahoms and who had lost all hopes of freedom.
They were now allowed to sail down on the Assamese Kvsas
to their homes, together with articles seized in the dwellings
of the Ahoms . 16

Mir Jumla’s hopes of early submission of the Ahom
populace were not easily fulfilled. Shihabuddin Talish regrets
that in spite of the Raja's cruelty and Mir Jumla’s kindness,
the Assamese “did not at all become submissive to the people
of Islam ". 17 Probably Mir Jumla’s sacking of temples and
desecration of Dewalgaon temple and digging up of graves
caused such a strong revulsion of feeling that it could not be
effaced by his measures for the welfare of peasants. But
gradually, as a result of Mir Jumla's strong measures against

16. FI. 35-36 (plunder and rape forbidden); 86-87 (Farhad censured);
146, 44-45 (villagers return), 34 and 49 (men of Kamrup), 48-49 ( release
of Mughal subjects).

BKK. 695, however, states that “the Mussalmans overran our
territory and plundered household articles and domesticated animals.’*

17. FI. 34-36. Any Assamese joining the Mughal and then returning
to the Raja was executed by the latter with his family. Ibid.

MIN/Sr/f

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Si

olitical offenders and of his solicitude for the people ahc
the failure of Ahom raids on Mughal thanaa the average
villagers came to realise that resistance to him was of no avail
In course of time the villagers in the Dakhinkol submitted to
the Mugbals ; and even the inhabitants of the UUarkol also
thought of yielding to the invaders, when the situation was
completely transformed 18 by the onset of the “calamitious
rainy season" earlier than usual.

18. FI. 75.

<SL

Section C

Mib Jumla's Sad Plight in Assam
1 . Beginning of Mir Jumla's real troubles .

The difficulties that Mir Jurnla had experienced so long*
during his victorious advance into Assam pale into insignificance
when compared to what he had now to face. The rainy season
was to an invader in Assam what winter is in the plains of
Russia. “Streams took to the ways of oceans, and nalas
looked like rivers.” The Mughal hor.se, the terror of the Ahoms,.
was paralysed in the flooded or muddy ground. They were
now emboldened to indulge freely in their harassing tactics.
Still avoiding a pitched battle, they concealed themselves here
and there, and, mustering from different sides, made night
attacks on every thana and incited the villagers who had already
submitted to the Mughals (as at Dewalgaon). They closed all
roads, cutoff news and intercepted the transport of provisions by
water from Lakhau to Garhgaon. By using “blood-drinking”
arrows the Ahoms made movements of the Mughals, even
between Mathurapur and Garhgaon, impossible without the
protection of a troop of archers. A night attack on Dewalgaon
failing due to the vigilance of its thanadar , the Ahoms under
the Bhitarual Phukau recovered Gajpur by killing its negligent
thanadar, Anwar Beg (10th May). By raising entrenchments
on the north side of the river Billing, from the proximity of
Trimohani and Gajpur to the environs of Lakhau, the Ahoms
prevented the arrival of provisions to the Mughal army. The
discomfiture of a Mughal naval escort to Tiok and beyond so
emboldened the Ahoms that the transport of Mughal beopari
(merchant) ships was suspended, involving the stoppage of
arrival of provisions. As the floods on the Dihing and the
torrents from the hill of Salpani froze the movements of the
Dariabadis and the cavalry and infantry of Miana Khan, the
Ahoms crossed the river and, descending from the hill, began
to surround and even invest Garhgaon, heroically defended by
Murtaza without any hope of reinforcements. An Ahom host,
10-12,000 strong under the nephew of Bar Gohain, hopelessly

minist^

LIFE OF MIB JUMLA

umbered Ghazi Khan, thanadar of Deopani, but retrea
• the fall of its leader. Since then, the ryots, who profess¬
ing obedience were living in the environs of Garhgaon,
Mathurapur and Abhoypur, began to desert their villages. 1

There were now ‘constant skirmishes and murders’ between
the Ahoms and the Mughals, too numerous to be mentioned.
The Raja, burning with rage at the exhumation of .the graves
of his ancestors, ordered slaughter of all Mughals. The
killing of a few did not, however, greatly reduce the strengh
of the imperial army. 2

The isolation of the Mughal outposts proved to be the
greatest handicap for Mir Jumla. The entire armv was
virtually in a state of siege from May to October, 1662. Yet
that General’s control over his men was so effective that during
those fateful months the army was always vigilant and ready
to repel the enemy even at the cost of their lives. Talish
writes: ‘‘It rarely happened that day and night the soldiers
drew their legs in the skirt of repose except in the narrow

place of the saddle.Persons fastidious of even a particle

of dust, became stained with mud from head to foot, men of
delicate constitution were plunged in water and burnt by the

sun. The saddles were never bare of the riders; the

horses’ backs were never stripped of the saddles ; masters had
no expectation of service from their servants : servants ceased
to attend their masters ; but each and all, at the least alarm,
leaped up from tiis post arid wielded his sword with both
hands.” 3

2 . Failure of Mir Jumla s efforts to restore
communications with the fleet.

No other Mughal General but Mir Jumla could have saved
his army from such dangers threatening it with annihilation.

X. FI. 75 (rains), 76-78 (Ahom activities), 89-91 (arrows, closing of
roads), 75-6 (Deolgaon), 79-80 (Deopani and ryots); BKK. 700-1 (Gajpur)
702-3 (Deopani). See also MA, 43;. MU. Ill, 552; Glanius, 171.

2. BKK. 095; SMAB. 97; AB. 20-1; PAB. 125.
x FI. 93-94; Aurangzib , III. 164, 168-9.

FAILURE OF EFFORTR TO CONTACT FLEET

duo to his coolness, prudence, promptitude and orga
ig skill. He promptly despatched succour wherever and
whenever it was needed. Rightly did he plan first to reopen his
life line, communications with his fleet. Yadgar Khan Uzbeg
reinforced Ali Reza, the hard-pressed thanadar of Dewa.lgaon
and was successful in stamping out rebellion in the
neighbourhood. But Sarandaz Khan Uzbeg, the new thanadar
of Gajpur, failed to restore communications with Lakhau, as
lie could not proceed beyond Tiok owing to flooded mlas. ‘ So
Mir Jumla deputed Muhammad Murad with some ships to
help Sarandaz Khan in crossing the streams and be helped by
the latter from land. The plan miscarried owing to the
negligence of some officers and dissensions between the two
captains. The escorting flotilla was captured by the 4homs
without any engagement ; Muhammad Murad fled on land
towards Trimohani (23rd May) and only a few ships, manned
by Dilir Khan’s Afghan contingent, hastily rowed away in
safety to Dewalgaon. However, Abul Hasan, sent by Mir
Jumla, destroyed the entrenchments thrown up by the Ahoras
to attack Deopani and slew them. For guarding Garhgaon
Mir Jumla deputed a contingent including 50 horsemen of
Sayyid Salar Khan. 4

Mir Jumla now ordered Farhad Khan to fetch provisions
from Lakhau, to destroy the Ahom entrenchments on both
sides of the way, to restore the thana of Gajpur and reinforce
those of Trimohani and Ramdang, Farhad was to be assisted
by Abul Hasan with a sepoy contingent of Mir Jumla himself.
But this stupendous task was bound to fail for paucity of
boats. Leaving Garhgaon on the night of 27th May, he crossed
the Dikhu, but had to come to a standstill at Tiok (between
Trimohani and Gajpur) on account of floods. The field seemed
to bo larger than the Dihing itself, and nowhere was any road
visible. Rains fell from the sky and water heaved up from
below ; the tents of the flooded encampment looked like

*:, , S I ’ 6 ' 76 (£>eo! « aon ); for Gajpur and Tiok, ibid., 77, 7# and BKK.
7UU-I; tor Deopani and G arhgaon, FI. 81.

MIN ISTfff

UFE OF Mitt JUMLA

Jbles on water ; the cavaliers sat the whole night on th
chargers and the foot-soldiers had to remain standing. In
despair Farhad tried to return, along with Saranda.z, to
Trimohani, but found the path blocked by the ‘'deep dytohes
and broad brooks,” which the Ahoms had joined to the Diking,
and by their trenches on its banks. The Blntarual Phukan s
boats encircled the Mughals and subjected them to heavy tire.
Without ships, without provisions, the beleaguered captain
found himself in a hopeless condition for one week, during
which he had to eat up his oxen and horses. Muhammad
Mumin Beg Ekkataz Khani, coming from the General, was held
up at Trimohani by floods, and failed to relieve Farhad. For
the same reason, Dilu Khan’s plan to send a rescuing party on
elephants had to be given up as being impracticable. At last on
Farhad’s signal, the Rajputs under Sujan Singh feigned to-
withdraw and tempted the Ahoms away from their boats, so
that Farhad captured about 41 ships, mostly Kusas. Embarking
on them at dawn, Farhad surprised and routed the negligent
Ahoms, and reached Trimohani in safety (about 6th June). 0

Si.

3. Oarhgaon isolated.

Emboldened by the failure of Farhad Khan’s mission, the

audacious Ahoms now completely closed all the roads. None
could come out oi his thana ; no help could be sent to it from
outside. So Mir Jumla withdrew all thanas. Adam Khan
returned with difficulty from Abhoypur to Mathurapur ; other
thanadars retired to Garhgaon ; the Dikhu was to be guarded
on the east by Sarandaz Khan and Miana Khan, and on the
west by Jalal Khan Dariabadi, Ghazi Khan and Muhammad
Muqim, acting under the command of Mir Murtaza. The
Ahoms recovered the entire country east of Lakhau except
Garhgaon and Mathurapur. They had so closely invested these
places that movement without protection was impossible. Mir
Jumla had not the slightest ray of hope of getting help and
reinforcement. No grain or other necessaries oflife could find
their way from outside into the Mughal camp. The Mughal

5. FI. 81-86; BKK. 701-3 (BhitaruuJ Phukan, Tiok and Cina).

WHtSTffy

GABJm&OW T80LATKD

in Assam lost all hopes of ever returning to their homes,
ifmplete was the interception of news that their relations in
Hindus than, hearing nothing of them, performed their funeral
rites. Tailsh does not exaggerate *' the misery of the imperial
army when he states : “In no history has it been read that in
any age from the advent of Adam to thfe time, a force of 10 or
12 thousand cavalry and many infantry and numberless camp
followers remained for six months powerless and enclosed like
the centre of a circle by brooks and streams, —so that nobody
could place his foot outside the circumference of the camp like
the (point of) a pair of compasses/’ 8

The Ahoms now redoubled the vigour of their activities.
The Raja sallied out of Namrup and stayed at Solaguri, only
four days’ march from Garhgaon. He appointed Baduli
Phukan his Neog Phukan, i. e., Prime minister and
Commander-in-chief, ordering him to annihilate the Mughal
army and to capture Mir Jumia. All Ahoms were ordered to
help and implicitly obey the Baduli Phukan, In 2 or 3 ' days,
the Phsukan had a wide, lofty and strong wall, 6 miles long, and
furnished with turrets, built bn the bank of the Dilli, east of
Mathurapnr, joining the southern hills with the Billing. His
night attacks on Mathurapnr, however, ceased after a severe
defeat at the hands of Dilir Khan. The Mughals at Silghat
retreated before a joint assault by the Baduli Phukan and the 1
Bar Gohain to Boorhat (S. of Namrup), where the assault of
the Baduli Phukan failed. The Baja of Sailing planned to
attack Garhgaon but was overpowered by Sujan Singh. Minor
clashes were too many to be counted, 6 7

6. FI, 86-91; Talish’s version (p. 89), also quoted in Aurangzib, Ill,
164n; Giamus, 170-171; acc. to the Ahom Buranjis the withdrawal of
thanas was done in stages. SMAB. 96-7.

7, FI 91-92, 93 (Sairing); MA. 40; Glanius, 170-171; BKK. 703
(attempt to capture Mir Jumia), 703-704, 707 (Silghat and Boorhat),
707-8 (Dilir’s successful charge on Tamulidaiai’s fort at Damarai, 704-5
(Mughal retreat from Sairtng to Boorhat, Ahoms encircled Taokak).

(contd.)

17

MINISr^

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

4. Fight for occupation of Oarhgaon.

The Baduli Phukan next turned towards blockading
Garhgaon. As this was the place where all imperial property,
provisions, animals, artillery and a few boats were stored, Mir
Jumla provided for strengthening its defences, though he was
not present on the spot. He despatched a column under
Farhad Khan (14th June) to reinforce Mir Murtaza, desperately
guarding the capital. A flotilla of 10 jalbas and IB bums was
fitted out, the enemy trenches in the garden west of the city
were destroyed, a bamboo fort extending to the bank of the
Dikiiu was set up in the N. W. corner of the city, and suitable
guards were posted on different sides. The Muslim musketeers
of Assam, recruited from the village of Chachni and stationed
by Mir Murtaza on the north, refused to desert their places,
when approached by the Ahoms.

The Ahoms launched successive night assaults on the
capital. On 8th July, they routed the Baksariya patrols of
the northern bamboo stockade and captured half of the fort,
causing much confusion and tumult. Farhad was wounded
with two poisoned arrows. But due to the exertion of one and
all inside the fort, the attack was repulsed. Wiser by
experience, Mir Murtaza next day raised a mud wall in place of
the bamboo {stockade and fortified the place, and made the
area in front into a level plain. Within a week he had the
whole fort enclosed by “a wide and lofty wail with turrets.”
Mir Jumla duly appreciated the value of this wail as an
effective defence saving Garhgaon. The Ahoms continued
their night attacks, but Farhad, wounded though he was,
remained sleeplessly vigilant. To guard the head of the bridge
over the Dandga nala from the Ahom snipers, Mir Jumla used

Sairing, .about 7 or S kos from Dewalgaon. (FI. 139). The Dilli
( modern Diroi ) lay north of the Dandga (n.n.e of Oarhgaon) and issued
from the (eastern) hills, passed by Mathurapur and fell into the Diking.
(FI. 112,92). The Diroi is now an affluent of .the Disang. Silghafc is
probably Seolakhptee, n,e. of Garhgaon (JASB, 1861 map, p. 366), and
Silakuti of Sibsagcir Dt. Oaz. map.

FIGHT FOR OCCUPATION OF GARHGAON

ute 200 troopers every night instead of stationing a
party, lest it would be busier in securing its own comforts
than in defence. They also used to participate in the defence
of the capital and return to Mathurapur at dawn.

Farhad fully justified the confidence which Mir Jumla had
reposed in him. During the grand and simultaneous assault
by four Ahom corps on the four sides of the capital in the night
of 12th July, it was Farhad’s strategy which saved an
indiscreet Dariabadi contingent of Sayyid Salar from impending
annihilation. Though wounded, Farhad stood on horseback
at the centre and sent reinforcements to the different sides.
Again, it was Farhad’s party including the author Shihabuddin
Talish, that dislodged and dispersed the Ahoms from the N W.
comer of the fort.

Deeply concerned at the fate of the defenders of Gargaon,
JVJjr Jumla used to keep his “ears fixed on the (distant) noise”
day and night. His watchers, perched on high wooden towers,
used to observe if fire ever broke out ip Garhgaon. As he
remarked to Shihabuddin Talish : “After performing the
religious duty (prayer) of the morning and the prostration of
thanks-giving, for 4 ghari* I slept on the carpet of prayer (lay
in the posture of prayer). That was all the repose I took in
the night and day.”

The Ahoms organised three more assaults on 15th, J7th and
18th July, but they could never penetrate into the enclosure.
Mir Jumla now deputed Rashid Khan to relieve the ailing
Farhad. In repeated and vigorous sorties, the new commandant
destroyed the Ahom trenches in the neighbourhood of Garhgaon
especially those on the Kakujan (23rd July). The demoralised
Ahoms evacuated their entrenchments on the bank of the Dilli
and ceased crossing the Dandga as well. At long last peace
and repose returned to the residents of Garhgaon 8 .

The indefatigable Phukan soon became conscious of the
futility of his ceaseless efforts. His night attacks, stoppage of

8. FI. 96-118.

The Kakujan R., north of Solaguri, falls into the Buri Dihing Tnd
Atlas , 3 29.

LIFE OF MB JUMLA

Sl

lies and blockade of the Mughal camp,-—all failed to shl
ie resolution of the Mughal General The Phukan, either at
the command of his king or at his own initiative, had made
overtures of peace (June-July) through the mediation of Dilir
Khan. Mir Jumla had offered some hard conditions of peace,
so that the Ahoms might not consider his attitude as one of
weakness. The Baja should present 500 elephants (which had
cut their first tusks) and, 30 lakh tolas of gold and silver, send
his daughter to the imperial harm, offer 50 elephants with first
tusks as annual tribute, and retain only Namrup and the
neighbouring hills. The territories already conquered were to
be annexed to the Mughal empire. The Phukan also informed
Mir Jumla’s agent, Khwajah Bhor Mai, in confidence that he
was willing to join the Mughals in case the Baja refused the
offer. When, however. Mir Jumla left Mathurapur for
Garhgaon (17th August) on account of pestilence, the Ahoms
refused to agree to Mir Jumla’s terms*®

J. Pestilence and famine in the Mughal camps at
Mathurapur and Garhgaon .

In August a terrible pestilence broke out in Mathurapur,
which affected the Mughals and the Ahoms alike. In the
Mughal camp hundreds died of ague and flux; Dilir Khan's
army dwindled to one-third. Among the Ahoms as many as
2,30*000 died. The dead could not be given proper burial.
Corpses were carried down in thousands by the Brahmaputra
and its water became so infected that the Mughal crew at
Lakhau could* not use it without boiling.

9. FI. 95-90. The name of Mir Jumla’s agent is given as Puran Mai
in AN. 798.

The BKK. (699) asserts that in the month of Ahar ( June-July)
Mir Jumla proposed that if the Bargohain joined him, he would ‘‘go
away leaving the country in his charge.” But the Bargohain refused.
Then Mir Jurnla sent a force (including olephants and horses, to storm
the hill fortress of the Bargohain ( ? on the Sessa river), but it perished.

PESTILENCE AND FAMINE IN MUGHAL CAMPS

Jumla could not withdraw immediately from
itlenoe-stricker. camp, lest he would have to leave behind
provisions and paddy for lack of transport. But food shortage
was inevitable. Out of 173 paddy heaps, only .16 could be
saved from flood and plunder by the enemy. Mir Jumla
reserved 6 of these for the beasts and 10 for the soldiers. All had
to take red and coarse rice. At first the men used beef boiled
in water or stewed in fat of oxen plundered; later on they had
to consume the flesh of horses, camels or elephants. A worse
condition followed and men began to suffer agonies for want
of their respective delicacies,—wheat, dal, ghee, sweetmeat,
opium, tobacco and salt. Ghee sold at Its. 14/- a seer, vetch
(mash ) at Rs. 1/- a seer, opium at 1 gold mohur a tola, a pipe
of tobacco at Rs. »/-, Mungdal and salt both at Rs. 10/- a seer.
Mahmud Beg Mir Bakhshi made a gift of a few sacks of tobacco
to the needy instead of selling it, and reduced his own daily
dose of opium to increase the quantity for distribution. 10

In short, life became intolerable at Mathurapur. So Mir
Jumla left it on the afternoon of the 17th August and, offering
his evening prayers at a palace of the Raja, Set out in the
midst of violent rains, and reached Garhgaon next dawn. Some
artillery carts of Mir Jumla, stuck up in the mud, were safely
guarded by l>ilir Khan at night and brought there on 18th
evening. Three-fourths of the stored paddy could not be taken
along despite the General's order. Many sick soldiers also
were left behind. * 11 (

"The Ahoms now renewed their night attacks on Garhgaon
but to ho purpose. Mir Jumla sent timely help to bis captains.
During the assault of the moonlit night of 15th September,
' Jumla’s despatch of a corps of his own attendants under

Mir

10. FI. 128-32; Glanius, 170-171 (water boiled). Storm, II. 100-101.
“The Raja had carried away all kinds of provisions and reduced by this
means the Emir into a strange extremity,” Glanius, 181; 8MAP- 97;
The Raja burnt nausal and paddy stores {Ibid , 96). The OPL. MS. of
, FI. (1215) gives the price of salt as Rs. 30 a seer.

11. FI. 133-5. Probably’some iron guns were left bfehind. JASB
(1872), 91 dl.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

ill' Hasan enabled Raja Sujan Singh in the eastern trench
•©pel the Ahoms, while Dilir Khan in the west drove them
to the Dandga nala. This Mughal victory so unnerved
the Ahoms that they gave up their plan of night attacks. 12

The refugees from Mathurapur soon infected the garrison
at Garhgaon and the pestilence and famine became most acute.
Several complex diseases of a fatal type broke out. “The
diseases of voiding excrement and dropsy supervened an ague

and purging,.. death became the doctor of many.. . .

a patient...... . All kinds of food stuffs disappeared, except

coarse red rice. and the ripe and raw lemons on trees

. The grandees fell a prey to hectic fever for eating

course rice. Poor men did not spare even the leaves on the
trees, the grass on the ground or the herbs on the river side/ 5
Mir Jumla showed his humaneness by refusing to use his
choicest delicacies which he had in plenty, and by sharing the
food and woes of his dependants. Remarkable social service was
rendered by Muhammad Mumin Tabrezi, the historiographer,
who did not spare himself in nursing the sick and helping the
distressed, till he himself died. 13

d. The Mughal navy in Assam,

During all these months of crisis, the imperial nawwara
defended itself and protected the army as well. Cut off’ from
Mir Jumla early in the rainy season, Admiral Ibn Husain kept
up the spirits of his crew at Lakhau by well-reasoned speeches,
and adopted various measures on his own inititiative. An
equipped flotilla sent under Ali Beg to reinforce Gajpu" was
overwhelmed on water and from land and had to retire down
to Bansbari (between Dewalgaon and Gajpur). Here it united
with the ships of Munawwar Khan, also sent by Ibn Husain,
and after recovering two Mughal ships from Tamulidalai*

12. FI 135-7; Glanius, 181-2. According to the unnamed ‘Dutch
•sailor Mir Jumla’s plan of encircling the attacking Ahoms with horsemen

was very effective (Glanius, 71-2), For his plan of collective punishment
of abetting villagers, Gait, 134,

13. FI. 137-38.

THE MUGHAL NAVY* IN ASSAM

2

/ed to Lakhau. The admiral had also planned to reope
munications with Mir Jumla by sailing to Garhgaon along
an unfamiliar route and joining with Ali Beg’s flotilla at
Gajpur. But he was wisely dissuaded from undertaking this
difficult task by Yadgar Khan, thanadar of Dewalgaon, as it
would have been highly impolitic to leave Lakhau, which
stood at the junction of several rivers arid contained the entire
baggage and provisions of the army.

Indeed Lakhau was the source of strength and inspiration
of the beleaguered army and Mir Jumla was anxious to contact
the fleet. Through two Ahora couriers, whom he had won
over, the General sent a message to the Admiral, advising the
latter not to be anxious at the army’s condition, but to be
careful about supplies, to concentrate all forces at Lakhau bs
summoning the contingents from Kaliabar, Samdhara and
Dewalgaon.

Ibn Husain assured the General (7th July) of the safety of
his fleet and sufficiency of his strength, but objected to the
withdrawal of the thanas of Samdhara and Kaliabar as that
would have cut off the fleet from Bengal. However, he with¬
drew the thana of Dewalgaon as being useless and it was occu¬
pied by the Bbitarual Phukan advancing from the Majuli
island. Ibn Husain set up a bamboo fort, threw up trenches
and fortified them to guard against night attacks, and main¬
tained communications with Gauhati on river. For a time
Lakhau was blockaded from trie west, south and north. But
the Admiral brought plenty of paddy from the north bank of
the Brahmaputra, and slaughtered many Ahoms of Solagarh
(between Lakhau and Kaliabar) in repeated sorties. At this
the overawed local peasants made over their own chiefs in
chains to the admiral, professed submission (5th August), and
were appointed to guard the line of communications westward.
Thus the way from Lakhau via Kaliabar to Gauhati became
perfectly safe. Sayyid Husain succeeded his deceased father-
in-law Sayyid Nasiruddin as thanadar of Kaliabar (12th August),
while Kishan Singh succeeded Sayyid Mirza deceased as
thanadar of Samdhara. In short, Ibn Husain utilised every
moment in the work of keeping hold over the country, for the

ML

LIFE W mm JUlMI A

Bfift weakness on the part of the fleet would have
ribly disheartened the men of the army as to lead them ‘‘to
out the thread of the hope of their life" and to render their
liberation impossible. 14

The Ahoms, baffled in their effort to crush the army at
Oarhgaon, turned to the destruction of the Mughal fleet. But
a midnight raid by the Bhitarual Phukan on the garrison at
Lakhau miscarried, as also other Ahom raids on its environs.
By way of reprisal Ibn Husain and his men ruthlessly
plundered and slew the Ahom inhabitants. The overawed and
distracted natives handed over two of their commanders,
Ghinglung Luthuri Dayangia Rajkhoa and Bura Gohain,
to the Mughal admiral. They also helped the Mughals in
repeatedly defeating the Ahoms entrenched between Lakhau
and Qarhgaon. The Bhitarual Phukan had to withdraw' from
Dewalgaon to Rangali Chapari in the Majuli island. Ibn
Husain now re established the thana of Dewalgaon and sent the
happy news to Mir Jumla through two Ahoms (5th September).
TamuIidalai also fled, after being defeated at Bansbari, leaving
the way to Gajpur clear. 15

14. FI, 118-126; BKK. 702-3, 700 (Gajpur and Tamulidalai); BKK.
H. 3 (Dewalgaon r,

15. Ft. 120-8' BKK. 707, 709 (midnight r^'d); it, 3-4 ( Dewalgaon
and Gajpur); PAB. 120.

Section D

Mm Jumla’s Resumption of Offensive

i. Mir Jumla breaks the isolation of Garhgaon.

At long last, by the middle of Safar (20th September, 1662),
the crisis which had so long hung over Mir Jumla’s army was
over. The end of the rains came in sight, the floods receded, the
roads reappeared, and news began to move. Since the re-estab
lishment of the thana of Dewalgaon, Mir Jumla began his
efforts to link up Garhgaon with Lakh an. Mir Murtaz a built
a wooden bridge over the Dikhu near Garhgaon. On 25th
September Abul Hassan proceeded to Sairing and Dewalgaon
along a circuitous high embankment from the bank of the
Dikhu. Dispersing the enemy on his way with the help of
Ahom guides, he set up thanas at Sairing (under Ghazi Khan)
and Gajpur (under Sayyid Ahmad Jamaatdar). On reaching
Dewalgaon he reopened communications with the fleet. Mir
Jumla's letters to the Emperor and to Dacca, containing news
of the condition of the army, as well as his parwanas to the
Queen-dowager of Darrang, to the Mughal faujdar of Gauhati
and to the thana of Kaliabar, were delivered to the Admiral
for despatch to the proper quarters. Soon afterwards Mir
Jumla received the Emperor’s Jarman , appointing Ihtisham
Khan governor of Assam and Rashid Khan faujdar of Kamrug,
but each declined to accept the offer. Provisions were sent
by the Admiral on boats under escort to Dewalgaon and
thenceforth to Garhgaon on dry land-route through porters,
heoparis (merchants) and pack animals, as the river route there
was still unsafe. These reached Garhgaon on 24th October,
while another consignment of provisions carried entirely on
boats by Abul Hassan arrived there on 31st. “ Plenty

replaced want and the long-suffering imperial army began to
experience unbounded joy.” 1

1. FI, 138-42; 143-4 ( imperial farman); BKK. II. 2 ( Sairing and
Gajpur ), Mir Jumla to Van den Brouke ( 2 letters ) 9 Storia , IV. 480.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

2. Mir. Jumla s march to Tipam.

d dried up, the Mughal cavalry again became
irresistible. The Ahom king retired, as before, to the hills of
Namrup. The Baduli Phukan now began to play a double
game. On the one hand, he, along with Garhgaoni Phukan,
strengthened the entrenchments on the bank of the Dilli, and
on the other he approached Mir Murtaza to induce Mir Jumla
to make peace. But Mir Jumla demanded unconditional
surrender of the A bonis and refused to consider the proposal
so long as the latter did not wait on him. The General now
planned to attack the Baduli Phukan’s trenches, 20 miles north¬
east of Garhgaon, simultaneously from two sides. Abul Hassan
sailed (10th November) up the Dilli to catch them up in the
'rear, while Mir Jumla himself left Garhgaon (16th November)
and forded the Dandga and the Dilli. The Baduli Phukan
evacuated his “strong and spacious fort." 2

On 20th November, Mir Jumla reached the Dihing, only to
see that the Ahoms under the Burba Gohain had deserted their
stronghold on the other bank and retired to Bar kata. The
Burha Gohain, guarding the area between Taokak on the south,
the Dihing on the north and Solaguri on the west, was scared
away by the fear of Mir Jumla’s name. 3

But the terrible hardships and strain of the campaign in the
foul climate of Assam had told on Mir Jumla’s health and the
first onset of the disease of which he was to die came. While
reconnoitring the enemy entrenchment, he fell down from his
horse and, reclining on the ground, so long as the bed was not

2. FI. 142-146; BKK. II. 4-5 ( Mughal advance, Ahom peace offers,
retreat of Ahoms ); BKK. 707-8 ( Baduli defeated at Boorhat; Mughal
siege of Damarai; Ahom retreat to Jhanji, east of Jorhat and Tiok ); 709
( Baduli ill; battle at Charaideo and attack on Mughals at Saffry n.e.
of Mathurapur ).

3. FI. 146: The Ahom Buranjis state that the Burha Gohain fled
only after a pitched battle with the Mughals, BKK. 713; II. 5; SMAB.
97; B. VIII. 912; AB„ 21; PAB, 125.

Solaguri, a former capital, 18. miles s.e. of Dibrugarh, and 33 miles
n.e. of Garhgaon, and on the southern bank of the Dihing. lnd t Atlas
Sh. 129.

MINISr^

MIR JUMLa’s MARCH TO TIPAM

he became senseless, Dilir Khan taking his head on h
On recovery of his senses, he was taken tp a tent.
Shihabuddin Talish came to attend on him ten days later. 1

On 30th November, the Baduli Phukan, rightly suspected of
treachery by the Raja, joined Mir Jumla at feilikhatol along
with his three brothers, and offered to bring the Raja a
prisoner. Mir Jumla rewarded him and crowned him Delta
Raja (lit. the junior king). In effect the Phukan became the
Mughal Governor of Eastern Assam in charge of the “the
affairs of the villages and towns botween Garhgaon and
Namrup and the regulation of the land and water routes up
to Trimoliani.” 4 5 6

Guided by the first renegade Phukan, Mir Jumla continued
his march in spite of his illness. On 2nd December he deputed
Darwesh Beg to extirpate the Ahoms and capture their
elephants at Solaguri. On the 6th he himself started for
Namrup and reached Solaguri the next day, and crossed the
river of the same name on the 8th, being preceded by Darwesh
Beg and Baduli Phukan as Van.®

On 10th December Mir Jumla took his meal, followed by a

bath, for the first time after his illness. But he soon complained

of pain in and swelling of the stomach. At night there came

a burning fever and pain in the chest. Dr. Karima of Gilan
alleviated his suffering, but the patient steadily refused to have
his blood abstracted. Pleurisy appeared after two or three
days.

Nevertheless, Mir Jumla resolved to advance to Namrup
to capture the Raja with the help of the Baduli Phukan. But
the dispirited Mughal army, even at the risk of losing their
service and property, refused to enter Namrup, whose very

Sl

4. FI. 140.

5. FI. 147-8; SMAB. 97; PAB. 125. BKK. IT. 6-8 ( names of Ahom
deserters ); B. VIII. 92; Silikhatol is Seolaikhotee, n e. of Garhgaon,.
JASB. 1861, map. p.,306.

6. FI. 148-50; BKK. II, 8-9 ( Ahom dispositions ); 713-5. Was the
encounter at Solaguri the “another” (and evidently the last) battle
between the Ahom under Burha Gohain and Mir Jumla, described in B.
VIII. 93 ?

MINIS/-*,,

LWM OT MIR 3ltMRA

Teat bed death, where no provisions could come by land
or water and where rains were ex:peeted to start towards the
end of January. The apprehension of suffering untold miseries
as in the past and of being isolated and starved by the Ahorns,
the fear that the army, already depleted by famine and
pestilence, might be insufficient for extirpating the Raja and
guarding the road from Namrup to Garhgaon, and the grave
possibility that the Mughal cavalry, unable to move in the
heights sheltering the Raja, would be encircled by his forces
and could have “neither place to stay nor roadto retreat,”-—all
weighed on the minds of the Mughal soldiers. Privates and
officers alike plotted to desert their General during the crossing
of the Dihing. They were, however, quieted by Dilir Khan,
who asked Mahmud Beg Rakhshi to inform Mir Jumla of the
situation.

The ailing General was perturbed at the watering attitude
of his army. His physical agony was aggravated, and when,
on the 15th December, he set out on a palanquin, he looked
“anxious and grave”. At last on the 18th, he pitched his tents
at the village of Tipam (opposite the pass of Namrup), the
farthest point of his advance, and posted Miana Khan to
guard the further side of the Dibiog. 7

3. Conclusion of Peace .

The defection Of the Baduli Phukan and marly other
notables alarmed the Ahom king. Despairing of further
resistance against a General who had no intention of
abandoning his resolve, the king and his Phukans considered
peace to be the only means of saving their country ., and had
begun to send envoys and gifts to Mir Jumla. But he had
rejected the peace overtures as being insincere (c. 30th
November). However, a fortnight later, at one stage before
Tipam, the Ahom envoys induced Dilir Khan to persuade
Mir Jumla to come to torms. Weighed down by disease,
worried about his own shattered constitution, disconcerted by

<SL

7. FI. 150-3; SMAB. 97; MA. 43-44; Beinier, 172; PAB. 126,

CONCLUSION O? MACE

Action in the army, calculating the possible evil effects
Jting the peace offer, and desirous of releasing alj
Mussalinan prisoners of war, M,ir Jumla reluctantly agreed to
conclude peace. Circumstances, he held, inexorably drifted to
that culmination and a speedy conclusion of peace and prompt
return he felt to be “ proper and best for all. But even in
that distressed state Mir Jumla wanted to make it clear that
he could still advance further and ordered that the preliminaries
of peace would be made at Tipam. His envoy, Kbwaja Bhor
Mai, conferred with the Phukans, the authorised agents of the
Raja. The terms of the treaty of peace were finally drawn up
through the mediation of Dilir Khan (Treaty of Ghilajari
Ghat, January, 1663),?

Mir Jumla may well claim to have secured “ Peace with
Honour ”. Firstly, the prestige of the empire was kept up.
and that of the Ahom Raja humbled, Jayadhwaj agreed to
“ rule as a vassal ” of the Emperor, to send an ambassador to
the court of the Mughal pro-consul at Gauhati, and to remain
obedient to his feudal lord. 8 9 He also agreed to send at once
his daughter and the sons of the Raja of Tipam to the imperial
court. Secondly, a huge war indemnity was exacted, from the
king. He was required to pay immediately 20,000 tolas of
gold, 1,20,000 tolas of silver, and make over 20 dressed
elephants for the Emperor, 15 for Mir Jumla and 5 for Dilir
Khan. Moreover, he agreed to pay next year 3,00,000 tolas of
silver, and 90 elephants in three instalments. Thirdly, the
sons of the Burha Gohain, the Bar Gohain, the Garhgaonia
Phukan and the Bar Patra Phukan, the four pillars of the
Ahom Kingdom, were to be sent as hostages, pending the
payment of the indemnity in instalments. Fourthly, the Raja

8. FI. 148-9; 152-3; SMAB. xxiii; AB. 21-2. Glanius, 174-5 ( Dilir’s
persuasions ). Mir Jumla sent some provisions to the Baja, so as to
alarm him by showing that he had enough for his army and to spare.
The Baja understood the “General’s design’' but though unwilling to
surrender himself, he expressed his willingness to agree to reasonable
terms. ( Glanius 172-3 ).

9. B. II (b), 1-5; SMAB, 100.

LIFE OF MIR JTTMI-A

pj agreed to pay in future an annual tribute of 20 elephan
fifthly, there was considerable expansion of the eastern limits
•of the Mughal Empire. The Raja had to cede to the Mughals
for the first time more than half of the province of Darrang in
the (Jttarkol, abounding in elephants, and the kingdom of
ISiakti Rani, adjoining the Garo hills, Beltala and Dimarua in
the Dakhinkol. The boundaries of the Mughal empire in the
east were extended to the Bharali and the Kallang rivers in the
northern and southern banks of the Brahmaputra respectively.
Lastly, the Ahom king agreed to release the captives carried off
from the Mughal dominion in Kamrup and also the imprisoned
family of the Badiili Phukan. 10

Mir Jumla sent to Aurangzeb Jayadhwaj's letter of
submission. The Emperor ratified the treaty and duly rewarded
Mir Jumla. 11

There were, however, little chances of full implementing of
the terms of peace. Even during Mir Jumla's stay in Assam
disputes arose regarding hostages, payment of indemnity
including elephants, delimitation of frontiers and repatriation
of Ahoms accompanying Mir Jumla. On 5th January, 1663,
the Raja sent the princess, the hostages, gold, silver and 10
elephants to the Mughal camp, and promised to send the

(St

10. FI* 153 56 ( articles drafted by Mir Jumla’s munshi ). The
Ahom Buranjis (B. II (b), 1-5 and SMAB. 100 ) and AN. 808, speak of
the daughter of the Tipam Baja, while Talish speaks of his sons.
Rahamat Banu, an Ahom princess, was married to Prince Md Azam,
MA* 73,

For Nakbi Rani, JBORS- I. 182 n : Desh Beltola, south of Pandu
and Gauhati, Robinson’s map of Kamrup-

For Ahom versions of the peace, see B. II (b). 1*5 (Jayadhwaj’s
proclamation and account of tributes paid to the Padshah); SMAB,
98-102; B- VIII. 93-4 (many valuable ornaments to be paid by the Raja.
Mir Jumla’s piesents to the Raja worth Rs. 15,000) BKK. II. 9 ( Baduli
Phukan at lirst advised Mir Jumla not to make peace, but only after
having a talk with Ahom envoys) The name of the Ahom king’s
daughter is given as Nangchen Gabhru in AB. 22; PAB, 127-8.

11. SMAB. 99-100; Mir Jumla’s letter to Aurangzeb, in Sadhona ,
II. 117.

CONCLUSION OF PEACE

271

of 30 elephants before the army's arrival at Lakhau.
"Mir was keen on having the hostages as stipulated. The
Ahoms had sent the nephew (brother’s son) of the Burha
Gohain instead of his son. On Mir Jumla’s insistence, the letter
came but as he was suffering from small pox, Mir Jumla
demanded another son of the Burha Gohain (by the Baja’s
sister). But as he had died a few days before this, Mir Jumla
demanded one of the two sons of the Bar Phukan (born of a
sister of the Baja). The Phukans refused to yield on this point
as it was not stipulated in the treaty, in spite of the persuasion
of Dilir Khan and Khwajah Bhor Mai. Mir Jumla thought
that the exchange could have been made if Dilir Khan had
been more diligent. Dilir Khan personally came to the General
and ‘‘laboured to file away this baseless displeasure.” 12

12. Payment of indemnity. SMAB. 100-101; B. II. 6-7; Boundary
dispute, SMAB. 102; repatriation of Ahoms. Ibid ; for hostages, FI. 156-8;
for dispute after Mir Jumla’s death, BKK. If. 12-14. 18; B. II. 10-11, 18:
B. VIII. 97-98.

MIN/Styj,

Mir Jumla's Retreat from Assam and Death

jf. Aggravation of the General's illness and his death .

On 10th January Mir Jumla issued the order of return to
Bengal to the intense delight of all. Riding a palanquin, the
sick Nawab retreated directly from Tiparn to Trimohani,
without going to Grarhgaon. He felt better on reaching Lakhau
(22nd January). But he had a relapse at Kajli fort (2nd
February) with occasional difficulty of breathing due to “the
agony of pleurisy and swelling and suffocation under the left
chest.” In the beginning he was treated by the Dutch surgeon,
Gelmar Vorburg, who prescribed for him distilled sulphur for a
week at the rate of 3 or 4 mashas (1/12th of a tola ) a day.
Subsequently on the advice of an English physician, he took
daily 4 mashas of the best treacle (or theriaca) and oil of fennel.
Later still he himself ate Jewish bitumen for a week. The use
of all these hot medicines, against the strong protests of Dr.
Karima, led to an aggravation of all bad symptoms ; difficulty
of breathing and palpitation of the heart grew intense, while
swelling spread from foot to right arm and stomach, and the
patient felt very thirsty. At times there were fits of coughing
and drops of blood came out with the phlegm. “The skill of
the doctor vanished at the appearance of the ulcer of the lungs
and tympany.”

At Baritala (28th February), Mir Jumla's condition grew
alarming. “An excessive burning fever” and a violent cough
indicated the onset of consumption, and “a black burning
blood 5 ' came out of the lungs with the phlegm, which
ultimately changed into pus. He grew so week that ho could
not stand, and began to faint. Physicians came, Hakim Zahir
Ardistani from Hugli, Hakim Mirza Muhammad from the
neighbourhood of Rajmahal, and Hakim Shafia from Dacca.
They expressed, “openly and by hints" that the Nawab had
lost all power of resistance, and that “endeavour for recovery
and search for release”, were “outside the 'Canons of Medicine',.

mt$r# y

THE GENERAL S ILLNESS AND HIS DEATH

Wests/ the Absolute Doctor gives recovery..and

^j/Rgs^ireordained a second life.” All appetite was gone. The
doctors importuned him to drink the broth of crabs. This, too,
he refused after some days. Hakim Zahir now prescribed goat’s
milk as the Nawab's “diet and medicine”, saying that he might
recover if he could digest it, but that death would be hastened
if “looseness of the bowels” set in. Eventually the seoond
alternative came to pass.

Mir Jumla conveyed his last wishes to Mahmud Beg, Mir
Bakhshi : his slaves were to be liberated, his corpse was to be
washed and. shrouded, his bones were to be sent to holy Najf>
and his many possessions in Persia were to be converted into
pious endowments. 1

The doctors suggested a change from Barit ala to Khizrpur.
The Nawab resignedly agreed, saying, “I am nowin your bands
like a boy : do whatever appears best for my good.” On 27th
March, he was placed on a charpai, and taken to a boat, which
glided down the Brahmaputra. Half an hour before sunset on
Wednesday, 2nd Ramzan, 1073/31st March, 1663 (April 11, NS),
the “amir azam, sipahmlar muazzam”, the great noble, great
Commander-in-Chief, died on board the boat, 4 miles above
Khizrpur, “after having performed the two confessions of hath
and whatever else was required by religion.” His bodily
remains, carried that very night to Khizrpur, were interred
the next day by Dilir Khan and Ihtisham Khan temporarily in
the vault which had been constructed at the Nawab’s order
after his starting for Assam. Subsequently they were taken at

27

and

1. FI. 159 (return), 160-2, 165 (Kajli), 168-70 (Baritala); BDB.
(April 8, 1663) in Storia, IV. 430 (Dutch surgeon).

Though all the doctors were agreed that at the beginning tho remedy
had Iain in bleeding, yet they differed on tho diagnosis of the disease.
Hakim Karima held that it was pleurisy; acoording to Hakim Zahir
hectic lever developed into consumption; Mirza Muhammad diagnosed
the case to be one of dropsy and ulcer of lungs. Ordinary people and
the Assamese believed that the Nawab was enchanted by tho shooting
of a magical arrow by the Raja. (FI. 169-’70).

18

MiN/sr^

LIFE OF MIR JTJMLA

orders, to the imperial court by Ihtisham Kha
is silent as to whether they were carried to Najf
to his testament. No tomb of Mir.Jpmla has yet
been traced in India.

§L

2. Administrative and Military problems during
Mir Jumla’s retreat.

Mir Jumla’s retreat was methodically planned and skilfully
executed. Indeed with a less consummate General the retreat
of the imperial army would have been a disaster. The Ahoms
did not treacherously fall upon the Mughals, But the General
took all precautions to guard against that contingency ; Qasim
Beg Baruti formed the rearguard of the army, and escorts were
arranged wherever necessary. Subsequent modifications of
such original arrangements were, however, inevitable. Stern
orders were passed forbidding the Mughal soldiers to oppress
the Ahom ryots or to plunder their goods and family during
their return. 2 3

2. FI. 170-17 T , 172 (last rites); Cont , 106b; Z.NA. 106; AN.8I2,

Bernier, 173; fitoria, II. 101; BDR. 1663. p. 424 (Sept. 3) in Storici, IV.
430. The exact place where Mir Jumla’s death took place is not known.
Talish only says that it was 4 miles distant from Khizrpur. Two
Assamese sources mention Bagaribari (SMAB 102) and Kola (B. VIII,
95) but they cannot be identified near Khizrpur. The chronogram of his
death is given by Mnsnad arae Bihist or ’occupant of paradise’, A.H
1073.

3. Contemporary European writers concur in stating that Mir Jumla
admirably conducted the army to safety in spite of the grave dangers
and difficulties like floods, want of provisions, pursuit by the Raja and
slaughter by ambuscades of the Ahoms (Bernier, 172; Storia, II. 101;
Glanius, 181-2). But Talish does not say a single word about these dan¬
gers during the Geheral’s return, except once in the Kajli wilderness
and that alsp about food shortage. He even plainly admits: “If the
Assamese had intended treachery, the men of the thanas oil the road,—
none of whom was at a distance of less than one day’s journey—would
not have performed the said work (of keeping the roads open).*’ FI.
161-2, 160 (Qasim Beg and prohibition of plunder).

MINlSr^

PROBLEMS DURING MIR JFMLA's RETREAT

e of the pressing tasks before the General was the sa:
oval of imperial property from Garhgaon. Even before his
departure he had urged Mir Murtaza to join Ibn Husain speedily
and sent instructions to both about the transport of articles.
But as the boats sent by the Admiral were insufficient for the
purpose, Mir Murtaza had to procure more boats. So he could
not meet the Nawab at Trimohani as arranged. Again,
Muhammad Murad Beg could not come to escort Mir Murtaza
as originally planned. Hence without waiting at Trimohani
for Mir Murtaza. Mir Jumla ordered that the thanctdars of
Sairing, Gajpur and Dewalgaon should esoort Mir Murtaza to
Lakhau,

There Mir Jumla waited for a few days (22nd-28th January),
Mir Murtaza also came there with all men and property. But
the Ahoms did not deliver the balance of 25 elephants of the
current year's tribute. So Mir Jumla stationed Dilir Khan and
the entire fleet at Lakhau for collecting the elephants within 10
days. In case of the Raja's failure to deliver them, Dilir would
return to Mir Jumla and the war would be renewed next year
or another year with full preparations. 4

Mir Jumla could not wait longer at Lakhau. Various
pressing problems still demanded his attention and the rainy
season was near at hand,—the settlement of the affairs of the
newly annexed districts of Darrang, Dimarua and others, the
administration of Gauhati, the chastisement of the Raja of
Kuch Bihar and its annexation. Arranging that the main
army would go on land along the Dakhinkol to a place
opposite Baritala and cross the Brahmaputra, the General
left Lakhau with the hostages on a boat and reached Kaliabar
(30th January), where he interviewed Sayyid Husain (son-in-
law of Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan) and Shaikh Muhammad
Sadiq. They were asked to accompany Dilir Khan in his
return march, together with all elephants caught before or after.
Dilir arrived at Pandu with 8 elephants (12th February),
leaving some men at Lakhau to bring the remaining elephants. 5

4. FI. 156, 161*3.

5. FI. 162 (problems), 163-4 (to Kaliabar), 167 (Dilir).

MIN ISTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA.

•taem

mother problem was that of the Ahom emigrants to Beng
j^d it caused some friction between Mir Jumla and the Ahoms
To the Raja’s remonstrance asking Mir Jumla to prohibit them
following the army, the latter replied that he was not taking
any one forcibly, but that he had not forbidden those who
accompanied the Mughal army of their free choice. At
Trimohani he witnessed many Kusas “full of Mussulmans and
Assamese”, coming from Garhgaon. Here some ryots of
Kamrup, prisoners in Namrup and its environs, and the released
members of the family of the Baduli Phukan, joined Mir Jumla.
Many Assamese, male and female, voluntarily came along with
Mir Murtaza from Garhgaon to Lakhau. 6

An additional cause of dispute arose over the question of
delimitation of frontiers. The Ahoms wanted to follow the
terms of the treaty of 1638 and fix the river Asurar Ali in the
south and the Barnadi in the north. But Mir Jumla insisted
on the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty of 1663, i.e., the
Kajli in the south and the Bharali in the north. On 30th
January he started from Kaliabar in a palanquin, inspected
the annexed portions of Dimarua, fixed the boundaries as
above and crossed the wilderness of Kajli, which had not been
traversed by any previous Mughal army.

Here with the help of the local people, he had the jungles
cleared and a road constructed on which 5 or 6 horsemen could
ride abreast. Covering 34 koa in 4 days, during which “no
fodder could be procured except grass and no food except
water”, he orossed the Kali ang by boat and halted at the foot
of the Kajli Fort. 7

(St

6. FI. 160, 161, 162. PAB. 128. According to Talish, some
Mussalmans and a few Assamese of the Namrup area willingly
accompanied tho Mughal army. We read in SMAB. 102, that Mir Jumla .
carried with him about 12,000 Ahoms, including the Ahom deserters.
This renders the charge of the Assam chronicles that many Ahoms wore
taken by tho Mughals forcibly (B. VIII. 94-95) very weak. The number
of boats conveying the army and tho Assamese emigrants probably
exceeded 32,000 (FI. 64; JBORS. I. 192),

7. SMAB. 102 (boundary dispute); FI. 164 ( to Kajli ). There were
‘‘unlimited and countless herding grounds of strongly built elephants’*
at Kajli.

MIN/Sr*

PROBLEMS DURING MIR JUMLA S RETREAT

Mir Jumla had also to deal with the feudatory chiefs of
Assam. At Kajii (2nd—11th February), Mir Jumla granted
interviews to the mother of Makaradhwaj, Raja of Darrang,
(who had died in Assam) and rewarded her (9th February)
for guarding the road against the Ahoms and for her other
services rendered to Muhammad Beg, faujdar of Gauhati,
during the rainy season. The General also put the tilca of
kingship on the forehead of the 12 year old boy of the Raja.
On the same day Mir Jumla granted an interview to the
mother of the Raja of Dimarua, the most important of all
Zamindars of Dakhinkol, but disbelieved her excuse that her
son could not come on account of illness. All who had come
to see Mir Jumla took leave of him at Pandu. 8

Despite his serious illness at Pandu (11th February) Mir
Jumla arranged for the administration of Kamrup. He streng¬
thened its defences and appointed (12th February) Rashid Khan
its faujdar and Muhammad Khalil Bakhshi and Waqianavis ,
and placed the hostages in charge of the former. A picket of
J00 men and 40 warships were stationed with Rashid, while
another small force and 10 ships with Muhammad Beg at
Kajii. Mir Sayyid Muhammad diwan was ordered (11th
February) : (a) to distribute land in the ,iarkar of Kamrup
to the ryots, who had been carried off by the Ahoms as pri¬
soners and now released, and to the voluntary emigrants from
Assam, and (b) to employ in the imperial service some able
artisans, handicraftsmen and artillery-men, as stipend-holders.
The diwan was specially ordered to give the Baduli Phukan
a pargana yielding 3,000 mds. of paddy in one of the sarkars
of Bengal. 9

Mir Jumla reached Baritala, commanding the road to Kuch
Bihar (28th February), and was joined after 6 or 6 days by the
remainder of the Assam army, and also by Isfandiyar Khan,
Askar Khan and Raja Bahroz, who had been waiting at the

S, FI. 164*7 ( brother’s son of the Raja of Dimania was asked to
send his uncle quickly ), 140 ( services ).

9. FI. 167-8; Storia , H. 101 ( Hajo ); Bernier, 173; B. VIII. do;
SMAB. 102 ( hostages ); AB. 23; PAB. 129.

MINlSr^

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<8L

frontier of Ohoragliat and Kuch Bihar. Though his illness was
on the increase, “his sense of honour forbade him to pass by
the neighbourhood of that country and to go back to Jahan-
girnagar (Dacca) without conquest*'. He got a litter prepared
for himself so that whenever he felt better, he would proceed
on it to Kuch Bihar. However, as his condition grew alarm-
ingly worse, he was forced to abandon the idea of invading
Kuch Bihar himself and selected Dilir Khan for executing that
task with the assistance of Askar Khan and Raja Bahroz.
The General himself would stay at Baritala until the arrival
of the Khan and the completion of the conquest of Kuch
Bihar. Subsequently, when he was medically advised to go to
Khizrpur, he changed his plan and commissioned Askar Khan
to undertake that work. 10

2. Significance of Mir Jumla’s Assam Campaign and
causes of Ms success against the Ahoms.

The last campaign of Mir Jumla was also the greatest one of
his life. It was the -first and the last expedition, waged on
behalf of the Mughal Empire, which extended its eastern
frontier far into Assam. It marked, indeed, the culmination of
the north-eastern push attempted by the Muslim conquerors
and rulers since the time of Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammad ibn
Bakhtiyar. In reality the campaign was a remarkable military
exploit. Mir Jumla succeeded where Muhammad bin Tughlak
of Delhi and Alauddin Hussain Shah of Bengal had signally
failed. Even in Jahangir’s reign the Mughal invasion of Assam
was initially successful, but ultimately a failure. In reply to
the Assamese peace offers after the capture of Solagarh, Mir
Jumla is said to have answered that the Raja should not
regard the expedition as the petty expeditions of former chiefs,
whose victory was soon changed into defeat. * 11 Shihabuddin
Talish observes : “In the past no (foreign) king could lay the

10. FI. 168,170-1.

11. FI. 40-1-

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASSAM CAMPAIGN

(1 of conquest oven on the fringe of this country, and no
foreigner could tread it with the foot of invasion. 1 "

Mir Jumla was able to recover Mughal Kamrup within the
the brief space of one month and even that mysterious and
dreadful country of Assam 13 fell prostrate before him within
barely two months and a half. Indeed, Mir Jumla s advance
from Kuch Bihar to the Ahom capital was a sort of a “triumphal
march”. The Ahom king had mustered his army at Samdhara,
“the key to his dominions”, thinking that it would be, as it had
been in former expeditions, the farthest point of the advance of
the imperial army. 14 JRut Mir Jumla penetrated almost into the
eastern end of the country which had, in the past, proved to be
the grave of am bition of many a king and conqueror. He even
hoped to explore a route to China and Pegu, and it is possible
that the reinforcements referred to by the Dutch surgeon 16
were intended for imperialist expansion in those lands. It is
true that the imperial army was isolated for six months, during
which it had, 4 to undergo endless troubles and privations. But
that was due to floods, famine and pestiienoe, none of which
Mir Jumla could have averted. This is to be certainly admitted
that his army had never to own defeat at the hands of the
Ahoms. It is significant that their over-awed ruler was
compelled to write a letter to the Bmperor of Delhi,
acknowledging submission to his authority, a humiliation
unprecedented on the part of any previous Ahom king. 16 Mir
Jumla’^ name was long remembered in Assam, as is clear from
the couplet ^associated with it in the Assamese Buranjis. 17

Inspired by the memory of their previous successes, the
Ahoms entertained hopes of victory over the invaders. Mir
Jumla at first did not expect to get correct information of the

12. Ibid., 57, 59, 52.

13. cf. FI. 3.

14. FI. 28.

15. Storia y II. 98; Sioria , IV, 430.

U . FI. 41-2.

17, “Short and robust Majum Khan, with rounded board in his face,
First will vanquish Gooch Behar* to Gauhati then he’ll pace”. (SMAB,
92). Of. Storia. II. 101; vidt Aurangzib , III. 180-1 n.

LIFE OF MIR JtTMLA

,<SL

try from the local zamindars. Yet the resistance of
ioms was everywhere feeble : they either declined an
engagement or were routed with heavy slaughter : the only
pitched battles they fought were at Pancharatan and Simiagarh.
True, the Ahoms were put to great disadvantage by the
pestilence which broke out among the defenders of Jogigupha
and by the delay in the arrival of reinforcements of the garrison
at Srighat. But if the defenders had held their own firmly till
the approach of the rainy season, the Mughala, as Talish himself
admits, would not have been able to capture a single fort. 18

The Ahoms were reputed for their courage and military

tactics ; they were ever vigilant ; like the hearts of their heroes,
their forts were “granite-based”, and they had men, money and
materials necessary for successful prosecution of war. Even
Mir Jumla was struck with wonder at the strength of some
of their forts especially Simiagarh and at the efficacy of
Ahom artillery and gun-powder. But men, arras and
ammunitions, provisions and materials did not prove to be of
; any avail without the guidance of a supreme leSider, who alone

could infuse a dynamic force into them. The delinquency of
King Jayadhwaj of Assam, who fled .ignoininously from his
capital even before the arrival of the General, earned for him
the notorious epithet 'Bhaganiya Raja’ or Deserting King.
Tims the remarks of Cunningham about the Sikhs during the
First Sikh War, may be equally applicable to the Ahoms in
1061- 62 : “Hearts to dare and hands to execute were numerous
but there was no mind to guide and animate the whole.” 19

I he evacuation of the well-fortified posts in Kamrup formed

no part of a deliberate policy of strategic retreat, but was the

direct outcome of defection among the Ahom commanders in
charge of the garrisons from the Monas to Gauhati. Incensed

18. SMAB. xxii (hopes of victory); FI. 18-19 (information), 24 (fear
among Ahoms).

, • 19. Testimony,; of Mulfa Darvish of Herat* regardingthe Ahoms as

%hters, in FI. 52.8,90,J)5 (jrBQRS,.I v l.M, , 188 . 192 3,; .JTH,. 371 ;
Delinquency of the. Ahom king, in JIH. V, 371-73: Cunningham, HS. 357.

CAUSES OF MIR JUMLA’s SUCCESS

e appropriation of the rich spoils found in Mughal Kamrujr
iv fchc Ahora captor of Gauhati, Tangchu Sandhikui, the Raja
had appointed a non-Ahom, Manthir Bharali llarua, a Hindu
Kayastha of the Bejdoloi family, commander of the Lower
Assam army- So the other Ahom generals remained sullen
and inactive and retreated from fort to fort, remarking: “Let
the Bejdoloi now come and fight”. The greatest malcontent
Ahom noble was the king’s father-in-law, Kajshahur
Barphukan. Rebelling against the king, he secretly helped
Mir Jumla in his advance specially in the Nowgong district. 20
Deserters began to stream into the Mughal ranks, after the
fall of Simlagarh and evacuation of Kamdhara and it was the
Ahoms who guided the Mughal General on to Lakhau and
Garhgaon, 21 assisted him in the occupation of villages after the
capture of the Ahom capital and in the exhumation of the
graves. The unknown Dutch sailor in Mir .Jumla s army did
not greatly exaggerate the case, when, in testimony to the loss
of morale of the Ahoms, he observes : “As soon as we were in
the Enemy’s oountry, a general consternation seized upon them,
and the feme of Nabob’s fortune, caused infinite numbers of
the Enemy’s subjects to come over to his side, as the surest
Mir Jumla’s tact, just and humane treatment of the Ahom
peasantry and prohibition of plunder by the Mughals on the
Ahoms, and his instructions to his tfumadars to endeavour to

reconcile the peaceful local people, served to overcome popular
opposition. On many occasions it was the local inhabitants,
who, terrified at collective slaughter of the contumacious

villagers, willingly handed over several leaders to the Mughals.

Absconding villagers, who had abandoned their habitations in
pursuance of the Ahom policy of starving the invaders, willingly
returned and the Mughals continued to get supplies from them.
Thus the Assam war could not become a full-fledged people s
war. Sometimes Mir Jumla received valuable information
about the Ahom Baja's stores also from Muhammadan
inhabitants in Assam, especially those of Garhgaon.

20. SMAB. 93-4, xxii (disaffection among.Ahom nobles); AB- 1% -0-

21. For Ahom guides, BKK, C74-fy. ,. i •- : i.. i. 1 e ' . .

22 Glanius, 150 (loss of morale)..

MiNisr^

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

fir Jumla was ably served by a band of resolute lieutena
^ Dilir Khan Daudzai, 23 who proved to be an “associate of

victory'" everywhere, the ever vigilant Farhad Khan, the
resourceful Ibn Husain, the patient Mir Murtaza, the humane
Mahmud Beg, the dashing Rashid Khan, the discreet Yadgar
Khan Uzbeg, besides other faithful officers and captains. Again,
no other General could have retained such an effective control
over his men as Mir Juinla did. His generalship, strategy,
discipline, and his sharing of the privations of the war,
pestilence and famine with one and all, ensured the unit} r of
command in the Mughal army and general goodwill among the
soldiers. His coolness and prudence in times of crisis, his
promptitude in the conducting of campaigns and in despatching
reinforcements wherever and whenever necessary, his orga¬
nising skill during the dark days of the rainy season of 1662,
all combined to save the vast imperial army from disaster.
Mir Jumla was supremely methodical: there was method in his
advance, method in his struggling through the rainy season
and method in his retreat. His unshakable resolution foiled
the ceaseless activities of the Baduli Phukan and impressed
upon the latter the futility of further struggle against him.

Nay, what was more, the Baduli Phukan even deserted his
master, joined Mir Jumla, and raising a local levy of 3 to 4
thousand men, guided the General to Solaguri and Tipam. His
example was followed by Jagatram Deka, Ragbunath Majumdar
and his son Manobar, Uddab Duaria and Dangdhara, and
others who stipulated to “deliver this country"* to Mir Jumla in
return of being made “Nawabs along with the Baduli”. Mir
Jumla tactfully replied : “You shall get what you have desired
after I have received tangible proof of your co-operation and
support’. Even Manthir Bharali Barua himself joined the
Mughal General, and promised to make over Jayadhwaj to him
after disclosing some secrets. But his conspiracy being detected,
he was executed under orders of the King. 34

23. MU. Eng. Tr. I. 498.

24. SMAB 97-98, lxix, xxiti; AB. 21, “Half the men left the kins;’',
acc. to BKK. II. 6-8 (list of deserters). FAB. 126.

misT^r

CAUSES OF MIR JUMLA S SUCCESS

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Mir Jumla's success
was won at a high cost, and it entailed, as has been already
noted, enormous sufferings on the army. Referring to its
pitiable condition during the rainy season of 1662, Talish
significantly remarks that “imprisonment by water is harder
than imprisonment in iro n\ lh Moreover, the new acquisitions,
the fruits of such sufferings, were lost to the Empire after the
Mir’s death. Though he cannot be blamed for that, his own
waqia navis names his account “Fathiyya i ibriyya” (Rook of
Victories which serve as warning). 26

25. FI. 3,

26 * Ibid., 5 .

MIN ISTffy

CHAPTER Vfll

>

CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT

i. Mir Jumla as a man.

Though there is no detailed contemporary description of
t>he figure and personality of the man, whose history has been
traced in the proceeding pages, incidental references in certain
contemporary sources enable us to form some idea of these.
We read in a general report sent to Aurangzeb by Muhammad
Mumin, the Mughal ambassador to Mir Jumla in 1653-54, that
be possessed “a pleasing countenanceand m a medium
stature A decade later Assamese accounts described him as
44 short and robust Majum Khan with a rounded beard on his
face While fighting the battle near Belghata during the
War of Succession, Mir Jumla put on a coat of mail and a cap
made of Chinese steel and carried two swords, a shield, a quiver
and a long bow (Kaman Kiyan). When on horseback he, with
his wrinkled forehead and an angry mien, looked like Azar-
gashp* 1

Though an adventurer, Mir Jumla was a polished naan of
high education, well-versed in the Quran and the Hadith,
and with full command over the Persian language. His
correspondence hears clear evidence of his erudition and
scholarship. At Golkonda he belonged to the literary circle of
its Peshwa, Nawab Allami Fahmi Shaikh Muhammad. Rightly
does Shihabuddin Talish describe him “ as a master of the
sword and the pen . He was an excellent speaker too.
Possessed of fine gifts of oratory and a superb mastery over
mob psychology, he delivered a spirited speech before the vaci¬
llating imperial army at Dogachi after the desertion of the
Prince.

1. A dab, 39 a; SMAB. 92. Poetn, 332 (white beard). F<?r references
to portraits of Mir Jumla, see Bibliography, Sec. G.

MIR JUMLA AS A MAJT

ulated his tone of expression to make his argument
ve according to the needs of the hour. He had some
knowledge of medicine too, and we find him taking Jewish
bitumen himself during his illness. 2

Trained in the school of adversity, Mir Jumla developed
certain sterling qualities of character which contributed
immensely to his future success in life, viz., strong determination,
sell-reliance, ambition, enterprise, thrift, quickness of apprehen¬
sion and ability to make the best use of any situation or
station in life. A man of varied interests, ranging from shoes
to diamonds, and from trade to war and government, and
dealing with various peoples, the Hindu Tamils and Telugus,
the Muhammadan Deccanis and Mughals, the Dutch, the
English, the Portuguese and the Danes, he was polite and
amiable in his dealings with others. 3 .Bowrey truly observes :
“ He was an absolute lover and a most Indulgent Prince to all
Ingenuous men, very charitable and a real lover of the English
nation, all in general (that ever knew him) were Enamoured
with his perfections, and a great many admired him in a great
measure, Esteeming© him as the glorious mirror of all Princely
Graces ” 4 . Tavernier bears witness to his hospitality and
sociability. At Gandikota (3rd September 1652, NS), the Mir
received Tavernier and his party well enquiring if they had
been “ comfortably housed ” and supplied with food and fodder
for their horses. He offered them betel, two bottles of wine.

2. Correspondence, Tabrezi, 74b, 77b. 78a-b, 79a; Pr. IHBC. (1942),
197; Power of his pen in MM. 9b; Literary circle, HS. 361 ; Pr. IHC.
(1940). 266-7; FI. 2: GD; Speech, Poem , 190-4; See ante, Ch. V. Sec.
0. § 6; Illness, Oh, VII. Sec. E.

3. Thevenot, 102 (ambition), Bowrey, 152n (thrift); Adah, 39a
(politeness); the English factors sometimes spoke ill of Mir Jumla (cf.

“a miserable covetous person, a friend to the Dutch.......EFI.

X. 205), But they were, as Sir William Foster truly observes, “prejudiced
witnesses” (ibid., 4-6). Indeed Mir Jumla showed due civility and
reasonable attitude towards the Bengal factors (ibid., 286, 288). See
also ante, Ch. 2 Sec. C.

4. Bowrey, 144-5.

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

/Spanish and the other of Shiraz, which was rare in Indii
invited them to dinner and a hunting excursion. ’

. Mir Jumla was a man of deep religious convictions, as is
clear from his intention to go to Mecca after the conquest of
Gandikota and from his last, wishes. The Poem describes him
as dinpanah (protector of religion). We get an inkling of his
experiments with spiritualism from his letters to Mirza Jalal, in
which he describes himself as his “religious brother” and seeks
his guidance. On his return from Mathurapur to Garhgaon in
Assam, he halted at a royal palace to offer his prayers. He had
a supreme conviction in the existence of God and belief in a
future life. After the dreadful loss of lives in fording the river
Mahananda south of Bholahat, Mir Jumla is said to have
exclaimed: “What justification shall I offer to God and the
Prophet ? Without God's mercy I shall certainly go to hell”.
During the critical skirmish at Dogachi, he prayed to God to
save “the honour of his white beard,” and assured his soldiers
that as “a descendant of the Prophet and Ali,” he would never
flee from the field. 5 6 He was a fatalist too. During the above
mentioned skirmish, he encouraged and exhorted his soldiers
to fight, saying that men would live so long as they were fated
to do, and that they could not die of war, unless it was so
decreed. His letter of condolence to Nawab Mustafa Khan of
Bijapur on the death of the latter s eldest son clearly illustrates
his spirit of resignation to divine will. “Time,” he wrote,
“inflicts some wounds on man's mind. One comes before

another is healed up..Inscrutable are the ways of

.Providence. We have to be patient.The decrees of

Fate cannot be annulled even with the greatest human endea¬
vour.” 7

There were, however, as is usual with most men, some
weaknesses in Mir Jumla’s character. He was not altogether
free from vanity. On his way from Haidarabad to Delhi in

5 Ball’s Tavernier,.!. 286-7, 293-

6 Tabrezi, 67a-88a (Mecca), 78a-b (Mirza Jalal); FI, 134 (prayer);
Poem, 271 (dinpanah), 480f (fording), 364-5 (Dogachi).

7. Poem , 364-5 (Dogachi), 205-6; Tabrezi, 74b (letter to Mustafa).

MIK JUMLA AS A STATESMAN

28

father of Bara, while he, on his side, could never find
“a kindlier father" than the Mir and accepted him as hi 3
guardian or “protector". This language puffed up Mir Jumla,
who became “very friendly" with the Prince and pledged his
word “to support him with his entire strength and his life."
Sometimes his egotism proved to be a cause of his discomfiture.
Elated with his initial success in the campaign against Shuja in
Bengal, he committed a grave mistake in despising the enemy
and not taking due precaution regarding the latter’s movements
or against his strength, with the result that he met with a
signal failure on 3rd May, 1859. 8

2. Mir Jumla as a statesman.

Mir J umla possessed in the fullest measure all those qualities
which go to make a successful minister of state. His intelligence,
foresight, penetrating discernment and administrative
experience won for him the epithets of the Asaf of the Age
(Asafud dauran), and the ‘Plato of the Age’ and he came to be
compared to Khizr. 9 A man of infinite capacity, indefatigable
industry, and fine organising skill, and master of even the
minutest details, he could exercise a careful supervision over
different aspects of the administration and be thorough, prompt
and efficient in the discharge of administrative duties. 10 In
Maasir ul Umara , he is justly described as “without a peer
among the contemporary nobles" for his great administrative
abilities and various other qualities. Tavernier, an eye-witness,

8. Storia, I, 236-7 (Mir Jumla won over by Aurangzob), ch. V. Sec,
C. § 3 (failure of May). The Ahom Buranjis also bear evidence to Mir
Jumla\s vanity (PB. IHQ. V. 475).

9. HS. 530, 535 (Asaf); Poem , 142-5 (Khizr); 125, 361 (Plato). John
Campbell describes him as “the wisest man in Hindustan”. (IA. 1906. p.

133).

10. For industry vide Ch. I. § 3 ante (construction of Hayat Mahal
Palace) and Ch. V ante (exertion at Malda); for prompt discharge of
administrative duties, Ch. II. Sec. B. ante f trial of criminals at
Garidikota).

LIFE OF MIR JtJMLA

s a tribute of admiration, to Mir Jumki/s eonsummaf
bility: “I have had occasion to speak to him several time*?,
arid T have admired the firmness and the promptitude with
which he responded to requests presented to him, giving'his
orders in every direction, and signing several despatches as if
he had but one sole matter to attend to." 11 His rebellion
against Sultan Qutb Shah of Golkonda and his advice to
Aurangzeb during the Bijapur campaign and on the eve ol the
commencement of the War of Succession illustrate his
marvellous foresight, efficiency, cool calculation and discretion.
Shrewd, tactful and possessed of “requisite prudence” and
power of concealing secrets, 12 Mir Jumia was indeed a “fit
servant” for Aurangzeb. 13

European writers like Bernier and Tavernier have accused
Mir Jumia of treachery. 14 It is true that he deserted two out
of his three masters in India. But the mere fact of change of
loyalties does not prove that he was innately treacherous. His
open desertion of Sultan Qutb Shah was not due to any sinister
motive nourished in secret, but to the primary need of self-
preservation against a wrathful and capricious master, bent on
his destruction. Also, in his failure to respond to the imperial
summons, legally tantamount to desertion of Emperor Shah-
jahan, he was impelled by the same desire of self-preservation,
besides adherence to his pledge to Aurangzeb. There is, how¬
ever, no doubt, that his actions were sometimes characterised
by opportunism, secretiveness and duplicity, but resort to

11. M.TJ. III. 555; Ball, I. 170. Ch. II, Sec B. § 2 contains further
accounts of Mir Jumia by Tavernier.

12. Storia, 1 . 237; cf. Aurangzeb’s observation: “I have not seen any
efficient person like Mir Jumia. In wisdom he excels Kings; in bravery
he resembles Gudarz and Piran”. Pown, 279-80. Gudarz was one of the
kings of Ashkanian dynasty. Piran was cue of the generals of Afiasiyab.
Dow rightly remarks, (III, 327) “He was calculated for the intrigues of
the cabinet as well as for the stratagems of the field”,

13. Bruce, II. 33; cf. Dow’s observet.ion (III, 182), that Aurangzeb
“found him, upon trial, a fit instrument for his ambition”,

14. Ball, I, 357-9, 360, 362; Bernier, 169-70, Thevenot, Oh, 8. 102;
Storia, II, 102, 289.

MIN ISTfy

MIR J VMLA i AS A STATESMAN

tatio trickery at times of the gravest danger to one's
life, family or property should not be construed as sins
of commission, specially when his opponents were unscrupulous
and formidable. 16 As a matter of fact, when circumstances
were not opposed to him, Mir Jumla was sincere and honest
and his promises could be implicity relied on. Before his
estrangement from Qutb Shah, he did serve that Sultan faith¬
fully and the latter also described him as his “chosen and
fortunate servant, giving satisfaction to whom would mean
keeping the Sultan pleased.” 16 Though he loyally served the
cause of Aurangzeb since his appointment to the imperial
service, he never gave Shahjahan any reason to regret the
confidence reposed in him. Further, his fidelity towards
Aurangzeb may be tested by the touchstone of the latter's
implicit confidence in his counsel and judgment, especially
during the Bijapur campaign and the War of Succession, At
Khajwa he was the confidential advisor and righthand man
of Aurangzeb. 17 Rightly does the Rozbihani follower of Mir
Jumla describe him as Ruhn id Khilafat (pillar of the Empire)
and the ‘'best of all councillors”. In a similar strain ^Talish
calls him “the prop of supreme royalty” Indeed, Mir Jumla
was honoured with so many titles that he was aptly described
as “Independent of Titles” (mwtaghni alqab ). 18

As an administrator, Mir Jumla was undoubtedly handi¬
capped by some unfavourable circumstances beyond his control.
Almost everywhere his government was necessarily of a military
nature, concerned with increasing the financial resources and
attempting to maintain law and order, but otherwise continu¬
ing the older system with little or no modification. In the
Karnatak he was at first pre-occupied with pressing .military

15. Ch. III. ante (fbr rebellion against Qutb Shah) ,* Oh. IV. Sec. 4
{for defiance of imperial summons) ; A dab, 39 (duplicity).

16. Tabrezi, 35a-36&.

17. EFI. X. 4-5: AN (Khajwa): Ball, I. 170, cf. Stori/^l I. 101-102
(fidelity).

18. Poem , 134-8: cf. Aurangzeb’s Jarman to Mir Jumla and Mir’s
reply, ibid., 269-76.•27(5-79 ; FI. 2*3. The Maasir ul Umara , (III. 565)
describes him as the maker of princes.

19

LITE OF MIfi JUMLA

Jems and considerations of self-defence, and subseque
l&o 1656 he was an absentee proprietor. From Bengal, too, be
had to be absent for nearly half the terra of his viceroyalty.
Nevertheless, it roust be admitted that everywhere his govern¬
ment was strict, thorough and methodical. In the conquered
countries consolidation kept pace with conquest and Mir Jumla
very wisely followed the policy of combining firmness with
moderation. By adequately providing for the welfare of the
ryots and strictly enforcing his orders against oppression
and plunder on the part of the solidiery, Mir Jumla earned a
great reputation as a man of integrity and imperial justice,
and as a protector of subjects. In fact, the salutary influence
of his character and personality contributed to the peculiar
excellence of his government. After his departure from the
Karnatak there were the “Hindu Revolt” and the friction of
his officers with the English factors. His absence from Kuch
Bihar was followed by the oppression on the part of the local
officers which excited the people there to throw off the Mughal
yoke. The removal of his eagle-eyed supervision from Bengal
caused, a general wave of laxity and disorder in that province.
The infusion of a new spirit of discipline and efficiency into
the administration was indeed the most remarkable achieve¬
ment of Mir Jumla, who also deserves much credit for his
laudable attempt to secure the reconciliation of the peasants
and other subjects to his rule.

Mir Jumla has to his credit some public works of utility,
both in the Deccan and in Bengal. Permanent traces of his
influence in this respect were comparatively few in Northern
India beoause of his shorter stay there than in the Deccan.
Telingana, where he lived long, contained some of liis memo-
sials. A tank, a garden and a mansion at Haidarabad bore his
name. Saidabad, a village 16 miles distant from Haidarabad
grow under his care and patronage and came to be known as the
pdta of Mir Jumla. The Mir not only improved the condition

19 , Jesfion, the English factor at Agra wrote to the Surat authorities
(.loth August, 1650) about Mir Jumla, “Tie reported hee does good
justice."EFI. X. 71. '

Mm JUMLA AS A GENERAL

road leading to the Gandikota fort, but also construoi
some buildings of the fort, including the Jama Masjid. A
brick-built bridge, constructed under Mir Jumla's orders over
the Pagla river near Dacca in Bengal struck Tavernier as “a
fine’' construction (January 13, 1666. N. S). 20

3* Mir Jumla as a General .

Great as an administrator, Mir Jumla was also a general of
superior calibre. Tavernier describes him as “one of the
greatest captains who had ever migrated from Persia to India.”
The historian Aqil Khan is not guilty of any exaggeration when
he writes that the Mir was “experienced in the art of general¬
ship, the chief among the veterans in the realm of command
and conversant with the laws of conquering countries/' The
Rozbihani follower of Mic Jumla rightly calls him the Sipahdar
i pir and “the best of soldiers.” Bowrey describes him as “a
great and politic warrior.” 21 Combining intrepidity with
wisdom, energy with caution and resolution with efficiency,
Mir Jumla made quick decisions and enforced them promptly.
The unnamed Dutch sailor, writing of Mir Jumla’s campaign
in Assam pays a great compliment to his tenacity of purpose
and unflinching zeal by observing that “the greatness of the
danger served only to heighten bis courage.” Again disaster
spurred him on to make greater effort to realise his aims. After
his failure at the frontal assault on Shuja at Suti in May, 1651),
Mir Jumla is said to have avowed, “If I fail to avenge my
heroes, then I am not a true descendant of the Prophet/’ His
stubborn fight during the skirmish at Dogachi against heavy

20; MTJ. III. 655; QN. 90; MM. 7a-10b (palace at Haidnr&bad, 1041,
vide Oh. I. ante. fn. 13); Waris, 110a (Saidabad); Crooke’s Tav. I. 120-1 ;
Ball, I. 284, and ASK. (1930-34). pp. 42-3 (Gandikota) ; Bail. I. 128-9
(bridge near Dacca). For the Gandikota mosque, “one of the largest-
mosques’* in the Madras Presidency, vide ASK. 1935-36, p 25, and pi,
VII d ; ASH. 1908-9, p 27. For Mir Jumla’s construction of the road
from Dacca to Mymensingh and the bridge on it at Tongi, See Dacca Dt %
Gqz. 30 ; OAILPB. 82 83.

21. Ball, I, 357 ; ZNA; 105; Poem, 142-5, 130-8; Bowrey, 137; MU.
III. 555. ;

MIN ISTfy

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

Si.

Is threw Shuja into despair. The latter is said to
'exclaimed in great, dismay, if we can believe the ftozbihani
poet, “I have not seen such a man in war; he is like Plato in

wisdom and like Rustam in bravery.With such a

general, I could have easily conquered the whole world. God
has given such a wise guide to Aurangzeb, because He wills to
make him Emperor.” 22 Mir Jumla’s Jinji campaign 23 makes
it clear that he did not allow his discretion to be overpowered
by sentiment or a false sense of honour.

Mir Jumla was a past master of the art of hitting upon right
strategical moves. Whenever possible, he preferred to rely
more on policy and skill than on open fight. In dissuading
Prince Muhammad Sultan from launching a direct assault on
Teliyagarbi, ho observed : “Why should you allow men to be
slain in a task which can be accomplished by strategy V The
plan of encircling the enemy by turning round his flank, as at
Monghyr, Sahibganj and in Malda, and also that of a double
attack on the enemy, illustrated in the GolkoDda campaign of
1665-6, and in the two-pronged offensive against Shuja, are
clear proofs of his brilliant strategy in war. But, though averse
to unnecessary loss of life, he did not shrink from a plan,
involving heavy casualties,—as in the fording ol the river
Mahananda,—when he was convinced that it was the decisive
move of the campaign east of the Ganges.**

Though a strict disciplinarian, Mir Jumla knew how to
retain the confidence and loyalty of his captains and privates,
by his liberal and sympathetic treatment of them. If he was

stern to the negligent or to those guilty of oppression, plunder
and rape, he enoouraged the dutiful persons by timely praise,
promotion and rewards. His oourage and presence of mind
enabled him to exercise a strong hold over his men as is

22. Glanius, 149 (“a man of dispatch”), ISO. of. Aurangxeb’a
Jarman In Poem, 269-75 (unflinching) , 167-74 (Suti), 365-73 (Gogaohi).

23. ante, Cli. 2. Sec. A. § 3

24. Poem, 147-48 (Teliyagarhi); ante, Ch. V. See. B § 3 (Monghyr),
$ 5 (Sahibganj), Sec. E. § 2, § 4 (Malda) ; Ch. HI. § 6(Golkonda campaign),
Ch, V. Sec. C § 5 (offensive against Shuja); Ch, V. Sec. E. § 4 (fording). ’

MIE .TUMLA AS A GENERAL

MIR .TUMLA AS A GENERAL 2WV

frated after the flight of Prince Muhammad Sultan^
ideed, “he was,” as Tavernier writes, ‘'both feared and
by beloved the army'*. 26

The General was not devoid of humane feelings. After the
battle near Belghata and Giria he expressed his grief for
Ekkataz, a promising young warrior then about to die of his
wounds, and sent for a physician. After fording the river
south of Bkolahat, the General spent a whole day in giving the
dead a decent burial, even at the risk of delay which enabled
Shuja to escape from Tarida. On the eve of the Assam
campaign, Mir Jumla informed the master of a Dutch ship that
he would retain with him three Dutch boys who were “too
young to serve in the Army.” During that campaign Mir
Jumla shared all the privations and hardships with the common
soldier. From the beginning of his march from Khizrpur till
his return from Assam this “magnanimous” General, the lord
of 20 inaunds of diamonds, did not ride on any beast except a
pony. During the period of famine in the camp, be refused
to partake of his additional stock of delicacies, and “Like
ordinary men ate no article save dal i mash (vetch), coagulated
milk and boiled rice, and occasionally expressed a desire to
take beef, in order that he might be the sharer and partner of

his (helpless) dependents in.privation and suffering.” 26

Commenting on the greatness of Mir Jumla's character, Sir J.N
Sarkar rightly observes: “No other General of that age
conducted war with so much humanity and justice, nor kept
his soldiers, privates and captains alike, under such discipline;
no other General could have retained to the last, the confidence
and even affection of his subordinates amidst such appalling
sunferings and dangers”. 27 The unnamed Dutch sailor aptly
describes Mir Jumla as “a wise and valiant captain, the soldiers'

25. Good conduct, Adah, 39a; rebuke to Zulfiqar, Poem, 202-6; praise,
FI. 112; Ball, 1, 357.

26. Poem t 345-8 (Ekkataz); Ch. V, Sec. E. § 5, ( Burial); Glanius.
143 (Butch boys) ; FI. 11-12 (pony), 137-8 (famine).

27. Aurangzib, III. 181. '

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

M m <si.

^darling and the People's favourite*’ 28 . He did not forget to
consider favourably the condition of his slaves, for whose
liberation he left instructions with the Mir Bakhshi on the eve
of his death, 29

As a general, Mir Jumla first made his mark in his conquest
of the Karnatak, where his almost unbroken record of victories
was marred only by his failure at Jinji and during the war
with Adil Shah over the partition of the Karnatak. Though
the Bijapur campaign of 1657-’8 was launched at his initiative,
his role was not that of the supreme commander. If he failed
to secure the oession of Parenda from the Bijapuris after the
conclusion of peace, the fault was not his, for circumstances
beyond his control were operating against him. But it must
be admitted that he committed an error of judgment in
persisting in his efforts to secure that fort. His conducting of
tho War of Succession against Shuja to a successful close in
Bihar and Bengal was brilliant beyond doubt, the only reverse
suffered by the Mir being that of 3rd May 1659. In his last but
most brilliant campaign, that directed against Kuch Bihar and
Assam, he exhibited wonderful feats of fortitude and bravery.
Though confronted with the severest odds, his army, ably
guided by him, was not even once defeated by the Ahoms.

Mir Jura la’s military achievements are succintly set forth in
an ode written by Mulla Darvesh of Herat in praise of the
conquest of Assam. 80

The rank—shattering warrior, the captor of forts
and conqueror of realms (Le. Mir Jumla)

Revived anew the forgotten tale of

The “Seven stages” which had been sung

by the Philosopher (Firdausi) in the Shahnqma

And which had been gone through by Isfandiyar and Rustam,

28. Olanius, 177.

29. FI. 170, Sec ante , Ch. VII. Sec. E. § i.

30. FI. 52; JBORS. I. 183.

MIB JUMLA. AB A DIPLOMAT

ie face of Fortune, the heart of Valour
and the arm of victory,

Conqueror of realms, bestower of kingdoms
and ornament of the world,

The Khan~i«khaaan, Commander-in-chief,

lea<ler of armies, whom, by way of honour,

The Emperor gave the title of ‘Faithful Friend/

That peer of royal dignity, that Sayyid

possessed of the characteristics of his ancestors,
The back of Persia, the cheek of India,
the head of the kingdom of God,—

He is a Mustafa charged with divine instruction

and guidance after that (chosen one, Muhammad) ;
He is a Murtaza (in) the keenness of his
Sword and spear in the day of battle.

4. Mir Jumla as a diplomat

Mir Jumla played a conspicuous role in the history of India
for about three decades as a business magnate, a minister and a
general, and most prominently of all as a remarkably successful
diplomat. The unnamed Butch sailor truly calls him “a great
politician”. 81 Like Bismarck performing the juggler's feat of
tossing five balls at a time, Mir Jumla could carry on intrigues
successsfully with several powers, far and near, without in any
way compromising his own honour, even during the highly
critical period of his rebellion against Sultan Qutb Shah. Yet
he could retain his freedom of action and lean on any one
power as he thought expedient, could play off one against
another, and succeed in improving his own diplomatic position. 33

Mir Jumla's diplomacy was certainly a great factor in
Mughal imperial history. Indeed, it may be affirmed without
any exaggeration that he towered above all his contemporaries
in India as regards his diplomatic acumen and sagacity. Even
Aurangzeb, so well-known for his astuteness and craft, yielded

31- Glanius, 177.

32 JBRS; XXX. 248; vide ante Ch, 3. for Mir Jumla 'a diplomatic
intrigues.

LIFE OF BIB *TUMLA

?.e the

palm to this Persian adventurer in this respect, and since
latter's enlistment in the imperial service, looked up to him for
advice in all matters as bis friend, philosopher and guide, It was
to t he Mir, then Wazir of the Mughal Empire, that Aurangzeb,
then Viceroy of the Deccan, appealed for pulling his chestnuts
out of the fire of imperial wrath and the Crown-Prince's
counter-intrigues. Bara was outwitted a t almost every step
by Aurangzeb’s faithful adherent It was Mir Jumla who
persuaded Shahjahaix to confer the Karnatak, then included
within the Empire, as a jagir on himself. It m as Mir Jtmila who
rejected Aurangzeb's scheme of a second Golkonda campaign,
took the initiative in launching the Bijapur campaign, induced
the Emperor to give up the Qandahar ex pen it i-on and to
sanction the plan for- the invasion of Bijapur and secured for
Aurangzeb absolute authority in conducting it, by counteracting
Bara’s hostile moves. It was Mir Jumla who dexterously
succeeded in foiling Bara's manoeuvres to isolate him from
Aurangzeb on the eve of the War of Succession, and saved
himself and his family from Bara’s vengeance. Again, it was
Mir Jumla's diplomacy which minimised the danger threatening
Aurangzeb from the defection of Jaswant Singh at the battle
ofKhajwa, 83 Thus, during 1656-58 Mir Jumla dominated the
diplomatic history of India like a Colossus, whose one foot was
at Delhi and the other in the ICarnatak.

The Rozbihani eulogist has tried to indicate Mir Jumla's
importance to Aurangzeb by observing that he was to the
latter what Aristotle was to Alexander. 34 Though Mir Jumia
was a very helpful officer of Aurangzeb, yet it is not possible
to agree with this over-estimate of his personality. It is also
difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mir Jumla failed to be a
constructive force in the history of the Mughal Empire. For
one thing, he lacked in high idealism, though he had efficiency,
wisdom and foresight. For another, it was a distinct loss to

*ftir

33. ante Ch, IV. Secs. B and C (the Karnatak, Golkonda and
Bijapur); Sec. D (War of Succession); Oh* V. See A (Kbajwa),

34. Poem, 415*23. cf. Bowrey, 137* :-,*r

M WIST/fy

MIR JUMLA AS A DIPLOMAT

It&te that the Wazir of the Mughal Empire was a partisan^
e was nothing but the agent of the Viceroy of the Deccan,
who was irreconeiliably oppoxsed to the Crown Prince. Thus
personal considerations overbore the greater interests of the
empire. Moreover, the lack of differentiation between the
civil and military functions constantly diverted him, from the
arts pf peace to the more alluring prospects of war and
conquest. Again, Aurangzob, once established on the throne,
had begun to harbour feelings of suspicion against this “over-
mighty'' subject. 80 Thus the conjunction of these two able and
intelligent personalities did not usher in any progressive force
within the Empire. In all probability, had a longer life been
vouchsafed to Mir Jumla, in the pacific years of Aurangzeb's
reign the Shiah creed of the Mir would have silently but
inexorably made a widening breach between him and his
orthodox Sunni master, and reduced him to obscurity if not
to nullity.

.£5. fjpE, (3rd September, 1663) in AA, 292n; Bernier, 173; Bowrey,
144-5; Storia, II. 102.

Appendix A

Date of the Karnatak Partition Agreement

In the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records
Commission (January, 1942), I published a letter of Qutb Shah
to Shahjahan, contained in TabrezFs Qolkonda Letters} It
runs as follows : t( I hare already informed you before that
the Zamindars of J inji and Tanjore sought help from me. I
hope Your Majesty would order the division of their countries

in the proportion of£: § as arranged in the ahdmrna .When

the truth of the violation of the agreement signed faithfully
by Adil Shah became known to the late Islam Khan......it

was considered advisable that the terms of the agreement

might be modified.The imperial orders are to be

obeyed as if they are divine. Previously Your Majesty had
gone for shikar to Kabul and I had agreed to this division and
an imperial wakil had gone to the Karnatak for division. Then
the above mentioned Nawab (Islam Khan) died and Adil Shah
found an opportunity to violate the agreement and sent many
wazirs under Shahji to help the Hindus in the Karnatak .. ..."

This letter enables us to fix the approximate date of the
conclusion of the partition agreement between Bijapur
and Golkonda. From Padshahnama 2 it appears that during the
Central Asiatic campaign, the Emperor left Lahore for Kabul
on Safar 18, 1056 (26th March, 1646). There is a description
of shikar on the bank of the Chenab on 4 Rabiulawwal (10th
April, 1646). The Emperor returned from Kabul to Lahore on
9 Shaban, 1056 (10th September, 1646),

Again Islam Khan, the Mughal Subadar of the Deccan,
died on 18th November, 1647. 1 2 3 Thus it would appear that
the partition was made between March-April, 1646. Another

1. Tabrezi, 5&-7a; Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 204-5. n 55.

2. BI. II. 560 J, 509

3. Waris. I. 6a. For Islam Khan Maahhadi, MIT. Text, t 162-7;

Tr. I. 694-6. '

DATE OF CONQUEST OF O ANDIKOTA

foey of the Emperor from Lahore to Kabul was made
18,1057 (16th March, 1647), but there is no mention of
shikar now* 1 He loft Kabul for India on 30 Rajab, 1057,
(21st August, 1647). 2

Appendix B

Date of the conquest of Gandikota by Mir Jumla

Tavernier cites 24th August, 1652, as the date of Mir
Jumla’s occupation of Gandikota. He says that the fort was
occupied by Mir Jumla after three months' siege only 8 days
before his visit (1st September, 1662). 3 But a critical study of
European factory records and Persian sources proves the
incorrectness of this date. This shows that Gandikota was
conquered by Mir Jumla in the spring of 1650. A Madras
letter dated 18th January, 1651, states that in September last
a Dutch mission was sent to the Nawab “ at Gandikota

( . ..subdued by his resolution, against the opinion of all

men, the last spring).” Sir William Foster writes that
“ notwithstanding the positive statement in the text there is
some doubt as to the date of the capture of the fortress. A
Dutch letter (Hague Tr. series I, Vol. XVII, no. 518) seems to
intimate that, at the time of the visit of Van Wessel, the
leader of the Dutch mission, it was still being besieged by Mir
Jumla . ... ) '* 4 Qutb Shah in his reply to his envoy at

Delhi, Mulla Abdus Samad, observes : " Received your letter

written w r hen the Emperor was stopping at Lahore on his way
to Kashmir. The complaints which Adil Shah made to the
Emperor through Mirza Fathullah were, strangely enough *
false. You have yourself seen the copy of the ahdnama .
Adil Shah had reported that the fort of Gandikota was

1. PN. BI. 637-42.

2. Waris. I, 4a,

3. Ball, I. 284.

4. EFI, IX, 22-23, n,

MINISr^

LIFE OF Aim JUMLA

^mquered by Qutb Shah against his order and without his
knowledge/' 1 The date (March-May, 1651) of the Emperor’s
going to Kashmir 2 and the reference to the occupation of Gandi-
kota in this letter show that it roust have been effected before
March, 1651. This agrees with the evidence of the English
records that it was occupied in the spring of 1650, and that in
September a Dutch mission was sent to Mir Jumla there and
also that about the same time an English mission under
Venkat Brahman went to see him, whose plans of commercial
partnership with the E. I. C. were incorporated in a letter to
Bantam (10th January, 1651) and instructions to Littleton
(12th January). 3 Moreover, the description of Mir Jumla's
activities in Gandikota, as given by Tavernier (e g. his making
of roads, establishment of cannon-foundries, administration of
justice, review of army, etc.), makes ib difficult for us to
believe that the fort was captured just 8 days before
Tavernier's visit. It is possible, however, that the date of
Tavernier refers to the subsequent occxxpation of Gandikota by
Mir Jumla after his defeat at the hands of the Bijapuri general
in the war between the two Sultans over the partition of the
Karnatak (1651-2).

1. Tabrezi, I9a-b; Pr, IHRC, XVIII, 205-6.

I. Waris, I, 49a-53a.

3. EFI, IX, 23,

MiN/sr^

Mir Jumla’s family

Mir Jumla tad one son, named Muhammad Amin and
several daughters. 1 He spent a lot in bringing Sayyid
Nizamuddin Ahmad (of Mecca), and Sayyid Sultan (of Najf) 2
to Haidarabad, and wanted to marry his two daughters to
them. On coming to know of this, Qutb Shah resolved to
marry them to two of his own daughters. So Mir Jumla was
displeased and joined Aurangzeb. Qutb Shah first married one
of his daughters to Sayyid Ahmad and then began to arrange
the marriage of the second with Sayyid Sultan. But Sayyid
Ahmad, having some enmity with the latter, threatened to
induce Aurangzeb to wipe out his kingdom. The Sultan
thereupon married his daughter to Abul Hasan (closely related
to the Shall throgh his own mother), and a servitor of Sayyid
Shah Raju (ancestor of Sayyid Muhammad Gisu Daraz) for
14 years. 3

Muhammad Amin 4 5 6 had a son, named Mirza Abdulla/'
Manuoci says that Mir Jumla, before his death, gave his wife
“some magnificent diamonds’' for his son and grandson. 0

1. Ball, I. 165.

2. Sayyfd Nizamuddin Ahmad was the son of the sister of Shah
Abbas II and Sayyid Masum; he was brought up at Mecca and became
distinguished for his education and ability (QN, 92). Sayyid Sultan was
the disciple of Sayyid Masum and of higher pedigree than Sayyid Ahmad
(ibid,, 90), Sayyid Sultan married the daughter of Muhammad Khan.

There is an inscription on an unfinished tomb of Nizamuddin Ahmad,
son-in-law of Abdullah and his wife (EIM, 1923*24, p. 31; ARAONH
(1924*5), pp. 5-6.

3. QN. 90-94; Ball, I. 170*1 and n.

4. For career of Muhammad Amin, see MU. Text. III. 613*20; Tr.
I. 241*245.

5. Storia> II. 101; FI. 134; CotU, 106b, killed in ]&t.W.Frontier, 21st
April, 1672. MU. III. 617: TMU. 1083.

6. The jewels of Mir Jumla’s widow were plundered by the Pathans.
Storia , II. 199*201*

MINISr^

Lira of mir jvm *a yy

k.

also wrote to Aurangzeb a letter, praying for his"favonrs
to them”. Auraugzeb’s behaviour towards Muhammad
Amin Khan was marked by utmost kindness and liberality ;
he confirmed the latter in his office of Bakhshi, increased his
allowance by 1,00,000 rupees, constituted him sole heir of his
father's property, and subsequently deputed him as Viceroy
■to Lahore. The annual pay of his son Mirza Abdulla was
fixed at P*s. 2,00,000. x

Appendix D

Arrest of Mir Jumla’s son

Muhammad Amin, the son and deputy of the absent Wazir
(Mir Jurnla) was an important personage in the Haidarabud
Court, having a considerable following. The reason of his
sudden arrest is variously stated in the contemporary sources,
If Manucci I. 2 is to be believed, Mir Jumla’s not obeying the
Sultan’s repeated summons led the latter to imprison Muham¬
mad Amin, But Manucei’s story of his fighting the Sultan from
his fortified mansion for 3 days till the arrival of Mir Jurnla
is inexplicable and is not corroborated by any other source.
Qutb Shah, in his letter to the Shah of Persia (c. 1656) wrote

that he imprisoned Muhammad Amin as he was not doing good
work, in the excesses of pride and egotism, born of successes
and as he committed some undesirable things. 3 It is true that
Muhammad Amin was by nature haughty and reckless. It
is possible that, puffed up with his youth and pride at his
father’s wealth and glory, he committed some improper acts.
But what were they ? Tavernier 4 remarks that Muhammad
Amin informed his father of the Sultan’s plots and that after

I. Storia, II. 101-2; Bernier, 173.

' Storia , H 233-5.

3„ Tabrezi, Ulb-144a; Pr. IHC. (1941). p. 608.

4. Ball, I. iOS B. -

; 'L.[

MINISr^

ARREST OF MTR JUMLA S SON

living his father's reply to his own warning, he Lot
ocused the Sultan of ingratitude towards his father, “without
whose aid he would never have come to the throne/' and
“somewhat carried away from his ordinary demeanour, used
such sharpness of expression" that the nobles handled him
roughly and the king, offended by his insolence, had him
arrested and imprisoned with his mother and sister. The
Maasir ul umara 1 says that Muhammad Amin “overstepped the
limits of propriety” and one day came drunk to the Court
and vomitted forth on the musnud , for which the Sultan
imprisoned him. But the real reason of his arrest was the
leakage of his negotiations with Aurangzeb. This is conclusi¬
vely proved by the following letter of Aurangzeb to the Sultan:
“it transpired from the application of Abdul Latif that you
have, in spite of knowing that a letter had been issued to Mir
Muhammad Amin, arrested him and without considering it as
impertinence, put him and his family in the fort of Golkonda

.” 2 A passage in Shahjahannama also bears this out :

“Kutbuf Mulk, the instant he gained intelligence of the
matter (Mir’s seeking imperial protection), imprisoned Mir
Jumla’s son,.....” 3

1. MU. III. 631.

3. A dab, 56b-57a; GD.

3. SHN. 336 ; E and D. VII. 109,

MIN ISTHy

Appendix £

Chronology of Mir Jumla 3 s retreat f rom Assam

<S

(January—March, 1663).

10th Januajeiy-

22nd January-

28th January-

30th January
30th January-

2nd Febbuary-
9th February-

11th February-

24th February-
28th February—
27 th March-
31st Maroh-

-Order of retreat : Mir Jumla leaves Tipam,
follows the bank of the Dihing and crosses
the river at Trimohani.

-Mir Jumia embarks on a boat at Dewalgaon
and reaches Lakhau.

-Mir Jumla leaves Lakhau on boat, the army
proceeding on land.

-Mir Jumla reaches Kaliabar.

-Mir Jumia starts from Kaliabar in a palan¬
quin, inspects Dimarua, crosses the wilder¬
ness of Kajli (34 kos in 4 days).

-Mir Jumla crosses the Kallang by boat and
halts at the foot of Kajli fort.

-Interviews the mother of Raja of Darrang
and the mother of the Raja of Dimarua.
Earthquake.

-Mir Jumia leaves Kajli and halts at Pandu,.
opposite Gauhati.

-Mir Jumla leaves Pandu in a boat.

■Mir Jumla halts at Raritala.

-Mir Jumla leaves Baritala on boat.

■Mir Jumla dies.

Appendix F

Currency and Weights

The following tables are given as a rough and
reckoner of value of coins and weight of articles

<SL

ready

(A)

50—80 cowries
Pice (half dam) [copper]
Dam (or pice) [copper]
Rupee [silver]

Moh a r [gold]

Pagoda, New, [gold]

Pagoda, Old, [gold]

Pan am [gold]

— 1 paisa.

== Re., rising to $ Re.

— A Re., rising to ? V Re.

*=' 2s. 3d.

= 31s 6d. or 14-14^ rupees.
=» 3-31 rupees.

= 4 5 rupees or over,

'-= variable (12, 15, 16, 18, 24,
32 to the pagoda)

[A hun was a gold coin, forming the usual currency in
Rij&pur and Golkonda and Hindu territories farther south and
called Pagoda by Europeans.]

Rial of eight (silver, Spanish money)=4s. 6d. or Rs. 2.
Ibrahimi (gold) = about 2| rupees.

Tuman—variable, average value £3. 9s. (rupees 29£, acc.

to Tavernier).

1 tola
1 rati

1 Man (maund)

(B)

=about 180 grains troy.

=2.66 grs. troy; ordinarily 1*75 to 1*93.

=40 Ser, but weight of Ser varied much.
Shahjahan fixed it at 40 dams, giving the
maund nearly 74 lb. In the Deccan and the
Itast Coast the maund was equal to about
261b.

20

BIBLIOGRAPHY

i. Primary Sources

A. Persian

(a) General Works

Padshahnarua. By Muhammad Waris; completed 11th
March, 1701 (OPL. Ms). A continuation of Abdul Hamid's
Padshahnama, containing a history of the last ten years of
Shahjaban’s reign. It gives a general review of Mir Jumla's
career up to his appointment as Mughal Wazir and some
details regarding the Bijapur Campaign

Shahjahannarna. By Muhammad Tahir entitled Inayet
Khan (Malakkhas) e. 1068 A. H. (1667-58). OPL. Ms. A history
of first 30 years of Shahjahan’s reign. Useful for Mir Jumla s
rebellion against Qutb Shah.

Amal-i-Salib By Muhammad Salih Kambu, assistant
(Peshdast) of Shaikh Makhdum Munshi, Chief Sadr; completed
1070/1659, with subsequent additions till 1081/167 L. (OPL.
Ms):Bl. edn. A history of Shahjahau till 1665. Useful for Mir
Jumla's role in the Bijapur campaign, his dismissal from
the wizarat and subsequent imprisonment by Aurangzeb;
treatment of the War of Succession very brief.

Alamgirnama. By Munshi Mirza Muhammad Kazim, son
of Muhammad Amin Qazvini (1668). BI. edn. The official
history of the first ten years of Aurangzeb’s reign. Useful
for Mir Jumla’s role in the War of Succession. It is not
necessary to depend on the Section on the Kuoh Bihar
and Assam Campaign of the Alamgirnama in the presence of
Talish’s masterly and more detailed account.

Maasir-i-Alamgiri. By Muhammad Saqi Mustaid Khan,
completed 1710-11- BI. edn. A complete history of Aurangzeb’s
reign. First 10 years abridged from AN.

Tarikh-i-Muf azzali By Sayyiri Mufazzal Khan; narrative
comes down to 1666 A.D. (10th Yr. of Aurangzeb’s reign)
E. and D. VII.

MINIS T/ty

GENERAL WORKS

^ wfamama-i-Alamgiri, also known as Auraugnama, Waqiat
or Halat-i-Alaingiri. By Mirj;a Askari (Aqil Khan Razi). Ho
was governor of Delhi at the time of his death. 1108 A. H.
(ASB. MS). A history of the first five years of Auraugzeb’s
reign, (see Ethe. 10 (No. 346, 347). Refers to Mir Jumla's
entry into Mughal service, the Rijapur Campaign, War of
Succession (esp. Khajwa), in Bihar and Bengal : treatment of
Assam war very brief.

Tarikh-LShah Shujai By Mir Muhammad Masum bin
Hasan bin Saleh, an old servant of Shuja (Sir J. N. Sarkar's
transcript of IOL. MS. 533). A history of the exploits of Shuja ;
abruptly ends on 18fch April, 1660: written in 1070/1659-60
at Malda. Rieu, I. 270, III. 1049. Invaluable for War of
4Succes8ion from Shuja’s point of view.

Aurangnama- (Sir J. N. 8arkar's transcript of Hyderabad
Asafiya Public Library, Tarikh No. 603). The author of the
poem, “Haqiri,” a Rozbihani follower of Mir Jurala says
(pp. 494-5) that he was present at Tanda after the defeat of
Shuja. Compiled 1072/1661. It is a work of much historical
importance, as 1 have already pointed out in an article in JPU.
Vol. I. No. 2 (Jan, 1945). p, 2In.

Fathiyya-i^ibriyya or Tarikhd*Mulk-i-Asfaam. By Ibn
Muhammad Wali Ahmad entitled Shihab ud din Talish, completed
Shawwai, 1073/May, 1663, (ASB. MS.)* Same as ‘Ajiba-i-
gharibah (Ethe, 10. 341-3). Value of the work discussed by
Sir J. N. Sarkar in J BOBS. I. 179-81 ; see also BPP, XXIX.
1925,p.7 ; abstract published by H. Biochmann in JASB, 1872.
pp. 63-96. As Mir Jurala's waqianavis, the iiuthor accom
pained him in his Kuch Bihar and Assam Campaign, and
hence he was an eye-witness. He gives the most detailed
account in Persian of Mir Jumia’s campaigns in N. E. Tndia.

Continuation of Shihab ud din Talish's Fatfaiyya-i-ibriyya.
(Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript of Bodleian MS. 589). It
describes the events in Bengal since the death of Mir Jurnla
(31 March, 1663) to the conquest of Chatgaon. (Chittagong,
27th January, 1666). Value discussed in SAR, 162-65 and
also in Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India ; four long sections
of the work translated therein and in JASB. 1906 arid 1907.

<SL

MIN l$ T/ty

tfapfnl for giving some important details relating to
J umla s administration in Bengal.

LIFE OF MIE JUMLA

Had Sqat-us- Salatin• By Nizamuddiu Alimad bin Abdullah
us Shirazi us Saidi. Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript of 10. MS.
JEthe. No. 464. See Rieu. I. 321-2. It is the 2nd Volume
of Tarikh-i-Qutbshahi (BM.MS. Addl. 6542), being the history
of Abdullah Qutb Shah till 1050/1640-1. Indispensable for
Mir Jumla's Golkonda career.

IVI ^Amm A Jin ima By IMaulana Muhammad Zahur bin
Zahuri (Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript of Kapurthala State
Library MS.). A history of Bijapur written in obedience to the
order of Sultan Muhammad Adil Shah communicated to
Nawab Mustafa Khan. Zahur uses Sahur San years, used in the
Deccan, which are nine years short of the Hijra years.
Indispensable for Mir Jumla’s campaigns in the Karnatak.

Futuhat i-Alamgiri. By Ishwardas, a Nagar Brahman of
Patan in Gujrat, whose Governor was the son of Mir Jumla;
completed 1730. (Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript of B M. Addl.
No. 23884). Highly valuable for giving the Woman of
Aurangzeb to Mir Jumla, appointing him Governor of
Bengal (48a-50b).

Nuskha-i-Dilkusha By Bhimsen ; completed 1120/1708-9 ;
Kujhwa MS.), Value discussed in SAR, and Studies in Mughal
India. Describes Mir Jumla's interview with Jaswant Singh
on the eve of the battle of Khajwa,

Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mualla , Daily news-letters from the
imperial oamp (See CHI, IV, 582), That of year 3 of
Aurangzeb used (Sarkar MS.). Not of much value for
Mir Jumla.

(b) Letters

Adab-i-Alaingiri(OPL. MS.). This collection of letters rang¬
ing in date from 26th November, 1649 to June, 1659, “by
far the largest and most important letter-book of Aurangzeb,”
was written by his earliest known Secretary, Munshi ul-
mamalik* Abu-l-Fath (entitled Qabil Khan), a native of Tatta
or Lower Sind (d. May, 1162). Contains Abu-l-Fath's own
letters also. Edited by Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq Muttalibi

MINIS;*,,

LETTERS

30

^Ambala in 1115/1703-1704. Value of the work discussed in
SAB, 290-2. Indispensable for Mir Jumla’s rebellion against
the Sultan of Golkonda, his activities as Mughal Wazir,
fate of his Karnatak dominions, his role in the Bijapur
campaign and the loss of his influence.

Tabi'ezi’s Golkonda Letters, (Sir J N. Sarkar’s transcript of
BM. Addl. 6600k A collection of letters drafted by Nazir ul
Mamalik. Haji Abdul Ali Tabrezi, a Golkonda State Munshi,
in the name of Abdullah Qutb Shah, Abul Hasan Qutb Shah
and of some nobles of the Golkonda Court chiefly Mir Jumla
as well as letters in his own name (vide. Bieu. I. 398-9). Though
undated, these letters contain extremely valuable details about
the affairs of the Karnatak, the conquests therein of Mir Jumla
on behalf of Golkonda, the relations of Golkonda with Delhi,
Bijapur and Persia respectively, the commercial activities of
Mir Jumla in Pegu and Arrakan, and his relations with the
European Companies and contemporary nobles and officers
in the Deccani Courts and the Wazir of Persia.(Pr. IHRO.
XVIII. 197).

Guldashta (Sir J.N. Sarkar’s transcript of Salar Jung MS.
Insha No. 2731). It contains letters from Mughal Emperors
and Aurangzeb and the Court of Persia to the Sultans and
officers of Golkonda and Bijapur. Partial translation by
Dr. K. K. Basu in JBORS. Dec. 1940, pp. 27!-’98 June,
1941. Throws light on (i) rebellion of Mir Jumla, (ii) fate of
Sri Ranga, (iii) Qutb Shah’s intrigues during Golkonda
Campaign, (iv) Mir Jumla’s appointment as Mughal Wazir,

(v) Boundary dispute between Mir Jumla and Qutb Shah,

(vi) Bijapur Campaign and gives the bond of Abdullah Qutb
Shah (1656).

Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani (Sarkar MS,), also known as
Insha-i-Mirza~Tahir Wahid. A collection of letters in the
name of Shah Abbas II, compiled by his minister Imad ud daula
Mirza Muhammad Tahir Wahid of Qazvin (d. 1110/1698-1699).
Useful as giving the reply of King Shah Abbas II to Mir
Jumla’s offer to enter Persian royal service.

Muraqaat-i-Hasan (Sir J.N. Sarkar's transcript of Rampur
State Library copy, Insha, No. 182). Letters of Maulana

mtsr/fy

LIFE OF MfR JUMtA

<§L

bn-l-Hasan, Secretary to the Governors of Orissa for nearly
12 years (1655-07) : compiled in 1680/1069-70. Value discussed
in SAR. 215. (lives incidental references relating to Mir Jumla’s
War of Succession in .Bengal, and connection with Orissa.

B. Assamese

Ahem Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai : (i) MS.

English l ranslation from the Ahom language in Assam Govern-
mont Secretariat, 2 vols (ii) Translated and edited by Rai
Sahib Golap Chandra Barua as Ahom Buranji. From the
earliest time to the end of Ahom rule. Calcutta. 1930. The
best known Ahom Buranji, it supplements details derived
fiotn lalish about Mir Jumla’s Assam campaign and gives
some new facts!

Buranji from Sukpha to Gadadhar Singh or Purani Assam

Buranji. Ed. by Hem Chandra Goswami and published by
Kamrup Anusandhan Samiti, Gauhati, 1922.

Ahom Buranji (from Khunlung to Gadadhar Singha) found
in the family of Sukumar Mahanta. Edited by Rai Bahadur
Dr. S. K. Bhuyan, 1945. (See JIH. 1927, p. 379). Valuable
for indicating (i) the reasons of disaffection among the Ahom
Generals against their king, (ii) the digging up of Ahom

Graves, (iii) Ahom guerilla lighting and‘scorched earth’policy,

(iv) the defection of the Baduli Phukan, (v) full details about
the treaty of peace, Mir Jumla’s letter to Aurangzeb, and
presents to the Ahom king and the latter’s payment of tributes
to the Emperor.

Assam Buranji, a history of the Ahom kings (1228-1696),
Bk. VIII (1605-87), in Assamese, found with the widow of
Keshab Kanta at Gauhati. pp. 1-128, Complete.

Assam Buranji 1650-58, being Ms.A. (pp. 185-201).

Buranji 1489.1G63 A.D., MS. B (pp. 1-92) in Ahom,
received from Sj. Hem Chandra Goswami, S.D.O. Dibrugarh.

Buranji Bk. II (b) An account of the tributes paid (1662-67)
to the Padshah by Jayadhwaja Simha for the devastation of
the province by the Mussalmans (pp. 1-25)

Padshah Buranji (a) Translated by Dr. S. K. Bhuyan in

MINIS

AbSAMM&ii SOURCES

Culture, July, 1928-July, 1029 under the title fv^w
Sghts on Moghul India from Assamese Sources”. Value
discussed in IsC. (1928) pp. 323, 540-1 (b) Annals of Delhi
Sultanate, IsC. 1933-34.

Assam Buranji from Khunlung to Gadadhar Singh:

Published by Karnrup Anusandhan Samiti : extracts published
by Dr. S. K. Bhuyan in JIH. Dec 1926

Assam Buranji from Dibingia Raja to Pramaiha Smgh

Published by Karnrup Anusandhan Samiti : extracts published
by Dr. S. K, Bhuyan in JIH. Dec. 1926.

Assam Buranji (1648-81). A history of Assam from 1648
to 1681 A D. with a chronology of events in the history
of Assam from 1468 to 1825 A.D. etc. Collated from old
Assamese Manuscript chronicles. Edited by S. K. Dutta. 1938.
Text mainly reproduced from (i) an old Assamese chronicle
from Javadhwaj Singha to Rudra Singha’s Kachari Wars,
obtained from the American Baptist Mission, Gauhati, (ii) a
transcript thereof obtained from Srijut Anandaram Gohain, Mari-
gaon, .Nowgong, (iii) an Assamese chronicle from Dihingia
E,aja to Chandra Kanta Singha obtained from Srijut Chida-
nanda Bezbarua, Nazira, Sibsagar,

Kamrupar Buranji, a history of Karnrup from earliest times
till 1682. Ed. by Dr. 8; K. Bhuyan, Assamese Text. See JIH,
V (1927), 379

C. European Record*

The English Factories in India 1618-69- By Sir W. Foster,
33 Vols. Oxford, published between 1906-27. The volumes
form a mine of information relating to Mir Jurala's relaiion
with the European Companies in all aspects, and throw
valuable light on his Golkomla career a mi his Karnatak con¬
quests, (esp, for dates), his administration therein, commercial
activities, and the battle of Khajwa, and Mir Jumla's
activities in Bihar and Bengal.

The Chamber’s Narrative gives a highly interesting account
of the Hindu Revolt of 1656-58; (its importance has been
discussed by me in JBORS. XXVI, 327n).

LIF1S OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

Supplementary Calendar of Documents iu India Office
relating to India or Homo Affairs of East India Company,
I 600-40. By Sir William Foster London, 1928.

A Calendar of The Court Minutes etc. of the East India
Company 1635-79, By Ethel Bruce Sains bury, 8 Vols. Oxford,
1906-27. Vols, 1650-54 1655-59.

The Dutch records, as contained in the Hague Transcripts
(I. O. Library) and the Batavia Dagh Register, are mainly used
from their extracts in English translation and references to some
of them in Sir William Fosier’s English Factories in India,

Danvers. F. C s (1) Be port on Records of India Office,
1888. ( 2 ) India Office Records. ( 3 ) Report on Records

relating to tiie East in the State Archives in the Hague (in
Typescipt) 1895-2 vols. ( 4 ) Report to the Secretary . /State
for India on Portuguese Records relating to the East Indies
contained in the Archive da Torre do Tombo and Public
Libraries at Lisbon and Evora, London, 1892.

Works of Seventeenth Century European
writers and Travellers,

(histories, travels, voyages and letters)

Purchas, His Pilgrimes, Vol V. 1625.

Mannque, Fray Sebastian. Itinerario de las Missiones
Orientals. 1629-43. Tr. & Ed. by Lt. Col. G. Ecfcford Luard
and Father H. Hosten. S. J. Hakluyt, 1927.

Oleaiius, Adam. Voyages <(• Travels of the Ambassadors
from the Holstein, to the Great Duke of Muscovy, and the

King of Persia, 1633-39.in 7 books. Tr. into English

by John Davies of Kidwelly, London, 1662.

Mandelslo, J. Albert De- The Voyages and Travels of ....

into the East Indies, 1638-40 . iu 3 books. Tr. into
English by John Davies of Kidwelly, London, 1662.

Mundy, Peter. The 'Travels of . m Europe and Asia,

1608-67, Ed. by Sir Richard Carnae Temple, 4 vols. Hakluyt.
Voi. I, 1907 ; II, 1914; III. 1919 ; IV. 1924.

Glanius, Mr. A Relation of an Unfortunate Voyage to
the Kingdom of f Bengala , (originally printed in Amsterdam in

MINIS

EUROPEAN WRITERS AND TRAVELLERS

1}. London, 1682. An account of the ship-wrecke
tchinan on board the Ter Schilling, 1661, Vide Mir Jumist’s
Invasion of Assam, A contemporary Dutch chronicle. BPP.
1925 (XXIX). Highly valuable for Mir Jumla's Assam cam¬
paign, especially the account of the naval battle above
Kaliabar* Makes useful observations re : Mir Jumla's character.

Manucci Niccolao, Storia do Mogor. 1653-1708 Tr. and ed.
by W. Trvine, 4 Vols. (Indian Text Series) London. 1907-8,
Gives some incidental details regarding Mir Jumla’s early life,
conquest* in the Karnatak, his participation in the War of
Succession and Assam Campaign. Some are valuable but all
cannot be fully relied on

Bernier Francois* (i) Travels in the Mogul Empire. A. D.
1656-68 Tr. and ed. by (a) Irving Brook, VoL I. 1828, (b)
Archibald Constable, 1891, (c) V. A Smith, Oxford, 1914.

(ii) History of the late. Revolution of the Empire of the Great
Mogul together with the most considerable passages for five
years following in that Empire, Tr. from the French of
Monsieur F, Bernier Physician of the Faculty of Montpelier, by
Irving Brook, Cal. 1826.

Ogilby, John Asia, the first Part, being an Accurate
Description of Persia and the Several Provinces thereof, in the
vast Empire of the Great Mogul and other Parts of India and
. their several kingdoms and religions etc, compiled by His
Majesty’s Cosmographer, Geographick Printer and Master of
His Majesty's Revels in the Kingdom of Ireland, London
MDCLXXIIL

Tavernier, Jean Baptiste, Baron of Aubortie. 0) The Six

Voyages through Turkey into Persia and the East Indies for the
space of Forty years etc. Tr. into English bv J Phillips.
London, 1678. (ii) Travels in India, Translated from the
original French edition of 1676 with a Biographical Sketch of
the author. Ed. by V. Ball, 2 Vole. 1889 : 2nd ed. by W.
Orooke, 2 Vots, Oxford, 1925, Highly useful as an eye-witness's
account of Mir Jumla's personality. Throws light on his
conquest of Gandikota and his Karnatak administration. But
not always reliable, viz . the account of his role as mediator

LIFE OF MIR JXJMLA

/initiator of peace proposals in the Golkonda campaign
,, ^5ricorreet. Moreover, Mir Jura la’s correspondence with Shuja
praying for shelter against Qutb Shah, is not supported by any
Persian chronicle.

Thevenot, Monsieur de. Travels into thz Deviin t, in 3 parts*
Tr. out of French, Dec. 1886. Preface by A. Lovell. Makes
valuable observations regarding Mir Jumla’s wealth and
conquest of Gandikota.

Bell, Richard, & John Campbell The Travel k of in

the East Indies, Persia and Palestine, 1054~’7O (BM. Sloane,
811). Ed. by Sir R. 0. Temple, IA. 1906^08. Wrong in dates.
Richard Bell was gunfounder of tho Mughal Emperor during
1054*68. John Campbell was with Murad Bakhsh.

Mission du Madure (in French). From unedited documents
by Le P. J. Bertrand of the Company of Jesus. Vol III.
Letter No. 2 of Father Antoine de Proenza, dated Trichinopoly,
1659 A. D.

(St

i SglLj

Bowrey, Thomas. /I Geographical Account of Countries round
the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679. Ed. by Sir Richard Carnac
Temple. Hakluyt: MDCCCCV. Throws some light on Mir
Jumla’s commercial activities.

John Marshall in India- Notes and observations in Bengal,
1668*72. Ed. by Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Allahabad Univ.
Studies Vol 5 O.U.P. London, 1927.

Master, Streynsham The Diaries of ., 1675*80. Rd. by

Sir Richard Carnac Temple, 2 Vols. (Indian Records Series)
London, 1911.

Macleod, De Oost —Indische Coinpagnie Als Zeemogenheid
in Azie, II, Translation of a passage dealing with the Siege of
Gingi, in JIH. XX. 812^13.

Hedges, William. The, Diary of .During His Agency

in Bengal as well as on his voyage out and return overland,
1681-87. Ed. by R. Barlow and Col. H. Yule, 3 Vols, Hakluyt,
1887, 1888, 1890.

Hamilton, Captain Alexander. .'1 New Account of the East
Indies, 2 Vols. Edinburgh, 1727. Ed. by Sir William Foster,

1930.

\ TAMIL TELUGTJ AND SANSKRIT

/ E. Tamil* Telugu and Sanskrit

Mackenzie Collection. A Descriptive Catalogue of the
Oriental Manuscripts, and other articles illustrative of the
Literature, History, Statistics and Antiquities of the South of
India ; collected by the Late Lieut. Col. Colin Mackenzie,
Surveyor General of India. By H,H. Wilson. 2 Vols. 1828,
I plodded through a huge mass of materials collected under this
section entitled Mackenzie Mss collection in the Asiatic Society
of Bengal, but did not come across any original point relating
to my thesis. The following in the collection, however, contain
incidental references to some events and persons connected with
the thesis:

(i) History of the Carnatic containing several articles
(Mack. Coll. Voi, II. Sec. IX. nos. 2-7,11, 10-20, 22.25/27,
31, 33, 35-40. pp. (oxxxv-cxxxvii) of which the ff. are impor¬
tant ibid., No. 16 (MoOgrai), no. 17 (Pennumurry), no. 18
(Paukal), no.20 (Goodypaut), no. 22 (Pulloor) no. 23 (Culloro
Poliam), no. 24 (Poolycherla), no. 27 (Ramrauze), no. 31.
(Calestry), no, 35 (Chingleput), no. 36-40 (Gingee), no. 47
(Ptirgunnahs in the Payen Ghaat belonging to the Veejapoor
Sooba, and to the Hydrabed Soobha).

(it) Madura. An account of the Gentoo kings of Madura
Kingdom of Pandyas, (Mack. Coll, Vol. II. Sec. IV. nos. 2*
3, 5-16, 17, 20, 22. p. cxxxii). History of Tirumala Nayak in
Ch 6 (ibid, no 11).

(in) Historical Account of the Sovereigns of Mysore , (MC
II. Sec. III. nos. 17 and 24, p. cxxxi.

(iv) Mohammedan Governments of Dekan (MC, II Sec XLI,
nos 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, pp. clxi, clxii) (a) Adil Shah Kings. (Ibid, no
2), (b) Of the Cootub Shaheea or Kings of Tailang, (ibid.,
no.4) This contains a brief reference to Mir Jumla's career in
Golkonda.

(«) Andhra, Oondavir &c (Mo. II. Sec. VII nos 8, 9, 15
p. cxxxiv).

(a) Tamil

Nafayana Kon s Carnataka Hajakkal Savistara Charitram
(complete History of the Karnatak Kings) in Tamil, found
in the Mackenzie Mss.

LIFE OF MIR JCJMLA

A translation of relevant portions of Section VI
supplied to me by Be wan Bahadur C.S, Srini vasachari
(See his History of Gingee (28-3In) for value of this work).
It refers to the agreement between the two Deooani Sultans
and the struggle over Jinjk

(6) Telugu

Dewan Bahadur C. S. Srinivasaehari informs me “There
is not much of what may be called original material in Telugu
literature regarding Mir Jumla in the Golconda Karnatak/

Some incidental references may bo gathered from MSS. like
XXXII. Ceded Districts, Local Tracts (Telugu), entitled
“Account of Gandikotta Hill Port'^Itl the Jambula Maddugu
Dt. (Mack. CoH. Vol. II. p. lxv)

The Velugotivarivamsavali. MC. I. 306-309. Ed. by Dr N.
Venkata Ramanayya, Univ. of Madras, 1939. Deals with the
family of Venkatagiri and Kalahasti—esp. exploits of Kumara
Yacha (21st generation) and Singa.

Tanjavuri Andhra Rajula Char Ur a, an account of the
Nayaks of Tanjore, and referred to in the Mack. Coll. 1,310-11,
Extracts in SVH. no. 98.pp. 319-36.

Ramarajiyamu, by Venkayya, SVH. no. 97. pp. 310-3J9.

Gkikkadeva Raya Vamsavali, by Tirumalarya : Sriranga
Raya III of Vijayanagar. SVH. no. 91. pp. 309-10.

Rahulasvacharitram , a poem by Damaria Vengalablmpala
of Kalahasti family. SVH. no. 93. pp. 304-7,

(c) Sanskrit

SivataRmratnakara by Keladi Basava (SVH no. 99 and 1.00)

<SL

F, Archaeological, Epigraphic and Numismatic

Annual Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India.
Annual Reports of the Archaeological Department of His
Exalted Highness the Nizam's Dominions (since 1915)

The Historical Inscriptions of Southern India (collected
till 1923) and outlines of Political History, by Robert Sewell,
and edited by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar. Madras, 1932.

misr/fy

PORTRAITS

%^fJMtgraphia Indo — Mo&Uwaica.

1923-24. (1) A now inscription from Golconda by

G. JTazdani.

1937-38. (2) Some Muslim Inscriptions from 'Madras-

Presidency and Orrisa, by G. Yazdani.

(3) Three Inscriptions from Gingee by F. A.
Khan.

(4) Some new inscriptions from the Golkonda
fort by Khwaja Md. Ahmad,

Epigraphia Carnatica (Inscriptions in the Mysore dt».),
Mysore Arch, series by B. Lewis Bice since 1888. Supplemen¬
tary Inscriptions by Dr. M. H. Krishna.

A Topographical List of the Inscriptions of the Madras
Presidency (collected till 1915 by V. Itangacharva, 3 Vole.
Madras, 1919.

Annual Beports on South Indian Epigraphy .

Banerji, B.D. (aj Inscribed Chins from Assam . JASB 1909.
(b) “ Inscribed Guns from. Assam" JASB. 1911. An inscribed
gun of Jayadhvaja Simha, probably recovered by Mir Jumla’s
forces and removed to Bhagalpur, has three separate inscrip¬
tions, one in Sanskrit and the remaining two in Persian.

Banerji , B. D. —Alamgirnagar, a new Mughal Mint, JASB.
1920. pp„ 85-86. A small silver coin (probably minted 1661—
Feb. 1663), belonging to the collection of Mr. Prafulla Nath
Tagore of Calcutta. (PI. XIII. no,8).

The Qutb Shahis of Haidardbad or Golconda by R. Bum.
JASB. 1909, pp. 317-8. A coin of 1008/1657-58 with the
prophetic legend “It has come to an and, well and auspiciously/'
The i Mughal Mint Town of Gokulgarh by H. Nelson White-
head, JASB. 1909, p. 341 (Alamgirpur).

G. Portraits

1. Catalogue, Br. Mus. Vol. III. 782a (Add, 23, 609), 779b (no.

31, — Add, 18, 801), 780b (Add. 5254), f. 18b; Supplar
meat, no. 411. f. 30a.

2. Amir Tumla amusing himself in his zenana after the

engraving from an Indian drawing in Valentyn's-
Beschryving , see Bernier. 170.

wmsr/f

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

4,

5 .

^Storia do Mogor, Vol. L Introduction, p, Lvii; Vol.

P 412.

Portrait of Mir Jumla Mir Muhammad Said, exhibited by
Rao Bahadur D, B. Parasnis. Pr. IHRO, VIf, 1925, p,
119, See BPP, 1925, facing p, 25 ; also KB frontispiece.

Photographic .Negatives (12” x I0 5> , 8£” x 6£”), no, 560,
561 prepared from Br. Museum by the office of the
Director of Archaeology, during 1920-21, (ARADND,
1920*1).

II. Secondary

A. Persian

Maasir-ul4Jmara, by Mir Abdur Razzaq, Nawab Samsam ud
daula Shabnawaz Khan Khwafi Aurangabadi, and his son
Abdul Hayy, (2nd edition) 1741-80: a biographical dictionary
of the peers of the Mughal Empire (1500*c. 1780 A.D.). Edited
by Maulavi ‘Abdur Rahim and Maulavi Mirza Ashraf Ali, (Bl.
1887-96). Partial Eng. Tr by H. Beveridge, revised and
completed by Dr. Baini Prashad. Vol. I. Calcutta, 1911*41.

Tarikh-i-'Muhammadi. By Mirza Muhammad bin Rustam
Ridas. (Khan Sahib S. H. Askari's transcript of Rampur MS).
Obituary notices of distinguished men in chronological order
from the beginning of Hijra era to the date of composition
1190/1776-77).

Basatm'-uS'-Salatin. By Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi, 1824 : (Litho.
Hyderabad) ; OPL. MS; See Morley, p. 79. A history of
Bijapur, ‘‘valuable aud accurate, in spite of its being a later
compilation. 5 '

Qutb-:auma-i-Alain By Sayyid Muhammad Mir Abu
Turab, 1806. Sir j, N. Sarkar's transcript of IOL. MS. 2428
(Ethe. 465). A history of Golkonda.

Hadiqat>ul*Alam By Mir Abud-Qasim, alias Mir Alam.
Litho. Hyderabad, A. H, 1309. A history of the Sultans of
Golkonda.

WNISTfy

^/TarJkh^Ali Adil Shalt II.. By Sayyid Nurullah bin Q

iSayyid Aii Md* al Hus iyni al-Qadiri. Ends. 1067 (Sir J. N.
Sarkar's transcript of 10JL. MS. 3052) B. M Adn. 27262 26268;

ASSAMESE

L

Rieu 318.

Majmua-i-Maktubat (ASB. MS. no. 359)—collection of official
letters belonging to the State correspondence of the Mughal
Court. Copied, c, 1070. Contains (i) two letters from Aurangzeb
to Qutb Shah, (ii) a letter from Aurangzeb to Md. Adil Shah,
(iii) Aurangzeb to Ahmad Beg re : the campaign in Bidar.

MukatabatM-muqima (ASB. MS), a collection of letters
and official documents by Aid. Muqim b. Mir Aid. Sharif al
Hasani, Refers to occupation of fort Udgir, and to a palace
built by Mir Jumla. etc,

MajmaulAfkar (OPL. MS. 860) contains : (i) Mir Jumla's

letter to Nawwab Wazir Khan, written by order of Shah Jahan
and Wazir Khan’s reply, (ii) several other letters to Khwajah
Abul Hasan and Mulla Hay at i Gilani, (iii) letter from Mirza
Jalala (a poet) to Na,wab Mir Jumla.

The Riyaz-us-Salatin, a history of Bengal. By Ghulam
Hussain Salim. Tr, into English from the original Persian by
Maniavi Abdus Salam (ASB. 1002).

Tazkirat-ul-Umara (ASB. MS. no. 216). By Kiwal Ram,
s/o Raghunath Das. 1780 (Br. Mus. Add. 16703).

Muniakhabul-Lubab By Muhammad Hashim Kha.fi
Khan (Bib. Ind. edn. 1874). Partial tr. in E. and D. VII.

Tarikh Farahbakhsh of Muhammad Faiz Bakhsh. Tr,
from the original Persian by William Hoey as Memoirs of
Delhi and Faizabad, Vol. I: the Memoirs of Delhi, Allahabad,
1888.

B. Assamese

Tung Khungia Buranji or History of Assam 1681-1826: Ed.
by I)r. S. K. Bhuyan, Introduction only.

Assam Buranji By Kasi Nath Tatmili Phukan. Re-print,
1906. Calcutta.

Assam Buranji or a History of Assam from the commence¬
ment of the Ahoni rule to the British occupation of Assam

LIFE OF Mill JIJMLA

1826 A.D. being an enlarged version of the ehroniole of
Kaeinatli Tamuli Phukan, By the late Harakaata Barua Sadr
Amin. Edited by 8. K. Bhuyan. 1930.

Deodhai Asam Buranji, with Several shorter Chronicles
of Assam. Compiled from old Assamese Buranjis. ed. by
S. K. Bhuyan, 1932.

C- Sanskrit

Haragaurisamvada. Written in Assamese characters, vide,
‘A new Source of the .Political History of Kamarupa by Dr.
P. C. Bagchi. IHQ. XVIII.

D. Later Works

Ahmad, Khan Chowdhri Amanatulla. Kuchbiharer Itilias
(in Bengali) Pt. I, Printed at the State Press and published
under authority of Cooch Behar State, 1938.

Aiyangar Diwan Bahadur Dr S. K.

1: Sources of Vijayanagar History , Madras, 1919.

2: History of Tirupaii , Vol, 2: Madras, 1941.

Aiyar, R. Satianatha. The Nayahs of Madura.

Balkrishna Shivaji the Greedy 2-Vols. Bombay, 1932.

Ballard. Rulers of the Indian Ocean . 1927.

Bendrey, V« S. A Study of Muslim Inscriptions with special
reference to the Inscriptions published in the Ep. Indo-Mosle-
maica. Poona, 1944:

Bhattacharya, Dr. Sudhindra Nath. A History of Mughal
North Eastern Frontier Policy : Calcutta, 1929:

Bruce, John. Annals of the Honorable East India Company
from their establishment by the Charter of Queen Elizabeth 1600>
to the Union of the London and English East India Company ,
1707-8. By John Bruce, Keeper of His Majesty's State Papers
and Historiographer to the Honorable E.I.C. 3 Vols. 1810.

Buchanan, F : A journey from Madras through the countries
of Mysore, Canara and Malabar. 3 Vols. 1807.

2: General view of the History of Kamarupa .

Burgess, John. The Chronology of Modem India , 1494-1894.

Cambridge. History of India, Vol, IV: 1937, Ch. 8 (by Sir
J. N. Sarkar) and Ch. 9 (by Lt. Col. Sir Wolseley Haig).

5

BA'iSSr w mm

X!apper, J. The Three PresidmiceB of IrtMa —rise and prkb
of British Indian possessions.

Catron, F. A History of the Mogul Dy nasty m India etc.

1828.

Codrington. Manual of Mumlman Numismatics iRASi VII).
Cope, Captain. New History of the East Indies. 1601-1758
Cox. North Arcot Manual.

Crole. GhingUput Manual.

Danvers, F. C: The Portuguese in India, 2 Vols.

Dey, Shumbhoo Chundev Hoogly Past and Present, Calcutta,

1906.

Dow* Alexander. The History of ITmdostan. Translated from
the Persian, VoL III. 1812.

Duff, Grant- History of the Mahrattae.

Edmundsoft, Rev. George* Anglo-Dulch Rivalry in the first
half of the Seventeenth Geniury.

Elphinstone. Rise of the British Power in the East.

Faruki, Zahiruddin Aurangzeb and His Times , 1935.

Foster, Williadt , The Founding of the Fort St. George.
Madras, 1902

Gait, EnA A History of Assam, Calcutta, 1906.

Garstan, J. H South Arcot district Manual , 1878.

Ghose, Moonshee Jadmiath. Iiajopakhpan (History of Kuch
Bihar). Tr, by Rev. R. Robinson, Calcutta, 1874.

Cribble, J. D. B. A History of the Deccan, 2 Vols. 1896.

Hall, D. G. E- Early English Intercourse with Burma . 1928.
Hamilton, F An Account of Assam. First compiled 1807-14.

Ed. by Dr. 8. J£. Bhuyan, 1940.

Harvey, G E. History of Burma , 1925.

Hemingway. I* Tanjore Gazetteer. 2. Trichinopoly Gazetteer,

Heras the Rev. Henry. The Aravidu dynasty of Vijayanagarci,
Madras, 1927,

Hodmtia, S. H. 1* Studies in Indo-Muslim History, A
critical Commentary on Elliot and Dowson's History
of India as told by its own Historians, Bombay, 1939.
2 . Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics (occasional
Memoirs of Numismatic Soe„ India. IT). Calcutta, 1923
Hunter. Statistical Account of Bengal.

21

WNtSTfy

LUIS OF M1B J17MLA

<SL

rvine, William- Army of ike Indian Mughals
Khan, Sir Shafaat Ahmad- Sources for the H istory of 17th
Century. British India in the India Office and public Records
office (JIH. Vol. T).

Love, Col H- D. Vestiges of Old Madras, 3 Vols. 1913.
Macpherson, The History and Management of the East India
Company from its origin in 1000 to present times. \ol. 1.
MDCCLXXXU.

Malcolm, A History of Persia, 2 Pols,

Mahalingam, T. V. Administration and Social life under
Vijaynagar, University of Madras, 1940.

Marshman, j. C. Outline of the history of Bengal, Serampore

1946.

Milbuvn , W, Oriental Comma ce, fcls. 1813.

Montague, C. J. S. A concise history of Bengal from the
Earliest period to the dose of Lord William Bentinck’s administra¬
tion, Calcutta, 1840.

Moreland, W-1. Relations of ( the kingdom of ) Golconda in
the early Seventeenth Century, (Hakluyt Society). 1031.

2. From Akbar to Aurangseb. 1923.

Morse, H- B- The Chronicles of East India Company trading
to China, 1835-1834, Vol. I. 1926.

Nolan, Dr- E- H- The History of the British Empire, in India
and the East. Vol. 1.

Orme, Robert. A Ilislory of the Military transactions of
the British nation in Indostan, from the year MDCCXLV etc.
2 Vols. London, MDCCCIIL
Pate, Tinnevelly Gazetteer.

PatwardheiJ- Source Book of Maratha History. Vol. I. Ed.
by ft. P Patwardhan and H. G. Rawlinson. 1929.

Penrose, Boies. Seafights in East Indies in the years 1602-
1339. 1931.

Phayre, Lt- Gen Sir Arthur- History of Burma. London,
1883.

Playne, Somerset- Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa.

Their history, people, commerce and Industrial

Resources, compiled by ..assisted by J. W. Bond.

Edited by Arnold Wright. London, 1917.

WNlSTffy.

LATER WORKS

iamanayya, N- Venkata- Studies in the History of the (hi ^
'lynasty of Vijaycmctgara. University of Madras, 1935.

Raye, N. N. The Annals of the Early English Settlement in
Bihar. 1927.

3.

4.

5 .

6 .

Sastri,

Ritchie, Leitch. A History of the Indian Empire and the
East India Company from the earliest times to the present. VoL I.

Saletore, Dr. B. A. Social and political life in the Vijaya-
nagar Empire . 2 Vols. 1934.

Sarkar, Sir J. N. 1 . A History of Aurangzih , 5 Vols.

2. A short History of Aurangzih,

Studies in Mughal India.

House of Shivaji.

Studies in Aurangzih's reign .

Skivaji , 3rd. ed.

K ( A Nilkanta Foreign Notices of South India
jrom Megasthenes to Ma Huan. University of Madras. 1939.

Sen, Dr. Surendranath. Indian Travels of Thevenot and
Careri. Indian Records Series, 1949.

Srmivasachari, Rao Bahadur C S.

7, A History of Madras.

2. A History of Gingee and its Rulers . Annamalai

University, 1943.

Stewart, Charles, A History of Bengal , 1813.

Vijayanagara Sexcentenary Volume. Vijayanagara Empire

Sexcentenary Association, Dharwar, 1936.

Vriddhagirisan, V. The Nayahs of Tanjore. (Annamalai
University Historical Series No, 3 ), 1942.

Wade, Dr. John Peter. An Account of Assam. 1800. Ed.
by Benudhar Sharma . 1927,

Wheeler, T. 7. Early Records of British India, Calcutta,
1878. 2. India under British Ride.

Wilks, Lieut. Col. Mark. Historical sketches of the South of
India, in an attempt to trace the History of Mysoor, 1810;

Edited by Murray Hammick. 1930.

Willson, Beetles- The Ledger and Sword or the Hon*
Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies ,

1599*1874. 2 Vols 1903 (Ch X of Vol I useful).

WNisr/fy

LIFE QM W& »J[TOIL*

<SL

II* (X) 2% Mmtty Annate of the English v
Bengal. Voi. L 1895*

{2} A Note on the English. Chiefs at Balasor in the Bay
of Bengal, 1633-501 1903.

Wright# A* Early English Adventurers in the East , 3*914.
ill. ARTICLES IN JOURNALS, MAGAZINES AND PROCnEBINGS.

Ahmad. Khan Bahadur Saiyid Zamiruddm. Baud Khan
Quraishi, Governor of Bihar and Founder of the town of
Daudnagar ... ... ... JBORS. IV.

Aiyangar, Divvoai Bahadur Dr S. K.

(1) Kanthirava Narasaraja Wodayar of Mysore and the

Last Emperor of Vijayanagar ... Pr. IHRC. XVIII,

(2) The character and significance of the Empire of

Vijayanagara in Indian History ... VSCV.

(3) The Rise of the Mahratta Power in the

South ... ... ... JIH. XX.

(4) Gollapallee Diamond mines ... JIH. XX : Pr.

IHRC. XIII.

(5) Srirangar&yalU ... ... JIH. XVIII.

(6) Sri Ranga, the last Ruler of the Vijayanagara
Empire, iti European Records ... BPP. 1939 : Pr. IHRC. XV.

Aiyar R. S- Sri Ranga III of Vijayanagar ... Pr. GO. 1924.

Anderson Bernard. The Capture of Gingi by Bijapur

JIH. Dec. 1914.

Askari, Khan Sahib Sayyid Hasan. Bihar under
Aurangzcb .. ... ... JBRS. Dec. 1945.

Austen, Major Hv Godwin, On the ruins of Dimapur on
the Dunsiri river ... JASR. 1874.

Bagdhi, Dr , P. C A new source of the Political History
of Kamarupa (Haragmiri Samvada) .. IHQ. XVIH.231-60.

Basu, Dr. K* K*

1. Some old Accounts of Bhagalpixr *.. JBORS. XXI.

2. Golkonda Court Letters ... JBORS. Dec. 4949.

3. Bijapun Ocmrt Betters JBORS* June, 1941.

Bbatfcndbarya* Dr. S* N. On the Transfer of the capital

of Mugh al Benga l from Rajm&hml to Dacca (JahangimagarJ byr
IsIlcq Khan Chifcfota ... *v DUS i.

miSTffy

JOtFRKJlI.B.«N» PaOOBEDINOa

tuyan, Dr. S. K-

l; Assamese Historical Literature .. IHQ. V. (1929).

2. Mir Jumla and Ram Singh in Assam..iJTHiV. (1927)
Beveridge, H The Week of the Ter SrMUing A. D. 1661

CR. XCL (1890)

Be&mes, John.

1. On the Geography of India in the reign of Akbar.

JASB. 1884
1885 Pt. I

3. Notes on Akbar’s Subahs with reference to the Ain

i Alcbari, No. 1. Bengal JRAS, 1896,

Bhattachwya, Prof. Padmanatli Vidyavinode. Notes on
Certain Archaeological Remains at Tezpur (Assam). JASB. 1909.
Bhattasaii, N-

1. The English Factory at Dacca. ... BPP. 1927.

2. Some Facts about old Dacca. ... BPP. 1936.

Bhaunani, P. A. A short history of the Foundation and

Growth of the city of Haidarabad. ... JHAS. 1917.

Blochmann, H. Contributions to the Geography and
History of Bengal (Muhammadan period). ... JASB. 1873.

Bora, Debendranath. A short sketch of the North Eastern
Policy of the Great Mughals. ... JARS. IX.

Chakravarti, Monmohan. Notes on Gaor and other old
places in Bengal. ••• JASB. 1909.

Chughtai, M- Abdulla. An unpublished Contemporary
History of Aurangzeb’s Accession.

Diskalkar, D- B. Shahji’s relations with

fsi.

Economic Conditions in

.. Pr. OC. 1930.
Vijayanagara.

V8CV.
the Time of
VSCV.

. JASB. 1872.

Dixit, G. S.

Krishuadewraja.

Foster, J. M-

1. Notes on Ghargaon, Assam.

2. The Temple of Jaysagar, Upper Assam.

... JASB. 1874.

Russia and India ip the 17th Century.
Hindusthan Standard, Pijja No. 1945.
Hpsan, Khan Bahadur Maulavi Zafar- Bibliography of
Indo-Moslem History excluding Provincial monarchies,

MASI. no. 45 (1932)

Goldberg, Nikolai.

LIFE OF M1K JUMLA

<SL

Historical Sketch of Portuguese India.

CB. 1881 r
BPP, 1909 (Ft.2)

Hossain, Syud Echoes from Old Dacca.

Hosten, Rev- H. (S. J.).

L Jesuit Annual Letter from Mogor 1648-9* .. JIH. I.

2. List of Jesuit Missionaries in “Mogor” (J580-1803),

.. JASB. 1910.

3. Relation of the Capuchin Mission in Egypt, Syria.
Mesopotamia, Persia and E, India, 1644-47. by
Father Ambrose of Rennes O. Cap. (Tr. from Latin)

... BPP. 1929.

4. Report of,.on his visit to Mylapore &c.

Pr. IHRC. IV. (1922).

Hosten & Betse- L* (S* J.) List of Portuguese Jesuit
Missionaries in Bengal and Burma (1576-1742) ... JASB. 1910.

Moreland, W- H.

1. Dutch Sources for Indian History (1590-1650).

JIH. II.

2. The Shahabandcir in the Eastern Seas. JRAS. 1920.
Mackenzie, Col- View of Events in the Carnatic from 1564

to 1687 etc.1. JASB. XII. (1844).

Nath, R- M. The Deopani ruins. ... JASB. VIIL

Notes on Schorer's Account of the Coromandel Coast.

IHQ. June, 1641.

Oldham, T. Notes upon the Geology of Rajmahal Hills.

JASB. 1854.

Peal. S E. Notes on a visit to the Tribes inhabiting the
Hills South of Sibsagar, Assam ... ... JASB, 1872,

Pfaayre, Sir Arthur P- Major General. The History of

Pegu. JASB. 1871 (Ft. I).
Rankin, J T- Dacca Dianes .. ... JASB. 1920.

Rehat&ek- Mandelsio and Thevenot, Their Travels in
•India . v -. ... CR. 1882.

Ramanyya, Dr N- Venkata- Karnatak ... JAHRS. X.

Sarkaf, Sir J N-

1. Assam and the Ahorns iri 1660 .. JBORS. I.

2. The Topography of Garhgaon and its Environs in

1662-3 ... ... .. JBORS. IV.

JOURNALS AND PROCEEDINGS

A Page from Early Mysore History MR. XLVI

(July-Dee.)

4. Early History of Shahji Bhonsla MR. Sept. 1917.

Sarkar, jagadish Narayan

1. A few letters of Qutb Shah & Mir Jumla relating to the

partition of the Karnatak. Pr. IHRC. X VIII.

2. The Rise of Mir Jumla ... Pr. IHRC. XIX.

3. Correspondence between the Deccani Sultanates &

Mir Jumla ... JBRS X.XVIII Pt 1.

4. Mir Jumla—Iran Correspondence, JBRS. XXVIII,

Part 2 : XXIX. Pts.l & 2

5. Some Aspects of Qutb Shahi Administration of

Golkonda JBRS. XXX .Pt. 1.

6. A few letters of Qutb Shah & Mir Jumla relating to

Karnatak Affairs • •• JBRS. XXX. Pt. 2.

7. Mir Jumla’s diplomatic relations with Sri Ranga Rayal

& Shahji Bhonsla ... JBRS. XXX. Pts. 3 & 4.

8. Fate of Mir Jura la’s Karnatak Dominions JIH. XXVI.

Pt. 2.

9. Role of Daud Khan in Mir Jumia’s Campaigns in

Bihar & Bengal ( with a map ) ... JPU. Vol. I. Pt. 2.

10. A few Letters of Aurangzeb to Emperor Aurangzob
relating to Mir Jumla and Sri Ranga Rayal JPU. II.
Stapleton- Contributions to the History and Ethnology of
N. E. India.. .. JASB. 1910.

Sherwill, Captain W S Notes upon a Tour through
the Rajmahal Hills •• JASB. 1851.

Shastri, H- Krishna- The Third VijayanagarA Dynasty ;
its Viceroys and Ministers. .. • • ASR. 1911-12.

Taylor, Rev. G. P- The Mints of the Mughal Emperors
of India. JBRRAS (Centenary Memorial Vol. 1905).

Tolbort, T WH Authorities for the History of the
Portuguese in India JASB. 1S/3.

Tucci, Guieseppe. The Sea and Land Travels of a
Buddhist Sadhu. ...IHQ. VII.

Thagaraju, A- S. A Study of Telugu Place names

JAHRS. 49-6(1.

w .jvhb jumla

Maulavi Ahdoi Surgeon Houghton and -the Grant
of Privitefes to the English Traders. JA8B. 1912.

rv. MAPS AND ATLASES

1. Atlas of South India by Pharaah & Co.

Bengal Atlas, Ed. 1871. by Major James Renneil

3. Indian Atlas.

4. Go varment of India Survey Maps.

5. Maps in the District Gazetteers.

6. Robinson, Maps of A^sam.

7. Sketch Map of the Northern Portion of Assam and
Burma with Fait of China-JASB. 1861, facing p. 366

8. Map of the North Eastern Frontier of Bengal-Pr.
ASB. Feb. 1869, facing p 74.

9. Rajmahal and its vicinity, BPP 1928. p. 43.

10. Maps of (i) the site of Dacca, BPP. 1936. p, 50.

(ii) the Environs of Dacca (ibid, 51)

(iii) Van den Broucke's Map (1660), Ibid., 54.

11. Map ortho Deccan (no 2 bet. pp. 32-33, in Orme,
Military Transactions) Vol I ; Plan of Masulipatam, ibid „
p. 480.

V. BEJ’BRBNOB books

1. Yule, Col. Sir Henry & Burnell, A. C. Hobson—Jobson
Being a Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and
Phrases. London, 1886.

2. Wilson, H. JH, Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms
relating to the Administration of the Government of British
India, etc.. London, 1855

3. Bengal District Gazetteers.

4. Assam District Gazetteers.

5. Imperial Gazetteer.

6. Mysore Gazetteer by Rice

7. Government of Assam Department of Historical and
Antiquarian Studies^ Bulletin No. L compiled by Dr. S. K.
Bhuyan, 1932.

8. Constable's Hand Gazetteer of India, 1888.

9. A list of the objects of Antiquarian Interest in the
Lower Provinces of Bengal, 1879.

INDEX

Abdul Bari Ansar i, 201
Abdul Hamid Deccani, 125
Abdul *Tabbar Khan, 04, 95, 99,
100, 103, 105
Abdul Kasim, 78

Abdullah Khan M&zand&ram, 5, 50
Abdullah Qhxtb Shah, 2-11,14-30,

35, 39, 50, 54, 58, 59, 62-80
84, 89-113- 132, 140, 288, 289,
295, 293-903
Abdul Latif. 66, 78, 303
Abdul Maal, I69n, 183
Abdul Mahud, 107
Abdul Majid Deccani, 18.7
Abdul Qudir Dhakiu. 117
A b du n Nabi, 183, 184
Abdur Rahman Sultan. 149
Abdus Salam, 225
Abhoypur, 247, 254, 256
Abul Hasan, 255, 262, 265, 266, 301
Abul Maali, sea Abdul Maal
Achoen (Achin), 44, 45, 56, 59
Adam Khan Kheshgi, 87, 247, 256
Adams Roger, 44
Adil Shah ( AH) II, 113
Adil Shah (Muhammad) 13-32,
63, 65-09. 71, 72, 75-77, 90, 94,
101,106. 113 116, 131, 294,
298, 499

Afaal Kl an. 13, 18, 78, 119, 126
Ahataguria Laban Phukan, 231
Ahmad Beg Kajmsani. 100
Ahmadnagar, 85, 127, 128, 132
Aiyappa, 13, 145
Ajmir, 110. 157
Akbarpur, 185, 190, 192
Alamgimagar, 228, 229
Alauddin Hussain Shah, 278
Alawaxdi Khan, 148
All Beg, 220. 262. 262
Ali Khan, 169

Alt Quit Khan. 152, 164, 182
Ali Reza Beg, * 90, 245, 2&f>

AMah Yar Khan, 228
A mar Singh, 246
Arurntgiri, 8
Aiiant pur, 23
Andrews, President, 205
Andur, 120
Ankalkot, 125
Anwar Beg, 245. 253
Arabia, 44, 47
Arcnt, 13n, 16, 18, 2 Oil
Ardistan, 1

Armagon, 13, 14
Ami, 108

Arrakan, 44, 46, 47, 200, 201,
208, 214. 224, 225, 232
Asad Khan, 19, 23
Asadullah, 76
AsaF Khan, 87n
Asir, 117
Asiur, 18

Askar Khan, 222, 228, 230, 277, 278
Ataullah, 245
Atur, 33

Aurangabad, 118, 120, 127, 128.
136, 140

Aurangzib, 12, 49, 66-139, 147-51,
168-171.180, J 83, 184, 186,
1.90, 195, 196, 200 03, 208-10,
213-15, 217, 220-225, 228,

229, 232, 265, 269, 270, 287-
89, 295-97, 301 303

Baduli Phukan, 231, 234, 237,
257-9, 265-270, 276, 277, 282
Baglaghat, see Bholahat
Bahadurpur, 152, 153
Bahlol, 119, 121

Bahroz, Raja 153, 154, 156, 190,
191, 277, 278
Baji Gliorpare, 30
Baker, President, 58
Balaghat, 12, 15, 19n
Balaji Haibat Rao, 33
Bala Rau, 36, 96, 142-145
Ba’asore, 161, 168, 204, 205, 213,
217, 222

Bansbari, 262, 264
Bantam, 4, 300
Baqarpur, 158, 160, 16#

Bari Saheba, 29

Baritala, 224. 227, 272., 273, 275,
277,278, 304
Bar Jangal, 154, 190
Bargohain, 224, 239, 242, 243,
247, 253. 257, 260n, 269
Barkata, 266
Bar Patra Phukan, 269
Bar Phukan, .237, 271, 281
Barukial Phukan. 237
Basavapatan, 13
Bednur, 13
Bejdoloi, 231, 281
Belghata, 158, 159, 178, 284, 293

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<8L

Beilur, 13

Beltala, 235, 270

Bezwada, 9

Bhagalpur, 181 182, 184
BhavaTiatib Karji, 224. 229
Bhitarual Gohain, 237
Bhitarual Phukan, V53, 256,263,
264

Bholahat, 197, n, 198, 280, 293

Bhutan, 227, 229

Bidar, 27, 120, 121, 123-25, 127,

128, i 32

Bijapur, 13, 16, 17, 2~-29, 33,41,
43, 71-73, 84, 87, 39, 96, 101,
104-7. 112-24, 128-31, 288,

294, 296, 298

Bir, 85, 105, 124, 133, 135
Bostoek, Thomas, 45
Bringbourne, Robert, 42
Bulaml Akhtar, 197-199
Bum Gohain, 237, 24.2, 26 5 , 266,
n, 269, 270

Biirhanpur, 81, 103, 127, 128,
133, 139, M0
Burma, 44, 45, 223.

Courua, 26
Cowl)ill, John, 42
Cuddapah, 14, 15, 21. 23

Campbell, John, 287n
Ceylon, 59, 160
Chaohni, 258
Chamber, Agent, 203
Chamberlain, 303, 204. 212
Chanda, 76
Chandor, 120n

Chatidragiri, 16, 26, 32, 35, 94,

144, 145

Chandraguti, see Guti
Changam, 20

Charaideo, 242, 246n, 266n
Cbarra, 247
Chatnagar, 155
Chaturbhuj Ghnuhaii* 157
Chaim Khan, 9

Chauki Mirda.dpur, 191-193, 199, 200
Chik Nayakanhalii- 13
Chilmari, 187
China, 6In, 223, 279
Chineleput, 17

Chmglung Luthuri Dayatigia Raj-
khoa, 264

ChinnatanVbi Mtidaliyar, 43, 146
Chinoor, 92

Chiragh, 152, 163, 181, 183-85, 194
Chittaikul, 20n
Chunar, 153

Cogan, Andrew, U, 62, 54
Cogan, Richard, 45
Colgong, 182, 185
Condapilly, See Mustafanagar

Conjeoverarn,19

Dacca, 158, 161, 194-201.208-11
214, n, 215, 217, 219. 224, 225,

228, 231, 246, 249, 265, 272, 278,.
291, n

Dadaji Pandifc, 21
DakhmkoL, 252, 270, 275, 277
Damarla, 13. 35, 43
Dnra. 66n, 67. 78, 82, 88, 89, 92-94,
99,102,108.110.112, 113. 117,
118, 122. 123, 1*25, 127, 129, 130,

134. 136 38, 147, 157, 176, 187,
296, 297

Darran:/, 236, 265. 270 , 275, 277,
304

Darwesh Beg, 267

Daud Khan Qureishi. 152, 154, 168,
172, 173. 177. 180-86. 190-201,
215, 221, 212

Daulatabad, 109, 115, 117, 11^,

135, 139

Deopani. 247, 254, 255
Deora i, 157

Dewaigaon, 243, b, 245, 247. 249.
251, 253, 255, 258n, 262-65, *275,
304

Dharmaraja, of Arrakan. 46 *,
of Bhutan, 229
Dbarur, 115
Dbubri, 231

Dthingia Phukan, 231* 242
Dilawwar Habshi, 122
DilawarKhan, 152
BiUr Khan, 121, 122, 152n,l80, 190,
192-94, 197-201, 221, 226, 232,
237, 238, 265-257, n 260-62,
266, 268-70, 273, 275
Dimarua, 236 270, 276-2/7, n, 304
Din Muhammad, 195
Dirck Steur, 58
Divy Point (Dubighat), 9
Dixon, Hugh. 42
Dodha, 191

Dogachi, 158, 162, 164, 169-72, l 7,

187-190.195,284,286,291

Dom Filippe Mascerhas, 60
Dortson, see Durson
Bunapur, Mi4, 165. 172. 177, 187, 190
Durson, John, 219, 22fin
Dutch, 9, 13-18, 25, 35. 45-61, 58-59
144 n, 146, IfiO, 168, 204, 205,
212-16, 219, 226, n, 227, 239.
240, 250. 272, 285, 293, 293, 300

Ekduar, 226, 227

Ekkatoz Khan, 152, 178, 180n. 293

-INDEX

re, 106
Imeison, Richard, 42
English (&.E.I.C.),' 9,« II, J7 25,
34—38, 44—60, 64, 141—46,

168, 202 - 206, 212, 21:), 216-22,
226, 239, 272, 285. 290, 300
Etwar Khan, 159

Farhad Khan, 183, 184. 190, 193,
194, 201, 2lln, 229, 237. 247,
250, 255, 256, 258, 259, 28 2
Faaihuddin Muhammad, 27
Fateh Jang Kh'au Ruhela. 152, 163,
188

Fafcehpur, 187, 222
Fateh Sarnaubat, 119
Fathulla Beg, 135n, 185
Fatulla.. 214

Fida? Khan, Bakharzai, 152. 156,
172, 175, 178, 188, 190; Governor
of Awadb, 153, 154 ; Shu jai te.
163, 177, 182, 183
Firozpur, !58 160, 166
Fort St. George. Hi, 29, 35. 42, 51,
54, 55, 58, 61, 142, l44n. 146,
206,222

Gajpur, 243, n, 245, 247, 253. 255,

262, 264, 266, 295

Gaadikota, 10, 19n v 20, 23 - 7,

28 -32,36, 41 — 43, 67- 59, 63
95, 110, 285, 286. 291, n, 299*
300

Gangaram, 212

Garhgaon 236, 242, 243. n. 245—
49, 251, • 53-68, 272, 275, 276,
281.285

Garhgaoni Ptmkan, 266, 269

Garhi, See Teliyagarhi

Gaulmti, 224, 234, 236, 240, 245.

263, 205, 269. 275. 277, 285, 281
Gau 158

Clayton. John, 45
Gelrnar Vorburg, 272
Ghazi All, 14

Ghazi Khan, 117, 247, 254, 256, 265

Ghila Bijoypur. 231

Ghiiajari Ghat, 269

Choragbat, 211, n, 227, 230, 278

Ghora Kobrak, 237

Gilan, 207

Giria, 179, 180, 186, 187, 293

Gisu Daraz, 122, 301

Goa, 60

Goalpara, 213

Gogri. 184

Golaghat, 243

Golkonda, G—4, 10, 12—18, 22, 23
27—32, 35. 43—50, 52—56. 59a.
60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 73- 80, 84,
85 89. 90. 92 97, 99 106, 110 -
13. 115, 117 119, 120, 131, 138*
284, 288, 292, 296, 298, 303
Gombroon, 4, 47, 21.7
Gorakhpur, 153
Gorumkonda, 108, 116
Greenhih, Agent, 57, 142, 144n,

145, 202, 206
Gujrat, 130
Gunrakba, 193

24, n, 20, n, 28. 29, 30
Gwador, 47

H&bsh Khan, 125
Hudi, J 69, 183
Hadidad Khan, 76
Ilaidarabtid, 41, 69, 75-79, 81, 92,
98. 95, 99 105, 109, 286, 290,

30), 302

Haji Ahmad Said, 117
Hajiganj, 214

Haji —Khan Miana, 117: M,uh&*
mm ad Baqr, 234 ; Muhammad
Shaft 2n; Nasira, 29 ; Shaft, 100,
103; Sulaiman, 95 :

Hajo, 21 In, 224

Hakim—-Mirza Muhammad, 27?,
273n ; Muhammad Hussain, IHi
Nizamuddin Ahmad’79; Shaft a
272 Zahir Ardifeiani, 273, 1 73 r
Hall, Richard, 42
Hamid, 185
•Harchand, 174
Hatsbiia, 224, 231
Hayatabad (*r<agar), 8
Hayat Mahal. 6
Hazrahati, 198, 200
Hijili, 177. 213
Hijrapur, 201

Hindu Revoit, 95—97, 107 —8, 290
Hugh*, 159, 160, 165, 16$, 173, 174 r
177. 204—206, 21?, 217, 219.
272

Husain Sagar Tank, 7 8, 80

Ibn Husain, 179, 216, 238, 245 r
262-5, 275, 282
Ibrahim Khan, 125, 216
Ihtimam Khan, 166
Ihtisham Khan, 152, 212, 214, 221,
265, 273, 274

ikhlas Khan see Khan Muhammad
Ikhlas Khan Khesftgi, 152, 156 r
172. 187, 198

mi$r# y

LIFE OF MW JUMLA

,x ttddini Muhammad, 278
ri 13, 14, 17n, 23
Imam Quli Bag, 8
Imam Wardi Beg, 67
Indradyumna Dhumdhofa, 162,
157, :16ft, 172, 176
Indur, 76, 80, IQ3, 106
Ingondour (Engodour), 9
Iraj Khan, 86
Iraq,6
Iran, 1,2,8

Isa Beg, 88, 126

Isfandiar Beg (Khan), 228—30,
277

Iskander Ruhela, 162
Islam Khan, Gov. of Deccan, 27,
298

Islam Khan, 14 8, 162, n, 166, 164,
172, 175, 188, 190, 195, 190, 201
Ismail Beg. 99, 100, 182
Ismail Jogi, 249
Ispahan, 1

Ifcibar Khan, me khwaja Mishki
Itimad ud daula, 87n
J tiqad Khan, 86, 87
Ivy, 56

Jafar Khan’s garden, 153
Tafnapatam, 160
Jagatram Deka, 282
Jagdev, 16, 18, 31
Jahanara, 78, 86, 118
Jahangira, 182 184

Jahangirnagar, see Dacca
Jakepoorah, 154
Jalal Khan, 247, 256
Jamal Diteak. 194
Jaraal Ghori, 185
Japan, 59, 6In
Jardin, M. Du, 42
Jasra, 213

Jaswant Singh, 148, 170, 196
Jayadhwaj, Raja, 225, 242, 206-
' 70, 280, 282
Jaynarain, 231
Jfe&on, 14 in, 290n
Jharkhand, 156, 157
Jillala, 23, 28, n

Jinji, 14, 16-23, 26, 28, 31, 66, 94,
101, 108, 292, 294, 298
Jogigupha; 231, 233, 234, 245, 280
Junnar, 125
J u si, 152

Kadanitola, 190, 191
Kahlpatara, 16

KajlL 234-6, 245, 249, 272, 270. $1%
304

Kalahasil, 13
Kalirbur, 238, 340, 241b. 240, 247.

248. 263, 265, 275, 276 304
Kalyani, 121 , 124, 125, 137
Kama! Khan, 213
Kambam, U, 94, 100, 107, 132
Kamgar Beg, 100, 101 .

Kamrup, 224, 225, 231, 232, 234, 251,
265, 270, 275, 277, 278, 280, 281
Kandarpi, 31
Kandu Khamnn, 231
Kiribati, 224

Karima, Dr, 267, 272, 273a
Karnatak, 11-49, 63, 58, 57, 58,60,
62-65, 67-09, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79,
83, 84, 89-113, 116, 119, 120, 122,
131, 140-44, 216, 249, 289, 290,
294, 296, 298, 300
Kashmir, 299, 300
Kasijurah, 213

Kassimbazar, 165, 168,173, 174, 177 P
204, 219

Kathalbari, 227, 229, 230, 235
Ken, 204-6

Kenduguria Batpatra, 237
Khajwa, 147.62, 296
Khalifa-i-Sultan, 1, 2n, 35, 48, 65
Khandesh, 109,140,147
Khan-i-Alam, see Sayyid Alam
Khan-i Dauran, 213
Khan Muhammad, 13, 15, 18-23, 28-
33, 66, 71, 72, 1*6, 119, 125, 128,
132 133

Kkanzad Khan, #ee Mir Isjandiar
Mamuri

Khan Zanmn, 158
Kharagpur, 153, 154, 156
Khatta, Chowki of, 234
Khawas Khan, 162
Kheri, 163

Khizipur, 214, n, 226, 273, 274n,
278 293

Khuntaghat, 227, 232
Khwa ja- Bhagwan Das Shujai, 214 ;
Bhor Mai, 260, 269, 270 ; Kamal
Afghan, 155, 156 ; Kiahor D&s,
228 ; Mishki, 177, 181-6, 192-4 ;
Muhammad Arjf, 81, 100 ^

Muinuddin, 66
Kishan ’Singh, 263
Kietappa Naydk, Krishna

Tupakki

Kokalafc, Raja, 199, 191 t

Kokkanur, 23, 30, 31, 108, H6
Koneri ChetJi, 96, 144, w
Konkan, 123, 131
Kora-Gau tarn pur, 147
Krishnagiri, 31

Krishna Tupakki, 14, I On, 43, 96,
107, 108, 116, 11 In, X45, 140

<8L

mt, no, 214, 210 , 220 , 222-
232, 275, 277-79, 290
Kukurakata, 239
Kularas, 119
Kulbarga, 18, 122
T&untit, 153

Kunvar Ram Singh, 152, 156, 157
Kurnul, 15, 20, 3 07

Lahui Phukan, 231
Ldkhau, 215, 24.2. n. 245, 246, 248,
251, 253, 255, 256, 260, 262-5,
271, 275, 276, 281, 304
Leigh. John, 39
Lingura Nayak, 96, 143
Littleton, Walter, 34, 41, 49, 57, 58,
306

Lodi Khan, 152, 163, 198, 200
Lun a oh amar i ,249

Macassar, 44, 46, 59
Madras, 35-39, 45, 47, 53, 55, 60,
96, 141..5, 202, 206, 216, 217, 220,
222

JVladura, 14, 16, 19, 22, 32
Mahabat Khan, 121, 122, 124
Mahakot, 139
Mahmudabad, 197, 198
Mahmud Beg, 216, 221, 237, 238,
26K 268, 273, 282
Maille, Claude, 42. 43
Majuli, 243, 245, 263, 264
Majwa, 174
Makaradhwaj, 277
Makran, 47

Maid a, 166, 186, 191, 195, 197, 198,
292

Malay Peninsula, 47

Maldives, 44, 46

Malik Almas, 6

Maiik Ambar, 8

Malik Raihan, 19n, 20n, 21, 23

Mallaeoa, 220

Mallaiya, 15

Mallappa, S6‘, 39

Mallovol (Malloale), 64

Malnad, 12, 13, 23, 28

Maloji, 80, 101

Malwa, 85, 91, .114, 118

Manikdttig, 92

Mansur Khan, 5

Mhnihir Bh&rali Barua, 281, n, 281,
282

Martaban, 45, 46

Masulipatam, 4, 5, 8*19, 46. 47, 48,
50, 51. 53*55, 57, 110, I35n,
144 ti, 202-6.218. 230
Mamirnbftfcui*, m Murshidabad

Mathurapur, 215 246, 247, 253, Ssiya
256-62, 266n, 286
Matthias Halstead, 204
Maurang, 227
MefcCa, 25, 286, 301
Mergul Archipeiago, 44
Maina Khan, 194, 238, 247, 253,
256, 268
Midnapur, 177

Mir—Abdul Hasan, 126 ; Abdul
Kasim, 76 ; Abdullah, 221 ;
Abdul Latif, 80'; Abdur Razzaq,
228 ; Ahmad Khwati* HO, 13on ;
Alauddin, 175; Azir, 200 ; Beg
Shujai, 236n ; Fazlullah, 76 ;
Glmfisi, 125, 215 ; Isf'andiur

Mainuri, 165, 179

Mir Jumla, 3, 5, 10 ; see Mir Muha¬
mmad Said

Mir Muhammad Husain Tabatabai,

110, 111, 202, 206, 220 ; Muha¬
mmad tf&diq, 228

Mir Muhammad Said Mir Jumla,
see "table of Contents.

Mir -Muhammad Tahir, 19/27, 99 ;
Murtaza, 232, 286-8, 246, 247,
253, 256, 25*, 265, 266. 275, 276,
282 ; Nurullah, 245 ; Rustam 8 ;
Sayyid Ali. 36, 96, 142, 143, 145 ;
Sayyid Muhammad, 247, 277 ;
Shamsuddln, 80, 115
Mirza, 182, 184, 193
Mirza—Abdullah, 301-2 ; FathuOah,
299 ; Hazaru. 1 ; Islandiyar,
177 ; Jalal, 286 / Jan Beg, 158,
179, 197, 199, 225; Lutluilah
Bog, 212; Muhammad Mashkadi,
115 ; Rustam, 8 ; Sultan, 122 ;
Taqi Nishapuri, 7
Mocha (Mokha), 44* 47, 143
Ittonghyr, 153*56, 180, 182-4, 190*
191, 192
Moonagalah, 8
Mountney, 54
Muazzam, 80

Muazzam Khan 9ee Mir Vfd. Said
Mndhol, 30

Muhammad—Abid, 223;Aman, 113,
128 / Amin. 69, 74-79* 81 106,

111, 117, 124, 133, 137, 139. 220,
223n, 30141— historiographer,
244 ; Ashraf, 246 ; Beg, 45, 81,

245. 277 ; Hossain Salduz, 155,
182, 184 ; Ishaq, 97 ; Khalil,

246, 277 ; Khan Lodi, 30 ;
Muazz&ui, 133, 135 ; Muraiu, 42,
69-72, 73n, 79, 284 ; Mumin Beg
Kltkataz Khan, 239. 240, 256 ;
Tabrezi, 262 ; Muqjm, 215, 246,
251, 256 ; Murad, 121, .152, 164,

WNtSTfty

LIFE OF MIR JUMLA

<SL

187:255, 275

Muhammadnagar, 78
Mtil>am ma d — Nasir 84 ; Qasim
>1 azandarani, 16 : Itozbihani,
152 ; Salih, 230 ; Shah, 165a ;
Sharif Yasawal, 75, 99, 124, 177
Muhammad Sultan, 76-80, 91, 100,
127-33, 136, 151-5, 158, 1.62, 164,
108-73, 178, 179, 181, 192, 195-6’
205, 292, 293

Muhammad—Tughluk 78 ; Yusuf,
125 ; Zaman, 175
Mutitashain Khan, 106
Mukarram Khan ( Murad Kam
Safavi ), 149

Mukhlis Khan, 199, 201, 214
Mulla—Abdus Samad, 29, 78, 92,
299 ; Ahmad Natia, .116, 132,
133 ; Darwesh, 28Qn, 294 ; Hasan
Aii, 45 ; Muhammad Taqi, 5 ;
Mustafa, 211 ; AA ais, 7, 8, 50
Munawwar Khan, 216, 239, 245, 262
Murad, 87, 130, 134, 137
Murshidabad, 158, 168, 172-8 180,
183, 205

Mursbid Quli, 85-7,99
Mustafa Klian, 16-21, 23, 28 ; Bija-
puri, 117, 286
Must&fanagar, 5, 8
Muxadabad, #«e Murshidabad
Muzaffar, 178, 199
Muzamgaon, 125
My lap ore, 13, 39, 96
Mysore, 12, 13, 22, 31-33, 66

Naiabat Khan, 121, 122
Najf, 48, 273, 274. 301
Nakhuda Nura, 45
Nakti Rani, 270
Naldrug, 125

M arm up, 243, 247, 256, 260 26o,
267, 268, 275, 276, n
Namier, 76, 78, 81, 135
Nandiyal, 3 3n, 15, 23, 28, n
Narayangarh, 177
Narsapur, 44
Narasing Baja, 201
Nasirpur (Nashipur), 180, 186
Nasin Khan, 80. 86, 124, 127
Naz.tr Muhammad Khan, 149
Nagapatam, 13
Nekrmfti Khan, 152
Nell ore , 16
Niazi Khan, 152
Nilkantha Dev, 213
Niyaz Beg, 78
Nizamshahi Konkan, 123
\.izamuddin Ahmad Shirazi, 4, 6, 8,
, 62

Noakbalij 160
« Nowgongi '281

Nuru) Hasan, 165, 166, 187, 200
Orissa, 168, 212, 213

Panoharatan 231,234,280 •

Pandu, 224 235. 275„277, 304
Parenda, 123—33, 294
Patakalang, 238, n
Pathri, 127, 128

Patna, 153—154,181, 203 6, 212;

216, 219- 222
Patura. 175
Poddanaikpetta, 96
Peddapolll'm, 96
Pegu, 4, 9, 38, 44—48, 143, 279
Penukonda, 31

Persia 1 2, 38, 44, 47, 48, 51, 56,
59 62. 64. 65, 217, 273, 291,
302

Peruk, 44. 46

Pettapoh, 39

Phulbarua 234

Pialapur, 155, 157, 185

Pir Mtihammad Uighur, 187, 194

Pirpahar, 191

Pits (Pitt, William), 219n

Point Divy, 9

Poonamallee, 36, 37, 49, 95, 96, 110?
.142

Portuguese, 42, 45, 47, 48, 56, 60—1,
160, 210, 213, 216, 219, 226, 227,
239

Pran Narayan, 225
Pratt, Thomas, 219, n
Puli cat, 13— 16, 35, 56n, 58, 59, 95,
96, 144, n, 146
Purnea, 185

Qabad Beg, 99, 100, 108
Qabil Khan, 97, 102, 137, 138
Qadir, 185

Qadirdad Ansari, 152
Qandahar, 1.13, 296
Qarawal Khan, 201
Qasini Beg Baruti 247n
Qasim Khan. 82, 166
Qasiinkota, 8

Qazi Keria, 172, 181,184
Qazi— -Muhammad Arif, 74, 81 ;

Muhammad Hashim 101, 104,
105, 107, 108, 202; Nizama,

123, 124; Rizvi, 211; Sfinui
Shujai, 228

Qizilbash Khan, 152, 172
QuliBeg,110
Queda, 56n, 220
Qutbpur, 2|3

Qutb Shah (Qutbulmulk) m
Abdullah Qutb Shah

mtST/fy

INDEX .

ot©e, 21

Jhunevth Majumdar, 282
Rai DhugWciti Das, 214, 221, 222
Ruichur, 20

Rajmahal, 110, 154, 155, 158—61,
172 -8, 182—5, 189 -92, 195,

201, 210, 213 214, 272
Bajmandri, 106
Raixldang, 245, 255
Ramdwft, 118
Ramgir, 84, 92
Raridaula Khan, 13, 116
Rangamati, 165, 158, 190
Rangamati, 225, 227, 231-3
R_ao—Amar Singh, .152, 15 7; Bhao
Singh Hftda. 152, 156, 157 ;

Chat tarsal, 122, 124, 152, 157
Rashid Khan Ansari, 152, n, 156,
163,169,172, 181-4, 192, 193,
105, 201, 21 in, 225, 231, 232,
234, 259, 265, 277, 282
Rasul Bog, 152, 182, 184, 190
Reddi, 23, 24
Rem Quli Beg, 229
Root, Jeremy, 42
Bud, 31

Rustam Beg, 37, 49
Rustam Zarnan, i9

Sadullah Khan, 82, 83, 92
Safi Khan, 86, 87
Sagar, i3
Sahibganj, 292
Saidabad, 290
Saif Khan, 14S
Saif ud din, 115

Hairing, 24ln, 246, 257n, 258n, 265,
276

Sairingia Raja. 237
Sufafoat Khan, 152n
Salar Firoz, 152n
Salpani, 247, 253
'iamdah, 186 , 186 , 191-7, 199
Samdhara, 235-8, 241, 245, 263,
279 28i

San Thome, 13.16, 35, 39, 55, 61,
95, 96, 110, 14 6

Sarandaz Khan tT/beg 255, 256
Sayyid— AbuRaEr, 225 ; Ahmad, 68,
70 , Ahmad Jamaatdar, 265 ;
Alam, 149, 166, 194, 195, 197,
199 ; Ali, 76, 78; Firoz Khan
Barha, 152, 159 ; Gisu Daraz,
1 ' J 2 ; Husain, 263, 275 ; Ibrahim,
36, 142; Mirza, 245, 263 ;

Muzaffar Khan Barha , 152, 156,
ill; Nasir, 152; Na^wMLn
Khan, 191, 201, 234, 24f, ^I3i
*275 ; Nizam ud din Ah mac* 30 rf
<Qidi, 162 ; Salar Khan, 194, 255,

269; Shah Raju, 30. ; Sher
Khan Barha, i52 : Shihab Khan,

1 62n ; Shujaat Khan, l52n, 157 ,
Sultan, 30i ; Taj ad din. 1 85,
1 flU-4

Sera, 13, d)n, 8l
Serajuddiu Jabri. 175
Shah Abbas 11, 65
Shahbaz Khan, 152n, 166
Shah Beg Khan, 85, 105, 107, 108,
112

Shahjaban, 18, 27, 29, 46, 63, 66-94,
98, 93, 102, 104, 106, U3-9,

122-30, 133-8, 147, 209, 21 7, 2.5,
287-9, 296, 298

Sindiji Bhonsla, 19-21, 23, 27, 3in,
72, 73n, 89, 101. (07, 108, llln,

! 1 Bn, i98

Shah Murtaz a, 165n
Shah Nawaz Khan, 115, 122
Shaikh—Abbas, 175 ; Abul Khair,
213 ; Azam, 211 ; Hamid, HU ,
Mir, 124 ; Mnhuimnad, 3, 4, 10,
284 ; Muhammad Hay at, 181 ;
Muhammad Sadiq, 275 ; Mustafa
Junaidi, 117

Shaista Khan, 91, 114, 21J.it, 215,
216, 221

Shams her, 182, 184
Shamsuddin Kheshgi, 122
Sher Beg, 157
Sherpur, 198, 200
Shiraz, 286
Shivaji, 116, 124, 125
Shuja', In, 110, 130, 134, 138, 147—
201, 203, 208, 210, 213—5, 218,
219, ^23, 224, 287, 291—4
Siddi Abdul Wahhab, 29
Sidcli Jauhax, 29, 107, 116
Siddi Marjan, 120, 121
Siddi Masaud, 33
Siddi Raihan Shoiapuri, 31
Sidhout, 15, 99, 100, 109
Sikrigali, 185
Silghat, 246, 257, 258n
bimlagarli, 236—-8, 241, 247, 250,
25.1, 280, 281

Sitalghat, 197
Solagarh, 241, 263, 278
Solaguri, 256, 266, n, 267, 282
Sonakanda, 214
Splindar Major, 1 77
Srighat, 224, 234, 235, 280
Srinivas, 66

Srirangapatam, 13

, Sri Ranga Rayal, 13—17, 21,22,
(‘27, 29, sl-6. 39, 65—9. 72—5,
U 6, 100, 106, 107, 119, 144, a,

145

life of mm jumla

Singh J&undela, 121, 152n,

, 19 K 2iln, 225—7, 256,
257, 262.

Sultanganj, 182

Sultan Muhammad, see Muhammad
Sultan

Surajgarh, 182

Surat, 4, 185, 202, 205, 206, 218,
218 , 222
Suri, 156

Suti, 160, 163—6, 169, 171, 172, 177,
186,. 187, 190, 195, 204, 291
Swally Marine, 11
Swarigonha, 20
Syed Chand Muhammad, 28
Syria, <2

Tabatabai, see Mir Muhammad
Huaan
Tabrezi, 298
Tadpatri, 21
Taj Niazi 163
Tambuli Phukan, 242
TamuJidalai, 257n, 262, 264
Tamkur, 13
Tamluk, 160

Tanda, 110, 158, 160, 161, 165, 175,
180, 184—6, 189, 191, 192, 195-
201, 293

Tandivanam. 18, 20n

Tangohu Saudhikui, 281

Tanjore, 14, 16-19, 22, 298

Tapa Tap, see Tabatabai

Taraisat, 242

Tarbiyat Khan, 115

Tartipur, 186, 200, 201

Taukak, 247, 257n, 266

Tegnapatam, 22, 11 In

Teliyagarhi, 154, 155, 185, 190, 292

Telingana, 5, 12, 76, 92, 290

Tenasserim, 44, 47

Terrawalatrasha, 143

Timmaji, 36, 87

Timma Nayar, 23, 24

Tiok, 253, 255, 256

Tipam, 242, 268, 269, 272, 282, 304

Tippera, 21 In

Tim, 243, 246

Tirumala, 14, 16. 18, 32

Tirupati, 16,* 26

Tongi, 29ln

Tranquebar, 13
Trevisa, Agent, 205-7. 212, 217-20
Trimohani, 243. n* 245, 248, 253*.

255-6, 267, 272, 275, 276, 304
Trinomal, 20

Tupakki Krishnappa, see Krishna
Tupakki

Uday*igm (Udgir), 14, Ion, 106, 107

Uddab Duaria, 282

XJighur, 178, 183,201

Ukhla (Ukbra;, 156

Uttarkol, 252. 270

Uzbeg, 183. 193

Vellore, 14, 16. 17, n, 20, n, 27, 32,
n, 66

Venguni Raja, 96, 144
Venkatapati, 13

Venkata Brahman, 34 41. 49, 57,
58. 300

Vijaynagar, 12. 23, 36, 44, 47. 54, 55

Wais Khan, 7
Wali Mahalclar Khan. 120
Walwyn. Richard. 44, 45
Wandiwash, 19, 20, n, 66
Wangi, 123. 131
Warangal, 143

War of Succession, 109-111, 147—
201, 203, 288. 294, 296
Wazir Khan, 140
Weddell, Captain, 54
Weyoor, 9

Winter, Edward, 202, 203
Wn a Court. 206
Wm Jersip (Jearsey), 206

Yadgar Khan, 235, 255, 263, 282

Yasowant, 117

Yusuf, 183 ; Shujaite, 184

Zabard a.st Khan, 152, 159
Zainuddin, 165. 194
Zulfiqar AsUvrabadi. 37
Zulhqar Khan Tabrezi, 152, 154 r
156, 159, 163-5, 172, 175, 176,
178, 179, 187, 188, 191, 193

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